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  • Inglese (4) disattivare il filtro

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Parola chiave

    Université de Fribourg

    Taking a shower in Youth Hostels: risks and delights of heterogeneity

    Matzke, Christina ; Challet, Damien

    Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. Heterogeneity allows...

    Université de Fribourg

    The therapy to shock therapy: optimal dynamical policies for transition economies

    Challet, Damien ; Solomon, Sorin ; Yaari, Gur

    We show that a simple model reproduces very closely the evolution of the GDP in constant dollars of many countries during the times of recession and recovery. A theoretical analysis illustrates how an optimal dynamical policy reduces both recession duration and severity, and increases the value of GDP at all times. We propose a criterion to distinguish a posteriori a dynamical policy from a...

    Université de Fribourg

    Fat tails, long memory, maturity and ageing in open-source software projects

    Challet, Damien ; Valverde, Sergi

    We report activity data analysis on several open source software projects, focusing on time between modifications and on the number of files modified at once. Both have fat-tailed distributions, long-term memory, and display systematic non-trivial cross-correlations, suggesting that quiet periods are followed by cascading modifications. In addition the maturity of a software project can be...

    Université de Fribourg

    Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting

    Challet, Damien ; De Martino, Andrea ; Marsili, Matteo

    In: Journal of Statistical Mecanics, Theory and Experiment (2008) L04004

    We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise...