

inflections (or changes in the rate of heartbeat), that cast doubt upon the truthfulness of the signal. Information conveyed in the index mode will enter into the image as it is conveyed. It would seem, then, that senders have only very incomplete control over the images produced by their communications, since encoded signal information will be weighted by the recipient, whereas index information is supplied involuntarily.

The most fascinating part of Mr. Jervis's analysis of image production, however, is that devoted to casting doubt upon this conclusion. According to him, image producers have many ways of manipulating both the signal function and the index function of their communications. He discusses these techniques in considerable detail, drawing upon a vast body of literature covering many fields (history, psychology, strategic analysis, and so on).

As to the desirable images themselves, Mr. Jervis mainly stresses two behavioral profile elements as essential to impart: "resolution," the readiness to take high risks, on the one hand, and "peacefulness," lack of aggressive intent, on the other. This definition of the main objectives of communication strategy essentially goes back to the deterrence doctrine of the recent past and thus gives the whole analysis a somewhat dated air. This applies particularly to the discussion of some concrete case material, for example, the Cuban missile crisis. The treatment of the problem of disengagement in Vietnam, contained in the last chapter, however, also contains some remarkably original and apt points. Generally speaking, the study has the merit of providing a number of fresh insights into the way in which the self-projected image of the actors enters into the international interaction process.

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**The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century.** By Roderick Ogley. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1970. Pp. 217. \$8.00.)

It is a most useful endeavor to present the student of international affairs and of modern history with an up-to-date picture of the law and practice of neutrality, since this specific pattern of political behavior of governments and nations does generally not enjoy great sympathy with the medium and great powers, and certainly not in the Anglo Saxon world. It is, therefore, incompletely known. Mr. Ogley, a Lecturer at the University of Sussex, gives such a picture in a new volume of the well known

World Studies Series edited by James Henderson. He proceeds by reproducing selected documents referring to his subject, with a substantial introduction of his own and short introductory remarks to most of the documents.

Documents? Along with such truly documentary materials as extracts from the Hague Convention of 1907, from the very interesting exchange of notes and declarations surrounding the neutralization of Belgium and its violation by Germany in 1914, from speeches and resolutions relative to the policy of neutrality of the USA in the opening phases of the two World Wars, and many similar texts, the author/editor reproduces a great many passages from historical writing and from articles in political journals. This creates a serious imbalance. Whereas documents in the true sense reflect the spirit of the moment and attitudes of the actors involved at the time of their writing and speaking, the historian's and the politician's writings represent a retrospective description of what has happened or what they believe happened or what they would like to happen. The value for the reader, then, depends entirely on the quality of each presentation, and on his ability to situate the writer correctly.

Among Ogley's somewhat haphazard selections from books and magazine articles, some provide a well balanced picture of particular situations of neutrality, such as Ambassador Hägglöf's brilliant notes on Sweden in World War II, or Emile Cammaerts' biography of King Albert I of the Belgians. Others are of altogether different quality: some partisan such as a book by E. Borchard and W. P. Lage on American neutrality (1940), others pleading a specific cause, such as the piece by Max Petitpierre, a former Foreign Minister of Switzerland, urging the world to believe that his thoroughly passive and timid foreign policy had gained a new dimension by simply adding to the traditional concept of neutrality the word "solidarity." To this category of special pleas belongs also the final section of the author's introduction to the book, where he concludes his otherwise objective assessment of legal, economic, strategic, and political factors of neutrality with a plea for a neutral Britain, or where he deals with a chimera such as "civilian defense" in contrast to active resistance to an aggressor.

Ogley groups his material historically, in five parts, beginning with the neutrality of Belgium, passing then to World War I, from there to the days of the League of Nations, to World War II, and finally to the atomic age. This classificatory method is not very helpful when it comes

to show different types of neutrality—permanent neutrality, *ad hoc* neutrality, neutralism, nonbelligerence, nonalignment. The author/editor is most successful when he examines the nature of nonalignment as clearly distinct from neutrality; he describes nonalignment as an offshoot of the Cold War and a policy which does not prevent its authors from being violently partisan in other respects. On the other hand, he is vague when it comes to drawing the boundary between permanent neutrality and a neutral attitude in some particular conflict, or between neutrality and the mere fact of not being actively involved in war. It seems strange, for example, to describe the Soviet Union, bound to Germany by the treaty of 1939, waging war against Finland, as a neutral.

In his own parts of the text, the author gives an excellent account of the strategic conditions of neutrality, explaining how the skillful use of deterrence—using military and economic arguments—is a condition of survival of neutral nations, and what the preferred instruments of deterrence of small nations may be. He seems, however, to contradict himself when he asserts that a guarantee by a great power is the strongest military asset of a neutral, having said himself, in another context, that a guarantee by *one* power would be in contradiction with any policy of neutrality.

Such logical contradictions, along with a few material errors pointing to some lack of familiarity with the subject, and the too narrow choice of titles in the Selected Bibliography limit somewhat the usefulness of the book as a true introduction to an interesting and little known subject. Having pointed to this inherent weakness, the reviewer is glad to endorse fully the author's conclusion, when he writes:

. . . neutrality, far from being an anachronism, is a condition that states are likely to find themselves in, by accident or design, with increasing frequency in the last third of this century. . . . The neutrality that we are likely to see will, then, be a somewhat messy neutrality; its rules may be improvised, and the powerful may be able to disregard them. But there will persist . . . a reluctance of third parties to involve themselves in other's conflicts, which may well lead to a dampening down of these conflicts . . . (p. 205).

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**Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts.** By V. V. Šveics. (New York: Exposition Press, 1970. Pp. 271. \$8.50.)

In recent years the literature of international

relations, which traditionally has been about great-power politics, has been supplemented by a number of useful books about the behavior and role of small states in international politics. While David Vital has spelled out some of the consequences of the material inequality of states for unaligned small nations, Robert L. Rothstein has analyzed the security problems of small powers in alliances. Professor Šveics's concern is with unaligned small nations involved in conflicts with militarily superior powers. Drawing on some older writings about strategy, especially early nineteenth-century German works, and on more recent books about resistance movements (particularly those dealing with reactions to German occupation in the Second World War), he analyzes a variety of unequal conflicts, but notably that between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in August 1968. He concludes that it is perfectly possible for a small nation successfully to defend itself against even a vastly superior military power, provided it knows how to do it and has will-power enough to go through with it.

The way to resist overwhelming force effectively, Professor Šveics argues, is to transfer the struggle from the military to the political level. If the small nation has been defeated militarily and has been occupied by the enemy, the defender should realize that the defeat is no more than an unimportant tactical setback and should continue the struggle politically by resorting to all possible means of noncooperation and resistance. Summoning up its full national strength, the small nation should engage the enemy where *he* is weakest, prevent him from gaining control of the *polis*, erode his grip on the state, and generally intensify the conflict until final victory is secured. Šveics does not claim that the idea of subordinating the military side of the conflict, or stage of the struggle, to the political is new. Indeed, he shows well how the relationship between war and politics was clarified more than one hundred and fifty years ago by A. H. D. von Bülow and Carl von Clausewitz; how the lessons they had drawn from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were almost forgotten in the nineteenth century; how they were taught again by T. E. Lawrence after his experiences with the Arabs; and how they have been put to use in the resistance movements and people's wars of recent decades. Šveics's forcible restatement of ideas which seem as relevant now as ever before is a worthwhile contribution to a subject in which old insights are sometimes forgotten in the search for new theories.

Nevertheless, it is clearly with action rather