Working papers SES

Working papers SES
La collection des Working Papers SES est une série de cahiers de recherche présentant les différents travaux menés au sein de la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l'Université de Fribourg (Suisse). Cette collection existe depuis 1980 et les thèmes abordés reflètent les différentes orientations scientifiques des membres de la Faculté: économie politique, gestion d'entreprise, informatique de gestion, méthodes quantitatives, sciences sociales et sciences des médias et de la communication. Le contenu de ces travaux n'engage que la responsabilité de leurs auteurs.
Université de Fribourg

Peer effects on perseverance

Buechel, Berno ; Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Petersen, Julia

(Working Papers SES ; 488)

Successful performance – be it in school, at the job, or in sports activities – requires perseverance, i.e., persistent work on a demanding task. We investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment how an individual’s social environment affects perseverance. We find evidence for two kinds of peer effects: being observed by a peer can serve as a commitment device, while observing a peer can...

Université de Fribourg

The strength of weak leaders - an experiment on social influence and social learning in teams

Buechel, Berno ; Klössner, Stefan ; Lochmüller, Martin ; Rauhut, Heiko

(Working Papers SES ; 486)

We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to rather competent...

Université de Fribourg

The swing voter's curse in social networks

Buechel, Berno ; Mechtenberg, Lydia

(Working Papers SES ; 485)

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency of the vote and hence...