In: Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 735-750
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single-peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi-dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately...
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In: Statistics, Politics and Policy, 2016, vol. 7, no. 1-2, p. 3-28
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In: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2016, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 173-190
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In: Aquatic Sciences, 2005, vol. 67, no. 1, p. 1-2
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In: Intereconomics, 2010, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 2-3
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In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 359-370
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In: Public Choice, 2012, vol. 151, no. 3-4, p. 585-610
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In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2012, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 244-260
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