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Federal Stability in Unequal Societies

Hug, Simon

In: Constitutional Political Economy, 2005, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 113-124

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    Titre
    • Federal Stability in Unequal Societies
    Auteur
    • Hug, Simon. Universität Zürich, 8001, Zürich, Switzerland
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Inglese
    Publié dans
    • Constitutional Political Economy, 2005, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 113-124. Kluwer Academic Publishers
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:310192
    Summary
    The stability of federal systems is a thorny issue. Several scholars have attempted to come to grips with this problem and have proposed mechanisms or institutions which may contribute to the stabilization of federal systems. In many instances, however, the underlying mechanisms and micro-foundations are poorly specified. In this paper I build upon existing models dealing with decentralization and secession to incorporate unequal income distributions and externalities of public goods. Based on this some insights may be derived on the appropriate mechanisms to foster federal stability