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On the status of exhaustiveness in cleft sentences: An empirical and cross-linguistic study of English *also/-only*-clefts and Italian *anche/-solo*-clefts

Abstract: The goal of the paper is to shed new light on the semantics and pragmatics of cleft sentences by discussing the exhaustive interpretation typically associated with these complex syntactic structures. Based on a fine-grained analysis of the contexts in which “exhaustiveness” can be cancelled as well as reinforced by English *also* and *only* and Italian *anche* and *solo*, we claim that this meaning component associated with clefts in English and Italian is best accounted for in terms of a conventionalized conversational implicature. Our analysis is based on a corpus of authentic cleft occurrences collected from different written sources.

Keywords: cleft sentences, exhaustiveness, conversational implicature, contrastive analysis, English–Italian, corpus study

1 Introduction

1.1 The puzzle of exhaustiveness in cleft sentences

Cleft sentences (also called *it*-clefts), illustrated below with examples (1), are bi-clausal structures. From a syntactic point of view, they are constructed with (i)
a copular clause (in (1a): it is Stella), containing the cleft pronoun it, the copula and the cleft constituent (to which we also refer as focus of the cleft), and (ii) a relative or relative-like clause (again in (1a): who stole the cookies), called the cleft clause:

(1)  
   a. It is Stella who stole the cookies.  
   b. It is the cookies that Stella stole.  
   c. It is yesterday that Stella stole the cookies.

The aim of the present study is to shed new light on the semantics and pragmatics of cleft sentences by discussing the exhaustive interpretation typically associated with these complex syntactic structures, i.e. the fact that they convey the idea that only the information provided by the cleft constituent is valid in the context of occurrence (in (1a): the fact that Stella and nobody else stole the cookies).

Exhaustiveness is a meaning component that is associated not only with English cleft sentences, but also with clefts in other languages. It has been associated – among others – with the French phrases clivées (Perrin-Naffakh 1996; Clech-Darbon et al. 1999; Destruel 2012), the Spanish oraciones hendidas (Moreno Cabrera 1999: 4248), the German Spaltsätze (Drenhaus et al. 2011) and the Swedish clefts (Bouma et al. 2010). Other than with English cleft sentences, this paper will be concerned with the Italian frasi scisse, of the type given in (2), which have also been associated with exhaustiveness (see D’Achille et al. 2005; Roggia 2009):

(2)  
   a. È Stella che ha rubato i biscotti.  
   b. Sono i biscotti che Stella ha rubato.  
   c. È ieri che Stella ha rubato i biscotti.

Exhaustiveness is a meaning component conveyed by different linguistic forms. As well as with cleft sentences proper, illustrated in (1) and (2), it is associated

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1 Italian also allows an implicit variant of the cleft sentence when the cleft constituent is a subject of the following subordinate clause (È Stella ad aver rubato i biscotti ‘lit. It is Stella to have stolen the cookies’). In such cases, the cleft clause is realized by the preposition a(d) followed by an infinitive form. It is important to observe that this construction is not available in English.

2 Italian clefts have been associated with exhaustiveness as early as in Fornaciari’s grammar (1881): “If the speaker wants to put special emphasis on the subject of the proposition to indicate that the subject and not someone/something else is involved in the action, the subject of the subordinate becomes the subject of the main proposition, with the verb essere. Io son che if feci [I am the one who did it], i.e. ‘it’s me who did it’ [...].” (Translation and emphasis are ours).

3 In the linguistic literature, not only in and on English but also in and on other languages, the terminology used to refer to this semantic component varies quite significantly: besides the term...
with other cleft constructions.\textsuperscript{4} It is also conveyed by a group of lexical items known as restrictive or exclusive focus particles (in the Italian linguistic literature they are called \textit{avverbi focalizzanti} ‘focus adverbs’), coinciding in English notably with \textit{only}, \textit{merely} and \textit{alone}, and in Italian with \textit{solo}, \textit{soltanto}, \textit{solamente} and \textit{unicamente}. Here are the equivalent examples of (1) and (2) with the particle \textit{only}/\textit{solo}:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Only Stella stole the cookies./Solo Stella ha rubato i biscotti.
\item Stella stole only the cookies./Stella ha rubato solo i biscotti.
\item Stella stole the cookies only yesterday./Stella ha rubato i biscotti solo ieri.
\end{enumerate}

Cleft sentences, which form a subtype of non-canonical sentences, as well as canonical sentences with \textit{only}/\textit{solo} convey, among other things, that the element in focus (\textit{Stella, the cookies} and \textit{yesterday}, respectively) and nobody/nothing else (in the discourse) satisfies the specific predication expressed in the sentence (for instance, in (1a) and (2a), it satisfies the predication \textit{steal the cookies}). This exhaustiveness interpretation is rather uncontroversially claimed to be conveyed semantically by the particle \textit{only}/\textit{solo}, i.e. to be a stable meaning component of this item.\textsuperscript{5} By contrast, as recently pointed out by Drenhaus et al. (2011), there is no consensus about the best way of accounting for the exhaustiveness ”effect” (as the authors call it) or exhaustiveness “understanding” (see Declerck 1988),

\textbf{exhaustiveness} (which seems to be the most widespread and used, among others, by Horn 1981; Declerck 1988; Drenhaus et al. 2011; and Patten 2012) and the closely related \textit{exhaustive listing} (in Horn 1981: 132 the term refers to the fact that the cleft constituent provides the exhaustive list of elements for which the predicate realized in the cleft clause holds) and \textit{exhaustivity} (see, for instance, Schulz and Van Rooij 2006), we find the terms \textit{uniqueness} (Delin and Oberlander 2005) and \textit{exclusiveness} (Collins 1991: 69). In the Italian linguistics literature reviewed, we found the terms \textit{esaustività} (Roggia 2009: 99) and \textit{univocità} (both terms are used interchangeably by D’Achille et al. 2005). For a theoretical discussion related to the terms used in the literature, see for instance Collins (1991: 70) and Molnár (2002) (in her discussion of the notion of \textit{contrast}, Molnár distinguishes between the features [± exclusive] and [± exhaustive]; in her view, only \textit{exhaustiveness} amounts to the exclusion of all the members of a set but one).

\textsuperscript{4} Exhaustiveness has been associated with pseudo-cleft sentences, reversed pseudo-cleft sentences and inferential clefts (see, for instance, Horn 1981: 132, Delin and Oberlander 2005). In this paper, we only focus on cleft sentences proper. Moreover, because there are differences also among cleft sentences proper, we will mainly focus on subject clefts (i.e. on examples such as (1)).

\textsuperscript{5} The exhaustive (or restrictive) meaning component of particles such as English \textit{only} and Italian \textit{solo} is generally described as being conveyed truth-functionally (see, for instance, Horn 1969 and König 1991 for English, and Andorno 2000 for Italian). For a discussion of this assumption, which has also been contested, see, among others, Foolen (1983) and more recently Sudhoff (2010).
commonly associated with cleft sentences. Is it to be accounted for in terms of a basic semantic component of this syntactic structure, i.e. as an invariable semantic feature that is part of the meaning conveyed by the cleft (similarly to *only*), or should it be considered to be of pragmatic nature, i.e. as not encoded in the structure of cleft sentences?

The answer to this question depends on the nature and source of the exhaustiveness component, which in the current literature is identified mainly by assessing the possibility of cancelling this component. Interestingly, the answer provided in the literature seems to vary according to the language(s) taken into consideration. As we mentioned, exhaustiveness seems to be a stable cross-linguistic feature associated with the cleft format. Yet, in the literature on the Romance languages, the idea that exhaustiveness is of pragmatic nature and ought to be accounted for in terms of a conversational implicature is much more widespread than in the studies on the English language, where it is generally considered a more basic (i.e. semantic) property of the structure. How should we account for this difference? Is it related to cross-linguistic differences in the encoding of exhaustiveness in the cleft format, or is it to be linked to other factors, for instance to the approach adopted to analyze the clefts (the literature on Romance clefts tend to have a stronger empirical basis)?

### 1.2 Exhaustiveness in cleft sentences as a conversational implicature

In this paper, we claim that the exhaustiveness interpretation associated with clefts in English and Italian is best accounted for in terms of a non-truth-conditional effect, rather than a stable meaning component. In other words, we prefer to consider it of pragmatic rather than semantic nature. Specifically, following Horn (1981), we consider that the best way of describing the source of this “effect” is in terms of a *generalized conversational implicature* (à la Grice). In line with Declerck (1988), we view exhaustiveness as an inference that is highly conventionalized. The arguments we provide to support these hypotheses are twofold: (i) exhaustiveness in clefts is difficult to cancel; (ii) exhaustiveness is easy to reinforce. While the first claim is not new (but is controversial), the second aspect has, in our view, not yet received the attention it deserves. The first point is discussed by focusing on the cases in which exhaustiveness can be cancelled by the occurrence of an additive particle (English *also*, Italian *anche*) in the cleft constituent of the sentence; the second argument is investigated on the basis of the cleft cases in which exhaustiveness can be reinforced by the presence of a restrictive particle (English *only*, Italian *solo*).
With respect to the rich literature available on the subject, our contribution is innovative in two ways. Firstly, while it is generally assumed that cleft sentences can receive the same basic treatment across languages, we believe that this assumption cannot be considered as an uncontroversial working premise and ought to be verified empirically. In order to find out whether there are – or could be – differences in the encoding of exhaustiveness in the clefts of two or more languages, we will discuss data from English and Italian. These two languages are interesting because they belong to different genetic families and, more importantly, because their cleft sentences show significant differences in terms of frequency, form and functions. A recent study based on a corpus of journalistic prose shows, for instance, that Italian clefts are almost twice as frequent as their English counterparts and that adverbial clefts are more common in English than in Italian (see De Cesare et al. 2014: 78–79). These findings could be related to differences in meaning of the clefts in the two languages. In fact, the claim has been made in the literature that the exhaustiveness effect is stronger in English than in Italian clefts (see D’Achille et al. 2005: 255). If this claim is true, then we should be able to verify it on the basis of the possibility of cancelling and reinforcing exhaustiveness with additive and restrictive expressions, respectively.

The second particularity of our study is the fact that it is strongly data-based. This is in contrast with most of the theoretical literature (Horn 1981; É.Kiss 1998; Hedberg 2000; Hedberg and Fadden 2007, etc.) as well as with recent experimental studies (see, among others, Drenhaus et al. 2011; Destruel 2012), which discuss the exhaustiveness issue generally on the basis of invented examples alone. Our empirically based analysis involves clefts retrieved from different written sources (see the Corpora section at the end of the paper for more information). Working with authentic data – we believe – is necessary because it allows for the study of clefts in their natural context of occurrence while at the same time ensuring full naturalness of both the clefts on which the analysis is based and their context of occurrence. As we will see, taking into account the linguistic context in which clefts are produced is an essential step in enhancing our understanding of the discourse functions of additive and restrictive expressions when they occur in the focus of a cleft, and thus ultimately for understanding the role these expressions play in the cancellation and reinforcement of the exhaustiveness effect associated with clefts.

Due to space limitations, it is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a fine-grained description of the formal and functional differences between English and Italian cleft sentences. Accounts of these differences can be found in D’Achille et al. (2005), De Cesare (2012) and Garassino (2014a, 2014b).
This paper is organized as follows: first, the different meaning components of cleft sentences and the debate around the exhaustiveness effect associated with them will be called to mind (Section 2). On the basis of our dataset of English and Italian clefts, we will then discuss the cases in which we find an additive (Section 3) or a restrictive (Section 4) expression in the focus of a cleft. We will conclude by providing a general assessment of our findings and by discussing their implications for the interpretation of the exhaustiveness effect in English and Italian clefts (Section 5).

2 The meaning components of cleft sentences and the problem of exhaustiveness

In the linguistic literature, cleft sentences are associated with at least three different components of meaning: (i) an existential meaning; (ii) a specifying (or identifying) meaning; and (iii) exhaustiveness. In the last few years, there has been a fierce debate in the literature (both theoretical and empirical) about the nature of these components, in particular of the last one. For some authors, all three components are semantic, hardwired in the syntactic structure of the cleft (see Atlas and Levinson 1981; Szabolcsi 1981, and more recently É.Kiss 1998 and Gussenhoven 2007), while for other authors only the first two are semantic, exhaustiveness being best accounted for in pragmatic terms (a milestone in this respect is Horn 1981). In what follows, we will provide a brief description of the first two meaning components, and then propose a more detailed description of exhaustiveness and the controversy with which it is associated.

2.1 Existential meaning component

Cleft sentences, such as (1a) repeated below in (4), convey what is generally known as a presupposition of existence:

(4) It is Stella who stole the cookies.

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7 For reasons of space and because of the lack of a detailed discussion in the Italian literature, this section of the paper will only provide examples in English.
8 Some scholars consider this meaning component of clefts to be a (conventional) implicature (see Horn 1981 for English and Frison 1988 for Italian).
The presupposition in which we are interested is a *global presupposition* (see, for instance, Charnavel 2011: 134), triggered at the sentence level (and not at the NP/DP level). In example (4), this presupposition coincides with the proposition *someone has the property of stealing the cookies*, and not with the existence of the cleft constituent (*Stella*). The global presupposition associated with example (4) can be described as an open proposition, as in (5):

(5) someone (=x) stole the cookies

### 2.2 Specificational meaning component

Cleft sentences have a specifying or identifying meaning (see, for instance, Declerck 1988 and Collins 1991 for English; Frison 1988: 196 and Salvi 1991 for Italian): they provide a value for the variable (x) of the open proposition conveying the existential presupposition. The value that is assigned to the variable is given by the cleft constituent. In the cleft provided in (4), which is associated with the open proposition in (5), *x stole the cookies*, the value identified as valid coincides with the referent *Stella*. In contrast to the open proposition, which is presupposed, the value expressed by the cleft constituent is asserted:

(6) x stole the cookies (presupposition), x = Stella (assertion)

The different status of the presupposed information (someone stole the cookies) on the one hand and of the asserted information (x = Stella) on the other hand can be shown on the basis of projection tests, for instance by embedding under negation:

(7) *It is not Stella that stole the cookies.*

What is negated in this case is only the asserted information, i.e. the fact that the referent *Stella* is identified as the value that fills the open proposition *x stole the cookies*. The open proposition itself, by contrast, is not altered. Hence, in the negated version of (4), i.e. in (7), the presupposition that *someone stole the cookies* still holds.

### 2.3 Exhaustiveness

As pointed out in the introduction, it is commonly assumed that cleft sentences convey exhaustiveness, i.e. the idea that the value provided for the variable is
the only value, from a set of contextually defined alternatives, which holds in the specific discourse context. Returning to our example (4) once more, this means that the cleft sentence *It is Stella who stole the cookies* does not only presuppose that someone stole the cookies and assert that the person who stole the cookies is the individual *Stella*; it also conveys that Stella *and no one else* is the appropriate value for the open proposition *x stole the cookies*.

Exhaustiveness is sometimes mixed up with the notion of *uniqueness/singularity*, but these two notions are logically distinct. As stated, for instance, by Collins (1991: 79), “the meaning of the exclusiveness implicature is exhaustive, rather than unique”. Uniqueness has been associated with clefts like *It is Stella that stole the cookies* (see Halvorsen 1978), where, at first sight, it could indeed be assumed that only one person (Stella) stole the cookies. However, uniqueness clearly does not hold for clefts in which there are two or more referents in focus. From examples such as *It is Stella and Eva who stole the cookies/It is the girls who stole the cookies*, it is evident that cleft sentences do not denote a singleton set by default (i.e. a set whose cardinality is 1; on this issue, see also Horn 1981: 128). The exhaustiveness component applies to the value encoded by the cleft constituent: this value can coincide with one or more individuals (or with another type of information: temporal span, etc.), but what is important here is that in the standard view, all the other, contextually defined individuals are excluded from the set. The following example, adapted from Horn (1981: 128), also proves this point:

(8) *It wasn’t Stella who stole the cookies, it was Eva and Eliana.*

Although exhaustiveness and clefts are commonly associated and seem quite tightly connected, the exact nature of their relation, and in particular whether it is semantic or pragmatic in nature, is a major source of controversy (a recent review of the different viewpoints taken in the literature can be found in Drenhaus et al. 2011). Moreover, when reviewing the relevant literature, we find that very different proposals have been put forward to identify the source of exhaustiveness: for some it has a truth-functional basis, for others it should be accounted for in terms of a presupposition or a conventional implicature and yet for others it is best accounted for as a conversational implicature. In what follows, we will discuss each of these proposals in more detail.

2.3.1 The truth-functional basis of exhaustiveness

Early works such as Atlas and Levinson (1981), Szabolcsi (1981), É.Kiss (1998) and more recently Gussenhoven (2007) consider exhaustiveness as something
enforced on clefts by virtue of their semantics (“the meaning of clefting is to exhaustively identify a constituent”, Gussenhoven 2007: 17). This semantic interpretation is often justified by the presence of a hidden operator in the syntax of clefts (an identificational focus operator in Szabolcsi 1981 and É.Kiss 1998). More importantly, in this account, clefts, such as (9), are advocated to be semantically equivalent to a canonical sentence with a restrictive particle, such as (10):

(9)  *It is Stella who stole the cookies.*
(10)  *Only Stella stole the cookies.*

Horn (1981), however, already provides strong arguments against a truth-functional interpretation of exhaustiveness. If this interpretation held for clefts, then example (11) would be acceptable, as the cleft sentence would be sufficient to convey that Stella is the only person who stole the cookies; conversely, in (12), the occurrence of *only* would be redundant, thus producing an infelicitous result (see also Büring and Križ 2013: 2):

(11)  *I know that Stella stole the cookies, but I’ve just discovered that it was Stella/ her who stole them.* (example adapted from Horn 1981)
(12)  *I know that Stella stole the cookies, but I’ve just discovered that it was only Stella/ her who stole them.*

However, the sequence provided in (11) is pragmatically infelicitous because it is not sufficiently informative: the *it*-cleft (*It was Stella who stole the cookies*) conveys the same propositional content as the “bare”-declarative sentence (*Stella stole the cookies*) and not as the declarative sentence with *only* (*Only Stella stole the cookies*). Thus, in Horn’s terms, “a cleft sentence is pointless to assert or to question, and idiotic to deny, if the corresponding simple declarative

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9 Several recent empirical studies provide experimental evidence that further supports this claim by showing that these sentences are processed differently (see Onea 2009 and Drenhaus et al. 2011). Based on a questionnaire and an ERP (event-related brain potentials) study, Drenhaus et al. (2011) show that the exhaustiveness effect is qualitatively different in clefts and in sentences with a restrictive focus particle (English *only*). In their paper, however, they do not take a stance on the nature of exclusiveness in clefts: in their view, this effect could be a presupposition or a (generalized) conversational implicature.

10 From now on, pragmatically infelicitous sentences or texts will be marked by the symbol “#”, while ungrammatical sentences will be marked by “*”.
is already established” (Horn 1981: 130). In (12), on the other hand, the mere occurrence of only in the cleft prevents the sequence from being awkward.

Ruling out the hypothesis that exhaustiveness is a semantic feature conveyed truth-functionally in clefts is but a first step in our understanding of the nature of this meaning component. We still need to understand its nature and source. Two alternative accounts have been proposed: first, exhaustiveness has been viewed as a presupposition (Delin and Oberlander 1995; Percus 1997; Hedberg 2000; Levinson 2000; Hedberg and Fadden 2007; Hedberg 2013) or a conventional implicature (Halvorsen 1978; Collins 1991: 69–70); second, it has been claimed to be a conversational implicature (among others, by Horn 1981; Schulz and Van Rooij 2006 and Washburn 2011 for English, by Dufter 2009 for English, German and several Romance languages including Italian, as well as by Roggia 2009 for Italian). In the literature, the view of exhaustiveness as a presupposition/conventional implicature12 or as a conversational implicature is based on its possibility of being cancelled.

2.3.2 Exhaustiveness in cleft sentences as a presupposition or conversational implicature

As pointed out by Horn (1981: 138), “if we ultimately find that exhaustiveness is indeed cancellable in clefts, [...] we will commensurately have reinforced the argument for assigning a pragmatic, conversational status to the exhaustiveness premise”. The possibility and the ways of cancelling the exhaustiveness component associated with clefts have been much debated in the literature (see, for instance, Declerck 1988: 33: “[exhaustiveness] appears to be cancellable by some contexts but not by others”). The discussion relies on the one hand on the classic projection tests (embedding under negation and question) and on the other hand – crucially – on the possibility of using an additive expression in the focus of the cleft (see, for instance, Horn 1981: 131, on the basis of Prince 1978; see also Declerck 1988: 33–34).

11 In this paper, we will not distinguish the notions of presupposition and conventional implicature. For a discussion of the differences between the two, see, for instance, Collins (1991: 69–70) and Potts (2007).

12 Büring and Križ (2013) defend a more original view. They claim that exhaustiveness is conveyed by clefts as a conditional presupposition: in the sentence It was the cookies she stole, we have the presupposition “if she stole the cookies, she didn’t steal anything else”. They extend this analysis to definites, showing that the same underlying presupposition is also at work here (their inquiry reinforces the hypothesis that clefts and definites are, at an abstract level of analysis, the same; on this view, see also Percus 1997; Hedberg 2000; Patten 2012).
As for the projection tests, Horn (1981: 128) has shown that exhaustiveness is not preserved when embedded under negation and questions.\textsuperscript{13} If we apply these two projection tests, shown in (14) and (15), to the cleft in (13), repeated from (1a), we observe that the exhaustiveness interpretation, \textit{Stella and no one else stole the cookies}, does not survive:

(13) \textit{It is Stella who stole the cookies.}

(14) \textit{It isn't Stella who stole the cookies.}

(15) \textit{Is it Stella who stole the cookies?}

It is important to note, however, that this test might not be sufficient because a presupposition can also be suspended; witness the following example (adapted from Declerck 1988: 35), where the verb \textit{to close} conventionally conveys the idea that the object referred to (here, the door) was previously open:

(16) A: \textit{It was Stella who closed the door.}

B: \textit{No, she didn't. The door was never open.}

It is generally assumed, however, that the suspension of a presupposition happens only when a presupposition trigger is embedded under another logical operator in the sentence, for instance under a negation (Beaver and Geurts 2011).\textsuperscript{14} By contrast, conversational implicatures can be cancelled much more easily because they do not need to be embedded under another logical operator. Observe, for instance, the possibility of cancelling the scalar implicature conveyed in the first part of (17) by the quantifier \textit{some} (which implicates \textit{not all}):

(17) \textit{Stella stole some of the cookies – in fact, she stole them all.}

Another piece of evidence discussed in the literature to assess the status of exhaustiveness is the possibility of using both an additive expression and a cleft sentence. The examples provided below range from cases in which an additive

\textsuperscript{13} On these tests, see also Beaver and Zeevat (2007: 504) and Geurts (1999).

\textsuperscript{14} Note also that, according to Declerck (1988: 35), only a conversational implicature can be cancelled by one and the same speaker (see (17)), who “first implicates something and then rejects it”. The suspension of a presupposition, on the other hand, only takes place in the form of a correction by a different speaker.
expression follows the cleft or the focus of the cleft, as in (18) to (20), or in which the cleft constituent co-occurs with a focus expression belonging to the class of particularizers (such as mainly in (21)), to the class of scalar particles (typically even, as in (22)) or to the one of additive focus particles (also, as in (23)):

(18) *It is Stella who stole the cookies, but not just her.*
(19) *It is Stella who stole the cookies, among other people.*
(20) *It is Stella, among others, who stole the cookies.*
(21) *It is mainly Stella who stole the cookies.*
(22) *It is even Stella who stole the cookies.*
(23) *It is also Stella who stole the cookies.*

In the literature, there is much debate surrounding, on the one hand, the actual possibility of using these additive expressions after or within a cleft sentence and, on the other hand, in the studies that accept one or more of the linguistic outcomes in (18) to (23), the readings associated with the additive expression. This, in turn, has led to different views on the role played by additive focus particles in the cancellation of the exhaustiveness component associated with clefts.

### 2.4 A first outcome of the discussion

After briefly reviewing the different explanations proposed in the literature to account for the exhaustiveness effect associated with cleft sentences, we can reasonably conclude that exhaustiveness is not truth-functionally conveyed by clefts and that it is best accounted for as a type of inference. The nature of this inference, though, is controversial and depends on whether one views exhaustiveness in clefts as cancellable or not. Scholars who argue that exhaustiveness cannot be cancelled consider it a presupposition/conventional implicature; by contrast, scholars who consider that this inference can – in some cases at least – be cancelled consider it to be a conversational implicature.

In the following paragraphs, we would like to cast new light on this issue in two ways. First, we will look in more detail at one of the main arguments used in the literature to assess the status of exhaustiveness, namely whether it can be cancelled by the use of an additive expression (English also, Italian anche) in the focus of a cleft. Second, we will discuss whether and how exhaustiveness can be
reinforced, an aspect that has not yet received the attention it deserves. Yet, it has been established that besides cancellability, another diagnostic test used for identifying the status of inferences is reinforceability, i.e. the possibility of adding a linguistic item to another item which means what the first merely implicates, without producing redundancy effects (Davis 2011).\(^\text{15}\) As we will see, the fact that English *only*/*Italian solo* can occur in the focus of a cleft sentence, as shown for English in (12) as well as in (24)–(26) strongly suggests that exhaustiveness is to be interpreted as a conversational implicature rather than a presupposition or a conventional implicature:

\begin{align}
(24) & \text{It's *only* Muriel who voted for Hubert. (example from Horn 1969: 106)} \\
(25) & \text{It's *only* John who protested. (example from Quirk et al. 1972: 438)} \\
(26) & \text{It was *only* John that kissed Mary. (example from Declerck 1988: 36)}
\end{align}

In contrast with reinforcing a conversational implicature, reinforcing a presupposition, i.e. asserting presupposed information, leads to pragmatic oddity. Consider for instance the following example:

\begin{align}
(27) & \text{Close the door. *The door is open.}
\end{align}

It should be noted that from now on we will move beyond an analysis based solely on invented examples considered in isolation. Starting from Section 3, we will discuss authentic examples from both English and Italian. Further, we will present cleft sentences in their context of occurrence (we will generally reproduce the paragraph in which the cleft occurs), which allows for a better understanding of their discourse functions. As we will see, a data-based and functional cross-linguistic analysis of this type enables a deeper understanding of the usage of an additive or a restrictive particle in the focus of the cleft and, consequently, allows judging more precisely the nature of the exhaustiveness component typically associated with this special syntactic format.

