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On Presentist Perdurantism

Benovksy, Jiri

In: SATS, 2007, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 79-88

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    Titre
    • On Presentist Perdurantism
    Auteur
    • Benovksy, Jiri. Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. jiri@benovsky.com
    Type de document
    • Postprint
    Langue
    • Multilingue
    Publié dans
    • SATS, 2007, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 79-88. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG
    Autre version électronique
    Identifiant OAI-PMH
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:300702
    Summary
    The combination of perdurantism and presentism has an alleged nice advantage: it seems to avoid the ‘no-change objection' to four-dimensionalism (non-presentist perdurantism). The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that this is not true, and that the ‘no-change objection' applies to presentist perdurantism with as much strength as it applies to four-dimensionalism, and secondly, that there are additional difficulties with this view, mainly due to the claim that wholes can have parts that don't exist