In: Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, p. 681-716
Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a configuration...
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In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research, ///-
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In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ///-
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In: Public Choice, 2015, vol. 162, no. 1-2, p. 1-24
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 67, p. 19 p
Natural disasters are good examples of catastrophic events that may affect vote decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of earthquakes changes voters' behavior at municipal elections and which channels drive this change, focusing in particular on the role of media exposure. We exploit data from 13,338 municipal electoral cycles where incumbents seek reelection between 1993 and...
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In: Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, p. 79-98
Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government...
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Thèse de doctorat : Université de Fribourg, 2020.
This dissertation consists of four independent papers on economically relevant topics that cap- tured my attention because of personal background and professional experiences, such as coming from Ukraine, being an educated woman, living in a bilingual Swiss region and observing people delaying their work. Throughout my papers, I empirically analyze the determinants of individual attitudes ...
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In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 131-144
Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a sys- tematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control...
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In: Electoral Studies, 2017, vol. 49, p. 65-74
In the aftermath of elections or ballots, the legitimacy of the result is regularly debated if voter turnout was considered to be low. Hence, discussions about legal reforms to increase turnout are common in most democracies. We analyze the impact of a very small change in voting costs on voter turnout. Some municipalities in the Swiss Canton of Bern reduced voting costs by prepaying the postage...
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In: Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 735-750
We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single-peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi-dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately...
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