In: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 2003, vol. 139, no. 3, p. 351-373
Politisch-ökonomische Analysen der demokratischen Kontrolle der Regierungstätigkeit vernachlässigen die Rolle unabhängiger Kontrollinstitutionen, insbesondere von Rechnungsprüfungsorganen. Solche unabhängigen Kontrolleinheiten spielen in den Schweizer Gemeinden eine besonders wichtige Rolle. Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen ihrer kantonal ganz unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen auf die...
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In: Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, p. 79-98
Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government...
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In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 357-380
Various political institutions designed to control the government have been analyzed in the academic literature. However, an important institution has been neglected so far: independent auditing institutions with an extended mandate to audit the budget draft and individual policy proposals. We argue that such auditors improve transparency and provide essential information on the impact of policy...
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In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, vol. 16, no. 4, p. -
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In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2014, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 207-229
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In: Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, no. 1-2, p. 79-98
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In: Public Choice, 2012, vol. 151, no. 3-4, p. 585-610
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In: Public Choice, 2013, vol. 154, no. 1-2, p. 149-151
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In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2012, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 244-260
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In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, vol. 8, no. 1, p. -
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