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Università della Svizzera italiana

Framing national security secrecy : a conceptual review

Heide, Marlen ; Villeneuve, Jean-Patrick

In: International journal, 2021, vol. 76, no. 2, p. 238-256

This essay investigates justifications for the “necessity” of official secrecy, by tracing and structuring the rationales underlying it. Justifications will be investigated through the case of “national security secrecy,” a prominent example of official secrecy. While the literature generally treats “national security secrecy” as unidimensional, this analysis demarcates several...

Université de Fribourg

Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable

Schelker, Mark

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 131-144

Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a sys- tematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control...

Université de Fribourg

The elasticity of voter turnout: Investing 85 cents per voter to increase voter turnout by 4 percent

Schelker, Mark ; Schneiter, Marco

In: Electoral Studies, 2017, vol. 49, p. 65-74

In the aftermath of elections or ballots, the legitimacy of the result is regularly debated if voter turnout was considered to be low. Hence, discussions about legal reforms to increase turnout are common in most democracies. We analyze the impact of a very small change in voting costs on voter turnout. Some municipalities in the Swiss Canton of Bern reduced voting costs by prepaying the postage...

Università della Svizzera italiana

Popularity shocks and political selection : the effects of anti-corruption audits on candidates quality

Cavalcanti, Francisco ; Daniele, Gianmarco ; Galletta, Sergio

We show that the disclosure of information about a government's conduct affects the types of candidates who stand for election. Our empirical test focuses on Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification strategy exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local governments. We observe that when the audit...