Journalists arguing newsmaking decisions on the basis of anticipated audience uptake

A study of argumentation in the newsroom

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“A babbo Alberto e a mamma Leonella, la migliore anticipazione dell’ Infinito che *potessi* desiderare. Se *non* mi aveste fatta, cresciuta e amata incondizionatemente, oggi *non* sarei qui.”

“A tutti i bambini, adolescenti e giovani adulti a cui sembra di aver perso il futuro perché hanno perso i genitori: perché sappiano che *possono* avere gli stessi desideri e gli stessi sogni di tutti gli altri”

“A tutti gli amici che non ce l’hanno fatta: perché sappiano che il loro sacrificio non è stato vano. Vivro’ per voi.”

Abstract

This thesis sets out to explore journalists' anticipatory reasoning on audience uptake, *i.e.* on the ways in which the audience will react to news. In order to reach this goal, I conduct an argumentative analysis of various types of newsroom activities. The analysis sheds light on journalists' reasoning processes concerning audience uptake that lead them to broadcast/publish one certain news item instead of another, or on the way they decide to broadcast/publish a news item, starting from their anticipatory inferences. The adopted corpus consists of data gained from two distinct datasets; *a)* data from a previous project, *Ideè Suisse*, consisting of TV-journalism data in Swiss German and French, and *b)* print-journalism data in Italian collected at the newsroom of *Corriere del Ticino*, the main Italian-language newspaper in Switzerland, in the framework of the project *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product*. The data consist of videotaped editorial conferences, informal and formal journalist discourses, frame interviews, retrospective interviews, news products and source materials. The contextual and argumentative analysis aims at investigating the distinct aspects involved in the anticipation of audience uptake and at investigating the places of reflection (*i.e.* editorial conferences, informal meetings and retrospective interviews) wherein certain kinds of standpoints are at stake and particular aspects of audience uptake are anticipated. The anticipated uptake includes 1) anticipation of an emotive effect, of a news 2) anticipation of a cognitive effect, and 3) anticipation of a persuasion. I sketched a typology of journalists' anticipation of audience uptake in terms of illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary force. On the theoretical level I merge two theories that both aim at studying the human mind from a rational perspective. On the one hand, I use Castelfranchi's theories on anticipation based on the cybernetic notion of goal, while, on the other hand, I use the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2011) for the study of the inferential configuration. I connect the fundamental notions of both theories as in a syllogism. Results have shown the noticeable prominence of anticipation of audience emotive uptake, where the object of journalists' anticipation are the audience emotions. This type of anticipation can be intertwined with cognitive audience uptake anticipation and both types have proven to be subordinated to the

anticipation of persuasion, since in the end journalists want to promote public understanding as well as capture audience attention. Results further show that many cases of anticipatory reasoning involved counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning focussing on better unrealized scenarios has been found to occur mostly in evaluative editorial conferences. Whereas counterfactual reasoning focused on worse unrealized scenarios mostly occurs in retrospective interviews in which the journalist justifies the goodness of his editorial choices. Empirical evidence of the relationship between invalidation of expectation and counterfactual reasoning is also provided. Finally, I provide evidence of the argumentative foundations of counterfactual reasoning.

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1. Journalists anticipating audience uptake of a news piece: a key form of collective reasoning for newsmaking and an hitherto unexplored domain of argumentation

1.1 Why studying journalists' anticipatory inferences concerning the audience uptake in the newsroom?

This thesis sets out to explore journalists' anticipation of the audience uptake of news items. Such anticipation constitutes a crucial form of collective reasoning for newsmaking.[1] In this thesis, I will argue that this kind of anticipatory reasoning strongly contributes to determine the way in which news items are chosen, shaped and presented, providing a rich documentation in the form of eight case studies. I provide an argumentative analysis of journalists' anticipatory reasonings in editorial conferences and in other types of interviews, in order to clarify the way in which these kinds of reasoning influence news selection, framing and editing.

Through an analysis of journalists' argumentative discussions in editorial conferences and in other types of newsroom discourses, I will illustrate how journalists accommodate not only their writing style, but also the topics and framing of the news to their audience's anticipated cognitive and emotive demands. All types of anticipatory reasoning, in terms of the configuration of beliefs and goals and in terms of anticipation of the audience uptake (emotive uptake, cognitive uptake, and anticipation of audience persuasion) will be discussed. In doing so, I show that the anticipation of persuasion plays a crucial role in journalists' anticipatory reasoning concerning audience uptake, since most of the other types of anticipation appear to be subordinate to an attempt to influence the beliefs and opinions of the audience about the reported events. Technically speaking, it appears that

[1] The present PhD thesis has been developed within the framework of the project "Argumentation in newsmaking process and product" aimed at examining the role of argumentative practices in newsmaking discourse with special attention paid to the forms of practical argumentation in newsroom decision-making (funded by the SNF (PDFMP1_137181/1, 2012-2015)

journalists attempt to persuade their audiences of their own views on reported events, even if they would only rarely present their activity in that light (typically, only when the production of opinion pieces is concerned). However, journalists' attempts to persuade represent only a part of their aims; indeed, they also aim at conveying a balanced view of the event they are reporting and at enabling readers to build an autonomous opinion about it.

It can be said that journalists construct the presentation of the news in a fashion that is similar to the Pragma-dialectical (P-D) model of strategic maneuvering; journalists give the audience the elements to build an opinion, putting forth standpoints supported by arguments in a reasonable way (conveying a balanced view of the event) and persuading (capturing the audience) at the same time. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Pragma-dialectic strategic maneuvering and journalistic maneuvering; P-D maneuvering presupposes an argumentative discussion, whereas the journalist does not necessarily want to suggest that there is a divergence of opinion regarding what s/he is saying to the audience. In short, the journalistic ideal of "conveying a balanced view to the audience" does not exactly correspond to the P-D ideal of criticality, which consists in solving a difference of opinion on the merits.

The prototypical news style, *i.e.* the way in which journalists present their news in terms of choosing relative topical importance and audience, is included in the idea that journalists are making inferences in an attempt to respond to their audience's demands[2]. In a nutshell, journalists shift their style to make the news more suitable to their audience. Accordingly, as Allan Bell observes, "the basic dimension on which we can examine a speaker's style is therefore a responsive one"[3] (Bell 1991: 105). Traditionally, we can distinguish two types of approaches to studying the way a speaker constructs his or her message for the audience; while Bell's strand of research, focused on audience design,

[2] As a matter of fact, we will see that all levels of a journalist's linguistic choices are concerned.

[3] Audience design parallels closely the principles of the Soviet literary theorist and philosopher of language, Michael Bakhtin. Bakhtin's theoretical framework is based on the dialogic essence of speech and literature: "For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) nothing is more terrible than a lack of response" (Bakhtin 1986: 127). Speaking means giving an answer and eliciting an answer: "An essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to someone, its addressivity" (Bakhtin 1986: 95).

came from a sociolinguistic background applied to journalism and media, a parallel approach arose in social psychology, under the name of accommodation theory. As the latter theory largely accounted for how speakers modify their speech in interpersonal encounters, the context of mass media characterized by an absent audience shows specific accommodative strategies exploiting stereotyped audiences. This state of affairs calls for the consideration of the link between two domains, namely journalism studies and pragmatics.

On the one hand, the research trend concerning the audience uptake in media studies (e.g. Peters 2012, 2013; Witschge 2012, 2013) concentrates on audience demand as a social criterium, and is based on theories aimed at standardizing the pressure of social forces on newsmaking decisions, so that audience demand is considered a simple *criterium* intervening in journalists' newsmaking discussions. On the other hand, pragmatics (e.g. Grice 1969, 1991, 2001; 2004; Recanati 1988, 2003; Sbisà & Turner 2013; Senft 2014) deepens the way in which the speaker benefits from anticipatory reasoning (mostly expectations) regarding the way in which the other speaker will intervene. Nevertheless, pragmatics largely lacks an empirical study of linguistic practices in context.

Therefore, these approaches do not investigate the way journalists concretely reason on the basis of their anticipatory inferences regarding audience uptake in the real life of the news organization.

The argumentative lens I adopted helps to shed light on journalists' reasoning processes concerning audience reactions that lead them to publish a certain news item instead of another, and on the way in which journalists decide to publish a news item, starting from their anticipatory inferences concerning audience reaction. Indeed, an argumentative approach allows us to understand the audience design not just in terms of the abstract mapping of speakers' anticipations concerning the audience uptake, but also in terms of a reasoning process that does not occur solely on an intra-individual level. Rather, the process is worked out publicly on a collective level, through concrete speaking practices within conference meetings. In fact, looking at argued anticipatory strategies in the newsroom provides an important contribution to socio-linguistic research on

newsmaking, and complements the focus that a large share of it places on audience design (e.g. Bell 1984; Bell 1991), and more generally on message design (e.g. O'Keefe 1991). In the next section, I will present and discuss the research questions guiding this study and discuss why it is important to study journalists' anticipation of the audience uptake with an argumentative perspective.

1.2 Why studying journalists' anticipatory inferences concerning the audience uptake in the newsroom? Research questions of this dissertation

How do journalists reason on audience uptake in TV- and print-journalism? In fact, journalists make a typical rhetorical action: they reconstruct how their readers will understand, perceive and use in their opinion formation the news items they produce. This journalist's conception reminds to the figure of the epideictic rhetor; epideictic rhetoric is one of the three branches of rhetoric as delineated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and is employed to praise or blame during ceremonies. The epideictic genre is not addressed to a *kritès*, but rather to a spectator: nevertheless, the spectator is also a *kritès*, since he also needs to make a judgement. As Aristle writes

> Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge (Rhetoric, II, 18, p.263).

In the epideictic rhetorics the object of praise is *to kalon*, whereas the object of blame is *to aiskhorn*. Aristotle deepens many characteristics of *to kalon* as "the honorable,

fine, or noble," but does not deepen the features of *to aiskhron*, "the shameful" (75). He writes: "Let shame be a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into disrespect" (132) (2007).

As previously said, neither traditional pragmatic studies nor media studies are apt to understand the actual reasoning dynamics at stake when journalists reason about the audience uptake in editorial conferences. The present study aims at filling this gap, starting from the fact that journalists' anticipatory reasoning concerning the audience uptake strongly influence their decisions concerning news editing and news selection, and that such anticipatory processes strongly determine the framing given to the news item. From such a hypothesis, a series of questions arise. Is it possible to find evidence of the fact that journalists' anticipatory inferences strongly determine editorial decisions and of the fact that these inferences strongly determine the whole framing given to the whole news? Which kinds of standpoints can be found in association with these anticipatory reasonings and in which places of reflection can we find them? Furthermore, with reference to the way in which journalists' anticipations concerning the audience uptake affect news items, how does the journalist shape the item in a peculiar way, having in mind anticipatory representation of audience's reactions?

This dissertation answers these questions and sheds light on the function of argumentation in journalists' discussions concerning anticipated audience uptake while looking at the degree to which newsroom interactions are argumentative.

Journalists are not neutral providers of news. Rather, they are openly involved agents who take a precise stance (standpoint) on decisions concerning the news to be broadcasted/ published. Ideally, these standpoints should also reflect their newsroom's mission or mandate and respect the commitments imposed by it. This last remark is particularly relevant in the case of media that have a clear public service mandate. Journalists' anticipatory representations are a fundamental part of the decision process in that, they can be used as goals and can guide their behavior. Their reasoning is necessarily anticipatory, since it is guided by the representation of the state of their goal, namely 'reaching a desirable audience uptake' and the present state of affairs (the actual alternatives of news/ of news' details). One hypothesis here is that journalists' anticipatory

representations are strictly bound to their decisions and to their consequent actions. Since journalists' anticipatory reasonings, particularly their expectations concerning their audience's mental states are expected to be crucial for explaining and predicting a large share of their motivations, newsmaking decisions, and planning activities, the first crucial research question, with accompanying sub-questions, are; (**RQ 1**) *How do journalists reason about audience uptake in television and print-journalism before producing news items?* (**RQ1a**) *How do journalists argue about the way in which the audience will react to the news item they will produce?*

In their everyday work, journalists reason in distinct places of reflection, such as formal and informal editorial meetings, that are used to decide crucial details about the editing of a forthcoming news item or to evaluate a past news item. When journalists evaluate a certain news item or decide about which news item to broadcast/publish or discuss the details of a forthcoming item, they advance difference types of standpoints. Observing the distinct standpoints in journalists' reflections concerning audience uptake allows us to understand when and how journalists decide about news editing and news selection. Accordingly, a second research question, with sub-question, arises: (**RQ 2**) *Which types of standpoint do journalists put forth when they anticipate audience uptake?* ***(RQ2a)*** *Is there a correlation between the specific place of reflection, such as evaluative/deliberative formal or informal editorial meetings and a specific kind of standpoint?*

There are different types of anticipation of audience uptake, therefore a third research question arises: **(RQ3)** *Which types of anticipation of audience uptake can we identify?* I hypothesize that in order to anticipate the possible effect of their news items on the audience and to know whether it is reasonable to publish one news item rather than another, journalists attempt to predict distinct aspects of the audience uptake.

Generally speaking, an important starting point for predicting others' behaviours and for interacting in an appropriate way consists in anticipating their future emotions (*e.g.* Salovey and Meyer 1990; Salovey and Grewal 2005). Doing so is a means for predicting their goals, adjusting their behaviours, and consequently influencing them. Accordingly, we can hypothesize that journalists try to predict their audience's reactions by anticipating

their feelings and sensitivity to possible journalistic choices. Accordingly, the third research question arises:

(**RQ 4**) *Which role does anticipation of audience emotive uptake plays in audience uptake oriented argumentative discussions in editorial conferences as well as in other types of data?* I hypothesize that when journalists anticipate the possible audience emotions in reaction to journalistic choices, they attempt to anticipate and predict how the audience emotions may be strengthened or changed as an effect of the journalists' choices about news products; does this attempt enable the journalist to decide which particular perspective should be given to each news item? I hypothesize that this attempt provides an opportunity for critical discussion, but at the same time may present some risks of unfair framing. This concern leads to a sub-research question: (**RQ 4a**) *In which way does audience emotive uptake influence the quality of reporting?* Do journalists have a persuasive intention which acts on the emotion of the audience, by inducing in the audience a judgement of reality that may be false, ambivalent or that simply may not be the only possible?

During the research and the observation of the corpus, I noticed that many anticipatory reasonings were counterfactual reasonings. The crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom has emerged: journalists try to imagine possible alternatives to past audience reactions or future/ hypothetical audience reactions to forthcoming news items concerning events that have already occurred but that may have been different *if*.. .. This has led to a theoretical in-depth-analysis that has enriched the research questions. Therefore, another important research question emerged during the research is: (**RQ 5**) *What role does counterfactual reasoning play in journalists' argumentative discussions centred on audience uptake?*

The type of audience that a journalist has in mind plays a crucial role in determining journalists' topical choices of anticipatory inferences, which may depend on the culture in which both a certain newsroom and a certain audience is embedded. With reference to this, we are compelled to ask ourselves: (**RQ 6**) *Do journalists rely on highly culture-specific shared premises?* Given that previous research has emphasized the importance of what is called the 'shared cognitive environment' (Tindale 2015: 145), for

conducting argumentation, my hypothesis is that journalists often argue using premises that refer to the cultural background of their audience. The type of audience that a journalist has in mind plays a crucial role in determining journalists' topical choices of anticipatory inferences, which may depend on the culture in which both a certain newsroom and a certain audience is embedded.

There are two main conceptions concerning the role of the journalists in news products. While a classic normative view of journalism emphasizes norms of objectivity and neutrality of reporting, downplaying the 'rhetorical' dimension of newsmaking mentioned above, a large literature on journalistic news framing, in contrast, highlights the active role of the journalist in reconfiguring collected information for the production of a certain *news item*, thereby framing it in a particular perspective, capable of activating certain inferences in the audience. To address these contrasting conceptions, another relevant research question needs to be addressed: (**RQ 7**) *Does the observation of journalists' anticipatory reasoning about audience uptake offer elements of an explanation for the news frames adopted by journalists? Specifically, can we trace the news frames underlying the text of news products, the explicit arguments observable in the products, and the stylistic choices made by the journalist to episodes of anticipatory argumentative reasoning?* To answer (**RQ7)** it is necessary to carefully observe the traces left by anticipatory reasoning in final news products. Journalists apply the editorial strategies discussed in the newsroom in their news items. However, it is not always the case that they succeed in so doing, and they may be more or less aware of those failures. Thus, one of my objectives is also to understand whether and how the editorial strategies discussed by journalists in the editorial conference are developed in the news items.

Frame choice can be motivated by persuasive aims (conveying a certain viewpoint consistent with the journalist's or newsroom's values), and, in every case, frames can *de facto* activate inferences in the audience affecting the audience's beliefs in a way that is to some extent predictable and that can be the object of design. Yet, journalists remain committed to norms of objectivity deeply entrenched in their professional ethos. In the thesis I approach anticipatory reasoning looking also at how these two seemingly contradictory perspectives can coexist. In terms of a research question, we can ask: (**RQ**

8) *Do journalists struggle between impressing the audience/capturing its attention and conveying an objective view of the event they are reporting?* My hypothesis is that journalists' struggle between conveying rhetorically constructed news (imposing of a unique distinctive framing) and conveying a balanced view of the event (exigency of checking the frame by testing it with all the available evidence) they are reporting. They may use arguments aiming at neutralizing an unbalanced view of the reported event, thereby opening a space for critical reasoning in a limited resource context like the newsroom. However, it is important to note that in order to influence the audience it is not sufficient to follow their expectations and desires. Rather, it is sometimes necessary to modify their values and emotive reactions. To change the audience's evaluations, it is necessary to create a contradiction between their values and judgements.

