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Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable

Schelker, Mark

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 131-144

Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a sys- tematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control...

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The elasticity of voter turnout: Investing 85 cents per voter to increase voter turnout by 4 percent

Schelker, Mark ; Schneiter, Marco

In: Electoral Studies, 2017, vol. 49, p. 65-74

In the aftermath of elections or ballots, the legitimacy of the result is regularly debated if voter turnout was considered to be low. Hence, discussions about legal reforms to increase turnout are common in most democracies. We analyze the impact of a very small change in voting costs on voter turnout. Some municipalities in the Swiss Canton of Bern reduced voting costs by prepaying the postage...

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