

difference between old and new approaches to X.) The work—full of allusions and intertexts—can be read for edification (in popular-philosophical mode), entertainment (an amusing, historically valid realization of symposium-culture) and Socratic *apologia*. The last-named is achieved partly by creating a ‘Golden Age’ in which, for example, Charmides (one of the Thirty—who killed Niceratus and Autolycus) is charming, Lycon (Socrates’ accuser) calls him a real *kaloskagathos*, and the Callias–Autolycus relationship (sordid to contemporary comedians) is uplifting (cf. Ischomachus’ wife in *Oeconomicus*)—the imputation being that people deteriorated when not under Socrates’ influence.

This is largely persuasive, and I end with some stray observations. 1.1 If X. is the only Socratic to make himself or his I-narrator a direct authority and if 1.1 contradicts the historical X’s age, is X. making a joke about other Socratic writers’ pseudo-historicity? 1.4 Callias deprecates generals—but is incited to political service at 8.37–8. This deserves notice, as does the link of *σπουδάρχαις* with *σπουδή/παιδιά* and Callias’ claim to be *σπουδῆς ἄξιον* (1.6). 1.11 H. thinks Philippus only pretends to be uninvited (this is the joke in 1.12). If so, his suggestion that *παῖδα* is Philippus’ stomach loses force; that Philippus has a slave is only inconsistent with his pretend-rôle (and mentioning him is part of the joke). 4.23 That Critobulus is younger than Cleinias adds another twist to the disconcerting way he rehearses his reactions to Cleinias rather than others’ reactions to him. 4.27 Against a simple association of *grammatistes* and elementary education see T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman World* (Cambridge, 1998), 10ff., esp. 12 n. 31. 6–7 We move from silence (6) to uproar (7.1) and a song (unenvisioned in 6.3–4). 6.10 (*ἂν ἂ μὴ δεῖ λέγειν, ἔφη, σιωπᾶς*) is aimed at the Syracusan, and Socrates’ rejection of the entertainment value of scientific problems about light (7.4) is prompted by his comments in 6.6–7 (cf. Socrates’ remarks in 6.7 on divine provision of light and reference to the *phrontistes* tag in 7.2). These connections are under-developed in H. 7.5 H. says the Syracusan exercises artistic freedom in providing the Dionysus–Ariadne scenario. Is he not also getting his own back? Socrates wants something tame and civilized, not excessive gyrations. What the impresario produces provokes the physical sexual feelings which 8 denounces. (Whether this contextualizes or undermines Socrates’ message in 8 is another matter.)

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THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES

R. BODÉÛS: *Aristote: Catégories* (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous la patronage de l’Association Guillaume Budé). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001. Pp. CCXVIII + 321. Cased. ISBN: 2-251-00497-1.

The new Budé *Categories* has a vast introduction, a text with double apparatus and facing translation, miscellaneous notes, three appendixes, and a thematic index.

In the introduction Bodeus urges that *Cat.* is not a lacunose treatment of the ‘categories’; ‘for nothing authorizes us to believe that the original text of our treatise contained accounts of any category whatever after the study of quality’ (p. 141 n. 1).

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Rather, it is an introduction to certain dialectical issues; as such, it exhibits a ‘perfect unity’ (p. XLII n. 2), and its rightful title is *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*.

11b1–8 suggests that *Cat.* originally said something about at least one of the ‘missing’ categories. True, Minio-Paluello wanted the lines transposed to follow 11a14, and that is where B. prints them. (If *P.Oxy.* 2403 shows that the MS order goes back to the third century A.D., that merely proves that the displacement is ancient, p. 284 n. 117; cf. pp. CXL, 140 n. 1.) But the transposition is anything but mandatory. As for the title, Andronicus called the work *Κατηγορίαι*; but no text implies that he invented the name (*pace* pp. XXV, XXVI, XXXIII). Porphyry reports that some had called the work *Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν* (*in Cat.* 56.18–31), and a text deriving from Porphyry shows that this title was known to Andronicus (Boethius, *in Cat.* 263BC). But nothing suggests that it was the standard title before Andronicus. According to Simplicius, Andronicus referred to ‘someone who entitled the book *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*’ (*in Cat.* 379.8–10). But Simplicius’ story is garbled (so B., p. XXVI n. 2—and it would be easy to correct *τοπῶν* to *τοπικῶν*). Ammonius, *in Cat.* 14.20, Olympiodorus, *in Cat.* 22.34, 134.2, 7, Elias, *in Cat.* 132.26, 133.3, 241.30, and Arethas, *in Cat.* 136.12–13 all report the title *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*; but each of these texts is patently confused (see p. XXXIV n. 4). The title *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων* appears in two of the catalogues of Aristotle’s works (DL V 24; [Hesychius], *vit. Arist.* [no. 57]). But there is no reason to identify this with *Cat.* (*pace* pp. XXXIII–XXXIV, LXXII); Alexander knew *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων* as a name for *Top.* A (*in Top.* 5.27–8—B.’s attempt to interpret the text in another way is unpersuasive). There is no case for holding that *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων* was an early title for *Cat.*, let alone the author’s title.

B. has collated the fifty MSS of *Cat.* which are earlier than the fourteenth century (p. IX). He divides them into five families, it being impossible to establish a stemma (p. CLXXIII). Whereas M.-P. adduces only two MSS, B. uses eleven, which he calls ‘the principal witnesses’ (p. CXII). It is irritating that his full account of all this is published elsewhere (p. CXIL n. 1).

In addition to the medieval MSS—and three scraps of papyrus—there is the evidence of the Greek commentaries and of the early translations. B. is more generous than M.-P. in his references to this indirect tradition, but he has a low estimate of its value. (See pp. CLI–CLII; cf. pp. CLXXV, CLXXXII.) He is right to insist that it is often difficult to ascertain exactly what text the tradition supposes (e.g. p. CLVI). But he is wrong when he asserts that, given five independent families of MSS, then ‘rich though it is, the indirect tradition is only useful for the establishment of the text in very rare cases—and even then its utility consists, without exception, in supporting a known reading which looks authentic in its own right’ (p. CLXXVI). M.-P. thought the indirect tradition to be independent of *a*, the archetype of the medieval MSS; hence a reading offered by Porphyry or Boethius is equal in weight, *ceteris paribus*, to all the readings in all the MSS, however many families they constitute. B. agrees that the indirect tradition is independent of *a* (see pp. CLIII, 254, 277; cf. p. CLXVI). He ought therefore to share M.-P.’s evaluation, and in practice, he does. B.’s *Cat.* differs from M.-P.’s in more than 170 places. He claims that this is ‘the effect of the attention which we have given to a far richer MS tradition’ (p. CLXXXIV). But in only four places does B. prefer a MS reading and M.-P. the indirect tradition, and on more than a dozen occasions B. gives more weight to the indirect tradition than does M.-P.

Almost all of B.’s differences from M.-P. are trifling, in that they do not make any difference to the sense (cf. p. CLXXXIII); but the trifles are collectively significant. B. believes that *Cat.* is a ‘scholastic’ text (cf. p. CLXXXV); and so, on principle, he prefers readings which produce repetition or redundancy. If his principle is accepted, then in

at least 125 places he is right against M.-P.—and the result is a *Cat.* distinctly un-Aristotelian in style. But then B. suspects that *Cat.* was not written by Aristotle (pp. CVII–CX). Should we embrace B.'s principle? He supposes it more likely that copyists would drop redundancies and repetitions than that they would introduce them. Given the history of *Cat.*, the latter seems as likely as the former.

Not all of B.'s major disagreements with M.-P. command assent. At 1a2, 4, 7, and 10 he deletes τῆς οὐσίας (after Waitz), claiming to follow the text of Andronicus and Boethus (p. 253 n. 1). According to Porphyry, Boethus did not comment on the phrase, and neither he nor Andronicus paraphrased it: Porphyry infers that it was missing from their MSS (Simplicius, *in Cat.* 29.29–30.5). The inference is frail—the more so inasmuch as Porphyry himself insists that it makes no odds whether you say ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας or simply ὁ λόγος (*in Cat.* 68.15–18). I doubt if the phrase was missing from any ancient MSS. B. transposes 2b5–6b to follow 2a35, claiming the authority of Porphyry (pp. 256–7 n. 15). The lines are redundant, or worse: I cannot see that Porphyry, *in Cat.* 89.16–17, supports their transposition, and Simplicius was right to delete them (*in Cat.* 88.24–9). At 2b11 B. adds δεύτεροι, again claiming to follow Porphyry (pp. 257–8 n. 19): the word appears at *in Cat.* 92.15–16—but in an expansive paraphrase. M.-P., following Cook Wilson, cut 11b8–17. B. agrees, save that he keeps 11b15–16: 'Enough has been said about the kinds which were proposed [τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν]'. He thinks that the kinds are 'the (four) genera which he proposed to examine at 2a11 to 11a38' (p. 142 n. 2, p. 286 n. 124). But *Cat.* has never proposed to examine four kinds, and the author of 11b15–16 is patently thinking of 1b27–8. At 15a16–17, where M.-P. obelizes, B. prints <οὐδὲ ἤ> μείωσις, which he describes as a 'palmary conjecture' (p. 300 n. 171). It is not bad. But I should prefer, for example, αὔξησις ἢ for ἡ αὔξησις.

