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Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers

KOLMAR, MARTIN ; MEIER, VOLKER

In: Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2012, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 531-548

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    Titel
    • Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers
    Autor
    • KOLMAR, MARTIN. University of St. Gallen and CESifo (Kolmar), University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research and CESifo (Meier)
    • MEIER, VOLKER. University of St. Gallen and CESifo (Kolmar), University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research and CESifo (Meier)
    Dokumententyp
    • Postprint
    Sprache
    • Englisch
    Veröffentlicht in
    • Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2012, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 531-548. Cambridge University Press
    Andere elektronische Ausgabe
    OAI-PMH-ID
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:292607
    Summary
    In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization