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A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts

Eichenberger, Reiner ; Stadelmann, David ; Portmann, Marco

In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2012, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 244-260

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    Titre
    • A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts
    Auteur
    • Eichenberger, Reiner. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    • Stadelmann, David. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    • Portmann, Marco. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Inglese
    Publié dans
    • Constitutional Political Economy, 2012, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 244-260. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:311327
    Summary
    We explore the quality of political representation of constituents' preferences for budgetary decisions within a quasi-experimental setting. In the Swiss referendum process, constituents reveal their preferences for budgetary proposals which are either expected to increase or decrease public debts. We match individual politicians' voting behavior on debt increasing and debt reducing legislative proposals with eight real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues from 2008 to 2011. Thereby, we directly explore deviations of politicians from constituents' preferences with respect to budgetary policies