Working papers SES

Working papers SES
La collection des Working Papers SES est une série de cahiers de recherche présentant les différents travaux menés au sein de la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l'Université de Fribourg (Suisse). Cette collection existe depuis 1980 et les thèmes abordés reflètent les différentes orientations scientifiques des membres de la Faculté: économie politique, gestion d'entreprise, informatique de gestion, méthodes quantitatives, sciences sociales et sciences des médias et de la communication. Le contenu de ces travaux n'engage que la responsabilité de leurs auteurs.
Université de Fribourg

What if dividends were tax-exempt? : evidence from a natural experiment

Isakov, Dušan ; Pérignon, Christophe ; Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe

(Working Papers SES ; 498)

We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policy of listed firms and discuss their implications for agency problems. To do so, we exploit a unique setting in Switzerland where some, but not all, firms were suddenly able to pay tax-exempted dividends to their shareholders following the corporate tax reform of 2011. Using a difference-in-differences specification, we...

Université de Fribourg

Do not wake sleeping dogs: Pay-out policies in founding family firms

Isakov, Dušan ; Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe

(Working Papers SES ; 443)

This article examines founding family influence on pay-out policies for Swiss listed firms over the period 2003-2010. We find that founding family firms have higher dividends and total pay-outs than non-family firms. There is no significant difference between stock repurchases for the two types of firms. We show that specific firm characteristics such as active involvement of family members, the...

Université de Fribourg

Are Founding Families Special Blockholders ? An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance

Isakov, Dušan ; Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe

(Working Papers SES ; 428)

This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family shareholders have a real incentive to reduce agency costs whereas non-family blockholders are similar to widely held companies. Our results...