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Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence onitsdeterminants in Germany

Braendle, Thomas ; Stutzer, Alois

In: Public Choice, 2010, vol. 145, no. 1-2, p. 223-252

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    Title
    • Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence onitsdeterminants in Germany
    Author
    • Braendle, Thomas. University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
    • Stutzer, Alois. University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
    Document Type
    • Postprint
    Language
    • English
    Published in
    • Public Choice, 2010, vol. 145, no. 1-2, p. 223-252. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Other Version
    OAI-PMH Identifier
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:314671
    Summary
    This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the representation of public servants in parliaments generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. We find that a legal incompatibility of a position in the public service and a political mandate decreases and a compensation for having to hold one's office in abeyance increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments