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Motivation of politicians and long-term policies

Müller, Markus

In: Public Choice, 2007, vol. 132, no. 3-4, p. 273-289

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    Title
    • Motivation of politicians and long-term policies
    Author
    • Müller, Markus. CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, 8092, Zurich, Switzerland
    Document Type
    • Postprint
    Language
    • English
    Published in
    • Public Choice, 2007, vol. 132, no. 3-4, p. 273-289. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Other Version
    OAI-PMH Identifier
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:314743
    Summary
    We analyze the motivation of politicians in democracies when long-term policies are socially desirable. Politicians receive utility from holding office and from the success of their projects. We refer to the two extreme types of politicians as "populists” and "policy success-seekers”. One result is that inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a politician is of the populist type. When politicians offer incentive contracts, the problem of inefficient decision-making may be solved. The amount of money necessary to induce the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of populism he displays