Finally, with reference to the way in which journalists handle news sources and transform them into news items, a further research question arises: (**RQ 9**) *Do journalists act as knowledge mediators between their available sources (corporate press releases, interviews to experts or to people involved in a reported event ...) and the audience, framing the whole news taking into consideration the audience uptake? Do journalists want their audience to maintain a critical attitude towards the news that they report? And how is this related to the anticipation of the audience's uptake of an item?* There is a strong connection between the distinct parts of a news items in which the protagonist is the journalist who produced the item. Reported interviews with lay people involved in events or with experts often represent arguments favouring the protagonist's standpoint, *i.e.* the journalist's standpoint.

1.3 Structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 is dedicated to illustrating the data, methodology, and results of the overarching research project *Argumentation in newsmaking processes and products*, within which the present dissertation is situated. The project has investigated the role played by argumentative practices in the newsroom -*i.e.* practices of socialized reasoning and reason-giving in newsmaking discourse and in final news products, showing that argumentation

is a fundamental professional dimension of journalistic practices. To understand the role played by argumentation, many distinct types of data were collected following a methodology called "Progression Analyisis" and were analysed from an argumentative perspective. The data have been transformed into case studies, that confirmed the importance of analysing argumentation at all levels of newsroom activities, from journalists' collective interactions to intermediate and final products, as well as to writing processes.

Chapter 3 provides a state of the art of the literature on newsroom discourse. The chapter is subdivided into sections concerning verbal interaction in the newsroom (3.1 and 3.2), news source material as intermediate texts leading to final news products (3.3), and newswriting (3.4). These studies lay the groundwork for understanding journalists' reasoning in the newsroom.

Since the present work aims at investigating how journalists argue about anticipated audience uptake, and since the data have undergone a contextual and argumentative analysis, **Chapter 4** is devoted to illustrating the adopted theoretical frameworks. In particular, in subsection 4.1 the focus is on the model of communication context provided by Rigotti and Rocci (2006), in subsection 4.2 on explaining the most recent developments of argumentation theory and the argumentative approach known as Extended Pragma-dialectics, while in subsection 4.3 I focus on the theoretical framework used to analyse inferential configurations of the journalists' reasoning, namely the *Argumentum Model of Topics* (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010).

In **Chapter 5** I focus on anticipation, one of the main mental processes on which journalists rely when they reason about how to frame a news item. The first part of the chapter is devoted to illustrating the importance of a goal-based approach for understanding newsroom deliberation (5.1), the importance of anticipatory reasoning in human behaviour (sub-section 5.2) and of the distinct kinds of anticipatory reasoning (sub-section 5.3). Then, in 5.4 I classify the different types of anticipation journalists adopt in terms of audience uptake. Finally, I devote subsection 5.5 to the anticipation of emotions, since it represents the most prominent type of anticipation in my corpus, and subsection 5.6 to the anticipation of persuasion.

The data analysis begins in **Chapter 6**, where I illustrate a case of study involving a journalists' discussion about the way in which the audience could be persuaded to watch a TV-debate by reading an article in the newspaper.

In **Chapter 7** I present a case study wherein journalists anticipate audience interest, which can be characterized as a type of audience emotive uptake. In this case study, the journalists' anticipations rely entirely on past experience. Using these insights, I then deepen the role of past analogy.

At this point of the analysis, since many case studies on anticipatory reasonings were counterfactual reasonings, in **Chapter 8** I define the notion of counterfactual reasoning, and I identify the main triggers of it (8.1 and 8.2). I point at the main determinants of counterfactual content (8.3), and I make a theoretical reflection illustrating the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and argument schemes (8.4). To conclude the chapter, I focus on the relationship between upward counterfactual reasoning and regret (8.5) and downward counterfactual thinking and relief (8.6).

In **Chapter 9** I move from the theoretical to a case study entirely focused on counterfactual reasoning. In this case, during an editorial conference, the journalists anticipate the audience's emotive uptake and want to convey to the audience the emotions that they themselves experience as a result of their counterfactual reasoning. I use this case to show how this can have slightly unfair framing implications for the news item.

Chapter 10 presents a case study in which journalists retrospectively anticipate unrealized better scenarios during the evaluation of an already published item. The negative evaluation of how a past item has been handled leads the journalists to repeatedely use counterfactual reasoning. My analysis shows the functions of counterfactual reasoning when journalists work both individually and collectively.

In **Chapter 11** I survey four short cases illustrating journalists conducting different types of counterfactual reasoning, imagining unrealized better as well as worse scenarios.

The general results of the research are drawn in **Chapter 12**. The examination of the analysed data opens new crucial theoretical questions in the area of anticipation and counterfactual thinking. Specifically, it sheds light on the distinct types of audience uptake in terms of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force (12.2.2.3). Furthermore,

for what concerns counterfactual reasoning, I have given evidence of the argumentative foundations of it (12.1.5). I have also given evidence that counterfactual reasoning is correlated with the shift of verbal tense from past to present, therefore demonstrating that some cases of counterfactual reasoning may prolong the editorial discussion, therefore being productive (12.2.2.2). The study of this topic would be the aim of future developments of the present research (12.3) along with plans to study the role played by personal and interpersonal relationships in newsroom discussions as well as a sketch of a typology of journalists' conflicts.

2. The research project "Argumentation in newsmaking process and product": data, methodology and results

The present dissertation is part of the project *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product*, (PDFMP1_137181/1, 2012-2015), funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. This research project has investigated the role played by argumentative practices in the newsroom occurring both in newsmaking discourse as well as in final news products, showing that argumentation is a fundamental professional dimension of journalistic practices, since it enables to understand which types of reasoning journalists apply when they build their news items and on which basis they do that. The Project has included a doubly comparative perspective, considering different media (radio-television *vs*. print-journalism) in the three main linguistic and cultural areas of Switzerland (German, French and Italian)[4]. The media organizations taken into account are two distinct sections of the public service broadcaster *Schweizer Fernsehen and Télévision Suisse Romande* (henceforth *SRG)* and the leading Italian language newspaper printed in Ticino, *i.e. Il Corriere del Ticino* (henceforth *CdT*), which is partly owned by a non-profit private foundation, which defines its mandate.

The *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product* project represents an ideal prolongation and an addition of the project "Idée Suisse: Language policy, norms and practice as exemplified by Swiss Radio and Television" (NP 56, 2005-2008). On the one side, it is a prolongation since the project relies on the Idée Suisse data, and a new corpus has been gathered using the same method- *i.e.* Progression Analysis. The Idée Suisse corpus comprehends data from three programs of the *Swiss public service television* (*SRG SSR*) in German and French, while data of the new corpus have been gathered at *Corriere del Ticino*, the leading Italian language newspaper in Switzerland. On the other side, the *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product* project brings an added value to the

[4] It has involved researchers from the Università della Svizzera italiana (Andrea Rocci, Marta Zampa, and the author), the University of Lausanne (Marcel Burger, Laura Delaloye Saillen) and the Zurich University of Applied Science (Daniel Perrin).

study carried out in the Idée Suisse project since it involves an argumentative analysis of the corpus.

2.1 Objectives and general structure of the Research Project

Discourse analysis has investigated for a long period print and TV-journalism. The domain of study concerning TV-journalism has mostly investigated *interaction* (Bell and Garret 1998; Clayman and Heritage 2002), whereas studies on print-journalism have mostly investigated the *representational* aspect of news items (Clayman 2008). Recently, a new strand of research on news discourse has appeared, whose aim is to connect the sociological approaches to news products with the linguistic essence of newsmaking processes (Macgilchrist 2007; O'Halloran 2009).

However, these recent studies did not take into account the role of argumentation neither in the processes that lead to newsmaking decisions nor in news products.

Thus, there is little scientific literature on argumentation in journalism domain. Indeed, even though studies dealing in various ways with arguments in the written and broadcast news occur frequently outside the argumentation community, they are spread in distinct fields of linguistics, spanning from Critical Discourse Analysis to computational linguistics, as well as of communications, so that it is impossible to recognize a common scientific debate.

The project *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product* is composed of three different but interweaved studies, in the shape of three different PhD dissertations carried out by the three PhD students involved. All three analyses are based on a common groundwork, which has aimed at investigating argumentation in newsmaking processes (newsroom editorial conferences, journalists' informal discourses, writing strategies…) and in final news products. In order to achieve this aim, the project has investigated the following dimensions of news production chain: (1) institutional mission of the newsroom, (2) newsroom interaction, (3) journalists' writing processes, (4) textual products. More specifically, the project has examined the role of practical argumentation in newsroom decisional processes both at a collective and at an individual level of analysis. For what

concerns individual problem-solving strategies, the three dissertations have investigated also the writing strategies adopted by journalists, in order to understand how much explicit or elicitable arguments have influenced newsmaking decisions and how much newsroom deliberation can be said to be a critical discussion. More specifically, with elicitable arguments I refer to arguments that the researcher has elicited to the journalist whereby specific interviews: this is very useful in order to understand how a journalist reasons and how this way of reasoning accounts for argumentations in the newsroom or for the way in which he anticipates an argumentative exchange with the reader/TV-viewer. Furthermore, the three works analyzed the role of argumentation in final news products and in different genres and desks. As a result of this, the theses shed light on distinct aspects of the role of argumentative practices in the newsroom, which are nevertheless bound by a common concern for the comprehension of the reasoning dynamics that lead journalists to publish certain news instead of others or that lead them to focus on certain details of a certain event instead of others.

2.2 The Swiss public service broadcaster *Schweizer Radio Gesellschaft*

The Swiss national public service broadcaster *Schweizer Radio Gesellschaft* (henceforth SRG) presents certain specific features that make it particularly adapted for the study of argumentation in the context of newsmaking processes. These characteristics are connected to what van Eemeren (2010: 129) calls the "raison d'être of the institution" and to what Rigotti & Rocci (2006: 172) identify as the "shared goals" of the institutional *interaction field*, to which participants are committed in their distinct roles and capacities (Rocci, Perrin and Burger 2012: 11).

Public service broadcasting companies are very powerful in Europe. In Switzerland, *SRG* is the broadcaster with the highest audience ratings. Being a public service institution, *SRG* has the responsibility to fulfill a mandate that involves federal, societal, and cultural aspects. This mandate concerned *promoting social integration by promoting public understanding*. Due to the multilingual nature of Switzerland, *SRG* is obliged to conceive

its mandate also taking into account the linguistic perspective of a multilingual country, which, at a first glance, seems to comprise fostering discourse beyond the language borders. At the same time, *SRG* is a media enterprise, that necessarily undergoes market and competitors. Note, also, that if audience ratings diminish, it would mean that a contact with the public was not properly established; hence, the mandate of promoting public understanding was not fulfilled. These tensions, which were investigated in the *Idée Suisse* project, have been further examined thanks to the argumentative lens in newsmaking processes and products; indeed, thanks to an argumentative analysis it is possible to clearly understand journalists' problem-solving strategies and to make explicit their implicit knowledge (Rocci, Perrin and Burger 2012: 11).

2.3 CDT: A Swiss Italian-language regional newspaper

CdT is the main Italian language newspaper published in Switzerland. It is published in Muzzano (Lugano) by the *Fondazione per il Corriere del Ticino*, in just under 40,000 copies daily and the current amount of readers has been estimated to be over 125,000.

> It employs 50 journalists and about 200 freelancers. One fundamental feature of *CdT* is its commitment to have, at the same time, the function of *local*, *regional* and *national* newspaper. Recently, *CdT* has spread to other media including a free online edition, a TV presence in the programming of the local broadcaster *TeleTicino*, and radio presence on *Radio3*. Moreover, the newspaper presents a weekly *Extra* (Entertainment and Leisure) and the magazine Ticino7. According to commissioned surveys, *CdT* audience includes people of all ages, mainly from the Italian part of Switzerland. *CdT* is owned by a private non-profit foundation. The statutes of the Foundation demand that the newspaper ensure the respect of the essential principle of state secularism ("laicità dello stato") and of the autonomy of its legislative, administrative and educational activities from any authoritative belief and from percepts and rules of any religion. At the same time, the statutes mention the "proper respect" and "special regard" that should be had for the Catholic religion, since it is the most widespread religion of the Ticino Canton. Furthermore, the statutes also state that the newspaper should follow "the research of the positive factors of understanding and cooperation in the political and humanitarian fields,

aimed at promoting peace, justice and mutual help among nations, emphasizing the traditional values of the presence of an independent Switzerland and open to the dialogue among nations" (Rocci, Perrin, Burger 2012: 12).

These statutes originated in a particular cultural humus in which the Ticino Canton was: in 1841 the Liberal-Conservative party was founded after years of long and lacerating political conflicts in Tessin, in order to guarantee the free market economy and reconciliation. In this socio-political context the statutes of *CdT* had been created in order to support the comprehension and dialogue among people. The *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product* project attempted to explain how this socio-political institutional mission, which is deeply anchored in the cultural and political history of the Ticino Canton (Agliati 2003), as I said above, as well as in long-established Swiss values, is currently construed by journalists, also by observing the way in which institutional mission and market pressures are intertwined in the discourse at the distinct levels of the organization. In my dissertation I have investigated this point by looking at journalists' anticipatory reasonings and at the way in which they struggle between conveying a balanced view of the reported news following the institutional mission on the one hand and satisfying the audience demand following market pressures.

2.4 Data and methodology

The research has been carried out partly on the basis of an already established corpus from the *Idèe Suisse* project, and partly on the basis of a corpus established for this project. The corpus inherited from the project Idée Suisse consists of two large datasets collected in 2006 at the two *SRG* units *Schweizer Fernsehen* and *Télévision Suisse Romande.* The more recent dataset has been collected in January 2013 at the newspaper *CdT*.

Data from the *Idée Suisse* project enable the study of argumentative practices in three TV-journalism newsrooms of two distinct linguistic and cultural regions of Switzerland; while the new data collected at *CdT* have enabled us to observe the same

practices in a print-journalism newsroom in the Italian-speaking region. The multiplicity of data enabled comparative multimedia and multilingual studies[5]. This dimension of the project has been important also in my dissertation. Indeed, on the one hand I have taken into account the multilingual perspective in order to understand whether journalists take into account the cultural premises when they anticipate the audience uptake and when they make their topical choices. On the other hand, the main vantage of having collected data from two different types of media has consisted in the possibility of observing how TV- and print-journalism share some characteristics but at the same time diverge for what concerns some phases of the newsmaking process: however, in my work I have not handled this topic which I set out to explore in future research.

Data have been collected applying Progression Analysis (Perrin 2013), a methodology to gather and assess data regarding the context and the shaping of a text, which associates "ethnographic observation, interviews, computer logging, and cue-based retrospective verbalizations to gather linguistic and contextual data" (Perrin 2013: 63). In order to collect data, the organization and journalists under investigation had to give the consent to the video recording and computer logging, privacy and data security had to be guaranteed. The following kinds of data were gathered: *a)* editorial conferences, *i.e.* formal meetings in which journalists discuss the issues of the day which consist in deciding which and how news should be published/broadcasted and in evaluating the adequacy of previous news, *b)* informal discourses, such as journalists' spontaneous discourses on general topics as well as informal desk meetings *c)* frame interviews, *i.e*. interviews led before that the journalist writes the news items which will be analyzed, in order to find out the journalist's culture, instruction, duties and in order to understand his/her function inside the organization, *d)* news products (newspaper articles and TV programs). For what concerns newspaper articles, we have handled distinct genres such as editorials and articles. For what concerns TV-programs, we have looked at the newscasts transmitted in

[5] Bonelli, L, & Luciani, M., 2015, *Pragmatic strategies of empathy in journalistic news items and their influence on arguments' acceptability in the audience: a multilingual and multimodal comparative study,* 14th International Pragmatics Conference, July 26-31 2015, Antwerpen, Belgium.
Perrin, D., Ehrensberger-Dow, M., & Zampa, M. (2016). Translation in the newsroom. Losing voices in multilingual newsflows? Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies.

the German speaking part and in the French speaking part of Switzerland, which belong to prevalently informative genre, and at the program *10vor10*, which is halfway between an informative and an entertainment program. Then, at the level of writing practices, data consists of *e)* retrospective verbal protocol, *i.e.* a review of the writing process exactly after that it had been finished: the researcher interviewed the journalist while showing him the recording of his desktop. This kind of datum is useful since it enables to understand "the decisions that an author could have made in principle" (Perrin 2013: 64). As states D. Perrin, "the RVP is transcribed and then encoded as the author's verbalization of aspects of his or her language awareness: writing strategies and conscious writing practices" (Perrin 2013, 64). Furthermore, another type of data are *f)* review interviews, namely interviews carried out right after the retrospective verbal protocol so that it was possible to sum up what had been done during it and to remark on it. After the data collection phase, a large amount of data belonging to the Italian-language corpus of *Corriere del Ticino* as well as a part of the data from the previously established corpus of the project *Ideè Suisse* has been transcribed and translated. In the Tables 1 and 2, the number of transcriptions and trasnlations done for each type of data (editorial conference, frame interview, review interview, retrospective verbal protocol) and for all interactions is shown.