\(^{15}\) Because the exhaustiveness component of restrictive focus particles is semantic, and thus asserted, it is not possible to “reinforce” it without being redundant (*Only solely Stella stole the cookies*). Furthermore, in contrast to the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, a sentence such as *Only Stella stole the cookies, and not Eva or Eliana* does not – in our view – contain a “reinforcement” of *only*. What happens here is that the coordination *and not Eva or Eliana* simply makes explicit the excluded alternatives.
3 The additive particles *also/anche* in the focus of cleft sentences

This section begins by highlighting the contribution the additive focus particle *also/anche* makes to the clause in which it occurs, as well as some cross-linguistic differences between English and Italian.

The additive value of the particle *also/anche* is generally characterized as a presupposition or conventional implicature à la Grice, while the proposition without the particle is considered to be asserted information (see König 1993: 980 and Sudhoff 2010: 50 for English; Andorno 2000: 66–67 for Italian). This means that in a canonical sentence such as (28a), *also/anche* presupposes that besides Stella, someone else (at least one other person) stole the cookies (28b) and asserts the propositional content without the particle (28c):

(28)  a. [Stella] *also* stole the cookies./*Anche* [Stella] ha rubato i biscotti.
    b. Someone distinct from Stella stole the cookies. (Presupposition)
    c. Stella stole the cookies. (Assertion)

Between English *also* and Italian *anche*, there are of course numerous semantic and syntactic differences.17 We will only highlight two here, and will specify other relevant differences in the remainder of the paper. From a semantic point of view, only Italian *anche* is compatible with a scalar reading:

(29)  *Anche* la persona più intelligente non riuscirebbe a capire.

*Also/Even* the most intelligent person would not be able to understand.

Syntactically, the two items differ with respect to the position in which they can occur in the clause and in the scope they take. Only *also* can occur between the subject and the predicate of a canonical sentence structure and operate on the whole predicate (cf. (30) vs. (31a)). By contrast, *anche* operates on the entire predicate when occurring either between the auxiliary and the past participle (31b) or immediately after a simple verb form (31c):

(30)  *Stella also* [has stolen the cookies].

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16 From now on, we will sometimes identify the focus domain of the particle (i.e. its focus) with square brackets.
17 For a contrastive study on English *also* and Italian *anche*, see De Cesare (in press). For a description of English *also*, see König (1991); for a description of Italian *anche*, see, for instance, Andorno (2000) and De Cesare (2004).
(31) a. *Stella anche [ha rubato i biscotti].
    b. Stella [ha anche rubato i biscotti].
    c. Stella [rubò anche i biscotti].

3.1 The additive focus particle also in English clefts

According to a first group of studies (see, e.g., Horn 1969 and Rooth 1999), additive focus particles such as also (and too, see Krifka 2007: 33; Drenhaus et al. 2011: 321) cannot occur in the focus of a cleft sentence and operate on the cleft constituent. These claims are supported by invented examples of the type given below:

(32) a. *It’s also Muriel who voted for Hubert. (Horn 1969: 106)
    b. *It’s also John that Mary took to the movies. (Rooth 1999)

The difficult acceptability of these “also-clefts”, i.e. clefts which host the focus particle also within the copular sentence, is generally explained in terms of a logical contradiction between the additive semantic component conveyed by also – someone else voted for Hubert in (32a) – and the exhaustiveness component semantically hardwired in the cleft format.

However, as noticed for instance by Horn in a later study (Horn 1981: 131, quoting Prince 1978), followed by Taglicht (1984), É.Kiss (1998), Hedberg (2000) and Hedberg and Fadden (2007), also-clefts are not impossible. Here is a first set of acceptable examples:

(33) a. It was also John who protested. (Quirk et al. 1972: 438; Quirk et al. 1985: 611)
    b. It was also JOHN who ran away. (Declerck 1988: 33)

In the literature, the interpretation of also-clefts varies significantly, and so does the assessment of whether the exhaustiveness effect associated with clefts can be cancelled. In what follows, we will describe three potential uses of the additive particle in the focus of a cleft sentence: also operates (i) on the whole cleft sentence; (ii) only on the subordinate clause; or (iii) on the cleft constituent alone. As we will see, while the first use is not available to also, the other two are attested in our data.

3.1.1 Also with scope over the whole cleft sentence

In a first reading of also-clefts (which, to our knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature), also operates on the whole propositional content conveyed by
the cleft and thus functions as a discourse connective (or conjunctional adverb) along the lines of in addition and moreover. This interpretation could hold for examples such as (34):

(34) *It was only John who had the motive. It was only John who had the opportunity. *It was also only John who found the body. (Hedberg 2013: 245)

As a discourse connective, also introduces an additional argument to one or more arguments given in the preceding context for a particular conclusion. Thus, in example (34), the three arguments provided could be co-oriented towards a conclusion such as “John is guilty of murder”. The last argument, marked by also, could also be considered to be the most relevant of all. In any case, in examples such as (34), it is clear that the additive component conveyed by also does not operate on the cleft constituent alone (only John), because this would lead to a semantic contradiction between also and only (as shown in *Also only John found the body, to be read with no prosodic break between the two particles).

Since the discourse connective use of also typically occurs when the particle occupies clause initial position, as in (35), it should be possible to use also in sentence initial position of cleft sentences such as (34) as well, as shown in (36):

(35) John is guilty of murder. Only he had the motive. Only he had the opportunity. Also, only he found the body.

(36) *It was only John who had the motive. It was only John who had the opportunity. Also (=In addition/Moreover), it was only John who found the body.

However, we may wonder why it is that we find also within the cleft structure in (34) and not before the cleft sentence, as in (36). This choice does not seem to be due to syntactic restrictions related to the position preceding the cleft, since our corpus does include examples with connectives occurring before the cleft:

(37) AWKWARD MOMENT

[However] it was not just the media who were causing Blatter angst. When asked about the use of the hijab, the Islamic head scarf, in soccer, Blatter shot down Prince Ali’s offer to answer on his behalf. (ICOCP, The New York Times)

(38) Recognising the added value to people of wages over benefits might mean a living wage for all, rather than complex tax credits, for example.[Indeed] it is
at times of financial constraint and limited resources that these rights best prove their worth. (ICOCP, The Guardian)

There is another argument that casts further doubt on the connective reading of the also-cleft given in (34): it is the fact that it is perfectly fine to conceive an utterance with both the particle also appearing immediately before the cleft constituent and an additive discourse connective (such as in addition/moreover) preceding the cleft. This is shown in example (39):

(39) *It was only John who had the motive. It was only John who had the opportunity. In addition/Moreover, it was also only John who found the body.*

Examples such as (39) thus lead us to interpret the scope of also in (34) in a different way.

3.1.2 Also with scope over the cleft clause

In a second interpretation of also-clefts, which seems plausible for example (34) as well, the additive feature of the particle operates on the content conveyed by the subordinate clause alone (see Taglicht 1984; Declerck 1988; Hedberg 1990; and Hedberg and Fadden 2007: 22). According to Hedberg (1990) and Hedberg and Fadden (2007), in these also-clefts “the main sentence stress would fall on the cleft clause [...] if they were spoken aloud, and additional information ‘about’ the activated cleft constituent is added by the cleft clause” (Hedberg and Fadden 2007: 70). In the following authentic example from Hedberg and Fadden (2007), also indicates that the cleft clause provides additional information about the cleft constituent, Bush, which is already activated in the preceding context (in the form of another cleft noun phrase: the President):

18 Hedberg and Fadden (2007: 70) add that the “scope of also seems to be wider than just the cleft constituent in these examples, e.g. applying to it was Bush instead of just Bush in [40]. In support of this hypothesis, the position of also can be changed to sentence-initial position with a felicitous result”. It is not clear, however, why also in initial position would have wide scope over the cleft constituent and the cleft clause, but operate only on the cleft clause. 

19 It should be noted that in Hedberg (1990, 2000), and in Hedberg and Fadden (2007), clefts are also described on the basis of the concepts of Topic and Comment. The cleft in (40), for instance, would in their view be a case of “Topic–Comment cleft”. Specifically, in this case, also is an additive marker that signals that an additional Comment (expressed by the content of the cleft clause) is being made about a Topic (coinciding with the referent Bush, expressed by the cleft constituent).
It was the President [not Baker], in a rare departure from the diplomacy of caution, who initiated the successful Panama invasion. It was also Bush who came up with the ideas of having an early, informal Malta summit with Gorbachev and a second round of troop cuts in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. But it was Baker who subtly turned the Malta summit from the informal, “putting our feet up” chat initially envisaged by the President into a platform for the United States to demonstrate through a 16-point initiative that it was prepared to help Gorbachev.


Again, it is clear that also does not presuppose that besides the referent denoted by the cleft constituent (Bush), there are other individuals that may satisfy the variable of the open proposition (x came up with the ideas of [...]). In semantic terms, the underlined cleft sentence in (40) should be interpreted as conveying the fact that the cleft constituent (Bush) “is taken to be the value not only of this variable but also of another one (or other ones)” (Declerck 1988: 33; see also Taglicht 1984: 173).

At this point, we could ask ourselves again why, if also ultimately only operates on the content conveyed by the second part of the cleft, it is not found in the cleft clause itself. A version of (40) with the additive particle following the relative pronoun (who) and extending its domain of operation only on the following verb phrase seems possible:

(41) It was the President, in a rare departure from the diplomacy of caution, who initiated the successful Panama invasion. It was Bush who also came up with the ideas of having an early, informal Malta summit with Gorbachev and a second round of troop cuts in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall.

In line, for instance, with Roggia (2009: 116–125), the concepts of Topic and Comment cannot, in our view, be straightforwardly applied to all clefts. We therefore use them only in one case, namely, when the referent denoted by the cleft constituent is already associated with the pragmatic function of Topic in a previous proposition (as in example (60)). Moreover, for us the term Topic strictly refers to an aboutness relation (in the sense of Lambrecht 1994) and thus does not include framing Topics (as expressed by adverbials of time, space, etc.).
In fact, in our corpus there is one instance of this very case:

(42) Hilton encouraged Cameron to adopt a tree as the party’s new logo and to boost its environmental credentials while in opposition. As part of that push, the future Tory leader was memorably filmed sledging with huskies at the north pole. It was Cameron’s determination to reposition the Tories that also prompted him to go ahead with a trip to Rwanda in 2007 when his Witney constituency was severely flooded. (ICOCP, The Guardian)

Interestingly, in this example, it is more difficult to imagine a version with also occurring immediately before the cleft constituent:

(43) Hilton encouraged Cameron to adopt a tree as the party’s new logo and to boost its environmental credentials while in opposition. As part of that push, the future Tory leader was memorably filmed sledging with huskies at the north pole. ??? It was also Cameron’s determination to reposition the Tories that prompted him to go ahead with a trip to Rwanda in 2007 when his Witney constituency was severely flooded.

The distributional restriction of the particle also within the cleft sentence in (43) thus seems to be related to information structure rather than syntax, and specifically to the activation state of the information denoted by the cleft constituent. In (40), also is possible before the cleft constituent because the referent Bush has been activated in the preceding context. By contrast, in (43) the information “Cameron’s determination to reposition the Tories” has not been stated explicitly, but can be at best inferred from the preceding discourse.

From the observations made on the basis of examples (40) to (43), it can be inferred that also does not operate on the cleft clause; instead, we suggest that the particle has scope over the cleft constituent. On the basis of the activated status of the cleft constituent in example (40), we also conclude that in these also-clefts, the particle does not signal “addition”, but rather reference continuity. This interpretation is very clear in the cases in which also precedes a cleft constituent functioning as an adverbial. Consider (44), where also operates on the temporal expression during these centuries (the antecedent of the anaphora these is to be found at the end of the previous utterance). In (44), also does not indicate that Neo-Confucianism was established as the official ideology from the tenth to the twelfth centuries (i.e. after the Sung dynasty) as well as during other centuries (additive reading), but rather that the temporal span during which Neo-Confucianism was established coincides with a period in which another important event happened (i.e. the appearance of the feminine Kuan-yin in
indigenous sutras, etc.). In this text, the temporal overlap of these two events, stated explicitly in the last utterance of (44), is very important from an argumentative point of view:

(44) Since Avalokitesvara became a feminine deity only in China and, furthermore, this happened only after the T’ang dynasty, it is necessary to offer some hypothetical explanations in closing. I think it has to be examined in the context of new developments in Chinese religions, including Buddhism, since the Sung dynasty (960–1279). The emergence of the feminine Kuan-yin must also be studied in the context of new cults of other goddesses, which, not coincidentally, also developed after the Sung era. The appearance of the feminine Kuan-yin in indigenous sutras, art, and miracle stories occurred from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. It was also during these centuries that Neo-Confucianism was established as the official ideology, functioning very much like a state religion. I do not think these events happened by coincidence or independent of each other.

The same holds true for clefts involving a locative expression as cleft constituent. In (45), also signals that the prepositional phrase in America is where another important event happened (America is thus where Horney finalized her theories on feminine psychology and where she truly found herself and her voice):

(45) Karen Horney’s contribution to psychology occurred in two distinct contexts (O’Connell & Russo, 1990 & O’Connell, 1980). The first is her early work in Germany, where she redefined psychoanalytic terms and developed an understanding of female psychology. The second includes her work in America. It is here that she finalized her theories on feminine psychology, and created a theory of personality development that is humanistic in nature (O’Connell & Russo, 1990). In my opinion, it is also in America that Horney truly found herself and her voice. This is reflected in her definition of the term “real self” and in her overt dissension from Freud and the traditional analysis of the time.

The functional description provided so far can of course be further refined. Indeed, the need to linguistically signal the continuity of the discourse referent denoted by the cleft constituent, as seen in (40), does not fully account for clefts
of this form. In cases such as (40) and (46), which is even clearer, the additive particle *also* signals as well that (i) the contrast which holds between the referent denoted by the cleft constituent and another relevant discourse referent was already present in the preceding context or will be present in the subsequent context (in (40), the cleft starting with *But it was Baker who...*) and (ii) that the information status of the cleft constituent, which *also* marks as “given”, is marked as such for the last time. Thus, the combination of *also* and the cleft constituent also functions overall as a marker of information shift (when the focus constituent is a discourse referent, as in (40) and (46), it could be a marker of Topic shift, too). What is conveyed by *also* in the last cleft of example (46) is on the one hand the continuity of the contrastive Topic (Molly vs. Jess) and on the other hand the fact that the information that is added about Molly is the last in a list (i.e. in the list of the three things that have caught the writer’s interest):

(46) *On the other hand, I’m interested to see that it’s [Molly] who, like many a non-Jewish spouse, ultimately upholds the importance of Jewish tradition in their new family. Without her, I wonder if Jess would bother to light those candles; and when his father discovers them living together, rends his garments, and begins reciting kaddish, it’s [Molly] who appreciates the gravity of the situation. It’s also [she] who, at the movie’s climactic moment, reminds Jess with cloying earnestness that “I may be a shiksa, [but] I know what Yom Kippur means: the Day of Atonement,” and that he must heal the rift with his father by singing the Kol Nidre service when the cantor is too frail to do it.*

([http://www.threepennyreview.com/samples/barton_su11.html](http://www.threepennyreview.com/samples/barton_su11.html), last accessed on 27 January 2013)

### 3.1.3 Also with scope over the cleft constituent

So far, we have not seen any instance of an *also*-cleft in which *also* can be interpreted as a true additive particle operating on the content conveyed by the cleft constituent. According to É.Kiss (1998), who considers exhaustiveness as being semantically encoded in the cleft format, *also* in the cleft constituent can be used to add a piece of information to another one, but this use has important discourse restrictions as it is accepted only in one specific context. In her opinion, “a cleft *also*-phrase appears to be acceptable precisely in a context where it can be understood to identify a member of a relevant set in addition to one or more members identified previously as such for which the predicate holds, with the rest of the set still excluded” (É.Kiss 1998: 252). Thus, in É.Kiss’ view, in (47), the answer provided by C is possible because apart from Sam and
John, everybody else is still excluded: “C adds John to the men identified by B, excluding everybody but Sam and John” (É.Kiss 1998: 252):

(47) A: Bill danced with Mary.
B: No, it was Sam that danced with Mary.
C: It was also John that danced with her.

In our data, we find occasional examples of this use of also-cLEFTs. Here are two cases in which also co-occurs with new information (the President/Romney), while the information provided in the cleft clause is at least partly given in another cleft clause (namely, the predicate to do the same in (48)).20 Similarly to (47), what also signals here is that the cleft constituent is an additional value for the open proposition associated with the cleft clause of both the cleft in which also occurs and a cleft (or cleft-alike: this was the party that ...) found in the preceding context:

(48) This was [the party] that ran on a commitment to restoring the Constitution.
   – It’s also [the President] who promised to do the same when he was a candidate. The rot is truly bipartisan.

(49) Actually, it’s [Karl Rove] who’s the really big liar, floating the story that Obama had nothing to do with killing Bin Laden (a charge denied soundly by Admiral McRaven, of Navy Seals Command). And it’s also [Romney] who’s lying about Obama robbing Medicare, when in truth, the President’s cuts were not to recipients, but to care providers – the people receiving benefits won’t lose a thing.
   (http://themakingsenseshow.com/2012/08/19/corporate-coup-detat/; last accessed on 27 January 2013)

20 In this paper, we use the concepts of given, new and inferable to refer to the discourse availability of pieces of information in the context, i.e. their so-called recoverability (see Collins 1991: 91). The label given information refers to information that has been previously introduced in the discourse; the label inferable information to information that is pragmatically retrievable. By contrast, the label new information subsumes information that has not been previously mentioned and is not immediately recoverable. It is important to observe that in this paper the terms given and new refer exclusively to the level of information structure known as referential givenness/newness and not to the one called relational givenness/newness, which captures the status of information in terms of the concepts Topic and Comment (for a discussion of these informational levels, see, for instance, Gundel and Fretheim 2004: 176–179).
In É. Kiss’ (1998) opinion, examples such as these do not contradict the assumption that clefts are semantically associated with exhaustiveness. However, in our view, the fact that examples (47)–(49) indicate that only two entities are valid while the rest of the individuals are excluded is not sufficient proof to claim that exhaustiveness is ultimately a semantic component of the cleft format. Consider the well-formed answer provided by (50C), where only one individual ends up being excluded:

(50) A: Bill danced with Mary.  
    B: No, it was Sam that danced with Mary.  
    C: It was also John that danced with her, in fact everybody except Bill danced with her.

There are even more convincing examples of also-cLEFTs in which the additive particle denotes an open set of alternatives. One such example is provided by Taglicht (1984), who considers it to be the only possible context in which also can be used as a true additive particle when occurring in the focus of a cleft. According to Taglicht (1984: 173), additive also-cLEFTs are possible “when the focus of the cleft construction denotes a cause or reason”, as in (51):

(51) It was also because of the children that they decided to move. (Taglicht 1984: 174)

CLEFT constituents that express a cause are relatively easy to find. Here is one authentic example found among many others:

(52) Denmark is among the staunchest supporters of liberalization in the framework of the multilateral trading system. We are a small and open economy. Danish exporters and importers are active in all regions of the globe. We trade across a wide range of goods, services and intellectual property rights. For many countries foreign trade corresponds to around 10 per cent of GNP. For Denmark the figure is as high as 35 per cent. The importance which Denmark attaches to trade liberalization is a reflection of these facts. It is also because of these facts that we push for the WTO to be forward-looking. The world is changing, and the issues facing international trade are changing as a result. In the interest of trade liberalization the WTO has to keep up with these changes.  
(Statement in English by Mr. Poul Nielson, Minister for Development Cooperation; [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/st6.html]; last accessed on 27 January 2013)
In Taglicht’s opinion, the “reason for the admissibility of [(51)] seems to be the feeling that causal explanations are typically partial rather than exhaustive” (Taglicht 1984: 174); also could therefore be replaced by partly. Unlike in (47)–(49), also in (51) and (52) clearly denotes an open set of alternatives to the value conveyed by the cleft constituent (“because of the children and because of potentially many other reasons”). This, in our view, is related to the fact that it is only in Taglicht’s example that no alternative to the focus of also is provided in the preceding context.

Besides adverbial clefts expressing a causal relation, we also find clefts encoding other semantic relations. Here is one example with a benefactive cleft constituent (for her). In this case, also signals that John Coltrane wrote the song Naima for his wife, as well as for other people:

(53) In a lecture by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, he stated that he met a relative of John Coltrane who told him that Coltrane believed in Islam. This is also confirmed by academics such as Moustafa Bayoumi of Brooklyn College, City University of New York, who states that in Coltrane’s “A Love Supreme” one can hear Coltrane and one of his bandmates chanting “Allah Supreme.” Other scholars, such as Dr. Hussein Rashid of Hofstra University, also have studied the effects that Islam has had on Blues, Jazz, and other forms of American music. You can read some of Dr. Rashid’s work here. Coltrane, a deeply spiritual musician, married his second wife Juanita Naima Grubbs in 1957 and through her came into contact with Islam. It is also for her that he wrote the song entitled “Naima.”

(https://meccastars.com/2012/11/16/john-coltranes-a-love-supreme; last accessed on 27 January 2013)

According to Taglicht (1984), these examples do not disprove that exhaustiveness has the status of a conventional implicature. However, unlike Taglicht, we do not think that examples (51) to (53) are exceptions to the rule excluding true additive particles from the focus of a cleft. From a descriptive point of view, it seems more economical to allow a true additive use of also, as this avoids multiplying the exceptions. What we do find, however, is that there is an asymmetry between the use of also as a marker of addition in subject clefts vs. adverbial clefts. The first possibility is very marginal, while the second one fairly frequent. We will return to this observation in the conclusion of the paper, and discuss its implications in the assessment of the exhaustiveness component associated with clefts.
3.2 Additive focus adverb *anche* in Italian clefts

Similarly to English, additive expressions such as *anche* may occur in the focus of Italian cleft sentences (see *È anche a Luisa che i ragazzi hanno rotto il vetro* ‘It’s also to Luisa that these guys have broken the window’, in Roggia 2009: 99). And again, similarly to English, the adverb *anche* can be associated with different readings.\(^{21}\)

3.2.1 *Anche* with scope over the cleft clause

In one reading of *anche*-clefts in which the adverb is found before the cleft constituent, *anche*, again, seems at first sight to semantically operate on the content of the cleft clause. Here is one example in which *anche* precedes a cleft constituent that is given information (*questo*):

(54)  *L’amore di Dio è diverso, è un amore per eccesso. Il più delle volte, invece di aggiustare, sovverte i piani. È questo che sbalordisce, che fa paura. Ma è anche questo che permette al figlio sbandato di tornare alla casa accolto non dall’astio ma dalla gioia.* (Susanna Tamaro, *Anima Mundi*; example from Gil 2003: 212)\(^ {22}\)

‘The love of God is different, it is extreme. Most of the time, it overturns things instead of fixing them. It is this fact [lit. this] that is astonishing and frightening. But it is also this fact [lit. this] that allows the prodigal son to come back home not unwelcomed but welcomed with open arms.’

However, if *anche* here truly operates on the content conveyed by the cleft clause, why do we find it in the cleft part of the structure and not in the subordinate clause itself? A preliminary answer might be that when *anche* occurs in the cleft clause, the sentence becomes ungrammatical (55) or ambiguous (56), *anche*’s focus coinciding either with the following

\(^{21}\) Regardless of its occurrence in a cleft, *anche* is very rarely used as a discourse connective (De Cesare 2004). We therefore do not discuss the potential use of *anche* as a connective when found in the focus of a cleft.

\(^{22}\) Due to space limitations, it is not always possible to translate the examples entirely. Searching for a compromise between clarity and space, in some cases we chose to translate, besides the cleft sentence, the portion of context that is directly relevant for understanding the example and its analysis.
constituent (as in (56a), where it coincides with the PP *the prodigal son*) or with the whole VP (see (56b)):

(55) *Ma è questo che anche permette al figlio sbandato di ...  
   ‘But it is this fact that *also* allows the prodigal son to...’

(56) a. Ma è questo che permette anche [al figlio sbandato] di...
   ‘But it is this fact that allows *also* [the prodigal son] to...
   
   b. Ma è questo che [permette anche al figlio sbandato di...].
   ‘But it is this fact that [allows *also* the prodigal son to...]’

However, a cleft sentence in which an additive expression other than *anche* occurs within the cleft clause and has wide scope over the whole content expressed in the subordinate clause does not seem appropriate in this context (see (57)). It thus seems that *anche* does not really function as an additive marker operating on the content of the cleft clause.

(57) Ma è questo che, *allo stesso modo*, permette al figlio sbandato di...
   ‘But it is this fact that, *similarly*, allows the prodigal son to...’

In line with what we suggested for English *also*, our alternative proposal is that *anche* is best accounted for as a marker of reference continuity. In example (58), *anche* signals that the constituent *in Italia* is already given in the previous context and that its reference should be maintained. In turn, because *anche* marks information as already given in the previous context, it necessarily follows that the content expressed in the cleft clause (*family businesses have been able to bypass the rigidity of the job market and the banking system achieving unparalleled levels of development*) is to be interpreted as a new piece of information – or predication – about the referent denoted by the cleft constituent.\(^\text{23}\)

\[\text{(58) A questo tipo di analisi si rifanno Alberto Alesina e Andrea Ichino in L’Italia fatta in casa. Indagine sulla vera ricchezza degli italiani (Mondadori, pp. 154, e17) per studiare l’economia del nostro paese. L’Italia è un meraviglioso laboratorio per questo tipo di studi perché qui più che altrove il ruolo della}\]

\[\text{23 In the Italian linguistics literature, similar instances of the focus adverb *anche* have been described as marking reference continuity, and this special reading has been called *additivo-continuativo* (see, for instance, Andorno 2000): C’era un ponte di legno, con un parapetto di listarelle anche di legno ‘There was a wooden bridge with a parapet with spindles also made of wood’ (authentic example from informal speech, Andorno 2000: 237).}\]
famiglia, della religione, della struttura civile e sociale ha effetti evidenti sull’organizzazione economica. In Italia più che altrove, infatti, la solida struttura di clan familiari ha saputo in alcune zone sostituirsi allo Stato per sviluppare una società e una economia (criminale) quasi indipendente. Ma è anche in Italia che l’impresa familiare ha saputo aggirare le rigidità del mercato del lavoro e del credito raggiungendo livelli di sviluppo unici. (La Stampa, 2 December 2009; http://www.lastampa.it/2009/12/02/cultura/italia-il-sostenibile-peso-della-famiglia-t3Se9bdFMdM97GUrbEtM5L/pagina.html; last accessed on 27 January 2013)

‘In Italy more than anywhere else the solid structure of family clans has been able to replace the State in some areas so as to develop an almost independent society and a (criminal) economy. But it is also in Italy that family businesses have been able to bypass the rigidity of the job market and the banking system achieving unparalleled levels of development.’

No matter where we place the adverb anche in the subordinate clause – as shown in (59) – we do not end up with a text that expresses the same meaning as the original one in (58). First, in all the cases given in (59), anche only operates on part of the cleft clause (on its subject, on its predicate or on the object, respectively). Second, because of the presence of the adversative conjunction ma, it is likely that the information conveyed by the cleft constituent (in Italia) is to be interpreted as being in contrast with another piece of information. This, in our view, would suggest that anche in (59) is not there to signal that the information conveyed by the cleft constituent is already given in the preceding text (in Italia e altrove).

(59) Ma è in Italia che (anche) l’impresa familiare ha (anche) saputo aggirare (anche) le rigidità del mercato del lavoro e del credito raggiungendo livelli di sviluppo unici.

‘But it is in Italy that (also) family businesses have (also) been able to bypass (also) the rigidity of the job market and the banking system achieving unparalleled levels of development.’

Another argument to view anche as a marker of reference continuity rather than a marker of addition operating on the cleft clause is the fact that (i) other markers of reference continuity may occur before the focus of the cleft, i.e. the adverbs sempre and ancora in non-temporal use (in the ICOCP corpus, there are 3 occurrences of sempre and 2 occurrences of ancora before the cleft constituent) and (ii) there are striking semantic similarities between anche and these other two markers of
reference continuity. In each of the following examples, it is clear that the referent following sempre/ancora is not only already given in the previous context, but also it already functions as a (discourse) Topic: (in (60), Giuseppe Lombardo < null subject < lui; in (61), La Banca d’Italia < via Nazionale.


‘Giuseppe Lombardo is in charge of almost all of the inquiries related to the ’ndrangheta clans from Reggio Calabria. In the last months he was the prosecutor in trials such as “Meta”, “Agathos”, “Bless” and “Vertice”, in which famous crime bosses from Reggio went before the bar. And it is also him that supervises the statements of many informers of the city that nail down bosses of the De Stefano, Libri, Tegano, Serraino, and Condello families.’

(61) La Banca d’Italia < Topic dice che nel nostro Paese i principali servizi hanno un cosiddetto «mark up», cioè la differenza fra il prezzo della prestazione erogata e il suo costo, superiore del 19,2% alla media dell’area euro. È ancora < via Nazionale < Topic ad affermare in un proprio studio che ripor-tando quel dato al livello europeo si potrebbe ottenere nei primi tre anni una crescita del Prodotto interno lordo pari al 5,4%. (ICOCP, Corriere della Sera)

24 On the differences betweenanche, sempre and ancora, see Andorno (2000: 90–93). On the different readings of ancora, the factors that determine its readings and the similarity between ancora and anche (which have a common origin and are still interchangeable in some contexts; ancora, like anche, has an additive reading which is evident in coordinated constructions: C’erano Luca, Paolo, Giovanni e ancora/anche Carlo, Roberto, Alfredo ‘There were Luca, Paolo, Giovanni and also Carlo, Roberto and Alfredo’), see Toven (1996) and Vegnaduzzo (2000). Note that in the second study mentioned, the term continuative is used to indicate a special temporal reading of the adverb, traditionally called durative (it refers to the fact that the “action was in progress previously”: Maria nuota ancora ‘Maria is still swimming’, Vegnaduzzo 2000: 145). The continuative/durative reading of sempre/ancora seems to be closely related to the one we are discussing here (i.e. reference continuity). As neither Toven (1996) nor Vegnaduzzo (2000) mention the reading of sempre and ancora as markers of reference continuity, further research is needed on this issue.
‘The Bank of Italy states that in our Country the main services have a so-called “mark up”, i.e. the difference between the price of the supplied service and its cost, which is 19.2% higher than the European average. It is also via Nazionale [i.e. the headquarters of the Bank of Italy] that claims in a study that by reducing that percentage to the European level it would be possible to obtain a GNP growth of 5.4% in the first three years.’

Note that in both of these cases we could not easily replace sempre and ancora with anche: as shown in examples (54) and (58), anche can be associated to a contrast that does not seem compatible with the other two adverbs. This contrast can be either explicit (as in the examples provided, where we find the adversative ma ‘but’) or implicit.

### 3.2.2 Anche with scope over the cleft constituent

In a second reading of anche-clefts, the adverb occurs with the cleft constituent while signalling that the information it conveys is to be added to another piece of information. Two cases ought to be distinguished here. In the first case, the alternative of the focus of anche is provided in the context, either before or after the cleft, as in (62):

\[(62) \text{ In tutti i campi osservati in cui sollevare è applicabile risulta che anche staccare è applicabile. In altre parole le qualità espresse da staccare accompagnano sempre le qualità espresse in IP2. Dato che non abbiamo portato argomenti per escludere che le proprietà espresse da staccare non facciano parte del senso di sollevare insieme alla proprietà “vincere lo stato gravitazionale” non è possibile escludere a priori che sollevare “implichi” staccare. Ponendo la questione in modo empirico osserviamo che in Fig. 7” è possibile che si verifichi, oltre ad una mancanza di gravità anche una fluttuazione degli oggetti. Dunque tali oggetti, fluttuando, non si “staccano” quando li si sposta. Potrebbe essere anche la mancanza di tale proprietà tipica a rendere inapplicabile il predicato in Fig. 7” e non, come abbiamo ipotizzato, la sola mancanza di rimozione dello stato stazionario gravitazionale. (LISUL)}

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25 Keep in mind that (62) is taken from a linguistics article. Also note that the cleft found in (62) is a so-called implicit cleft (in which the subordinate clause is opened by a and followed by an infinitive verb).
In every instance in which *sollevare* [to lift up] is appropriate it seems also the case that *staccare* [to detach, to separate] is fine. In other words, the features expressed by *staccare* always convey the features expressed in IP2. Given that we did not provide arguments to rule out that the features expressed by *staccare* do not belong to the meaning of *sollevare*, together with the property “breaking the gravitational state”, it is not possible to exclude a priori that *sollevare* “implies” *staccare*. From an empirical point of view, we can observe that in Fig. 7” it is possible to also establish, besides a lack of gravity, a fluctuation of objects. These objects, while fluctuating, do not “detach” when we move them. It could also be the lack of such a typical property that makes the predicate in Fig. 7” inapplicable and not, as we thought, only the lack of removal of the gravitational stationary state.

In (62), the additive meaning conveyed by *anche* explicitly denies that the predicate of Fig. 7” mentioned in the text is inapplicable only because of the lack of gravity. The adverb *anche* signals that the predicate may also be inapplicable because of the lack of a typical property, which is fluctuation. The other property under discussion (gravity) is picked up and clarified in the context provided immediately afterwards (*mancanza di rimozione dello stato stazionario gravitazionale > mancanza di gravità*). The question, again, is whether *anche* can be considered to have a true additive reading here. We believe that the adverb has an additive reading because it is plausible to imagine that the text given in (62) could continue by discussing other factors involved in the non-application of the predicate. Whether other alternatives (i.e. factors) are in fact excluded or not is, for us, not so relevant. What is crucial is that *anche* adds a new value (via the pattern *è anche x, e non solo y* ‘it is also x and not only y’) that satisfies the open proposition associated with the cleft clause.

In the second case to be distinguished, the alternative value(s) to the focus of the additive adverb *anche* is/are not given in the context. As a consequence, there is no limit to the number of alternatives to the value of the focus of *anche*. Empirical data seem to suggest that this second use of *anche*-clefts generally occurs when the cleft constituent is not part of the argument structure of the verb. The cleft constituent can express a causal relation (in line with the observation from Taglicht 1984 on English) or encode a locative expression. In all these cases, the additive value of *anche* is very clear as there is no boundary to the number of alternatives that could be equally valid:

(63) *Concretamente, quali sono le possibilità che la riscossia possa partire proprio dai titoli ad alto dividendo? «L’ipotesi di un taglio sensibile ai dividendi*
Specifically, how many possibilities are there for a recovery starting from high-dividend stocks? “The idea of a substantial dividend cut due to a strong reduction of firm profits in the next two years is unrealistic. Profits and dividends are going to be stationary or slightly growing in 2011 and in 2012 at most a slight reduction is expected. It is also for this reason that societies with a high dividend yield could recover very well in case of an upswing in stock markets.”

Ma ciò non preoccupa il lettore che sappia cogliere in questa scrittura e in questo modo di narrare (del resto rintracciabili in altri giovani narratori oggi emergenti) lo precipuo e già accennata qualità di una lingua poetica, dove il come-è-detto tende sempre di più a farsi un cosa-vuol-dire, ossia significato. Non si tratta di nostalgie formalistiche, ma di un fenomeno che discende più o meno direttamente da una nuova sociologia e tecnologia dell’informazione: come la rivoluzione industriale del secolo scorso segnò insieme alla fioritura del romanzo la nascita di una poesia moderna che sempre più si sarebbe trovata confinata in un suo aristocratico hortus conclusus e magari ghetto, così la nostra età di audiovisivo imperante e di scritture mercificate o puramente strumentali promuove un aperto lettetario aspirato ad obbligare le tradizionali funzioni informative nel senso più corrente trasferite ormai ad altri canali. Perciò il giovane scrittore tende a scrivere oggi racconti, brevi o meno brevi, piuttosto che improbabili telenovelas a stampa, perciò è anche nei racconti di un esordiente come Mario Fortunato che il recensore può verificare la presenza del nuovo, la valorosa ricerca di uno stile e quella strenua sconfessione del luogo comune che è da sempre funzione non ultima della letteratura, della poesia. (LISUL)

‘For these reasons, young writers tend nowadays to write short stories, which are more or less short, rather than unlikely literary soap operas. Therefore, it is also in the short stories of a newcomer such as Mario Fortunato that the reviewer can find the presence of the new, the brave search for a
style and the tireless renouncement of clichés that has always been an important function of literature, of poetry.'

Thus, similarly to English *also*-clefts, subject *anche*-clefts are less frequent than adverbial *anche*-clefts (of cause, time, space etc.). As already mentioned, in the conclusion of this study we will provide an explanation for this asymmetry and will discuss the implications of our findings for the description of the exhaustiveness effect associated with clefts.

4 The restrictive expressions *only/solo* in the focus of cleft sentences

In what follows, we concentrate on “*only*-clefts”, a cover term that we will use for the cases in which the cleft constituent of a prototypical cleft sentence (and preferably with a clefted subject) co-occurs either with adverbial *only/solo* (Sections 4.1, 4.2) or with adjectival *solo* (Section 4.3).

Before considering the cases in which we find *only* and *solo* in the focus of a cleft sentence, let us start again by providing a brief description of the semantic contribution of *only* and *solo* used as focus particles (or adverbs). Since Horn (1969), it has generally been assumed that a sentence with *only* “presupposes that the predication holds for the expression in focus, and asserts that it does not hold for any alternative” (see Krifka 1999: 111).\(^{26}\)

Consider the following examples:

(65)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item **Only [Stella] stole the cookies.**
  \item **Solo [Stella] ha rubato i biscotti.**
\end{itemize}

Stella stole the cookies. (Presupposition)
Nobody else than Stella stole the cookies. (Assertion)

Besides the exhaustive reading shown in (65), *only* and *solo* also present a scalar reading:

(66)  
*The inventor was only an employee.* (Beaver and Coppock 2011: 200)

(67)  
*L’inventore era solo un impiegato.*

\(^{26}\) This is a very basic semantic characterization of *only*. For a more detailed discussion, see at least Foolen (1983), König (1991) and Beaver and Clark (2008). On Italian *solo*, see in particular Andorno (2000).
The reading of *only/solo* in these examples implies the presence of ranked alternatives: for instance, from (66) and (67) it can be inferred that *employee* is considered a weak alternative in comparison to pragmatically (i.e. socially) stronger alternatives such as *manager* (see Beaver and Copock 2011: 199–201). As observed in the literature (see, among others, König 1991, Beaver and Clark 2008: 251–252, and Zeevat 2009 for English; Andorno 2000 for Italian), *only/solo* can also signal that the expression in their focus is less than expected. In this case, the particle comes to convey the content of the adverb *surprisingly*. Consider the following examples:

(68) *I really expected a suite but only got a single room with 2 beds*. (example from Beaver and Clark 2008: 252)

(69) *I really expected a single room with 2 beds but only got a suite*. (example from Beaver and Clark 2008: 252)

In the first proposition of (68), the speaker is communicating that he was expecting a stronger alternative (on the scale of potential sleeping arrangements), but in the second proposition, through the use of *only*, the speaker conveys that the actual alternative is weaker. As shown in (69), reversing the expectation and the focus of *only* leads to a pragmatically infelicitous utterance (for a more detailed discussion and analysis, see Beaver and Clark 2008).

### 4.1 The restrictive particle *only* in the focus of English clefts

Unlike English *also*, the occurrence of the particle *only* in the focus of a cleft sentence is not a source of controversy. Consider, next to examples (24) to (26) repeated below, the invented example in (70):

(24) *It’s only Muriel who [voted for Hubert]*. (example from Horn 1969: 106)

(25) *It’s only John who protested*. (example from Quirk et al. 1972: 438)

(26) *It was only John that kissed Mary*. (example from Declerck 1988: 36)

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27 We will not consider the cases in which *only* is accompanied by the negation (*It is not only Stella who stole the cookies*) because, contrary to what is claimed by Declerck (1988: 33), the negation operates on the exhaustiveness component lexically asserted by the restrictive adverb *only*. In our view, then, these cases cannot be used to cast light on the status of exhaustiveness in bare-clefts (i.e. in clefts with no restrictive adverb).
(70) It is only Stella who stole the cookies.

The naturalness of the form given in (70) can be confirmed by looking at real language data. Here is one example, which we will describe in more detail below:

(71) The single market. Barroso says that it is only the institutions of the EU as a whole that can protect what he called the “integrity of the single market”.

(ICOCP, The Guardian)

Cases like these are crucial in assessing the status of the exhaustiveness component associated with clefts because they allow us to conclude that exhaustiveness is better accounted for as a conversational implicature than as a presupposition or conventional implicature.

In order to understand why the restrictive particle only occurs in the focus of a cleft, to discover its semantic and pragmatic contribution to the cleft and to the context of occurrence of only-clefts, as well as to determine whether the insertion of an exhaustive operator in a cleft can be perceived as redundant or not, we will compare only-clefts to bare-clefts, i.e. to clefts without a restrictive modifier, such as:

(72) It is Stella who stole the cookies.

As noted by Declerck (1988: 36), a bare-cleft differs from an only-cleft from a semantic as well as from a pragmatic point of view. In a bare-cleft, the exhaustiveness component is merely implicated (for Declerck, it corresponds to a conversational implicature), while in the only-cleft this meaning component is conveyed explicitly by the particle and is an integral part of the asserted information. This difference explains why a bare-cleft answers a neutral wh-question, whereas an only-cleft is used to answer a question requiring the specification of other values that are able to satisfy the predication (i.e. steal the cookies):

(73) A: Who stole the cookies?
    B: It is Stella who stole the cookies.
    C: #It is only Stella who stole the cookies.

    A: Who else stole the cookies?
    B: #It is Stella who stole the cookies.
    C: It is only Stella who stole the cookies.

The bare-cleft used in the answers provided by B presupposes that someone stole the cookies, asserts that this individual is Stella and implicates that Stella
and nobody else stole the cookies. The only-cleft in C, on the other hand, presupposes that Stella stole the cookies and asserts that nobody other than her stole them. Thus, as pointed out by Declerck (1988: 36), these two structures “have different presuppositions and make different assertions”.

These observations can be made even clearer with authentic examples such as (71), repeated with more context as (74):

(74) The single market. Barroso says that it is only the institutions of the EU as a whole that can protect what he called the “integrity of the single market”.

Translation: Britain may feel uncomfortable with the power wielded by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. But they offer the only protection against French protectionism. (ICOCP, The Guardian)

The difference between the only-cleft and the bare-cleft (given in (75)) is again related to the status of the exhaustiveness component. Only in (74) is this meaning component asserted and the fact that there might be someone else besides the institutions of the EU as a whole is explicitly denied.

(75) The single market. Barroso says that it is the institutions of the EU as a whole that can protect what he called the “integrity of the single market”. […]

On the basis of these examples, we can also observe that only-clefts are not redundant at all: the lexical insertion of an exhaustive particle in the focus of a cleft leads to a different status of the exhaustiveness component (Declerck 1988) and to different pragmatic-discursive properties (Beaver and Clark 2008) than the ones associated with bare-clefts.

### 4.2 The restrictive adverb solo in the focus of Italian clefts

Similar considerations to the ones provided in Section 4.1 for only-clefts can be made for Italian solo-clefts. Consider the following examples:

(76) Patané fa notare che Arcigay “custodisce i dati sensibili di decine e decine di migliaia di iscritti. Non escludo che ci possano essere nomi noti, ma non lo voglio sapere, perché possono essere solo queste persone a decidere cosa vuole [sic] fare della loro sessualità. Noi tuteleremo la loro privacy a spada tratta”. (ICOCP, La Repubblica)
‘Patané notes that Arcigay “keeps sensitive data of tens of thousands members. I do not exclude that there might also be well-known people, but I do not want to know it, because only these persons can decide what they want to do with their sexuality [lit. it can be only these persons that decide what they want to do with their own sexuality]. We will preserve their privacy whatever it takes”.

(77) Le lacrime di Sabrina cancellano la speranza illuminata in questa lunga udienza preliminare da testimonianze a favore delle due donne (psichiatra e psicologa del carcere) e da Michele Misseri che per la prima volta dopo le accuse alla figlia ha avuto la possibilità di essere ascoltato davanti a un magistrato. Da lui, anche ieri, sempre la stessa versione: «Sono stato solo io, a uccidere e a nascondere il corpo». Il gup non gli crede. E dice che anche il fratello Carmine e il nipote Cosimino dovranno affrontare il processo per concurso in soppressione di cadavere. (ICOCP, la Stampa)

‘With Sabrina’s tears vanish the reasons for hope that arose in this long preliminary hearing by statements in favor of the two women (prison psychiatrist and psychologist) and by Michele Misseri, who had the chance to be heard by a magistrate for the first time after the allegations against his daughter. Yesterday again he repeated the same version: “It was only me that killed and hid the body.” The judge does not believe him and says that his brother Carmine and his nephew Cosimino, too, will have to stand the trial for complicity in eliminating the corpse.’

In these cases, solo cannot be considered to be redundant, i.e. to be merely duplicating the exhaustiveness component associated with the cleft. This can be seen from the fact that in (76) it is not even possible to leave out solo (see (78)); indeed, omitting solo seems to imply the loss of the modal semantic value conveyed by the combination possono...essere solo. If we replace the modal verb possono with the deontic modal verb devono (79), the text is much more acceptable:

(78) Non escludo che ci possano essere nomi noti, ma non lo voglio sapere,
#perché possono essere queste persone a decidere cosa vuole [sic] fare della loro sessualità.

‘I do not exclude that there might be well-known people, but I do not want to know it, because these persons can decide what they want to do with their sexuality [lit. it can be these persons that decide what they want to do with their own sexuality].’
(79) *Non escludo che ci possano essere nomi noti, ma non lo voglio sapere, perché devono essere queste persone a decidere cosa vuole [sic] fare della loro sessualità.*

‘I do not exclude that there might be well-known people, but I do not want to know it, because these persons have to decide what they want to do with their sexuality [lit. it has to be these persons that decide what they want to do with their own sexuality].’

Unlike in (76), it is possible in (77) to leave out *solo*, but the outcome is very different from the original text:

(80) *Le lacrime di Sabrina cancellano la speranza illuminata in questa lunga udienza preliminare da testimonianze a favore delle due donne (psichiatra e psicologa del carcere) e da Michele Misseri che per la prima volta dopo le accuse alla figlia ha avuto la possibilità di essere ascoltato davanti a un magistrato. Da lui, anche ieri, sempre la stessa versione: «Sono stato io, a uccidere e a nascondere il corpo».*

‘It was me that killed and hid the body.’

The difference between (77) and (80) is primarily due to the change in status of the exhaustiveness component associated with the value conveyed by the subject *Michele Misseri*. In (80), the exhaustive information is merely conveyed as an inference and is thus *backgrounded* with respect to the identity of the person who killed and hid the body. By contrast, the use in (77) of the lexical restrictive particle *solo* puts the exhaustiveness component at the *center* or *foreground* of the message: in this case, the identification of the subject as the killer seems secondary with respect to the fact that this individual committed the crime alone. In other words, (77) explicitly denies that there is more than one person involved in the crime; (80) merely implicates it. The difference between (77) and (80) is of course crucial in the context of a trial. In the original text, by asserting that nobody other than him committed the crime, Michele Misseri explicitly denies the possibility – i.e. strong suspicion from the judges – that there are other people involved in the crime that should be prosecuted (Sabrina, Carmine, Cosimino), while in (80), by merely asserting the identity of the murderer, he claims that he is the one to be charged for the crime.

In line with *only*, we thus conclude that *solo* is not at all redundant when occurring in the focus of a cleft. When operating on the cleft constituent, the restrictive adverb *solo* reinforces the exhaustiveness component of the cleft
sentence, in the sense that this component is made explicit and is asserted, whereas it is only implicit and implicated in a bare-cleft.

4.3 The restrictive adjective *solo* in the focus of Italian clefts

4.3.1 General remarks on the syntax and semantic properties of *solo* used as adjective

In this section, we will explore the contribution of the adjective *solo* to Italian cleft sentences. Before examining the data, we will provide a sketchy description of its syntactic and semantic properties. *Solo*, similarly to many other Romance adjectives, can occur in linear syntax both before and after the noun it modifies, with different meanings:

(81) *il solo bambino*
    ‘the only child [lit. the sole child]’

(82) *il bambino solo*
    ‘the lonely child’

Prenominal *solo* in (81) has a restrictive value corresponding to the English adjectives *only* and *sole*; following the noun, *solo* is a qualifying adjective that can be translated into English as *lonely* or *solitary*. It is worth mentioning that the postnominal position may be ambiguous: *un bambino solo* can be interpreted, depending on the context, as *a lonely child* or *a sole child*:

(83) *Sei tanti bambini dentro un bambino solo.*
    [http://www.mammole.it/forum-gravidanza/blogs/kiary-948.htm; last accessed on 27 January 2013]
    ‘You are many children within one child [lit. a sole child].’

(84) *Gianni è un bambino solo.*
    ‘Gianni is a lonely child.’

In order to avoid such ambiguity, this paper will focus on the prenominal occurrences of *solo*.

Adverbal and adjectival *solo* have basically the same semantics because they share the same presupposition and assertion (cf. Section 4.2). Adjectival *solo* presupposes the sentence without the exhaustive adjective and asserts that the predication does not hold for alternatives. The only difference between the
adverb and the adjective lies in their scope: adverbial solo (like English only) can take scope over either NPs or VPs, while the scope of the adjective is restricted to the NP domain. Consider the following sentence:

(85) **Il solo alunno che vedi è venuto a scuola.**

‘The one pupil you see came to school [lit. the sole/only pupil you see came to school].’

Sentence (85) means: (i) you see only one pupil and (ii) he came to school; it presupposes that the corresponding sentence without solo is true (*L’alunno che vedi è venuto a scuola* ‘The pupil you see came to school’) and asserts that no other pupil came to school. However, the semantic content of solo is more complex than this description suggests, as occurrences such as (86) reveal:

(86) **Un solo alunno è venuto a scuola.**

‘Only one pupil came to school [lit. a sole/unique pupil came to school].’

A possible paraphrase of (86) would be something along the lines of “no more than one pupil came to school”, whereas in (85) the paraphrase would be as follows: “there exists a sole pupil you see who came to school”. In other words, prenominal solo allows different semantic readings: a truly exhaustive interpretation (with a definite article, as in (85)) and a cardinal interpretation (with an indefinite article, as in (86), in which solo is merely used to express

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28 Taking into account observations about French seul (as described in Amsili et al. 2002), we can claim that solo accompanied by a definite determiner (as in example (85)) needs another noun modifier, such as a restrictive relative clause, so as to make the sentence fully acceptable: compare in this respect (i) *#Il solo alunno è venuto a scuola* ‘#The sole pupil came to school’ with (ii) *Il solo alunno che vedi è venuto a scuola* ‘The sole pupil you see came to school’. Although apparently motivated, this constraint seems nonetheless too strong (at least for Italian examples). The following authentic sentences without other noun modifiers are commonly attested: (iii) *La sola ricevuta non prova la trasmissione* (web example) ‘The receipt only/Soely the receipt does not prove the transmission’, and (iv) *La sola posizione non può bastare* (web example) ‘The location only is not enough.’ It is worth mentioning that in cases (iii) and (iv) the subject NPs are found in contexts where relevant alternatives are explicitly mentioned in the discourse (for instance in (iv), drawn from a review of a resort, other parameters besides location play a role in the customer evaluation). This fact may suggest that an NP containing a definite determiner and solo without an additional modifier is possible only if the NP is contrasted with (given or easily inferable) alternatives (this empirical observation is also supported by the cleft occurrences (88), (89) and (92)). However, further studies are required on this point.
uniqueness,\textsuperscript{29} i.e. to restrict the NP denotation to a singleton). Ultimately, these readings show the effects of the interplay between the semantics of \textit{solo} and different kinds of determiners.\textsuperscript{30}

Distinguishing between these values allows us to identify the data that actually matter for the purposes of our analysis (the contribution of the exhaustive adjective \textit{solo} to cleft sentences) and which do not. Cleft occurrences with \textit{solo} and a definite determiner will thus be considered, whereas examples with \textit{solo} and an indefinite determiner will be ruled out as not strictly relevant for our discussion. In clefts such as (87), for instance, \textit{solo} provides a singular-cardinality reading, particularly clear in the context given below because of the singularity/plurality contrast explicitly enforced by \textit{un solo N ‘only one N’, and gli altri N ‘the others’}:

\begin{equation}
\text{(87) Prima c’erano i partiti, tanti partiti: ognuno raccolg}e\text{va una percentuale di voti e la trasformava, appunto in proporzione, in seggi al Parlamento. Stavolta ci sono invece le alleanze, perché in ogni collegio è un solo candidato che vince e gli altri restano a casa qualunque percentuale di voti raccolgano. Basta arrivare secondi e si perde, quindi bisogna allearsi con lo scopo di risultar primi: è la legge, non scritta ma ferrea, del nuovo sistema, la legge delle alleanze. (La Repubblica Corpus)}
\end{equation}

‘In the past there were political parties, a lot of them: each one used to get a vote percentage that was then proportionally transformed into parliamentary seats. Now there are alliances because in every electoral college it is a sole/unique candidate that wins and the others lose [lit. stay at home] regardless of the vote percentage they get.’

\textsuperscript{29} As we have noted before (Section 2.3), we prefer to keep uniqueness and exhaustiveness conceptually separate.

\textsuperscript{30} A systematic semantic analysis of \textit{solo} and the presuppositions of definite and indefinite determiners lie well beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed formal semantic study, we refer to Beaver and Coppock (2012) and Amsili et al. (2002). Although the former is focused on English \textit{sole} and the latter on French \textit{seul}, many of their observations can be applied to \textit{solo} as well. In particular, the aforementioned paraphrase of (86) could be considered a nested presupposition resulting from the existence and uniqueness presuppositions of the definite article (i.e. there is a sole/unique pupil) and the exclusive semantics of the adjective (i.e. the pupil you see came to school; no other pupils came to school), see Amsili et al. (2002). On the other hand, English \textit{sole} and Italian \textit{solo}, accompanied by an indefinite determiner, impose a cardinality-one requirement (Beaver and Coppock 2012). This fact also explains why \textit{sole} and \textit{solo} are not compatible with plural indefinite determiners (*\textit{alcuni soli uomini ‘some sole men’} but only with plural definite determiners (\textit{le sole donne ‘the only women’}; in this case no cardinality-one condition is needed as \textit{solo} is used in its exhaustive value).
4.3.2 The contribution of adjective *solo* to Italian cleft sentences

Similarly to adverbial *only/solo*, the use of adjectival exhaustive operator *solo* in the cleft constituent expresses values and properties not strictly overlapping with the ones conveyed by a bare-cleft. Consider the following examples:

(88) *Lavoro che è formato appunto da un’introduzioneorchestrale, un prologoequattro movimenti sinfonici: “una sinfonia con cori”, la defini Berlioz. Nella prima parte un contralto, un tenore e un piccolo coro commentano insieme all’orchestra la vicenda. Ma è la sola orchestrae esprimere nella seconda parte la tristezza di Romeo, a narrare la scenadal balcone, a dar vita alla tirata di Mercuzio con un incantevole Scherzo che descrive meglio delle parole i capricci della fata Mab. (La Repubblica Corpus)*

‘In the first part a contralto, a tenore and a small choir together with the orchestra accompany the action of the plot. But it is only the orchestra [lit. it is the sole orchestra] that expresses in the second part Romeo’s sadness, that accompanies the balcony scene, that breathes life into Mercutio’s monologue with a delightful Scherzo that describes better than words Queen Mab’s caprice.’

(89) *Le percentuali fornite dall’Istat ci dicono che nel 53,6 per cento delle famiglie italiane sono i componenti di sesso maschile a lavorare. Nel 35% dei casi uomini e donne insieme portano a casa uno stipendio. Mentre soltanto nell’11,5% delle famiglie sono le sole donne a tirare la carretta. (La Repubblica Corpus)*

‘The percentages provided by Istat show that in 53.6% of Italian families it is men [lit. the male component] that work. In 35% of the cases both men and women earn money, whereas only in 11.5% of the families is it only women [lit. is it the sole women] that work.’

In (88), the journalist is describing an opera performance: in the first part, various participants are involved (a contralto, a tenore, a small choir and the orchestra), but in the second part it is only the orchestra doing most of the work (as stressed by the series of coordinated cleft clauses: *that expresses in the second part Romeo’s sadness, that accompanies the balcony scene, that breathes life into Mercutio’s monologue*). By resorting to a cleft clause with *solo*, the writer underlines that the orchestra alone (and no one else, i.e. no alternative NPs) is performing all those actions.
In a bare-cleft such as the one given in (90), the exhaustiveness component is implicit. The most important piece of information expressed in (90) is that the orchestra can be identified as the element performing the relevant actions:

(90) *Ma è l’orchestra a esprimere nella seconda parte la tristezza di Romeo, a narrare la scena dal balcone, a dar vita alla tirata di Mercuzio con un incantevole Scherzo che descrive meglio delle parole i capricci della fata Mab.*

‘But in the second part it is the orchestra that expresses Romeo’s sadness, that accompanies the balcony scene, that breathes life into Mercutio’s monologue with a delightful Scherzo that describes better than words Queen Mab’s caprice.’

A similar situation occurs in (89) and (91), which repeats (89) without *solo*:

(91) *Le percentuali fornite dall’Istat ci dicono che nel 53,6 per cento delle famiglie italiane sono i componenti di sesso maschile a lavorare. Nel 35% dei casi uomini e donne insieme portano a casa uno stipendio. Mentre soltanto nell’11,5% delle famiglie sono le donne a tirare la carretta.*

‘The percentages provided by Istat show that in 53.6% of Italian families it is men [lit. the male component] that work. In 35% of the cases both men and women earn money, whereas only in 11.5% of the families is it women [lit. is it the women] that work.’

In (89), the exhaustiveness component is highlighted and put at the forefront of the message: in 11.5% of families, only women (and no one else!) earn money. In (91), an exhaustive interpretation is available but is implied by the bare-cleft sentence. Once again, the fact that women are to be identified as the ones who earn money is the most basic information conveyed by the bare-cleft. On the basis of this analysis, we can state that adjectival *solo* shows overlapping behaviour with adverbial exhaustive operators as it is used to explicitly assert exhaustiveness in cleft sentences. The only difference with adverbial *only/solo* is the restriction of adjectival scope to the NP (i.e. adjectival *solo* cannot operate on VPs).

Besides shedding light on the contribution of (adverbial and adjectival) restrictive lexical items to cleft semantics, the comparison between *only/-solo-* and bare-clefs also allows us to make some additional remarks on the nature of exhaustiveness within bare-clefs. What emerges is that exhaustiveness does not seem to be conveyed homogeneously by bare-clefs, but that this meaning
component has different degrees of “strength” depending on the specific context in which the cleft occurs. Consider in this respect examples (88) to (91): as we pointed out, while the solo-clefts in (88) and (89) lexically assert exhaustiveness, the bare-clefts in (90) and (91) pragmatically implicate it. In (90) and (91), an exhaustive interpretation is nonetheless “strongly” suggested. In our opinion, strongly implied exhaustiveness may be related to the context of the clefts: in these examples, the relevant alternatives are given in the previous discourse (contralto, tenore, piccolo coro in (90); uomini and uomini e donne insieme in (91)). In addition, a strong contrastive meaning is conveyed by the adversative conjunctions ma ‘but’ in (90) and mentre ‘while’ in (91). An opposition between the cleft constituent and other contextually relevant alternatives is thus explicitly signalled. As a consequence, it is natural to read è l’orchestra ‘it is the orchestra’ in (90) and sono le donne ‘it is women’ in (91) as “it is only the orchestra” (and not the contralto, the tenore and the small choir) and “it is only women” (and not men, nor men and women together).

In other cases, when an explicit contrast between the referent of the cleft constituent and alternatives is not available in the discourse, the exhaustiveness component seems more weakly evoked in bare-clefts. Consider the following examples:

(92) L’immobile, la compagnia, oltre a provvedere al risarcimento del danno alle opere murarie (e al contenuto se previsto in polizza), risarcirà anche le spese per il trasporto delle macerie alla più vicina discarica. Di solito, tale copertura viene prevista nel complesso della polizza, cioè senza supplemento di tariffa. Ma, in genere, la somma massima risarcibile può raggiungere il 5% del danno pattuito per il fabbricato [...] Talvolta, specialmente quando è il solo tetto a bruciare e la discarica non è nelle vicinanze del sinistro, il 5 per cento può dimostrarsi insufficiente a rifondere il danno. (CORIS corpus)

‘Generally speaking, the maximum amount of money refundable can reach 5% of the damage agreed on to the building. Sometimes, especially when it is only the roof that burns and the landfill is not close to the place of the accident, 5% might not be enough to compensate for the damage.’

(93) Talvolta, specialmente quando è il tetto a bruciare e la discarica non è nelle vicinanze del sinistro, il 5 per cento può dimostrarsi insufficiente a rifondere il danno.

‘Sometimes especially when it is the roof that burns and the landfill is not close to the place of the accident, 5% might not be enough to compensate for the damage.’
In (92) and (93), a paradigm of alternatives is not explicitly presented in the context; it is only inferable given the part-whole relation between tetto ‘roof’ and fabbricato ‘building’. The only-cleft points out that the roof alone burns (and not the other parts of the building). The bare-cleft in (93) primarily conveys that the roof is the part of the building that burns and secondarily that it is the only part that burns; as such, exhaustiveness is evoked more weakly in bare-cleft (93) than in bare-clefts (90) and (91). Consequently, as far as the exhaustiveness effect is concerned, the difference between examples (92) and (93) seems more clear-cut than between (88) and (90) and between (89) and (91).

If these observations are on the right track, it appears that the relative “strength” of the exhaustiveness information (i.e. its relative foregroundedness or backgroundedness) shown by bare-clefts can be considered a sign of its inherently pragmatic nature since it can be heavily influenced by specific contextual features.

5 Final remarks and open questions

5.1 Cancellability of exhaustiveness in English and Italian cleft sentences

In this paper, we have shown that also- and anche-clefts may convey (at least) two different readings: a continuative and an additive one. One of the main contributions of our paper has been to provide a unified account of these two readings, mainly by discussing the information status of the cleft constituent as well as the cleft clause. The information structure of continuative and additive also-/anche-clefts is presented in Table 1 (recall that given and new are notions that refer to the discourse status of the denotatum; see footnote 20):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Continuative clefts</th>
<th>Additive clefts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleft constituent</td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleft clause</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Given</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our data have shown that continuative as well as additive also-/anche-clefts are rare: in the ICOCP corpus of journalistic texts, there is not a single example of an also-cleft (out of 95 attested clefts) and there are only three occurrences of
anche-clefts (out of 219 occurrences).\footnote{Because of the scarcity of the data found in the ICOCP corpus, we cannot provide solid evidence to point out a difference between Continuative and Additive clefts. Our corpus data seem to suggest that the latter is more typical than the former. However, from our internet searches, the reverse seems to be true.} It should be noted that one instance of an anche-cleft is clearly the product of translation (from German?), and should perhaps best be discarded, as we do not know what the original structure triggering this cleft was in the first place:


“I think I can assure you that you will get as much help as possible from Germany.” This is what has been declared by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. [...] “We will help you – she said – it will be also the private sector that will intervene.”

The other two occurrences of anche-clefts are similar to each other. They are instances of additive clefts with the cleft constituent conveying a cause (expressed in the form of an adverbial). Here is one example (the other example has been provided in (63)):

(95) Dal 2001 al 2011 amministratore delegato e oggi presidente di Google, Schmidt è un tecnico - si direbbe in gergo politico – o più semplicemente un ingegnere col pallino degli affari, che da Sun Microsystems è passato a Novell, dove ha potuto assaggiare la sconfitta al termine di un lungo braccio di ferro col gigante e concorrente Microsoft. E forse è anche per questo che non solo è stato chiamato a guidare Google, ma a far parte del consiglio di amministrazione di Apple nell’agosto del 2006. (ICOCP, la Repubblica)

‘And maybe it is also for this reason that he was appointed not only to lead Google, but to be part, in August 2006, of Apple’s executive board.’

At this point, we should of course ask ourselves why also-/anche-clefts are rarely found in our data: is this chiefly due to the fact that the exhaustiveness component associated with cleft sentences clashes with the use of additive
particles such as *also* and *anche* or could there be other factors playing a role as well? In order to answer this question properly, we would have to look more closely at other types of additive expressions and their frequency in cleft sentences. Although we do not have a definite answer to this question yet, at least two other factors could be at play in explaining the low frequency of *also-/anche*-clefts. First, their low frequency may result from discourse-related restrictions. As our data suggests, both continuative and additive *also-/anche*-clefts require the occurrence of a cleft (one or more) in the previous context (recall examples (40), (45), (46), (49), (50) in English and (54) in Italian).

The second factor at play in explaining the low frequency of *also-/anche*-clefts is the type of cleft construction this paper has focused on, namely the prototypical cleft: our data shows that additive *also* and *anche* are much more common in other types of clefts, in particular in Italian reversed clefts (*A rubare i biscotti è stata anche Stella* ‘lit. To have stolen the cookies it was also Stella’, a form of cleft that is strikingly similar to pseudo-clefts). A novel question that ought therefore to be addressed in future research is whether different types of cleft constructions pragmatically convey exhaustiveness in different ways and whether this could be related to the position of the cleft constituent within the cleft structure (at the beginning of the construction in prototypical cleft sentences, at the end in Italian reversed cleft sentences).

A closer look at the empirical data collected for this paper also shows that there is a strong asymmetry between subject *also-/anche*-clefts and adverbial *also-/anche*-clefts (expressing a cause, a temporal span, etc.). Two explanations are possible here. In our view, the second one is more convincing than the first one because it is more economical. It holds for the class of adverbials as a whole and is thus not linked to a special semantic type of adverbial.

(i) Like subject clefts, adverbial clefts are identifying constructions and convey exhaustiveness, derived from the identifying meaning (see Section 2). Exhaustiveness can, however, be cancelled by the clefting of adverbials with a specific semantic content. According to Taglicht (1984), these are adverbials expressing a cause: as a cause is “typically partial rather than exhaustive” (Taglicht 1984: 174), a cleft expressing a causal relation does not convey exhaustiveness. This is of course true even if the causal relation is not modified by an additive expression.

(ii) Unlike subject or object clefts, adverbials clefts can be argued to be identifying constructions with weak or no identifying meaning; on this view, exhaustiveness is not even encoded to start with. Consider, for instance, the difference between *It’s you I love/I hate* and *It’s because you are a genius that I love you*; Italian *Sei tu che amo/odio* and *È perché sei un genio che ti amo*. The description of adverbial clefts as weak...
identifying constructions is a hypothesis put forward, among others, by Berretta (1996) for Italian. Similar claims have been made by Declerck (1988: 223) for English: according to this scholar, in what he calls *discontinuous clefts* (which roughly correspond to Prince’s category of “all new clefts”: *It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the weekend*; example from Prince 1978: 898), “there is hardly anything left of their specificational meaning”. This, in turn, explains why these clefts occur more often with an additive expression.

All in all, the most important conclusion here is that cancelling exhaustiveness is difficult and rarely carried out by the additive particles *also* and *anche*. It is clear, however, that in order to assess more precisely the possibility of cancelling exhaustiveness in clefts, we would need to propose the same fine-grained analysis of other additive expressions that can be found in the focus of a cleft, for instance scalar particles/adverbs (such as English *even* – see Declerck 1988: 34 – and Italian *perfino-persino* and *addirittura*) and particularizers (for instance English *mainly*, Italian *soprattutto*).

### 5.2 Reinforcement of exhaustiveness in English and Italian cleft sentences

In contrast with the possibility of cancelling exhaustiveness, there is little discussion in the literature about the possibility of reinforcing it, for instance by using restrictive particles such as *only/solo*. In the studies which do consider *only*-clefts, on the other hand, not much is said about these clefts and their implications for the exhaustiveness component associated with clefts: Declerck (1988: 36) – to our knowledge one of the few authors who devotes some space to this question – notes that *only* can occur in a cleft and describes *only*-clefts as non-redundant. Similarly, Taglicht (1984: 172) quotes Horn (1969: 106) who considers that in a cleft *only* “specifies uniqueness”.

In this paper, we have shown that exhaustive particle and adjectival operators are fully compatible with the semantic structure of cleft sentences: when these restrictive operators modify the cleft constituent, they reinforce the implicature of exhaustiveness in the sense that they make explicit (i.e. assert) an implicit component of the cleft (pragmatically conveyed in a bare-cleft). This reinforcement is responsible for a particular division of labour between bare-clefts and clefts containing an exhaustive operator; for instance, *only*-clefts are preferred to bare-clefts when it is important (or necessary) for contextual reasons to explicitly exclude that the predication holds for alternative values besides the...
cleft constituent. Paradigmatic examples are (77) and (80): in the context of a trial for murder, using the exhaustive adverb *solo* within the cleft can make a difference. In fact, a bare-cleft (in virtue of its specification semantics) would primarily point out the murderer’s identity (*Sono io ad aver ucciso ‘It was me that killed’*) and only secondarily convey that the killer had no accomplices. An *only*-cleft, on the contrary, primarily stresses that the man under suspicion acted alone, explicitly ruling out the involvement of other persons.

In this paper, we have analyzed both adverbial *only/solo* and adjectival *solo* in cleft sentences. As we observed, there is no difference in their semantics and pragmatics, but only a difference in their scope: while exhaustive particles can have scope over either NPs or VPs, the adjective can only take scope over NPs. In view of their similarity, we adopted a unitary analysis for both adverbial and adjective occurrences in clefts. On the basis of our data, we can now also propose a unitary analysis for the information flow of English *only* and Italian *solo*-clefts. As reported in Table 2, *only-/solo*-clefts tend to associate with a cleft constituent that is referentially given (the information status of the cleft clause, on the contrary, can be both given or new):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleft Constituent</th>
<th>Cleft Clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Given (or inferable)</td>
<td>Given/New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the data we collected, it appears that clefts containing adverbial *only* and *solo* are slightly more frequent than the ones with adjectival *solo* (with an exhaustive reading). We found four occurrences of adverbial *solo*-clefts (out of a total of 219 cleft sentences) and two occurrences of adverbial *only*-clefts (out of 95 cleft occurrences) in the ICOCP corpus. Since no adjectival *solo*-cleft was found in the ICOCP corpus, we relied on larger corpora, such as the CORIS corpus of texts (where we found only five adjectival *solo*-clefts out of 1,000 occurrences containing the string “definite article plus adjective *solo*”) and the online corpus *La Repubblica* (where we only found two cleft sentences while looking for occurrences with the definite article plus the adjective *solo*).  

32 Crucially, the CORIS corpus only allows a maximum of 1,000 occurrences of a particular form or string to be viewed (we searched for a string including a definite determiner, i.e. *il, la, lo, l’, i, le, gli ‘the’, together with solo, sola, soli, sole ‘sole’*). Therefore, our results are not based on the entire corpus.
frequency of adjectival *solo*-clefts, but we can suggest the following reasons: on the one hand, there is competition with other exhaustive lexical items (e.g. the adjective *unico* ‘unique’) and the very same adverbial *solo*; on the other hand, analogously to *also*-clefts, restrictive particles might be sensitive to different types of cleft constructions. These are of course mere suggestions: only a future quantitative and qualitative analysis can shed more light on these phenomena.

5.3 On the status of exhaustiveness in English and Italian cleft sentences

The studies reviewed in this paper argue that it is impossible or difficult to cancel exhaustiveness; as a consequence, it is hypothesized that this meaning component must be either a presupposition/conventional implicature or a conversational implicature that is highly conventionalized (this second hypothesis is put forward by Declerck 1988). However, we believe that it would be misleading to conclude that exhaustiveness is semantic rather than pragmatic in nature only on the basis of its cancellability potential. In this paper, we have therefore considered the ways in which exhaustiveness can be both cancelled and reinforced. Our main findings confirm the fact – duly noticed in the literature – that it is hard to cancel exhaustiveness, at least with additive focus particles such as English *also* and Italian *anche* in the focus of prototypical clefts. Our findings, however, also point out something which has largely been unnoticed, namely, that exhaustiveness is easy to reinforce. Consequently, we conclude that exhaustiveness is more difficult to cancel than to reinforce.

From our discussion of the cases in which exhaustiveness can be reinforced by means of English *only* and Italian *solo*, we conclude that this component is necessarily weaker than a presupposition/conventional implicature and propose instead – notably in line with Horn 1981 – that it is expressed

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33 The following fact is worth noting when plural NPs are involved. If we consider out of context NPs such as *i soli uomini* ‘the only men’ vs. *solo gli uomini* ‘only men’, the second possibility sounds slightly more natural (Amsili et al. 2002 note a similar situation in French). Unfortunately, at the moment, we are not able to provide an explanation for this fact.

34 Again, see Horn (1981: 134): “exhaustiveness [is] barely, if at all, cancellable”; for Declerck (1988: 35), exhaustiveness is cancellable only in two specific contexts: when the cleft constituent is preceded by the string *not only* and when it co-occurs with a focus particle such as *chiefly, mainly, primarily*, etc. For Rooth (1999), exhaustiveness in clefts can be removed by expressions such as *in part* or *at least in part*. These observations also make it clear that it is crucial to take other additive particles into account in future research.
as a conversational implicature. Taking into account both facts – i.e. cancellation and reinforcement of exhaustiveness – we thus consider that exhaustiveness is a discrete notion that can have different degrees of prominence depending on the context (see Section 4.3.2). Consequently, depending on pragmatic factors, the difference between bare-clefts and only-clefts can be perceived as more or less clear-cut. This was shown on the basis of examples (90), (91) and (93): when there is a clear opposition between the cleft constituent of a bare-cleft and other alternatives, as in (90) and (91), the exhaustiveness component of the bare-cleft is foregrounded. In other cases, when no explicit contrast is suggested, as in the bare-cleft of (93), exhaustiveness is evoked but in the background. These considerations concerning the relation between a restrictive reading and the context confirm the idea that exhaustiveness in clefts is ultimately pragmatic.

In our view, exhaustiveness follows from the interaction between the specificational semantics of the cleft format (see Section 2.2) and default pragmatic mechanisms. Specifically, following for instance Declerck (1988), we consider that exhaustiveness can be derived as a conversational implicature from the interplay between the specificational component of clefts on the one hand and the Gricean Maxims of Quality (“Try to make your contribution one that is true”, Grice 1975: 152) and Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange”, Grice 1975: 152) on the other hand. According to Declerck (1988: 30), “the Maxim of Quality prescribes that the speaker should specify the correct value(s) for the variable”, while “the Maxim of Quantity prescribes that the speaker should give the complete (exhaustive) list of the values that satisfy the variable”.

By way of conclusion, we would like to make a final cross-linguistic remark. From the data analyzed in this paper, it seems that the nature and strength of the exhaustiveness component is the same in English and Italian clefts. However, cross-linguistic differences cannot be excluded. Identifying potential differences in the degree of strength associated with the exhaustiveness component in English and Italian clefts could for instance be tested through an experimental study along the lines proposed by Destruel (2012).

Acknowledgments: This paper has been written with the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Project PP00P1-133716/1, Italian Constituent Order in a Contrastive Perspective), to which we express our gratitude. We would like to thank Daniel Jacob for having invited us to present our first observations on the subject at the Linguistisches Forschungskolloquium of the Romanisches Seminar.

35 See also the recent formal analysis in Washburn (2011).
of the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität (Freiburg im Breisgau) in May 2012. The discussion following the paper has been a very valuable one. We would also like to thank our colleague Carlo Enrico Roggia for handing us his collection of clefts extracted from the LISUL corpus (a private corpus assembled at the University of Lausanne). Finally, we are indebted to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions, as well as to the editor of *Folia Linguistica*, Hubert Cuyckens, for his careful editing of the manuscript.

**Corpora**

The authentic cleft sentences examined in this article were drawn from a variety of written corpora. Our empirical analysis was, however, mostly based on the following two sources:

(i) The English and Italian subsections of the *Italian Constituent Order in a Contrastive Perspective* (ICOCP) corpus, a collection of written journalistic texts in which 95 English and 219 Italian cleft sentences were attested. The English subpart of the ICOCP corpus includes 425,000 tokens, the Italian subpart 600,000 tokens (for a detailed description of the corpus, see De Cesare et al. 2014: 52–62).

(ii) A collection of 320 Italian cleft sentences extracted from the LISUL corpus (the acronym LISUL stands for *Linguistica italiana sincronica all’università di Losanna*; this is a corpus consisting of roughly 1 million words from different types of written journalistic and academic texts).

As already mentioned in Section 5.2, in order to retrieve Italian adjectival *solo*-clefts (which do not occur either in (i) or in (ii)), we relied on two other much larger corpora:

(iii) The online corpus of the Italian daily *La Repubblica* which contains approximately 380 million tokens. The corpus can be consulted online ([http://dev.ssimit.unibo.it/corpora/corpus.php?path=&name=Repubblica](http://dev.ssimit.unibo.it/corpora/corpus.php?path=&name=Repubblica)).

(iv) The Italian corpus *CORpus di Italiano Scritto* (CORIS) containing approximately 130 million tokens. It is possible to consult this corpus online as well ([http://dslo.unibo.it/coris_ita.html](http://dslo.unibo.it/coris_ita.html)).

Finally, in order to retrieve additional data, we also relied on (v) the Internet via Google searches of specific cleft formats.
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