Under the text there are two apparatuses. The upper one lists testimonies. The list does not purport to be complete (e.g. it omits the citations in Didymus: *CPF* I 1*, pp. 289–92). Moreover, the numerous citations in the CIAG commentaries on *Cat.* are given separately in Appendix I. The disadvantages of this are evident, the advantages less so. The lower apparatus, an *apparatus criticus*, purportedly contains 'only the variants which are most important for the understanding of the text itself' (p. CLXXXI). But B. has a comprehensive idea of what is important. Moreover, the apparatus is positive, and it does not use the family names of the MSS. The result is thick, forbidding, and difficult to consult. Since all the material—and a little more—is repeated in Appendix II, B. would have gained much and lost nothing had he placed a more streamlined apparatus beneath the text. He might then have found room for a few conjectures (e.g. at 1b23–24, or 14a26).

The translation is close—it aspires to the sort of fidelity characteristic of the Clarendon Aristotle series. In particular, B. has decided to translate most of the Greek particles: this makes for heavy—and sometimes misleading—French. Technical terms are usually given their orthodox translations; but 'imputer' etc. for κατηγορεῖν etc. (1b10 *et semper*) is eccentric. ποσόν and ποιόν are generally 'quantité' and 'qualité' (see p. 48 n. 1): this is particularly unfortunate at 3b10 and 20. There is a slip at 8a32–3, where ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά must mean 'something might be said against the point'.

As for the notes, most of them are useful, and some of them are excellent. (But Aristotle does not hold that no individuals have proper names: *Met.* 1035b2–3 refers to individual circles, not to individuals in general.) If their corporate function is unclear, and if their division into footnotes and endnotes—a division based on no exegetical principle and answering to no typographical exigency—is inexcusably exasperating, then B. should not be held responsible for the foibles of Budé.

B.'s edition represents a vast labour and presents a vast number of facts. It does not replace M.-P.'s OCT; but it may stand alongside that remarkable text.

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DICAEARCHUS

W. W. FORTENBAUGH, E. SCHÜTRUMPF (edd.): *Dicaearchus of Messana. Text, Translation, and Discussion*. (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 10.) Pp. viii + 389. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001. Cased, £58.95. ISBN: 0-7658-0093-4.

D[icaearchus] did not share the encyclopaedic interests of his master, Aristotle; but his philosophical voice is more distinctive than that of some of Aristotle's followers, and adds variety and depth to our picture of the early Lyceum. The present volume (which follows the editors' *Demetrius of Phalerum* in the same series) supersedes Wehrli's 1944 collection of D.'s fragments by presenting an improved edition of the sources, and a series of ten discursive essays by a distinguished international team of scholars. The edition is by M[irhady]: it starts with a list of book-titles attested for D., provides more contextual material than Wehrli, and adds three substantial new sources. There is a facing English translation (which just occasionally veers into solecism, but is generally elegant and accurate). M.'s 'fundamental criterion of inclusion' is strict: that D. is named in the text (normally, at least; as it happens this is not true of any of the three 'new' fragments). But the great virtue of the volume's arrangement is that more speculative attributions can be covered as well in the essays—where there is more room to discuss their claims.

D. is best known for his contributions to psychology and historical anthropology, and both topics receive multiple treatment in this volume. Sharples and Caston try, in a paper each, to pin down D.'s psychological position, and to square what is certain, that D. denied that the soul was substantially distinct from the body, with trickier evidence that he explained certain forms of divination by the activity of the soul *outside* the body (Source 31A, from Cicero). Sharples inclines towards an emergent view of the Dicaearchan soul according to which it is not independent of the body, but does have causal efficacy over it. His caution in approaching the evidence is well taken; though I am attracted to Caston's argument in favour of a 'bold' epiphenomenalism, a soul which is perfectly reliant on the body and is causally inefficacious. Caston relies for a solution of the apparent contradiction in the claim that the soul could operate outside the body on a nice point (that the crucial claim in the crucial source comes in the mouth of an interlocutor); Sharples, on the other hand, reaches the pessimistic conclusion that insolubility is built into the poor quality of the evidence possessed, and supplied, by Cicero.

D.'s *Life of Greece* and the history of civilization it presents is the subject of discussions by Saunders, Schütrumpf, and Ax. (Ax is interested in the work's influence on Varro, but also has careful and extremely useful discussions of matters such as its title, genre, and theme.) The traditional view of the work has D. argue for the decline of mankind from a 'golden age', but Saunders and Ax both challenge this view, and reconstruct for D. a theory which both describe with a phrase borrowed from Bernhard Reischl: 'ambivalente Aszendenztheorie'. It is true, they say, that