Table 1. Total amount of transcribed data subdivided for each type of interaction.

TRANSCRIPTIONS

	Editorial conferences	Frame interviews	Review interviews	Informal discourse	Retrospective verbal protocols
CdT Newsroom (Italian)	14	5	5	4	5
Téléjournal newsroom (French)	5	5	5	1	5
Tagesschau	5	5	5	2	5
10vor10	5	5	5	2	5

Table 2. Total amount of translated data subdivided for each type of interaction, newsroom and linguistic area.

TRANSLATIONS

	Editorial conferences	Frame interviews	Review interviews	Informal discourses	Retrospective verbal protocol	Language of translation
CdT Newsroom (Italian)	9	2	2	3	5	English
Téléjournal Newsroom (French)	3	2	2	3	1	English
10vor10 Newsroom (German)	3	2	3	2	2	English
Tagesschau (German)	2	1	1	1	2	English
CdT Newsroom (Italian)	2	3	1	1	3	French

Additionally, a part of transcriptions has been refined according to conversation analytical criteria for interactional and multimodal analysis in order to be apt for a detailed-oriented analysis of argumentation in interaction and for studying the para-verbal and non-verbal dimension of argumentation in the newsmaking process, in a fashion that is typical of multimodality and linguistic ethnography. This part of work has been done by Laura Delaloye for the purposes of her dissertation.

Firstly, the context in which the interaction took place, *i.e.* the newsroom of *Il Corriere del Ticino*, *Tagesschau*, *10vor10* and *Téléjournal*, has been taken into consideration, since the goals of the place in which an interaction takes place strongly influence the argumentation. Different kinds of signals derived from the context and from the text (such as argumentative indicators) allowed the members of the whole project to identify the presence of argumentative discussions in the collected data. Then, the issue at stake for each argumentative discussion identified in all types of data under consideration

and the final and/or intermediate standpoints supported have been identified. Later, the argumentative reconstruction has been carried out; the arguments supporting each standpoint were identified and the structure of argumentation has been delinated by illustrating the way in which the arguments were linked to the standpoints and to each other. In a nutshell, reconstructing argumentation means "representing argumentation in a form which ensures that its structure is represented explicitely, precisely and transparently" (Brun and Betz 2016: 45)[6]. I will explain in detail the model I adopt for making the argumentative analysis in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the inferential analysis of the focal argumentative moves of the argumentative discussion under investigation has been carried out according to *Argumentum Model of Topics* (henceforth AMT, Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010), which I will explain in section 4.3. In short, making an inferential analysis means to analyze the reasoning passage that makes possible to reach a conclusion starting from a given premise[7]. In particular, the AMT method gave the possibility to lay stress on the missing link represented by implicit premises and enabled to shed light on the newsmaking's *endoxa*, *i.e*. the shared and accepted opinions within the journalistic community.

A large amount of data has been already analyzed, and the obtained results are shown in the main publications and presentations to conferences[8]. Many analyses of the data are still ongoing and many publications are in preparation.

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[6] For more details see Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.

[7] For more details on inferential analysis and AMT see Chapter 4, subsection 4.3.

[8] A list of publications resulted from the project can be found here:

Andone, C. and Rocci, A. 2016, "Argumentation in journalism. Professional practices and the public sphere". [Special Issue], *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 5:1.

Andone C. and Rocci, A. 2016, Argumentation in journalism: professional practices and the public sphere, Introduction to the Special Issue 'Argumentation in journalism: professional practices and the public sphere', Journal of Argumentation in Context, 5:1, 1-8.

Burger M. and Delaloye L. 2016, "The Framing of Argumentation in the Making of a Political Editorial: From Normative Expectations to Stylistic Credo of the Journalists" (2016), *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 5 (1), pp. 29-47.

Burger, M. and Perrin, D. 2014, "Ce que le quotidien des journalistes nous dit sur les tension des disours médiatiques" dans, Berthoud Anne-Claude et Marcel Burger (eds.), *Repenser le rôle des pratiques langagières dans la constitution des espaces sociaux contemporains*, Bruxelles, De Boeck, p. 165-194.

Delaloye, L., 2016, "Approche ethnographique et linguistique de l'écriture d'un éditorial", dans A. Touboul, I. Hare, J.M. Rampon, J.F. Tétu (eds.), *Informer avec internet. Reprises et métamorphoses de l'information*, Besançon, Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté.

2.5 Some key results

The analysis of the distinct types of data specified in the previous section (sub-section 2.4) carried out by the members of the project has shown that argumentation is a fundamental professional dimension of journalistic practices, which is evident both in the newsmaking activities as well as in news products. An important result concerns economic-financial journalism: economic-financial journalists often act as argumentative intermediaries between corporate press releases and and the audience. Indeed, whereby argumentation they filter information coming from corporate press releases and propose a balanced view of the reported event, therefore opening a space for critical discussion in the audience's minds (Rocci and Luciani 2016). Furthermore, I have given evidence of the importance of argumentation when journalists attempt to anticipate the audience emotions in editorial conferences; whereby argumentation they decide how to frame the news in such a way to have the best impact possible on the audience (for more details see Chapter 9). In general,

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Delaloye, L. 2015, "Compte-rendu de la conférence Langage et Argumentation 2015", *Studies in communication sciences*, 95, pp. 229-230.

Luciani M., Rocci A. & Zampa M., *Capturing editorial gatekeeping through the analysis of argumentation in editorial conferences*, in Miecznikowski, J., Casoni, M., Christopher, S., Kamber, A., Pandolfi, E.M., Rocci, A. (eds.) (2015). *Norme linguistiche in contesto / Sprachnormen im Kontext / Normes langagières en contexte / Language Norms in Context. Actes du colloque VALS-ASLA 2014 (Lugano, 12-14 février 2014)*. Special issue of *Bulletin suisse de linguistique appliquée* (3 volumes), Volume 2, 215-236.

Luciani, M., 2016, *Journalists' Emotionally Colored Standpoints: A Path Leading to Foster Existing Stereotypes in the Audience?*, in 'Argumentation and reasoned action', Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon 2015, Volume I, 429-452.

Rocci, A., & Luciani, M., 2016, & *Economic-financial journalists as argumentative intermediaries*, *in* Journal of Argumenation in Context, Special Issue Argumentation in Journalism, 88-111.

Zampa, M. 2016. Objectivity in newsmaking: an argumentative perspective. *Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18th-21st May 2016.*

Zampa, Marta, & Perrin, D. (2016). Arguing with oneself. The writing process as an argumentative soliloquy. *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 5(1), 9–28.

ZAMPA, M. (2017). *Argumentation in the newsroom*. Argumentation in context Book Series, edited by Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

the results obtained thanks to the argumentative analysis carried out can be staged at three distinct levels.

At the level of newsroom interaction, the argumentative analysis let emerge two distinct types of editorial conferences, that included different kinds of discussions, revolving around various issues of newsmaking. Firstly, there are deliberative editorial conferences, in which argumentation has proved to be relevant when journalists decide on good journalistic practices. Secondly, there are evaluative editorial conferences, in which argumentation has proved to be relevant when journalists evaluate both general editorial practices (therefore involving standpoints that regard newsmaking routinized practices and polices) and specific past decisions (therefore involving standpoints that regard specific instances of newsmaking). Furthermore, as a result of a fine-grained analysis of newsroom discussions, it has been shown that gatekeeping practices rely on argumentative reasoning, in which news values and other aspects play the role of endoxical premises, therefore contributing to the endoxical function. Moreover, argumentation has proved to be relevant when journalists decide about the framing of a given news item, especially in view of the audience emotive uptake, which strongly influences journalists' editorial decisions. Thanks to the analysis of the inferential structure of arguments, we have been able to look at implicit premises, showing how the connection argument-standpoint is actually realized; loci from final cause have been found to recur frequently in editorial conferences, since deliberative discussions attempt to satisfy institutional goals. Therefore, arguments often draw upon a standpoint's foundation in relation to such goals. Even the frequent occurrence of loci from past analogy has been observed, indeed journalists often rely on past editorial experiences in order to predict future outcomes of editorial choices, therefore arguments often draw upon a standpoint's validity in relation to past experiences. At the level of endoxa shared by the journalists, news values and editorial norms as well as desirable editorial goals have emerged. In this endeavor, multiple relevant results both for studies on argumentation in context and on journalism have been brought by Marta Zampa's thesis on news values as endoxa of newsmaking (Zampa 2015). Results made it possible to see how everyday journalistic practices correspond to the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and how journalists reason from recurrent loci that are

dependent from the institutional preconditions of the newsroom. Moreover, it showed the argumentative role played by news values in journalistic reasoning, as well as the internal complexity of the category, going beyond the classification traditionally considered in the literature. It also showed how journalists do not – as often stated by scholars – act only in a standardized way. On the contrary, they carefully ponder on their decisions, are willing to comply with the mandate of their organization and to produce the best news possible.

At the level of news products, results obtained have shown that journalists edit their argumentation in their news products; indeed, journalists construct their item according to their beliefs and to what they have collectively discussed in editorial conferences. Journalists individually reformulate their source material, which is argumentative and often rhetorically constructed, and its argumentation in the news product. Moreover, it has also been observed that journalists' argumentation in news products can have a strong influence in argumentation in the public sphere, since journalists' argumentation in news products has the power to lead the audience to accept a certain conclusion instead of another in a way that is persuasive *per se*. Indeed, observing all kinds of news products we have observed that journalists construct their news items using arguments in favor of a given standpoint that they themselves support. This has been confirmed thanks to the analysis of writing practices.

At the level of writing processes, the argumentative analysis of retrospective verbal protocols has been useful in order to understand the ways in which the journalist had reasoned about changes that he had made and about certain linguistic choices. The retrospective interviews can be considered as a live soliloquy by the writer, whose decisions may be subject to change, reformulation, questioning and critical evaluation. Argumentation has proved to play a major role in writing processes, being writing practices highly reflective moments in which journalists' inner argumentation emerges. In retrospective interviews, in which journalists argued with themselves, it become clear why journalists had edited some texts and the way in which they reasoned as well as their conscious writing strategies and practices; for instance, in one case of study of the business desk, in the retrospective verbal protocol the journalist had clearly spelled out his difficulty of adopting a critical stance towards the source material. Furthermore, one strand of

research has shed light on journalists' individual decisions concerning an item, for instance providing insights into a writer's conscious decisions that resulted in a coherence problem in his or her text. Multilingual problems in the news have also been investigated (see Perrin et alii 2016). Moreover, writing processes have been observed as an argumentative soliloquy and observed as precious sources for studyin journalists' inner argumentation (see Zampa and Perrin 2016).

By applying Progression analysis and by making an argumentative analysis of the whole intertextual chain of newsmaking processes, some journalists' decisional tensions have emerged, namely *a)* a decisional tension between hard news' genre's rules –such as avoiding authorial involvement- and the will to give a judgement and b) a decisional tension between journalists' will to convey a balanced view of the event and open to the critical discussion on the one hand and the journalists' will to capture audience attention on the other hand.

As a result of this focus of research, a Special Issue on Argumentation in Journalism (see Andone Rocci 2016) was entirely dedicated to journalistic argumentation, focused on the role played by argumentative practices as a precondition for the better understanding of the dynamics of journalism as a profession as well as for comprehending how journalism participates in the creation of the public sphere in contemporary societies, by creating a space where issues pertaining to different domains are reconfigured and are played out publicly. The peculiarities of the economic-financial journalism and the role of argumentation in the business-finance desk were also deeply investigated (see Rocci and Luciani 2016), by looking at how the economic-financial journalist faces the argumentative and persuasive essence of corporate press releases on financial results on which he relies for his reporting. Light was shed on the way in which journalists of the economy desk compose their items, "showing that even within the constrained genre of hard news reporting and despite the epistemic and practical limitations of newsmaking practices the journalist does not renounce to a critical stance towards the argumentation in the source" (Rocci and Luciani 2016: 1).

A slightly different strand of research has focused on the discursive construction of identities in the newsroom domain. One of the main results of this strand concerns the

normative expectations constraining political editorials in the work by Burger and Delaloye (Burger and Delaloye 2016: 1). The authors have adopted an internal perspective focusing on the process of "making" an editorial: "how and why is argumentation constructed and what is at stake with it from the journalistic point of view". Taking into account the editorial conferences where the topic is examined as well as the writing process, the authors have analyzed the "emergent normative expectations and the individual credos of argumentation in the editorial" (Burger and Delaloye 2016: 1). Results have shown how journalists' expectations are embedded in the daily activities at three different levels: the generic, the institutional and the individual level that the journalist has to face.

2.6 Relevance of the present dissertation for project

In this sub-section I highlight the strict relationship between the research questions behind my thesis and behind the project. Firstly, (1) having analyzed argument exchanges concerning journalists' anticipation on the audience uptake in newsmaking processes, the dissertation has considered an audience-oriented activity which is typical of the newsroom; (2) furthermore, the present dissertation has enabled to understand how journalists' reasoning on the audience uptake deals as a starting point for framing news items in a peculiar way, which answers one of the main question of the research project, that sounds 'how do journalists maintain a balance between capturing the audience attention and promoting public understanding, therefore aiming at fulfilling the public mandate?'

Thirdly, (3) the inferential analysis and evaluation of argument schemes has offered the opportunity to understand hidden premises of journalists' arguments concerning audience uptake, therefore revealing their inferential path. To be more specific, the inferential analysis is useful since it enables to understand which values journalists rely on when they anticipate what could produce a positive and a high impact on the audience. Fourthly, (4) the high attention paid to counterfactual reasoning has represented an important point of investigation, since it has enabled to shed light on some important

journalists' reasoning patterns that often include simulative –and *not only* actual-premises. This is in line with one of the main goal of the project, namely that of discovering the most recurrent types of reasoning in newsmaking practices[9], which in turn represents an important contribution to studies on argumentative patterns in argumentation in context[10].

(5) Furthermore, in my dissertation I have investigated how journalists try to find a balance between capturing the audience attention by making a certain framing of the news on the one side and conveying a balanced view of a reported event on the other side.

At a more practical level of contribution to the project, this dissertation may provide interesting suggestions to media professionals for different aspects. In particular, it may offer a better understanding of (a) the processes through which information is selected, represented and adapted to the emotive and cognitive abilities of the audience as well as to their sociological and ideological interpretation; (b) the different phases of the decision-making processes during newsroom editorial conferences; (c) the general coherence of such processes in relation to the declared goals of the media institution and the individual journalists.

[9] Zampa, M. (2017). *Argumentation in the newsroom*, Argumentation in context Book Series, edited by Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

[10] Argumentative patterns can be defined as "a particular constellation of argumentative moves in which in a particular kind of argumentation structure a particular cobination of argument schemes is exploited in defense of a particular type of standpoint" (van Eemeren and Garssen 2013: 7).

3. Newsroom discourse: from editorial conferences to final news products

This chapter is dedicated to discussing the various strands of research on newsroom discourse. As briefly sketched in the Introduction, various disciplines have contributed to the study of newsroom activities that lead to the production of news items; in this chapter a part will be devoted to gatekeeping in newsroom discourse (3.1), one to shed light on how news sources are transformed into news products (3.2), and one to newswriting strategies (3.3).

3.1 The concept of gatekeeping in newsroom discourse

The term "gatekeeping" was coined by the social psychologist Kurt Lewin (Lewin 1947): with this term, he firstly referred to a wife or mother as the person who chooses which aliments can be found on a family's table. Even though Lewin firstly applied the concept of gatekeeping to the food chain, afterwards he focused on the news media. According to him, the gatekeeping process in the news media consists in the way in which news items flow through communication paths. The gatekeeper is the person who chooses what shall proceed through each gate section in any process. Lewin's gatekeeping concept can be traced back to his work on social planning and is conceived as an individual matter (1947); "in any organizational environment a singular decision-maker functions as *the* gatekeeper, and the primary phenomenon of interest is that gatekeeper's 'psychology'-presumably, the attitudes and values favoring certain choices over others" (179).

On the contrary, the sociological perspective emphasized criteria of newsworthiness that act as selection criteria, conducting editors as they choose which stories will be apt to be published. Newsroom decisions are bound either to the reporter's innate and impulsive tendency to choose the most apt news or to stardandized conducts (Gieber 1964; White

1964 [1950]) filtering the information to be conveyed to the audience. In these sociological appraoches journalists are conceived as actors that carry out standardized logics and that undergo market pressures. Thus, in this perspective journalists are conceived as machines that produce news in a purely mechanistic way.

More recently, some studies in sociology and media linguistics introduced a new perspective, suggesting that real life dynamics of a newsroom may be understood only by observing all kinds of interactions of newsroom activities from the editorial conferences to the final news products (Clayman and Reisner 1998; van Hout and Jacobs 2008; Perrin 2013). The way in which journalists reason when they build a news have not been examined until now, except for researches coming from the *Argumentation in newsmaking process and product project* (illustrated in Chapter 2); and in particular, the ways in which journalists reason when they customize their news for their audience have not yet been investigated in argumentative terms, except for the attempts made in this dissertation. This study owes much to Clayman and Reisner' s paper (Clayman and Reisner 1998) who clearly state that abstract criteria of newsworthiness "tend to have weak predictive value [in order to understand news selection processes], and they do not fully explain actual selection decision" (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 179). Furthermore, the authors highlight the need for an analysis of interaction in the newsroom and they also maintain that

> journalists' reasoning process does not take place exclusively within editors' minds; it is worked out publicly, through concrete speaking practices embedded in courses of interaction within conference meetings. To describe, evaluate and select stories is to engage in basic forms of social action that remain largely unexamined in the newsroom context (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 180).

