Università della Svizzera italiana

Quid pro quo in IPOs : why book-building is dominating auctions

Degeorge, François ; Derrien, François ; Womack, Kent L.

The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors hascaptured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the auction mechanism. This paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of book-building and auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the...

Università della Svizzera italiana

Vers une analyse financière indépendante?

Degeorge, François

In: Revue d'économie financière, 2005, vol. 79, p. 221-227

We analyze financial analysts’ activities and their added value, the pressures on analyst independence, and the 2002 Global Agreement in the U.S. and its impact on independent financial analysis. Financial analysts are potentially confronted with many pressures on their independence. These pressures are inherent to the multiplicity of their activities, and are not necessarily due to conflicts...

Università della Svizzera italiana

Selling company shares to reluctant employees : France telecom's experience

Degeorge, François ; Jenter, Dirk ; Moel, Alberto ; Tufano, Peter

In: Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, vol. 71, p. 169-210

In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees' decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with our neoclassical model. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible...

Università della Svizzera italiana

The ecology of risk taking

Degeorge, François ; Moselle, Boaz ; Zeckhauser, Richard

In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2004, vol. 28, p. 195-228

We analyze the risk level chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality. We show that even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their reputation in the market, and that such choices will be influenced by the mix of other agents’ types. Assuming that the market has no strong prior about whether the agents are good or bad, good agents will choose...