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Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care

Zweifel, Peter ; Telser, Harry ; Vaterlaus, Stephan

In: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 319-332

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    Titre
    • Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care
    Auteur
    • Zweifel, Peter. Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Hottingerstr. 10, CH-8032, Zurich, Switzerland
    • Telser, Harry. Plaut Economics, Adlikerstr. 246, CH-8105, Regensdorf, Switzerland
    • Vaterlaus, Stephan. Plaut Economics, Adlikerstr. 246, CH-8105, Regensdorf, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Anglais
    Publié dans
    • Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 319-332. Kluwer Academic Publishers
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:315741
    Summary
    Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance