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Generic substitution, financial interests, and imperfect agency

Rischatsch, Maurus ; Trottmann, Maria ; Zweifel, Peter

In: International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2013, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 115-138

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    Titre
    • Generic substitution, financial interests, and imperfect agency
    Auteur
    • Rischatsch, Maurus. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032, Zurich, Switzerland
    • Trottmann, Maria. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032, Zurich, Switzerland
    • Zweifel, Peter. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032, Zurich, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Anglais
    Publié dans
    • International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2013, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 115-138. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:319788
    Summary
    Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution. In this paper, the importance of prescribing physicians' imperfect agency is tested using the fact that some Swiss jurisdictions allow physicians to dispense drugs on their own account (physician dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We estimate a model of physician drug choice with the help of drug claim data, finding a significant positive association between PD and the use of generics. While this points to imperfect agency, generics are prescribed more often to patients with high copayments or low incomes