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Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation

Jacquette, Dale

In: Acta Analytica, 2011, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 15-35

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    Titre
    • Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation
    Auteur
    • Jacquette, Dale. Institut für Philosophie, Lehrstuhl für theoretische Philosophie, Unitobler, University of Bern, Länggassstrasse 49a, CH-3000, Bern 9, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:315534
    Summary
    If conceptual analysis is possible for finite thinkers, then there must ultimately be a distinction between complex and primitive or irreducible and unanalyzable concepts, by which complex concepts are analyzed as relations among primitive concepts. This investigation considers the advantages of categorizing intentionality as a primitiverather than analyzable concept, in both a historical Brentanian context and in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. Arguments in support of intentionality as a primitive relation are evaluated relative to objections, especially a recent criticism by Jerry A. Fodor. Against this background, the relation between qualia andintentionality in the understanding of consciousness is explored