In: Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 2015, vol. 29, no. 4, p. 337-363
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In: Journal of Clinical Monitoring and Computing, 2015, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 377-383
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In: Formal Methods in System Design, 2015, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 262-285
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(Working Papers SES ; 522)
We conduct a field experiment with remote workers to assess potential adverse effects of monitoring. We find that monitoring reduces the average performance of workers, in particular among the intrinsically motivated workforce. Moreover, monitoring cultivates the average worker: There are fewer high performers and the variance in performance is significantly reduced. Importantly, we show that...
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In: The journal of legal studies, 2016, vol. 45, no. 2, p. 331-366
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. Thereby, it can observe the number of detected offenders but not the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent or the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. When several monitoring intensities lead to an observationally identical outcome, only the...
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In: European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 2014, vol. 70, no. 2, p. 215-223
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In: Conservation Genetics, 2014, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 1219-1230
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In: Sozial- und Präventivmedizin, 2002, vol. 47, no. 1, p. 33-38
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In: Brain Topography, 2008, vol. 20, no. 4, p. 224-231
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