Working papers SES

Working papers SES
Die "Working Papers SES" ist eine Reihe von Forschungsheften, welche verschiedene wissenschaftliche Arbeiten von Mitarbeitern der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät vorstellt. Diese Reihe existiert seit 1980 und die angesprochenen Themen reflektieren die unterschiedlichen Ausrichtungen der Mitglieder der Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft, Betriebswirtschaft, Wirtschaftsinformatik, quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung, Sozialwissenschaften und Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaften. Für den Inhalt dieser Arbeiten tragen einzig die Autoren die Verantwortung.
Université de Fribourg

Founding family ownership, stock market returns, and agency problems

Eugster, Nicolas ; Isakov, Dušan

(Working Papers SES ; 490 (revised))

This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different firm characteristics and risk factors. Family firms...

Université de Fribourg

Founding family ownership, stock market returns, and agency problems

Eugster, Nicolas ; Isakov, Dušan

(Working Papers SES ; 490)

This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different risk factors and firm characteristics. Family firms...

Université de Fribourg

Are Founding Families Special Blockholders ? An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance

Isakov, Dušan ; Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe

(Working Papers SES ; 428)

This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family shareholders have a real incentive to reduce agency costs whereas non-family blockholders are similar to widely held companies. Our results...