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A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations

Bailer, Stefanie ; Weiler, Florian

In: The Review of International Organizations, 2015, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 43-66

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    Titre
    • A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations
    Auteur
    • Bailer, Stefanie. ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092, Zürich, Switzerland
    • Weiler, Florian. University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstrasse 21, 96045, Bamberg, Germany
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Inglese
    Publié dans
    • The Review of International Organizations, 2015, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 43-66. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:332003
    Summary
    After the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen climate summit, it still remains to be explained why the participating states chose irreconcilable negotiation positions that reflected very diverse domestic interests in spite of a publicly displayed desire for cooperation. While environmental studies have intensely investigated national climate policies and their determinants over the last few decades, little attention has been paid to the bargaining positions the same governments assume in climate negotiations. We argue that their bargaining positions reflect structural, economic, and domestic factors, but less so strategic factors. A country's vulnerability to climate change, its power and its democratic status are among the best predictors of its choice of negotiation position; its international interconnectedness, on the other hand, does not seem to have an influence. By comparing two negotiation issues - reducing emissions and financing climate mitigation - we can show that democracies choose very different negotiation positions, depending on the issue. When it comes to compensation mechanisms, serious climate reduction measures democracies do not commit to substantial emission reduction targets due to pressure from industry at home. They are, however, more prepared than other states to pay for projects that help to reduce emissions in the sense of a compensation mechanism. By understanding the choice of negotiation positions we can thus explain why the more or less cooperative bargaining positions adopted by states led to a breakdown of the Copenhagen negotiations. We investigated this question using a novel dataset on the UNFCCC negotiations, in which the positions of all participating governments were collected by hand-coding protocols from the negotiations as well as expert interviews with negotiators.