Université de Fribourg

Independent and competing agencies : An effective way to control government

Schelker, Mark ; Eichenberger, Reiner

In: Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, p. 79-98

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government...

Université de Fribourg

Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution

Schelker, Mark ; Eichenberger, Reiner

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 357-380

Various political institutions designed to control the government have been analyzed in the academic literature. However, an important institution has been neglected so far: independent auditing institutions with an extended mandate to audit the budget draft and individual policy proposals. We argue that such auditors improve transparency and provide essential information on the impact of policy...

Consortium of Swiss Academic Libraries

Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix ; Eichenberger, Reiner

In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, vol. 8, no. 1, p. -