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A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums

Martin, Marc-Jean

In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 359-370

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    Titre
    • A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums
    Auteur
    • Martin, Marc-Jean. Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration - IDHEAP, University of Lausanne, Route de la Maladière 21, CH-1022, Chavannes-Lausanne, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Inglese
    Publié dans
    • Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 359-370. Kluwer Academic Publishers
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:313065
    Summary
    This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests - on the basis of theoretical arguments -that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendums can impose greater constraints than optional fiscal referendums. In conclusion, various recommendations based on this observation are proposed