In: Synthese, 2016, p. 1-16
David Lewis famously endorsed Unrestricted Composition. His defense of such a controversial principle builds on the alleged innocence of mereology. This innocence defense has come under different attacks in the last decades. In this paper I pursue another line of defense, that stems from some early remarks by van Inwagen. I argue that Unrestricted Composition leads to a better metaphysics. In...
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In: Erkenntnis, 2016, vol. 81, no. 6, p. 1173-1194
In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses (at least those who do not simply deny the metaphysical import of empirical data and their proposed interpretation)...
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In: Philosophy Compass, 2016, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 102-120
Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is ‘spacetime unitism’ (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different...
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In: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2013, vol. 8, p. 332-350
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In: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2015, vol. 9, p. 376-389
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In: Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic: Present and Past – Essays in Honour of Peter Simons, 2015, vol. 91, p. 3-15
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In: Thought, A Journal of Philosophy, 2015, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 19-27
We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that,...
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In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2016, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 103-122
Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual...
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In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2014, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 31-59
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In: Travaux du Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques, 1981, vol. 39, p. 35-58
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