The authors deepen the concept of gatekeeping: Who is responsible for choosing news stories? In which way are they selected and in which way are they evaluated as appropriate in order gain the prominency given by the front page? The sociology of news media has long dealt with these issues; indeed, they are connected to the fact "that journalists work within a complex institutional and cultural environment that leaves its imprint on the daily news" (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 196). According to the authors, the way in which stories are selected and adapted to a certain audience can be understood

only by studying the ongoing newsmaking practices actually at stake in a newsroom. Furthermore, Clayman and Reisner's analysis is implicitly close to the focus of the present dissertation, since it implicitly recalls the concept of anticipation of audience uptake; indeed, it focuses on the way in which journalists judge news stories as more or less newsworthy *for a certain audience*, so that the salience of a certain news story is more or less implicitly established on the basis of the anticipated audience uptake.

Some scholars have pointed to newsroom interaction as journalists' elective site for taking decisions on news production (e.g. Shoemaker 1991; Tuchman 1978); however, they only point to the important role played by newsroom interaction, without deeply analyzing it. On the contrary, Clayman and Reisner (1998) go one step further and analyze editorial conferences in detail. They adopt a sociological approach, inspired in part by Conversation Analysis (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 2007). The authors concentrate on gatekeeping practices in editorial conferences, classifying distinct journalistic strategies aiming at fostering news stories for page one and at analyzing how journalists ascribe newsworthiness to news stories.

As a result of their empirical investigation conducted in the newsrooms of eight American daily newspapers, Clayman and Reisner state that gatekeeping is a "reasoning process" which is "worked out publicly, through concrete speaking practices embedded in course of interaction within conference meetings" (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 180). Indeed, during editorial conferences journalists decide which stories can 'pass' and are therefore suitable for publication. Clayman and Reisner point at the presence of specific phases of the editorial conference, that they label as *preliminaries*, *story review*, *story selection*, *aftermath*. During the preliminaries phase, the editorial team simply sets the conditions for the newsroom activities, such as controlling that all involved personell is present and introducing guests. In the second phase, the editorial team summarizes and reviews the most important stories of each section. Reactions to stories' summaries come primarily from the managing editors, who initiate the vast majority of responses, although the frequency of responses varies greatly from newspaper to newspaper. The authors observe that at smaller newspapers managing editors 'usually do not comment on the

newsworthiness of particular stories, but they may offer forms of acknowledgement, probe for further details, make suggestions regarding angles to be pursued, facts to be verified'.

In the third phase, the authors observe that journalists begin to talk about how the stories should be disposed in the newspaper, and in particular about which stories should gain prominence on the first page. On the contrary, in the empirical part of my dissertation, I will show some examples of story selection and of story's details selection that do not deal with selection for page one but rather with news' selection for overall media coverage. And then, in the closing phase, the *aftermath*, journalists may have some additional spontaneous conversations before going back to their activities.

In the passages of editorial conferences analyzed by Clayman and Reisner (1998: 185), the discussions mainly focused on newsworthiness assessment for page one stories, in order to reach the main aim of their study. On the contrary, the cases analyzed in my research deal with journalists' interpretations on which news story may be good in view of the audience uptake. During editorial conferences journalists establish which facts of a story are newsworthy for a certain audience and try to imagine what reaction a given story or a given detail of a story could produce in the audience.

There is a certain difference for what concerns newsworthiness assessment depending on print- and TV- journalism (Zampa 2015: 137). Even though editorial conferences are quite similarly organized both in different media and in distinct nations (cf. Clayman and Reisner 1998; Cotter 2010), some diversities bound to the medium can be noticed with reference to journalists' way of anticipating audience uptake in editorial conference discussions analysed in this dissertation. In television editorial conferences, journalists devote a great amount of the editorial conference thinking aloud about the distinct alternatives and try to anticipate which would be the best alternative to choose. These exclusion-of-the-alternatives phase is also devoted to establish a hierarchy of salience of events that could at the same time better capture the audience and fulfill the program's mandate; at this stage journalists attempt to frame their stories in such a way that suits with the audience cognitive and emotive expectations. In this case we face a shared and inter-individual decision-making process, whilst in the case of print-journalism, journalists arrive to the editorial conference with already individually taken

decisions, so that the editorial conference's function is mainly to share an *a priori* taken decision and profit from further discussion (Zampa 2015: 138). Furthermore, as also stated by Zampa (Zampa 2015)

> TV journalists check what other programs of the same media organization did on the topic and how they presented it in more detail than newspaper journalists. Crosschecking between different media also takes place. At television, avoiding repetition with respects to what has already been broadcasted is an earnest concern, whereas they more easily get around dealing with others' prerogatives when they can make an exclusive out of it (Zampa 2015: 138).

Differently, at a newspaper each journalist is specialized in a precise topic depending on the specific desk in which the journalist works; the functions of the participants to the discussion are clearly defined and the issues strictly depend on the type of desk. Consequently, discussions in newspaper newsrooms often consist of dialogues between the journalist in charge of the editorial conference and the journalist of a certain desk. The other journalists are seen simply as "auditors" [(Bell 1984)], namely "known, ratified but unaddressed participants, who can nevertheless intervene in the discussion" (Zampa 2015: 138).

3.2 The interactional approach to gatekeeping

I am indebted to Clayman and Reisner's innovative study (1998), since they argue in favor of an interactional approach to gatekeeping. Furthermore, they explicitly consider the role played by the context and they implicitly take into account the audience uptake as a parameter on which much newsmaking decisions processes are based. However, my work goes one step further than Clayman and Reisner's interactional approach on gatekeeping. Indeed, this study follows their point of view, but also marks an improvement in two directions. Firstly, it helps us in understanding journalists' actual reasoning processes at stake in editorial conferences, which provides first evidence to react to the authors' demand for "further research […] necessary to specify the relative importance of criterial

news values" (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 197). As a result of an in-depth study of newsroom discussions, I will show the argumentative basis of newsroom decision-making processes. Secondly, this study provides a more focused and precise insight on those individual and collective journalistic reasonings that concern anticipation of the audience uptake.

It is interesting to notice that even though Clayman and Reisner do not explicitly speak of argumentation, they hint at it when they delineate how the editorial team decides which stories can be defined newsworthy and which not; the authors use terms such as *justify*, *defend*, *provide evidence, criticism, justificatory account, defensive move* when they speak about journalists taking decisions, in a fashion that is similar to argumentation scholars when they speak of participants' argumentative moves in argumentative discussions.

Clayman and Reisner concentrate on the stories that deserve consideration for the front-page placement; they show that the participants display an adherence to this norm when it is broken- that is when the salience of an item being offered for review is in doubt. The managing editor, for example, may disapprove an editor who pays too much attention to material that does *not* seem suitable for the front page.

The authors look at journalists' orientation to page one: the authors show an example in which when the managing editor asks the city editor about a particular story not mentioned in his review, the city editor explains its absence by reference to the expectation that only page-one candidates warrant inclusion in the review. Similarly, but also very differently, my research will focus on journalists' expectation that only candidate news that are appropriate for a certain audience may be included in a newspaper/Tv-program.

Furthermore, the authors point at the fact that the focal point of editorial conferences is not the phase of stories' summarizing, but rather they claim that it is the third phase in which stories summaries are commented, motivated and fostered: as they say, "summarized stories are being offered, and are understood as being offered, as candidates for the front page" (185). Journalists promote their summarized stories as means that potentially enable to capture the audience, therefore as means that enable a desirable goal for the whole newsroom.

When journalists promote stories they have in mind an imagined audience, and the system of values that enable to judge a certain story as good for a certain audience is shared by the whole journalistic team. The authors often use terms such as *importance* and *significance* to refer to a news, therefore frequently emphasizing the concept of salience of a news: nevertheless, they do not say *with respect to what and/or to whom* a story should be *important* and an event *significant*. Obviously, the significance of an event and the importance of a news are assessed with reference to the audience: indeed, an event is significant for the journalists in view of the audience uptake and a news is important in view of the audience uptake. Therefore, stressing the role of audience uptake anticipation is crucial in order to understand how a story is presented and fostered, which in turn is crucial for understanding the gatekeeping process. The authors identify three types of journalists' promotional practices; *a)* one promotional practice may concern the positioning of a given story within the review phase. Editors may classify their evaluations in a way that enables to start with those stories they consider to be prominent, whereas they may present subsequent stories in order of decreasing prominence, *b)* a second promotional practice concerns the design of the story summary itself. Peculiar facts may be singled out, defined, and framed in such a way that stresses the novelty, impact, and/or significance of the events delineated in the story, *c)* another promotional practice concerns stories' promotion by means of explicit evaluative stancing. Editors may go beyond the specific facts of the story and comment explicitly on the story's appropriateness for the front page. More specifically, these comments concern assessments of newsworthiness.

The authors focus on the most important type of journalists' evaluation, namely on assessments of newsworthiness; assessments are occasionally introduced in the midst of a story summary, and these internal assessments do not concern the whole story, but rather particular facts about the story. Therefore, the referent of each assessment may not be the whole story, but rather a particular fact with which the story is associated. Journalists concentrate on the parts of the story that they believe to be significant for a certain audience, indeed the assessment terms used are all variants of *interesting*, *good*, *good read*, which presuppose an interest and a goodness for an audience.

For what concerns assessments of judgement, they tend to be favorable in character, but only *mildly* favorable, so that stories are considered *fairly interesting*, *pretty good*, *fairly important*; this is an interesting evidence, since it indicates a certain degree of uncertainty in journalists for what concerns a future audience uptake, that may be anticipated but that can never be predicted in a clear way.

On the contrary, strongly favorable assessments are often justified by many arguments, since there are more clear grounds that enable to predict a positive audience uptake (190).

For what concerns unfavorable assessments, they are framed as characterizing the speaker's own perspective or attitude towards the story (*e.g. I am not hugely enthusiastic*). This contrasts sharply with the design of favorable assessments, which directly characterize the story itself (*e.g. it's a good story*). Potentially newsworthy good read stories are thought for an audience: the role of subject of the story (the story is a *good read*..) emphasizes the story's inclination to be spread to the audience, whereas the passive role attributed to stories in unfavorable assessments emphasizes the subjective feeling of the journalist and shifts the attention from the potential audience uptake to the subjective perception that the news is not apt for a certain audience.

Another interesting point of Clayman and Reisner's work is the authors' hint at the anticipatory behavior in the newsroom, even though they focus on journalists' anticipation concerning the other journalists as an audience: in fact, the scholars notice that journalists' "justificatory accounts in particular seem designed to head off anticipated resistance" (191). Similarly, but differently, the focus of my research will deal with journalists' anticipatory behavior concerning the audience uptake, that I will deepen (from a theoretical point of view) in Chapter 4.

The authors underlie that journalists' both stronger and weaker endorsements are offered much more cautiously, with justificatory accounts, markers of subjectivity, and distinct forms of mitigation. Some of these features may be efforts to make the assessment less vulnerable to criticism or attack. Editors thus are more cautious or defensive when rendering assessments that are either stronger or weaker than mildly favorable norm (191). Furthermore, they observe that "a cautious/defensive stance may emerge whenever an

editor feels him- or herself to be *going out on a limb*" (191): the future continuous signals that the editor is anticipating an uncertain future outcome that depends on the present state of affairs.

The various promotional practices analyzed by Clayman and Reisner (1998) are strongly associated with gatekeeping outcomes. All in all, this indicates that what counts in the gatekeeping process is not only the news values that editors have in their own individual minds, but rather what they express with words and actions publicly and collectively during the editorial conference. However, gatekeeping processes is not limited to news values, which represent only one dimension of it. My study is a reply to Clayman and Reisner's invitation to further research in order "to specify the relative importance of criterial news values and context-sensitive promotional practices" (197): in my research I focus in some way on the 'context-sensitive promotional practices' that deal with the audience uptake anticipations that may support the fostering of a story within a given newsroom and that are not limited to news values.

3.3 Journalists as active intermediaries: from source material to audience-driven news

In the previous sub-sections we have seen that many researchers in sociology and media linguistics have deepened the study of the newsroom discourse in recent years and looked at newsroom interaction. However, the key role played by journalists' sources in news items' production has not yet been introduced; it is necessary to deepen this topic in order to carry out the main aim of the present study. By looking at the contributions on the topic (Van Hout & Jacobs 2008; Catenaccio et al. 2011; Van Hout 2010; Jacobs 1999; Cotter 2010) it is immediately possible to define the point of interest of these studies for the present dissertation, by describing the *core dynamics* of the process of knowledge transformation acted out by journalists in re-elaborating the sources and in producing the news item; indeed, this point is crucial for understanding why journalists take editorial decisions anticipating the audience uptake, since sources or pieces of them are always selected, redefined and re-elaborated in view of the potential audience.

3.3.1 Journalists as knowledge creators and mediators[11]

When journalists build their news, they mediate between the events reported by the sources that they consult and the potential audience, therefore playing the crucial role of mediators –and even creators- of information in the newsroom. The *core dynamics* of journalists' mediation are realized when journalists observe sources, modify them, and merge them with their own ideas, thus shaping them in an individual way by giving them a particular frame and interpretation and by giving more prominence to some aspects of a given fact or event instead of others. On the one side, journalists strongly rely on sources of all type (press releases, interviews…); on the other side, they take distance from them and judge their content, thereby attempting to ascertain the best way to convey an event to the audience, in a way that should be attractive, comprehensible and true at the same time (Cotter 2010).

Therefore, journalists are prominent actors in spreading knowledge, they may strongly influence the public opinion on given events and topics, by individually framing an event and reporting it in a peculiar way to the vast public. Several authors analyzed which is the process starting from journalists' observation of source material and leading them to produce news items' contents. Jacobs (1999) analyzed what is usually included in corporate press releases and how specific features in the writing process might guide the journalists' response. Later, Van Hout and Jacobs (2008: 59) focus on the "notions of agency, interaction and power in business news journalism" and apply these theoretical notions to press releases and especially to the linguistic pragmatic investigation of the precise collective and textual habits that enable their conversion into news items. The authors rely on data gathered at the economy desk of Flemish newspaper; they use a novel methodology that merges "newsroom ethnography and computer-assisted writing process analysis" (Van Hout and Jacobs 2008: 59), which gives the chance to observe the way in which a journalist comes across a story that is not yet news, proposes it to the editorial board, writes and meditates on it. This methodology enables to focus on the individual

[11] In this section I follow the path traced by Van Hout 2010.

journalist's writing practices and to understand the way in which he handles sources and his degree of dependence on press releases. Following the path traced by Beeman & Peterson (2001), the authors support the conception of journalism as an "'interpretive practice' and of news production as a process of entextualization involving multiple actors who struggle over authority, ownership and control" (Van Hout & Jacobs 2008: 59). Later, in his Ph.D. dissertation, Van Hout (2010) focused on the process that transform a press release into a news product. In his view, journalists act as knowledge mediators, interpreting and not only reporting the content of the disclosed information. He examines a corpus collected at of a Belgian paper, and more precisely at the Economic Desk, and handles matters of writing research that are very similar to those investigated in the present research. Van Hout focuses on the active role played out by journalists that must decide the significance of an information and that must convey it effectively, establishing the most relevant information for the audience. He follows the path traced by Picard stating that

> if value is to be created, journalists cannot continue to report merely in the traditional ways or merely re-report the news that has appeared elsewhere. They must add something that creates value. They will have to start providing information and knowledge that is not readily available elsewhere, in forms that are not available elsewhere, or in forms that are more useable by and relevant to their audiences (Picard 2009).

In particular, Van Hout underlines three main theoretical gaps in media discourse, newsroom ethnography and journalism studies, that all concern the disregard of journalists' active and interactive role. These gaps can be summarized as follows (Van Hout 2010: 152);

1- previous research has been too much focused on language (see for instance Kress & Trew 1978; Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Koller 2005), as if it was the only important factor in newsroom activities, without paying attention to "*producers, practices and processes*", as we can read in the following quotation:

The instrumental relation between language and news media has yielded productive lines of inquiry in

disciplines such as critical discourse analysis, conversation analysis, corpus linguistics, sociolinguistics, text linguistics and linguistic anthropology (for an overview, see Cotter 2001). Summarizing a large body of literature then, these systematic and detailed studies argue that meaning-making is a social activity, a construct based on negotiating shared knowledge and producing versions of events which could always also be told in other ways (Fairclough 1995; Koller 2005; Bhatia 2006; Wodak 2006; Doolin 2007). They have pointed to ways in which news texts make particular worldviews seem commonsense (Kress & Trew 1978; Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; van Dijk 1998; Briggs 2005), how they engender social identities (Spitulnik 1999; Talbot 2007) and canonize ways of speaking (Peterson 2005; Higgins 2007). This body of literature has also yielded important insights into the structure (Bell, A. 1991; Bell, A. & Garrett 1998), epistemology (Peterson 2001; Khalil 2006; Thomson, White & Kitley 2008; Thorsen 2008) and function (Fairclough 1995; Richardson 2007) of news texts and has described micro level, interactional aspects such as the mechanics of turn-taking, repair and positioning in news interviews (Clayman & Heritage 2002; Montgomery 2008; Weizman 2009). Although these insights lay the theoretical foundations for my study, investigations of media language have tended to remain 'unpeopled' and text-based, with little focused attention paid to the production *process*. In other words, these studies have focused primarily on the textual *products* of journalism. (Van Hout 2010: 8).

2- sociological studies concerning ethnography in news production have disregarded journalists' agency, *i.e.* the human ability to act in any given environment

3- journalists were previously considered as "*news processors* rather than *news generators*"; this brings to the fore the interesting issue of journalists' source dependence in print journalism but underestimates the discursive processes underlying journalism.

These three gaps all point to the disregard of the active role played by journalists both at the individual and at the inter-individual (collective) level; however, looking at journalists as active actors is a fundamental pre-requisite to conceive journalists' audience uptake anticipations as a determining factor in framing the news in an individual and peculiar way. Van Hout's study has shown that source reliance is not simply synonymous of source copying, but rather it has shown that intertextuality can be considered form of social action during which journalists are active generators of knowledge. More specifically, the analyses presented by this scholar have shown that intertextuality is also (and always) "a strategically deployed practice through which producers […] construct

meanings, frame activities and pursue outcomes" (Peterson 2003: 239). At this point it is necessary to introduce the notion of intertextual chain, which can be defined as as a

> network of texts and events. What is said and done and written in a particular event or text is intertextually related to other events and texts: people inevitably draw on, anticipate and respond to other events and other texts. So we cannot understand particular events or particular texts, or the significance of these for the participants, without exploring (and asking about) these wider intertextual chains (Fairclough 2010).

Thus, it is clear that the study of intertextual chains is fundamental for investigating the effects of discourse in different contexts of interaction (Krieg-Planque 2009). In the newsroom intertextual chains are made up by source materials, editorial conferences, news items and retrospective interviews: in all case studies that I will present in the thesis I will look at intertextual chains (sections 6, 7, 9, 10, 11).

As these studies show, and as I will show in the empirical part of the research, not all news based on whatever kind of source and news agency feeds can be said to be a mere facsimile of the source material. As Van Hout says

> reproductive writing is a far more complex matter than simply churning preformulated news discourses into newspaper articles. It crucially involves the recontextualization of multiple news discourses (a corporate press release, interview notes, news archive material, prior knowledge) into a single narrative, re-framed as an authoritative, unified account of a news event (Van Hout 2010: 158).

Indeed, journalists are responsible for many tasks that can be considered the basis for producing a news article: they start from previous source materials, then they check the authoritativeness of sources, establish the significance of events and facts, gather information and deal with stylistic and audience concerns (Van Hout & Jacobs 2008).

In a similar fashion, focusing on financial journalism, the role of the financial journalist as a mediator between the firm-generated contents and the audience welcoming is pivotal in the paper by Rocci and Luciani (2016); the authors put in evidence how journalists are able to interpret and assign value to the information, cleaning out potentially

exaggerated or hard-to-believe self-promotional content by the firm, providing in this way the readers with the means useful to build a proper opinion by themselves.

All the mentioned recent studies highlighting an active role of journalists in shaping the news (Van Hout 2010, Van Hout & Jacobs 2008, Rocci & Luciani 2016) follow Beeman and Peterson's notion of interpretive practice: according to them, interpretive practices are "the ways that routine procedures, cultural categories, and social positions come together in particular 'instances' of interpretation" (2001: 159). If we implement this conception of interpretive practice to studies on news production, it

> turns our attention from the structures that organize action to the contingency that is always present in media production and the specific momentary, negotiated processes by which agency is employed to challenge, change or reproduce structure (Peterson 2003: 186).

The contextual processes described in the quotation above hint at all kinds of interactions in the newsroom, in all kinds of newsroom activities, between sources, reporters and editors. Therefore, in these studies journalists are considered as active interpreters, who builds connections with economic and social structures in which he acts. This conception of the journalist as able of an interpretative action highly differs from those proposed by sociological approaches that conceives the journalist as a machine described at the beginning of the chapter (section 3.1). In my dissertation, I will follow this strand of research and I will focus on journalists' anticipatory inferences at stake in all these kinds of interactions, also looking at their use of source material and looking at source material's selection and reformulation in view of the audience uptake. What can help to dispel the myth of the journalist as a machine if not the focus on his anticipatory inferences? My approach is thus decidedly focused on exploring the relationship between journalists' agency and audience uptake anticipation, since I focus on individual journalist's anticipatory inferences, deepen the precise manners in which he situates his story and on the way in which he frames the whole news in view of the audience uptake.

Starting from the fact that journalists rely in a strong way on sources in all fields of journalism, I am forced to pay attention to issues of source-news interaction. In which way

are journalistic sources and news stories interrelated? In which way does the journalist change the linguistic content of his sources? In which way does the journalist composes the news item? In this dissertation I will answer these questions by providing an argumentative analysis of news discourses concerning anticipation of audience uptake and of news products and of source materials in some empirical case studies.

3.4 Studies on newswriting

In the previous sub-sections I have shown the contribution given by the study of source materials, conceived as intermediate texts. However, the study of source materials is not enough to understand how journalists build a news item and how they take a decision. Therefore, D. Perrin focused on newswriting processes and developed the innovative methodology labeled Progression analysis in order to understand journalists' reasoning while they construct a news piece (Perrin 2013).

This subsection is devoted to describing the studies of linguistics of newswriting that I take into consideration in the present research: in this part of my dissertation I mostly rely on the book "The linguistics of newswriting" by D. Perrin (Perrin 2013). Indeed, the study of newswriting strategies represents a crucial point in order to understand journalists' anticipatory strategies. By observing newswriting activities, it is possible to discover the distinct phases of journalists' reasonings about the way in which texts are modified from one version to the other, how they are constructed and framed in view of the audience uptake. In the present research I embrace Perrin's perspective about the linguistics of newswriting (Perrin 2013), which considers newswriting as the field of professional language use. But what is linguistics of newswriting? Linguistics of newswriting is a sub-discipline of media linguistics. Media linguistics is a sub-field of applied linguistics that focuses on linguistic usages in media products and in the production processes, therefore completing previous discourse analytical and sociological studies on the topic that disregarded this point that is crucial in order to understand real-life language uses in the newsroom (Cotter 2010). It is situated between theoretical and applied linguistics, therefore it may place its attention on theoretical as well as on applied

issues (Perrin 2013: 29). Under a theoretical angle "it uses data from media settings to answer research questions raised by linguistics itself", while under an applied perspective "it clarifies problems of media practice with linguistic tools" (ibid.). Media linguistics can be subdivided in many inner sub-disciplines, depending on the specific subfield of interest.

The linguistics of newswriting is the sub-discipline in the field of media linguistics that examines the routines of news generation that are based on linguistic verbal or written practices and considers news journalists as an ingroup with an own specific language use (*e.g.* Perrin 2003, Van Hout & Jacobs 2008). The linguistics of newswriting has a twofold object of interest for what concerns language users; at the individual level the crucial language users are journalists and editors, whereas at the collective level the crucial language users are editorial boards or media systems. Since, as suggested by Perrin "they are in close contact with sources and in permanent indirect contact with their audiences" (Perrin 2013, 31), it is crucial to take into consideration the linguistically-based practices between them for the scope of the present research, namely for understanding journalists' anticipations based on the audience uptake.

Furthermore, according to Perrin, among the distinct linguistic activities, the linguistics of newswriting focuses on cooperative writing (Perrin 2013, 31). Two are the conceptions of writing activity that can be sketched; in a narrower sense, writing can be seen simply as the mere production of written language, whereas in a more widespread sense the activity of writing may be seen as comprising all linguistically-based news editing connecting the text, sound and pictures as well as comprehending all kinds of preparatory activities such as reading steps, for example such as reading source texts.

Furthermore, the linguistics of newswriting also takes into consideration the dynamics of text production, which can be observed at distinct levels of zooming; at a more restricted level of observation workflows in the newsroom, at a medium level of observation writing sessions devoted to build a certain news item, and at a smallest level of zooming single decisions during the writing process can be investigated (Perrin 2013: 31).

In this approach, all writing phases (including actual writing processes as well as other phases more indirectly bound to writing such as source reading phases) play a crucial

role and are seen as the focal center of the newsroom activities. However, the present dissertation does not look at writing processes with the eye of newswriting studies, but rather with the eye of the argumentation scholar; therefore, I will look at writing processes whereby the argumentative lens, shedding light on reasoning processes hidden behind writing processes. Indeed, this thesis goes beyond linguistics of newswriting, since argumentation enables to uncover journalists' reasoning processes at stake when they compose news items.

In studying newsroom writing, Perrin (2013: 64) considers audience design as one important focus of study of linguistics of newswriting; assuming that linguistics can treat language as a means able to connect what people do in a given context and social structures and processes, "a linguistics of newswriting will focus on how social groups such as editorial teams customize their linguistic products for their target audiences" (Perrin 2013, 64).

Which linguistic devices, for instance how many terms belonging to the same frame, does an editorial board/ a journalist choose to insert in a certain item in view of a certain audience? For what concerns nouns' morphology, how many *nomina agentis* are used by a journalist in an item in order to stress the agents' role? An interesting way to look at linguistics' finesses is by applying version analysis, which according to Perrin "is the method of collecting and analyzing data in order to reconstruct the changes in text features from version to version throughout intertextual chains" (Perrin 2013: 62). The comparison of various versions of texts enables to understand the way in which texts are accomodated from one version to the other. Nevertheless, "version analysis fails to provide any information about whether the journalists were conscious of their actions when re-contextualizing or engaging in other practices of text production" and "whether the practices are typical of certain media with certain target audiences; or whether the issues associated with those practices are discussed and negotiated in the editorial offices". (Perrin, 2016: 364) In order to understand such issues, more sophisticated methodological approaches are needed. One useful methodology is variation analysis, which is able to grasp these linguistic finesses, being it the methodology of gathering and studying textual data in order to analyse the distinctive characteristics belonging to the language of a given

discourse community. Variation analysis investigates "the type and frequency of typical features of certain language users' productions in certain kinds of communication situations such as newswriting for a specific audience" (Grésillon and Perrin 2014: 92). Perrin's assumption that

> variation analyses investigate the type and frequency of typical features of certain language users' productions in certain kinds of communication situations, such as newswriting for a specific audience [and that] what variation analysis discerns is the differences between the language used in different situations by the same users (e.g. Koller 2004) or by various users in similar situations (Fang 1991, Werlen 2000) (Perrin 2013, 63-64)

perfectly mirrors the findings of this research (Section 12.3.1.3), which concern the framing implications on news items depending on journalists' anticipatory inferences on the audience uptake; all journalists try to maneuver strategically the news item in such a way to convey a balanced view of the situation. However, this method alone cannot explain the reason why a community opts for framing its texts in a given manner, so that the integration with a methodology such as Progression Analysis and with an argumentative analysis becomes fundamental in order to understand the actual reasoning processes at stake in journalists' mind when they anticipate their audience uptake and when they frame the news item taking into account these anticipatory inferences. This is confirmed in various instances in my corpus, where variation analysis sheds light on different editing details of multiple intermediate drafts of a news item thereby highlighting a change in the journalist's cognitive process; however, it is only with progression analysis that it was possible to shed light on the reasons why the journalist had modified the previous drafts of an item in view of the audience uptake. More specifically, variation analyisis enabled me to observe that there were two distinct framings given by the journalist in two distinct drafts of the news items (an intermediate and the final draft); however, I could understand the reasons of these two distinct framings, namely the editorial board's excessive emotional involvement, only thanks to Progression analysis and to an argumentative approach (see TEMPO case in Section 9). A similar case is the

JUGE case, in which variation analysis has simply shown different versions of a same news item and the interweaving of progression analysis and of an argumentative analysis has then revealed the journalist's will to create a framing that accounted for both audience cognitive and emotive needs (see JUGE case in Section 7). In another case of the print journalism, variation analysis enabled me to verify the presence of two distinct titles in two distinct drafts of the news items, and the merging of progression analysis and of an argumentative lens revealed that the journalist changed them in order to convey an overall balanced view of the reported event. Concluding, a congruent overview of how an editorial board/ a journalist reasons on the anticipated audience uptake and of how a news item is shaped depending on the journalists' expectations on the audience uptake can be reached only thanks to the interweaving of version analysis, variation analysis and progression analysis with an argumentative analysis. This is exactly what I have done in my research, and what I will show in the empirical part of the dissertation.

At a wider level, progression analysis is a multimethod approach to obtain and relate data on three stages: the work circumstances, the writing moments, and the writing strategies and conscious practices. These methods were initially outlined to study newswriting, but they have been used to investigate also other writing contexts.

One of the focal concept of newswriting that progression analysis is able to underline very well is that of newswriting strategies, and more specifically, these emerge in the retrospective verbal protocol as one of the aspects of the journalist's aware externalization of aspects bound to his or her language consciousness. According to Bisaillon, strategies represent not actual but rather *potential* dynamics, *i.e*. *in nuce* dynamics that have the possibility to be realized in a more or less near future but that in the present moment are not realized. Potential dynamics are counterposed to *actual* dynamics, *e.g.* practices, routines, and procedures that represent currently existing dynamics (Bisaillon 2007).

For what concerns writing strategies, Perrin identifies them as "the reinforced, conscious, and therefore articulable idea of how decisions are to be made during the act of writing so that the writing process or text product has a great probability of fulfilling the intended function" (Perrin 2013, 55). In the author's view strategies are considered as

recursive mechanisms, indeed they may contain sub-strategies. Both journalists and editorial boards have a huge set of writing strategies, so that they can choose among many alternatives the most suitable in view of the audience uptake, by making an online selection of the strategy that best fits the journalists' anticipations on the audience uptake. The study of writing strategies is a focal point for my research, since observing writing strategies enables to look at journalists' aware reflections on the audience uptake in a clear way, therefore shedding light on what we may call journalists' naïve pragmatic theories on the audience uptake.

3.4.1 The social context of newswriting

Taking into account the social context of newswriting is fundamental in order to understand journalists' dynamics that lead them to follow certain editorial strategies instead of others.

The different editorial figures, such as managing editors, producers, desk coordinators, news editors, work together in order to define items and issues within an environment that imposes strict time and space limits. They have to merge routines and creativity to pursue the main purpose of the newsroom, namely to select relevant topics for the audience that may help to promote public understanding on time.

In the case of the newsroom at stake in my corpus, the Swiss public broadcasting company SRG asks their editorial board to be committed to promote public understanding. Therefore, journalists ask themselves how they could best realize their main goal of promoting public understanding; their anticipatory representations may guide their editorial choices. Journalists' goal of promoting public understanding is on the basis of the attention for the cognitive and emotive audience uptake that drives the behaviour of the journalist in newsroom activities. From a sociolinguistic perspective, fostering public understanding in Switzerland signifies connecting different speech communities among each other, therefore connecting the German, French, Italian and Romansh cultural areas among each other. In multilingual countries promoting public understanding means fostering communication across the language borders; nevertheless, from a sociolinguistic

perspective, it is worth to review the language borders idea (*e.g.* Widmer, Coray, Acklin Muji, & Godel, 2004). Indeed, there may be distinct linguistic varieties also depending on the socio-economical and geographical factors of a given population. Due to the fact that the mandate refers to the need of fostering public understanding in all kinds of communities, in my research, I attempted to understand in which way the media organization, torn between public service claims and market pressures, realizes such mandate. As stated by Perrin,

> Promoting public understanding interacts with psychobiographical, organizational, and wider contextual structures of variegated durability and power, ranging from journalists' individual language awareness to the cultural resources of Switzerland as a rich country in the Western world. All these structures enable or constrain newswriting activity and are reproduced or altered by it. The key elements and relations in this interplay can be condensed into the following proposition: Promoting public understanding involves agents, requires resources, is realized through journalistic practices, causes impacts, and triggers evaluations (Perrin 2013: 4).

In order to illustrate the relevance of studying newswriting in the newsroom, Perrin shows some case stories that show the importance of newswriting in different critical situations. Perrin lays stress on the difference between case studies and case stories; indeed, according to him, case stories consists of results of the research process and have an instrisic narrative nature. One interesting case story is the LEBA case, which reports the appearance and accomplishment of one journalist's intention to modify one specific word and to make it become the main theme. Unlike European media, that usually give account of violence in Lebanon due to political problems, the journalist R.G. decided to lay stress on nonviolent features of the demonstrations in Lebanon in his news items. In a first moment the journalist had inserted the term *expressway* to define the straight itinerary over the Mediterranean sea, *la voie express de la méditerranée*. Then, when he was interweaving the text with the images he noticed that inserting *a tranquil path*, *la voie tranquille*, would have better matched with the quiet journey of a boat. When the journalist became aware of this, he chose to eliminate *express* and substituted it with *tranquille*.

Together with other details added by the journalist R.G. and by the emergence of his language awareness, the design given to the item became clear: the journalist wanted to stress the pacifistic side of demonstrations in Lebanon. Perrin lays stress on micro linguistic details that activate macro changes by investigating the retrospective interview. In the retrospective verbal protocol the journalist constantly refers to the audience. The journalist "says that he loves the adjective 'tranquille' because it corresponds not only to the image of the boats but also to the tranquility of the demonstration." Furthermore, "he expects the 'tranquill' to resonate in the minds of the audience" (Perrin 2013: 23). The journalist assimilated the source material and decided which knowledge should be conveyed to the audience, in order to give comprehensible and relevant information to the audience: this is the operation that mostly enables the journalist to promote public understanding.

Perrin shows a single-case analysis, the LEBA case, in which an experienced journalist elaborates strategies to merge market claims and the public mission. "By altering a single word, he found a leitmotiv that helped him overcome stereotypes and explain phenomena from new perspectives" (Perrin 2013: 41).

3.4.2 Investigating language functions in newswriting: how do journalists transform knowledge for their audience?

Perrin zooms on four increasingly complex functions of language across which newswriting takes place: the referential, the cognitive, the interactive, and the social function.

The first investigated function is the referential function. "Language usually refers to things outside itself; it relates to non-verbal phenomena and labels things in the world. Every form of communication makes use of this labeling" (Perrin 2013: 105). Nevertheless, "as the term suggests, journalist news is concerned with conveying new information" (ibid.). However, linguistics of newswriting ca be said to examine not only references to and explanations of what is new, but also the processes leading to correct and clear references to entities in the reported world.

The second investigated function is the cognitive function: "the use of language requires and generates cognitive processes: by speaking or writing, people express thoughts in the form of language. Understanding this language triggers new thoughts" (Perrin 2013: 106). With reference to the interweaving of cognitive language function and language use in journalistic media, a question arises: how is language processed in the mind? How does prior knowledge contribute to texts' comprehension? Due to the fact that journalists do not know the audience to which they are communicating, they rely on fundamental assumptions based on previous knowledge. In particular, the linguistics of newswriting "investigates not only how journalists conceive their audience's emotions, expectations, and previous knowledge in order to write attractively and comprehensibly, but also *how* they exploit their own mental resources when writing" (Perrin 2013: 106). This fits very well with an argumentative approach, since adopting an argumentative lens on newswriting data enables to reconstruct the actual reasoning processes at stake in journalists' minds, that are consciously externalized during the various retrospective interviews.

The third investigated function is the interactive function. "Cognitive change favors interactive change: when knowledge changes, behavior can change. People do things with language purposefully, i.e. to make something happen" (Perrin 2013: 107). Furthermore, "in journalistic communication, participants such as media professionals, sources, the target audience, and society at large pursue objectives that partly contradict each other" (ibid.). At this point a theoretical question arises concerning the interface between pragmatic language function and language use in journalistic media: which intentions do journalists have and how do they realize them in the media? On an empirical level, the same question arises with reference to the conflict caused by the journalistic need to inform and attract the audience at the same time. When the focus is on newswriting, media linguistics examines practices related to conflicts and solutions revolving around writing processes and the resulting texts. Again, an argumentative approach perfectly suits to this topic of interest of newswriting, since it enables to understand journalists' reasoning mechanisms at stake in deciding about whether to give priority to audience information or audience attraction in a given news item.

The last investigated function is the social function. Journalistic communication helps to connect the language of specific communities, such as the language of experts, with lay audiences. This enables to overcome societal disparities- and conteporaneously to reinforce them. From the point of view of language use in journalistic media the question sounds; how can journalists reliably arrive at distinct audiences with linguistic tools and contemporaneously specify a single portrait in the market and committing audience? Media linguistics employs devices from sociolinguistics to analyze audience design, namely language use by which media professionals commit their target groups (Bell 1984, Conboy 2010, Perrin 2011). When focusing on newswriting, media linguistics investigates not only which languages, variants, styles, styles, shifts, and audience design apply and work for whom in which conditions, but also how they are negotiated in the newsrooms and beyond.

In practice, newswriting takes place across these functions. News refers to real world events, triggers changes in knowledge and behavior, and fosters discourse between societal groups. The same applies for the processes of newswriting. Journalists explain what is new, connect it to their audience previous knowledge, balance various stakeholders' goals, and mediate between linguistic communities. In doing so, they deal with sources, topics, own positions, stories and audience. Through newswriting the journalist re-elaborates the information coming from the sources; it is only by deepening the relationship between language functions and newswriting with an argumentative lens that we can fully understand how journalists shape and transform knowledge taking into account their audience uptake.

3.4.3 How journalists' argumentation on anticipated audience uptake fits with the linguistics of newswriting

In this sub-section I illustrate the reasons for which examining evidence of journalists' argumentation on the anticipated audience uptake well fits with the applied linguistic research agenda of the linguistics of newswriting. In what follows, I will focus mainly on

three general points of reciprocal benefits that the two distinct viewpoints on the same topic may gain.

Firstly, examining evidence of argumentative structure in news products and evidence of argument editing in the writing process, naturally complements production based research on journalistic stancing (Perrin 2012). When journalists take a stance, either directly via their authorial voice, or, indirectly, by framing reported voices, they typically also present arguments in support of such a position (standpoint) either directly or indirectly, by framing reported arguments. Since, typically, the situation originating the reported voices is itself an argumentative confrontation. In particular, examining evidence of journalists' argument editing on the basis of anticipated audience uptake well suits with the newswriting's strand of research focused on revealing audience design aimed at understanding how editorial boards and journalists "customize their linguistic products for their target audiences" (Perrin 2013: 64).

Secondly, more generally, argumentation, and particularly the analysis of practical reasoning offers a convenient format to capture and describe the conscious problem-solving strategies of journalistic writers (cf. writing strategies in Perrin 2013) as elicited in retrospective interviews (Zampa and Perrin 2016). Indeed, retrospective verbal protocols reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation (that the journalist has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting on what he was writing), so that journalists' reasoning about writing choices and strategies is made explicit. In particular, with reference to the present research, light is shed on the conscious decisions that lead journalist to adopt certain writing strategies instead of others in order to be congruent with the audience uptake.

Finally, if we take into account the applied nature of the newswriting research agenda we might want to consider the value of moments of newsroom argumentation in view of their transparency for discussing best practices with practitioners. These often are moments where a reflective practitioner truly emerges, and are precious for further reflection. In this endeavor, journalists' reasonings on the audience uptake easily come to the fore either in the shape of evaluations of previous negatively or positively judged

audience-oriented news items, or of deliberations based on more or less established journalistic practices, therefore representing a respective bad or good example to follow.

Without context, words and actions have no meaning at all. This is true not only of human communication in words but also of all communication whatsoever, of all mental process, of all mind, including that which tells the sea anemone how to grow and the amoeba what he should do next.
(Bateson 1979: 15)

4. General theoretical framework

In this Section I give an overview of the theoretical framework that I have adopted in my dissertation. In order to analyse argumentative discussions, I embrace the perspective of the Lugano group, analyzing the context (Rigotti and Rocci 2006; Palmieri 2010, 2014) in which argumentative discussions are embedded (4.1) and merging crucial notions of the extended pragma-dialectical theory (4.2), and more specifically the model of a critical discussion, with the analysis of the inferential configuration of arguments via the AMT (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010) (4.3).

Argumentation theory dates back to the studies of logic, rhetoric and dialectic in Antiquity[12]; more specifically, argumentation theory finds its point of origin in Artistotle. In classical times logic, rhetoric and dialectic were studied together. On the contrary, in the 1500ies and in the 1600ies dialectic and logic were considered separatedly from rhetoric. It is only in recent times that logic, dialectic and rhetoric have been reunited, namely when argumentation scholars have noticed the importance of producing not only reasonable argumentation –being thus centred only on solving a disagreement according to an ideal model- but also effective argumentation, therefore aiming at persuading the audience.

In recent times two approaches to argumentation have been developed that both

originate from the "perceived insufficiency of logical validity as defined in modern (formal) logic as the sole criterion of soundness for the arguments" (Dascal et al. 2005: 2). These two models are the Toulmin Model (Toulmin 1958) and the model developed by Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2010[1958]).

The Toulmin Model (Toulmin 1958) "has the advantage of presenting the whole argumentative process as an ongoing dialogue between an arguer and a *challenger*, who asks the reasons for the arguer's claims; such a perspective evidences the dialogical nature of argumentation" (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 31). Therefore, Toulmin has the merit of having shed light on the inherently dialogical nature of argumentation. An author who has deeply investigated Toulmin's dialectic interpretation was James B. Freeman in his work "Dialectic and the macrostructure of arguments" (1991). J. B. Freeman is above all interested in the way in which entire sentences act in natural language argumentation, "with the kinds of support sentences can offer to other sentences and with the structure of those support relationships; this is what he means when he talks about the 'macrostructure' of argument" (Fischer 1992: 193).

The New Rhetoric (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 2010 [1958]) zooms on the efficacy of argumentation and contains a theory of the audience, which is sub-divided in particular and universal audience. "According to these authors, every argumentation is developed towards a certain addressee or audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958:7); moreover, the validity of its acceptance depends on its acceptance by the audience." (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 31) This view is clearly a relativistic one, since the fundamental criterion that leads to positively evaluate an argumentation is its audience's acceptance. Furthermore, the New Rhetoric includes a fine-grained study of argument schemes that relies on the ancient topical tradition.

Both Toulmin and Perelman treat logic in an alternative way in comparison with traditional approaches to logic. Indeed, in their perspective

> a logic exclusively preoccupied with formal criteria of validity risked abandoning outside the pale of rationality most of the arguments that are exchanged in ordinary life – indeed everything outside mathematics and (perhaps) the natural sciences. Both took law and judicial practice as a paradigm of a rationality that could not be reduced to formal logic

(Rocci 2017a: 36).

This reconciliation of logic with matters that are closer to those of argumentation theory fits with the research strand within argumentation theory that investigates "the rules of inference supporting ordinary arguments" (Rocci 2017a: 43). This strand of research is labeled *argumentation schemes* (Walton 1996, Walton et al. 2008):

> the term *scheme* refers to the rules of inference, while other authors approach these concerns drawing on the rich Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance tradition of the *topics* and use the notion of a *topic* (alternatively, τόπος, 'topos' or *locus*) as their main theoretical construct (Rigotti 2009; Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010) (Rocci 2017a: 43).

This path of research coincides only partially with the matters of logical inquiry for non-deductive reasoning. Indeed,

> it is true that often argument schemes are presented as non-deductive rules (be they inductive, abductive or presumptive), what is even more characteristic of them, however, is that they are not formulated in terms of abstract logical forms, but at a more concrete level, involving a rich inventory of semantic-ontological relations on which the inference is based. One speaks, for instance, of arguments *from cause to effect* or *from parts to wholes* and so on. Katzav and Reed (2004) call "relations of conveyance" those relations between facts such as *cause*, *part*, *class membership* on which an argument scheme can be based. Rigotti and Greco-Morasso (2010) simply call these relations *loci*, recovering one of the readings of the *topos/locus* in the Medieval tradition (Rocci 2017a: 43).

In recent appeals to argument schemes (for instance Walton et al. 2008, Rigotti 2007, 2009, Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010) "it often appears that schemes, while described at the level of more concrete semantic-ontological relations, *do* have an underlying logical form, even though not necessarily a deductive one" (Rocci 2017a: 43). In this dissertation I will apply the *Argumentum Model of Topics* (AMT) and its concept of *locus* (Rigotti and Greco-Morasso 2010), "which takes into account both the semantic-ontological content of argument schemes and their logical form" (Rocci 2017a: 43). I will explain Argumentum Model of Topics into more details in Section 4.3.

Another at the same time similar and different influential approach to argumentation theory that dominates the current scene of argumentation theory is Pragma-Dialectics, which has been developed at the University of Amsterdam. This dialectical approach has been highly influenced by "Hamblin's work on the dynamics of commitment in idealized argumentative dialogues and other works in the same formal dialectic vein" (Rocci 2017: 38). This approach recovers ideas belonging to the rhetorical and dialectical traditions of classical times, reuniting them:

> This orientation was inaugurated by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendost (1984, 2004) who proposed a theory (Pragma-Dialectics) that seeks to bridge the gap between formal dialectical systems and real world discussions by integrating Searlean speech-act theory and Gricean pragmatics with a normative dialectical model. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 21) regard argumentation as "part of an explicit or implicit discussion between parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion (which may be implicit) by testing the acceptability of the standpoints concerned". (Rocci 2017: 38)

In recent times argumentation theory has known a 'contextual turn', thus focussing on argumentative practices in real-life contexts:

> the understanding of the context of argumentation, conceived of as *dialogue type* where argumentation is at work [Walton and Krabbe 1995 can be considered a foundational work in this respect] and including the rules of communication that argumentation depends upon; and the study of the rhetorical aspects of discourse, including the role of the audience in evaluating argumentation" (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009: 33).

The importance of looking at argumentation in context has been maintained especially by the Lugano School of argumentation (Rigotti and Rocci 2006; Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2009). The context itself intervenes on and modifies the argumentative discussions; therefore, it plays a crucial role in argumentative discussions. Many different real-life contexts have been the object of study of many argumentation scholars in the last ten years; more specifically, studies have been carried out in the medical context (Craven

et alii 2012; Rubinelli and Schulz 2006; Zanini and Rubinelli 2012 [among the others]), in the legal context (Feteris 2016; Saunders 1993; Feteris 2013), in the political sphere (van Eemeren 2002; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; Finlayson 2013; Lewinski & Mohammed 2013; Zarefsky 2008), in therapeutic discourse (Grossen and Salazar Orvig 2006). In the field of financial communication, many studies have deepened the financial context (Palmieri 2014; Rigotti and Palmieri 2010, 2014). Furthermore, the context of mediation (Aakhus 2003; Greco Morasso 2011; Jacobs 2002) and that of advertisement (Kjeldsen 2007, 2012; Rocci 2008; Rocci, Mazzali-Lurati and Pollaroli 2013) have also been widely investigated by many argumentation scholars.

4.1 Model of communication in context[13]

Due to the contextual essence of argumentation, many researchers in the field have started examining extensively the context in which argumentation takes place. Actually, the context acts on argumentation at different stages. Generally speaking, a given context, conceived at a broader level of zooming as a culture, community or institution, contemplates a certain level of argumentation, which regulates the extent to which the involved people can argue, the commitment to argue, the possibility to take a stance and to assess others' opinions. At a narrower level of zooming, every real-life domain can include distinct types of aims, questions, problems, and conclusions, which respectively call for distinct argumentative processes. A given social context enables to a speech event to carry out certain actions and the actions carried out by the speech event change the social context.

However, the context does not only influence argumentation, but rather it is itself affected by argumentation, since the latter may be deployed as a tool to achieve a certain aim and enables to modify the interested social reality. The arguer can be conceived as an agent whose aim is to realize a goal which can be conceived as a mental representation "which corresponds to a change in the present world (context) into a more suitable *possible*

[13] In order to explain the model of communication in context I will mostly base on Palmieri 2010.

world (a new envisaged context), undertakes an activity realizing such a context's change" (Palmieri 2010: 34; Rigotti 2008). However, contexts are characterized not only by individual goals, but rather –and above all- by shared goals that an agent has joined in his interactions with other people in a given context. This is perfectly in line with the general definition of goal given by Castelfranchi: according to him, it is a mental representation,

> *a)* which is always anticipatory about how the world is not (or better it is assumed not to be), *b)* of any possible format (sensory-motor, abstract and symbolic, propositional or linguistic, procedural), and *c)* is employed as a set-point in a control-system, in the cybernetic cycle driving the external behavior (that becomes an action) of the agent for modifying the world' (Castelfranchi 2012: 835-836).

In argumentative terms, if the arguer wishes to produce changes in the context starting from his/her anticipated needs/desires, the knowledge of such context (that must be modified) is essential so that it is possible to produce suitable arguments. Knowing the context is crucial not only for single agents' decisions but also – and especially- for inter-individual decision making processes; "Indeed, a few goals can be achieved by means of individual actions, requiring instead joint actions[14] (Clark 1996), in particular interactions (Rigotti 2003, 2005a), which involve two agents, one of which must be convinced to accept the standpoint[15]".

For what concerns the analysis of the context in which the argumentative discussions in the newsroom are situated, this dissertation takes the perspective of the model of social context of communication elaborated by the Lugano school, and especially by Rigotti & Rocci (2006). As it is illustrated in Figure 1, according to this model, the context has two distinct dimensions, namely an institutionalized and an interpersonal dimension. This representation is based on the concept of interaction field, which

[14] Following Clark, joint actions enable human beings to engage in shared actions (1996: 59). The author describes a joint action as "an action by an ensemble of people" (1996:18) (quoted in Palmieri 2010: 34).

[15] Interactants' goals have distinct but interdependent goals and combine their corresponding causal chains in such a way that the accomplishment of one agent's aim implies the accomplishment of the other's aim. On the contrary, a co-operation, contemplates two co-agents who share the same aim and are therefore synchronized in activating the same causal chain (cf. Rigotti 2003, 2005).

represents a fragment of social reality (Searle 1995) in which a communicative episode (for instance an argumentative discussion) is situated and on which it intervenes (for instance the newsroom), and is determined by a common leading goal (frequently corresponding with its mission) emerging from the interactants' personal aims. At the same time, it establishes the conditions of relevance and of possibilities of a given argumentation and it is influenced by the outcome of the discussion. Some instances of interaction field are: a university, a school, a doctor's office, a psychotherapeutic practice, a newsroom[16]. "Within an interaction field, in order to realize their shared and individual goals, people undertake communicative and non-communicative activities in which they assume mutual commitments and roles" (Palmieri 2010: 34). In Fig. 1 I show the model of communication in context elaborated by the Lugano school:



Figure 1. The model of communication context (Rigotti & Rocci 2006).

[16] We can observe an interaction field from distinct angles and at distinct degrees of zooming (cf. Rigotti & Greco 2005; Rigotti & Rocci 2006; Rocci 2009): at a bigger level of zooming we can observe the interaction field of the newsroom, wheras at a smaller level of zooming we can observe the peculiarities of the interaction field of a specific newsroom such as the newsroom of *CdT*.

Argumentative interactions, like every interaction, are situated into an institutionalized activity type (Levinson 1979/1992)[17]. A journalist attempting to find out the best way to convey a news to the audience accomplishes this within ("in the context of") an editorial conference, in which the overall aim is to take editorial decisions that finest mirror the mission of the institution, in the case of SRG capturing the audience attention and above all promoting public understanding.

In order to reach their goals, interagents often, even though not automatically, trigger an interaction scheme, which following Rigotti and Rocci can be defined as:

> "culturally shared 'recipes' for interaction congruent with more or less broad classes of joint goals and involving scheme-roles presupposing generic requirements. Deliberation negotiation, advisory, problem solving, adjudication, mediation, teaching are fairly broad interaction schemes; while more specific interaction schemes may correspond to proper 'jobs" (Rigotti and Rocci 2006: 173).

According to this theoretical frame of reference, an activity type corresponds to the projection of an interaction scheme onto an interaction field. Indeed, an interaction scheme is not sufficient to build an actual activity, being it a *potential* social reality; therefore, an interaction scheme always requires the application onto an interaction field, which instead coincides with a *concrete* fragment of social reality. The projection of interaction scheme onto an interaction field gives rise to roles and duties for the interactants and between them. Put in Rigotti and Rocci's words, "the roles of the interaction scheme need to be made to correspond to compatible roles in the interaction field" (Rigotti & Rocci 2006: 173).

It is possible to map different interaction schemes onto the same field (for instance, deliberation and evaluation are two schemes possibly used within a newsroom). In a similar way, it is possible to use the same interaction scheme can be used in distinct interaction fields (deliberation, for example, can be applied in a newsroom, in case that

[17] Levinson made use of this key concept to refer to "a fuzzy category whose focal-members are goal defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions" (1979/1992: 69).

journalists should take some editorial decisions on which event should be published, as well as within a family when parents have to decide which school their children should attend). The projection of the interaction scheme onto the interaction field gives rise to distinct activity types. For example, when the interaction scheme of deliberation is applied onto the interaction field of the newsroom the result is a deliberative editorial conference, whereas when the interaction scheme of evaluation is mapped onto the interaction field of the newsroom the result is an evaluative editorial conference. Even though a given activity type instantiates specific roles, it is wise to specificy that these roles do not have to be conceived as boxes that must necessarily be filled; indeed, behind roles there are human beings that have an individuality which goes beyond the role and duties established by the institutional dimension. Apart from reciprocal duties, interactants are connected to each other by an interpersonal bond, which relies on a distinct type of cohesion (Perret-Clermont and Muller-Mirza 1999). Hence,

> besides the institutional dimension surrounding a communicative interaction, an interpersonal dimension is involved, which can assume a different specific relevance according to the specific activity type. We can imagine, for example, that the interpersonal dimension dominates in the context of a family mediation's discussion (Greco Morasso 2011), unlike the context of legal fight, which is expected to be highly institutionalized (Palmieri 2010: 37).

In other types of situations both aspects can be very relevant, like in a psychotherapeutic session during which a psychotherapist cures a person who has been a patient for a long time.

In the context of the newsroom, both the institutionalized and the interpersonal components are at stake. For example, editorial conferences are institutional activities because the journalists are committed to take decisions that respect the mission of the institution, *i.e.* promote public understanding in the case of SRG. Nevertheless, the interaction occurring in this setting leads to developing and altering the cognitive environment of the individual journalists as well as the shared cognitive environment (among journalists), and may put into discussion and redefine the mission's objectives.

Therefore, journalists' personal and interpersonal stories may also play a major role in newsroosm activities.

4.2 The extended Pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation

In my thesis I carry out an argumentative analysis that follows the theoretical principles established by the extended Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren 2010), since it is an essential tool for argumentative analysis, which enables me to shed light on the way in which journalists reason. The Pragma-Dialectical approach to argumentation is a very widespread theoretical approach to look into argumentation; it has been founded in the last three decades of the twentieth century at the University of Amsterdam and since then it has become one of the most influential theories of argumentation.

Following Pragma-Dialectics[18], argumentation is a practice that aims at finding a solution to an implied or open divergence of opinion, by putting forth arguments in order to support one's standpoint or by rebutting arguments in order to refute an antagonist's standpoint. Argumentation is situated in a critical discussion in which two figures are at stake; one is the person who advances a standpoint, namely a protagonist, and the other is the person who doubts on that standpoint or that advances arguments against it, namely the antagonist. Pragma-Dialectics concerns a model of an ideal critical discussion, namely a model that at the same time prescribes how a discussion should be and that describes how a discussion actually is. This model functions simultaneously both as an analytical tool as well as an evaluative tool. Moreover, the model presents both a dialectical dimension "because it is premised on two parties who try to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a methodical exchange of discussion moves", as well as a pragmatic dimension, "because these discussion moves are described as speech acts that are performed in a specific situation and context" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 22). A normative

[18] In order to explain Pragma-Dialectics I partially follow the path traced by Zampa (2015).

critical discussion is guided by ten rules[19] and occurs in five phases, that often do not come in chronological succession. Rules and phases are necessary conditions, or better said - necessary sub-goals-, that it is necessary to pursue in order to reach a reasonable resolution of the divergence of opinion on the merits. The five stages are: *a)* the issue stage, in which the issue emerges as having importance and priority*; b)* the confrontation stage, in which the standpoint is advanced by the protagonist and the doubts are more or less explicitly manifested by the antagonist; *c)* the opening stage, during which the premises between the participants to the discussion are established; *d)* the argumentation stage, in which arguments are put forth and/or refuted; and *e)* the concluding stage, in which the discussion ends, either with a resolution of a divergence of opinion or not.

Furthermore, in terms of the disputed proposition, there are two types of divergence of opinion. Firstly, there is a divergence of opinion that can be labeld as single; this is the case of when only one proposition is disputed (the proposition can be confronted with a doubt, therefore being single non-mixed, or it can be confronted with a contradictory standpoint, therefore being single mixed). Secondly, there is a divergence of opinion that can be labeled as multiple; in this case more propositions are disputed (the propositions can be both doubted, therefore being the discussion multiple non-mixed, or they can be contradicted, therefore being the discussion multiple mixed).

According to the typology of standpoints developed by Palmieri et al. (Palmieri et

[19] Following van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoek Henkemans I quote the ten norms of an ideal critical discussion. "Rule 1: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubts on standpoints. […] Rule 2: A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so. […] Rule 3: A party's attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. […] Rule 4: A party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation related to that standpoint. […] Rule 5: A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit. […] Rule 6: No party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point. […] Rule 7: A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme that us correctly applied. […] Rule 8: The reasoning in the argumentation must logically valid or must be capable of beng made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises. […] Rule 9: A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting her doubts. […] Rule 10: Parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoek Henkemans 2002: 110-136).

al. 2015) standpoints can be; *a)* descriptive standpoints, that provide evidence in support of factual statements about the present situation or the past, or *b)* predictive standpoints that are justified when reasons are provided that make an expectation more plausible, or *c)* evaluative standpoints that are advanced when the grounds for the reasonableness of a qualitative assessment or valuation about a present or past state of affairs *d)* practical standpoints that refer to the desirability of a proposed future action and that answers to the question 'what should we do?', or *e)* explanatory standpoints that are advanced when the causes for a past event are at issue.

A pragma-dialectical analysis begins with the analytic overview, in which the context of the argumentative discussion is characterized, and the point in question, the participants and their standpoints are identified.

After having done the analytic overview, the argumentative reconstruction is carried out: the connections of all arguments with the standpoint(s) and the connections between arguments are shown. In case that one argument straight supports the standpoint, argumentation is labeled as single (x because y). In case that various arguments sustain each other (in a potentially endless chain) and finally sustain the standpoint, argumentation is labeled subordinative (x because y because of c…). Then, there is the case in which more than one argument supports the standpoint: in this cases two distinct cases of argumentation may be faced, namely multiple or coordinative argumentation. Argumentation will be said to be multiple in case that the arguments supporting the standpoint act autonomously (*i.e.* x because y, moreover because c), whereas it will be said to be coordinative when the arguments necessarily need to act together to support the standpoint (*i.e.*, x because c and d and e) (Zampa 2015: 61-62). In what follows I will exemplify the distinct types of argumentation by reconstructing the argumentative structure of some excerpts of the editorial conferences of Clayman and Reisner's study. By looking to the original excerpts of editorial conferences and to the respective argumentative analayses, it will be evident that an argumentative analysis consists in a series of transformations. In excerpt (1) we read

(1) RE: -> the measles story is uh/ another very interesting story although its principal impact again/ is in the metro city area. there's a/ the measles epidemic is now up to about uh/ five

hundred and eighty-three cases (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 188).

An example of how a single argumentation is represented is shown in Fig. 2:



Figure 2. Single argumentation (referred to Extract 18 of Clayman and Reisner's study, Clayman and Reisner 1998: 188).

In the following excerpt we can notice a subordinative argumentation:

(2) RE: The best story we had was the crash test story/ the flight attendants/ the surviving flight attendants from the UA flight/ two thirty two held a press conference at the/ airport Hilton today it was a pretty emotional scene/ they talked about/ their experience during the crash and their feelings since then/ mixture as dopoing euphoria and grief (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 188).

When a subordinative argumentation is at stake[20], arguments are organized one on top of the other and a decimal is included one time for every rank. (Figure 3):

[20] Argumentation can be said to be subordinative when it has more than one subargument.



Figure 3. Subordinative argumentation (referred to extract 20 of Clayman and Reisner's study, Clayman and Reisner 1998: 190).

In excerpt (3) we see an example of multiple argumentation:

(3) BE: -> we've got a fairly important bank deal today on LaBelle Street uhm/ LaBelle National Bank which is owned/ by a Dutch firm is acquiring the/ First National Bank of Metrocity which/ will make the combined/ bank will be the fifth largest bank in the state/ and will mean now that two of our top five banks are/ foreign owned uh both banks are quite/ well known and well established institutions on/ LaBelle streetand this is very much of a surprise/ deal that was announced early this morning (Clayman and Reisner 1998: 188).

In case that the arguments supporting a standpoint are independent from each other, the argumentation is called multiple (Figure 4):



Figure 4. Multiple argumentation (referred to extract 13 of Clayman and Reisner's study, Clayman and Reisner 1998: 186).

Finally, in excerpt (4) we see an example of coordinative argumentation.

(4) I'm not hugely enthusiastic about this he/ it is the President and it is a press conference/ but it – there's not a/ not an awful lot of detail and there's nothing/ wildly unexpected in what he said (Clayman and Reisner 1988: 191).

In *coordinative* argumentation the arguments jointly support the standpoint (Figure 5):



Figure 5. Coordinative argumentation (referred to 21 of Clayman and Reisner's study, Clayman and Reisner 1998: 191).

Extended Pragma-Dialectics goes one step forward than Pragma-Dialectics, since it interweaves the dialectical dimension of argumentation, whose main goal is that of concluding a divergence of opinion on the merits in a reasonable way, with the rhetorical dimension, whose main aim is that of reaching effectiveness (van Eemeren 2010). Indeed, the protagonist of a standpoint in an argumentative discussion has to use reasonable arguments (thus exploiting the dialectical dimension) and has to act in such a way that her/his standpoint is accepted (thus exploiting the rhetorical dimension). Reaching an equilibrium between the dialectical and the rhetorical dimension is the goal of strategic maneuvering: this mechanism is the constant of every argumentative move and does not depend on the contextual situation. Due to the significance of the concept of strategic maneuvering for the investigation of argumentation in the newsroom, I dedicate an entire paragraph to it in Subsection 4.2.1, in which I will explain it in detail. Furthermore, another subsection (4.2.2) is devoted to explain how the journalist may usually strive between the dialectical dimension (aiming at conveying a critical view) and the rhetorical dimension

(being effective in order to capture the audience attention).

Generally speaking, in recent times, argumentation is considered by the most prominent scholars in the field as

> a type of communication aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. Generally, this communication will take place by verbal means, whether oral or written, but non-verbal elements (such as gestures and images) may also play a part. In practice, the term argumentation is used in two ways at the same time: it refers to a process ('I am still in the middle of my argumentation') as well to its result ('Let's examine what her argumentation amounts to') (Van Eemeren *et alii* 2007).

This definition is particularly thorough, since it underlines the interpersonal aspect of argumentation, which occurs in an open or tacit dialogue among an arguer, who puts forth some propositions, and a recipient, who receives the arguer'standpoint. The recipient is conceived as a *kritès* that critically tests the arguer's standpoint as well as all his propositions; it is up to the addressee wheather to accept or not the arguer's standpoint.

4.2.1 A closer look at the notion of strategic maneuvering: reconciling dialectics and rhetoric

As we have previously said, in the Extended Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren 2010), dialectics and rhetoric, the two fundamental levels of every actual argumentation, are reunited in spite of an extensive tradition which judged them as irreconcilable.

Two are the goals of the arguers: *a)* finding a solution to a divergence of opinion concerning the issue at stake, and *b)* having success in the discussion and being effective with the audience (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). In many real world contexts arguers' main goal is that of persuading the audience. While argumentation is defined by the joint commitment towards a reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion, in many (not all) real world situations the chief goal of arguers is to persuade. It becomes thus clear that the rhetorical dimension plays a major role in argumentation; indeed, in real-life contexts and in actual human interactions, in which real-life issues are at stake, the rhetorical aspect

plays a crucial role in reaching the arguers' purposes (Rigotti 2007, 2009). Human beings use argumentation when they want to accomplish several goals: They use argumentation in order to identify the pros and cons of the various alternatives, both for promoting a course of action focusing on its (additional) advantages, or contrasting another one by focusing on negative effects. Through argumentation people may try to persuade the others, in the sense that in order to change their goals or their preferences between given goals, they work on beliefs, memory retrieval, reasoning, etc. For instance, a psychotherapist may argue during a session in order to persuade a depressed patient to have a more functional view of the world. In all real situations there is a dynamic balance between a persuasive commitment and a commitment aimed at the reasonableness of the decision.

As we shall see, also journalists argue in their editorial conferences in order to convince the editorial board of the goodness of a given editorial choice or they may argue in their news products in order to persuade the audience of a given opinion of an event. In this research I claim that journalists aim at fulfilling the mandate of their newsroom, trying to produce news items that are balanced and attractive at the same time, with a persuasive commitment and a search for reasonableness.

The features of the relationship between the plausible disposition followed by dialectic and the effectiveness requested by rhetoric has been one of the nearly all disputed matters from the beginning of argumentation's studies onwards. Generally speaking, dialectic and rhetoric have been regarded as antagonistic and even irreconcilable. This conception has been challenged and modified by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999, 2002, 2005), who have widened Pragma-Dialectics whereby the addition of the concept of *strategic maneuvering*: this notion is used by the authors to make reference to the arguers' effort to reach a balance between the two distinct types of goals, namely the dialectical and the rhetorical goal. When arguers maneuver strategically, they attempt to reconcile their two main goals, namely that given by the congruence with their desire (persuading the audience) and that given by their commitment (being reasonable).

Following the extended Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010), arguers conciliate dialectical needs and rhetorical aims at three intertwined levels, namely at the level of *topical potential* (1), at the level of *audience demand* (2), and at the level of *presentational techniques* (3). Put in van Eemeren and Houtlosser's words, strategic maneuvering occurs when "a particular choice made from the available topical potential, a particular way in which the opportunities for framing the addressee's perspective are used, and a particular way in which presentational possibilities are exploited" (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009: 6). The *topical potential* is the first feature to be taken into account when one agent maneuvers strategically: the agent chooses the most convenient moves to reinforce his position. Here, arguers may single out among distinct perspectives of the issue and connected standpoints and may select distinct arguments in favour of their standpoint. Another feature of strategic maneuvering is *audience demand*: this aspect is particularly important in my dissertation, since it lays stress on the role played by the *audience*. Indeed, the audience is the *kritès* that establishes if it is the case of consenting to the validity of a standpoint or not[21]; subsequently, arguments must be accomodated to his/her cognition, attention, expectations, circumstances, preferences, sensitiveness, and so on. The adjustment to audience demand calls for the arguer's encyclopedic knowledge of the recipients of the discourse. In editorial conferences two different critical discussions are at stake: *a)* a discussion in which the protagonist is a journalist X and the antagonist is another journalist Y, and *b)* a discussion in which the protagonist are the journalists and the antagonist is the audienc. The audience demand is a very important level for the scope of the present dissertation, since the final goal of the editorial board in an editorial conferences and in many newsroom activities is that of persuading the audience either *a)* by producing news items that are coherent with the emotive and cognitive environment of the audience or *b)* by producing new items that contradict the audience premises and that lead them to change their previous opinion on a certain state of affairs.

[21] Following van Rees & Rigotti (2011), rhetoric can be harmonically integrated into a dialectical approach, and this "brings to the fore the strategic function of the addressee of the argumentative interaction that is identified as the audience". Furthermore, topical potential and presentational devices – are, following these scholars, "teleologically ruled by the search of the maximum expediency in relation to the image of the audience activated by the arguer".

The third aspect of strategic maneuvering is labeled as *Presentational techniques:* this aspect deals with the adequacy of the used communicative tools. Presentational techniques are truly helpful in enabling the arguer to accomplish the planned and desirable "communicative and interactional effects" (van Eemeren 2010: 119); indeed, by means of some presentational devices instead of others, a discourse can follow a path that is more acceptable and coherent and understandable for the recipient, therefore enabling him to accept and totally comprehend the arguer's reasoning. Presentational techniques have proved to be very useful tools to find a merging point between the topical potential and the audience demand (van Rees & Rigotti, 2011).

4.2.2 The journalist as a rhetor

After having investigated the notion of strategic maneuvering, it becomes clear that the journalist can be conceived as a rhetor that attempts to find a balance between his commitment to criticality and his desire persuade the audience of *a)* the relevance and the credibility of the news and *b)* of the attempt to persuade the audience to adopt a given evaluative stance on a certain state of affairs.

I will now zoom on the journalist's attempt to persuade the audience, which is carried out on a twofold level. First of all, the journalist has to persuade the other journalists of the relevance of the news that he has selected and then he has to persuade the audience that the news is relevant and worth of being read/heard/watched: this level has to do with the persuasion of the relevance and of the credibility of the news. Secondly, the other level of persuasion concerns the journalists' attempt to persuade the audience of their own stance on a given reported event; it is a kind of persuasion that deals with the acceptability of the journalists' evaluations. This second type of persuasion can be carried out in an explicit way in the editorials or in an implicit way through an editorial framing. A persuasion towards a given evaluative stance can occur even in a very implicit way, whereby the usage of given words instead of others or whereby putting forth implicit arguments, as it is often the case in hard news, in which evaluations are often evoked or provoked rather than explicitly expressed.

Implicit evaluation has been deeply studied by J.R. Martin and P.R.R. White (2005), who classify distinct "journalistic voices" at stake in news items. They distinguish between reporter voice and writer voice. When the reporter voice is at stake, there is no authorial unmediated judgement and if there is some judgement, then it is ascribed. It goes without saying that in these cases, when reporter voice is at stake, the evaluation is always implicit, for example in the sentence "According to Zurich tourists, Lugano is a *picturesque* town on the lake" the term *pictoresque* signals some implicit positive judgement. In journalistic products in which a reporter voice is used, the journalist's evaluative role is backgrounded and that of the quoted source is foregrounded; these news products advance or favor stance taking, even though evaluative meanings are explicitly relegated to quoted sources.

On the contrary, when the writer voice is at stake, there is always an inscribed authorial judgement: writer voice can be subdivided into correspondent voice ("in which there is no or minimal authorial inscribed social sanction; if there is an inscribed social sanction, then it is attributed; there are no co-textual constraints on social esteem",) and commentator voice ("there are no co-textual constraints on judgement, there is free occurrence of unmediated social sanction and social esteem") (Martin and White 2005: 173). In these cases in which the writer voice is at stake, there is always an overt evaluation, such as in a sentence like "the future of the society is *threatened*", in which a clear judgement is at stake.

As I have argued above, journalists always have an inner tension between making a critical and fair item on the one side and making a rhetorically constructed item on the other side. This tension is often strongly determined by the anticipation of the audience uptake. In particular, journalists' anticipatory inferences concerning the emotive audience uptake may lead the journalists towards an unfair framing that may present some risk of manipulative deviation. In fact, there is a continuous struggle in the journalists' mind between the will to convey facts in an objective/balanced way on the one side and to frame the news in such a way that is coherent with journalists' anticipatory reasoning concerning audience emotive reactions; this can be said to be a *strategic manoeuvring* carried out by the journalist or by the newspaper (Van Eemeren, 2010; Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002). This represents an attempt to report events in a reasonable manner and to satisfy

the audience emotive demand, therefore presenting a certain portrayal of events themselves. There is a close bond between the selection of a contextual frame and a specific plan activated by the journalist to support a certain stance. For this reason, argumentation plays a crucial role within the seemingly communicative type of news reporting. Keeping the balance between the adherence to reasonableness and the effort at being impressive results in the fact that the arguers have to maneuver strategically in every move that are realized in an argumentative discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002). For journalists, this means that they face a continuous struggle between the editorial commitment to open a space for criticality whereby giving a fair and balanced view of events on the one side, and the attempt at satisfying the audience demand whereby taking into account and predicting their possible/probable/desirable emotive uptake.

In the next sub-section I will look at the inferential dimension of argumentation, namely at the reasoning proposed to a speaker in order to shift from a premise to a conclusion.

4.3 Argumentum Model of Topics: the forms of reasoning in ordinary arguments

Even though Extended Pragma-Dialectics is a crucial tool for analyzing argumentation in context and it is very helpful for reconstructing journalists' argumentative interactions and the resulting news products in their dialectical and rhetorical dimension, it lacks an adequate tool to investigate argument schemes and implicit premises, *i.e.* premises based on the implicit common knowledge of the participants to the argumentative discussion. In order to analyse argument schemes and implicit premises, the Lugano School has developed a theory known as Argumentum Model of Topics.

Argumentum Model of Topics, from now on AMT (Rigotti 2006, 2008, 2009; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010), is a theoretical framework developed to investigate the inferential conformation of arguments[22]. The inferential dimension is a crucial aspect of

[22] In order to explain AMT I will mostly rely on Palmieri 2010.

every argumentative interaction, and in particular, it is fundamental for the study of argumentation in the media and for understanding how journalists' discussions (through their individual and collective decisions and through the reorganization of a mutual cognitive environment in the newsroom) influence news product's construction. The core dynamic of newsmaking -put in Van Eemeren's words, the *point* of all communicative activity types of the context of newsmaking- is to decide how to produce a news item which should be both objective/balanced and attractive for the audience: the essence of such decision is clearly inferential. If we want to ascertain the crucial role of argumentation in journalists' discussions it is crucial to analyse the inference that makes a news or a detail of a news significant for deciding to publish it and that, for this reason, journalists can deploy strategically to convey a balanced view of the reported information and persuade their audience.

Nowadays argumentation researchers usually construe the connection from the argument to the standpoint represented by inferences as an argument scheme (see Hastings 1962; Garssen 2001; Kienpointer 1992; Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008), recognizing distinct types of argument schemes, such as the argument schemes from cause, from analogy, or from authority. The AMT developed by Rigotti and Greco Morasso is a theoretical framework of argument schemes which merges the ample contribution of the Antiquity- more specifically Aristotle and Cicero - and of the Middle Ages, including authors like Boethius, Peter of Spain, Buridan and Abelard, with contemporary works[23]. The study of the inferential structure of arguments with the AMT fits well with the dialectical-rhetorical reconstruction of extended Pragma-dialcetics. Firslty, the AMT enables to identify the purely inferential-logical part of the argument, which designates "the deep structure of the dialectical moves performed in the argumentation stage indicated by the analytic overview"; secondly, the AMT "accounts for the context-bound component of the argument, which comprises the material premises that must be shared in order to make the reasoning effective" (Palmieri 2014: 31).

As noted by Palmieri (2014)

[23] A systematized illustration of AMT and of the other contemporary approaches to argument schemes is presented in Rigotti & Greco Morasso (2010).

> The analysis of the inferential configuration of an argument basically consists in the addition of those implicit premises without which the passage from the explicit premise functioning as argument to the standpoint would not be warranted. Indeed, arguers normally communicate their arguments with *enthymemes*, thus leaving some premises unexpressed: these are not uttered/written, but the arguer can be held committed to them on the basis of what he/she has said explicitly (Palmieri 2014: 31).

For instance, if a journalist justifies his/her decision to broadcast a news item in an emotional way as a strategy to capture audience attention, refusing the claim that emotional news items capture audience attention would be unreasonable.[24] AMT attempts to understand the way in which an agent sustains a standpoint via overt and tacit premises. Two distinct elements are at stake in the inferential configuration. On the one hand, a procedural element is at stake, which guarantees for the inferential connection between argument and standpoint; on the other hand, a material element consisting of contextual premises is at stake, which reconnects the abstract inferential part with the actual argumentation. The abstract procedural part of the inferential configuration consists of three levels: the *locus*, the *maxim* and the *logical form*, whereas the material part

> conjoins two distinct types of proposition situated in the context: the *endoxon*, which tends to remain implicit, and the *datum*, a minor premise which represents the part of the argument usually made explicit in the discourse (see Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010: 493-502) (Palmieri 2014: 31).

In order to make clear the way in which the AMT merges these two components to achieve the inferential configuration, I show an easy case of argumentation gained from *CdT* newsroom. During an editorial conference two journalists are evaluating the editorial choices of a past item, and more specifically the discussion revolves around an item dealing with the Italian politician Berlusconi and the inadequacy of having put an old

[24] Refusing an implicit premise to which one is committed infringes one of the ten rules for critical dicussion and therefore gives rise to a fallacy. (see Rule 5. The unexpressed premise rule: A party may not deny a premise that he/she him/herself has left implicit.)

photo of him as a splash: one journalist evaluates in a negative way the fact that they had put an old photo and says: 'Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice, it gives an old-fashioned idea of the newspaper'.

The journalist's standpoint is clearly 'Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice' and the argument that supports it is 'it gives an old-fashioned idea of the newspaper'. This second information is called *datum* in the AMT: It is an actual and emerging piece of evidence, which the arguer communicates (like in the example above) or recalls from the context to reinforce the reasonableness of the standpoint. In order to understand the way in which the standpoint can be inferred from the datum, the first step is that of recognizing the *locus*, *i.e.* the ontological relation[25] at stake between the aspect taken into account in the datum and the aspect taken into account in the standpoint. In my example, these two aspects correspond to 'old-fashioned idea of the newspaper' and 'old photo as a splash was a bad choice' respectively. Therefore, by asking ourselves the question *what is 'old fashioned idea of the newspaper'* in connection to *'old photo as a splash was a bad choice'?* we notice that '*old fashioned idea of the newspaper*' is an undesired effect caused by the action of '*having put an old photo as a splash*'. The avoidance of a bad goal is at stake in this journalist's argumentation: we face a *locus from final cause*. According to Rigotti, "within the ontology of human action, [the] locus from final cause focuses on the relation connecting the end (goal, purpose) of an action with the action itself" (Rigotti 2008: 566), which perfectly meets Castelfranchi's conception of goal (or better said goal-directed action) as the fundamental mental representation of the cognitive universe: according to him, goal-directed action changes and adapts the world in a guided and prefigured way. As he says, "in the end it's all about goals: -action is for goals, -knowledge is for goals, - intelligence is for goals (solving problems via mental representations), -sociality is for goals and goal-based, emotions are goal centered" (Castelfranchi 2012: 826). With reference to our example, in fact, using an old photo as a splash is an action that leads to a worse and undesirable state of affairs. *Loci a causa finali* are very frequent in journalists' argumentative newsroom discussions, since all

[25] In Latin locus means 'place' (*topos* in Greek), meaning not a physical place but rather a sort of conceptual space, from which the argument is inferred (put in Cicero's words: 'locus sedes est argumenti, uel unde argumenta docuntur').

discussions aim in a certain way to decide which editorial choices realize or do not realize the newsrooms' goals.

AMT accounts for inference "by considering at its roots the intersection of two syllogistic lines of reasoning: a topical (responsible for the inferential mechanism) and an endoxical one (providing persuasive effectiveness by linking the argument to a shared opinion in the community)" (Zampa 2015: 71). In order to graphically represent this complicated configuration, Rigotti and Greco Morasso have elaborated the so called 'Y-structure', which visually resembles the letter 'Y'; the two branches of the letter 'Y' represent the material (left branch) and the procedural starting points (right branch), and the stem of the 'Y' represents the intersection of the two kinds of starting points. In Figure 6 I show the Y-structure that reconstructs the inferential configuration of a journalist's argumentation:



Figure 6. Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice because it gives an old-fashioned idea of the newspaper.

On the left branch of the Y structure there is the syllogism with context-bound premises. The major premise of this syllogism is an *endoxon* and the minor premise is a *datum*. An *endoxon*, following the Aristotleian terminology[26], can be defined as a premise that is accepted by the cultural community in which the discussion is situated and it is often determined by the interaction field, comprising the institutionalized and interpersonal common aims, duties, principles and cultures. Due to the fact that *endoxa* are expected to be shared by the community, they are usually conveyed in a tacit manner. In our example the *endoxon* 'being up-to-date is essential to the image of professionalism that *CdT* wants to convey' is implicit, since the journalist does not need to express the basic requirement of any newsroom goals. The minor premise is a *datum*, which is overtly expressed by the journalist ('the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with the requirement of being up-to-date'). The juxtaposition of *endoxon* and *datum* activates an endoxical syllogism, whose functioning I show in what follows:

Major premise (endoxon): being up-to-date is essential to the image of professionalism that *CdT* wants to convey

Minor premise (datum): the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with the requirement of being up-to-date

First conclusion: the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi is inconsistent with the image that *CdT* wants to convey

The first conclusion of this endoxical syllogism functions as minor premise of the topical syllogism, whose major premise is a maxim gained from the locus. The maxim induces a logic form (such as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*) whose conclusion

[26] Aristotle conceives *endoxa* as 'opinions that are accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by the wise men (all of them or the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them' (Topics 100b.21).

corresponds to the standpoint.

For that reason, the first conclusion of the endoxical syllogism and the minor premise of the topical syllogism 'the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi is inconsistent with the image that *CdT* wants to convey' corresponds to the intersection point of the material and the procedural components.

In what follows I show how the topical syllogism works:

Major premise (maxim): if the expected result of an action X is inconsistent with the pursued goal Y, then the action X should not be undertaken

Minor premise (first conclusion of the endoxical syllogism): the publication of an old photo of Berlusconi conveys an old-fashioned image of the newspaper inconsistent with the requirement of being up-to-date

Conclusion: *CdT* should not have published the old photo of Berlusconi

Every ontological relation (*locus*) generates a number of inferential connections, called *maxims*.

> The datum and the standpoint are not simply related ontologically, but are connected by an inferential principle that links them in a particular way. A maxim is a hypothetical statement (having the form of a 'if-then' entailment, formally 'p -> q') which establishes a connection between the two extremes of the locus relation. (Palmieri 2014: 33).

It is important to notice that since maxims combine the concepts of the locus, they are very generic assumptions that should be regarded as not bound to the context. Indeed, for instance, the maxim of the example above (if the expected result of an action X is inconsistent with the pursued goal Y, then the action X should not be undertaken) can be utilized in many other contexts and argumentative discussions in which an action should not be undertaken due to the inconsistency of its expected result with a pursued goal, as in the examples below:

1. The layout template Y should not be kept because it is inadequate and confusing.

2. It was not a good choice to publish the service on the monastry of Claro and not on the monastery of Cademario because Claro gives a dead and Decadent idea of Catholicism.

3. Alberto should not go out when it rains because he may get a cold.

4. Margherita should not lay into the sun because she has a sun allergy.

By applying the maxim onto the first conclusion in the topical syllogism, the final conclusion can be drawn: the final conclusion coincides with the standpoint of the protagonist.

According to Rocci (2017) loci can be classified in a taxonomy (Fig. 6), which is indebted to those of the contributions from the Middle Ages. The author classifies loci in three categories. The first class is that of Intrinsic loci (1), which "are attached to the subject under discussion itself" (Cicero; Topica, 8), the second class is that of extrinsic loci (2), which are "drawn from without" and "which stand apart and are clearly dissociated", and the third one is that of complex loci (3), which are based on ontological relationships merging features of intrinsic and extrinsic loci. In Figure 6 I show the taxonomy of loci according to Rocci (2017):



Figure 6. Taxonomy of loci according to Rocci (2017: 55).

5. Anticipation of audience uptake

In the present Chapter I focus on one of the main mental processes on which journalists rely when they reason on how to frame their items with their audience in mind, namely *anticipation*. My claim is that the mental operation of anticipation is a key cognitive process at stake in journalists' minds when they argue in the context of newsroom deliberation about news selection and news framing. In this Chapter I propose a typology of the many types of anticipation in terms of configuration of beliefs and goals according to Castelfranchi and Miceli' s cognitive account (2014) (see subsection 5.2). Furthermore, in the last part of this Chapter I will zoom on fictive anticipation in counterfactual reasoning, since many case studies that I have analyzed deal with this type of reasoning.
I will also sketch an overview of the distinct types of audience uptake that are anticipated in the journalists' mind, namely cognitive and emotive anticipation as well as anticipation of persuasion (see subsection 5.3). Among the many types of anticipation, I will devote a particular attention to the anticipation of emotions, in which the object of the anticipation are emotions; this choice is due to the fact that data analysis has revealed that anticipation of audience emotive uptake is the prominent type of anticipation at stake in the newsroom.

Starting from the assumption that such reasonings strongly influence journalists' decisions in newsmaking, my aim is to investigate this anticipating dimension of newsmaking from an argumentative perspective, and I will show some case studies.
The argumentative lens that I adopt gives the chance to shed light on the reasoning processes concerning audience reaction that lead to publish a certain news instead of another and on the way in which journalists decide to publish a news, starting from their anticipatory inferences concerning audience reaction. We have seen in Chapter 3 how Perrin (2013) gives crucial importance to the comprehension of the audience design in journalistic newswriting. According to Clark and Murphy, whose analyses -differently from mine- have been mainly conducted on conversational data, "the speaker designs each

utterance for specific listeners, and they, in turn, make essential use of this fact in understanding that utterance. We call this property of utterances audience design" (1982: 59). Even though in journalism the uptake of the listeners is not evident, Clark and Murphy's definition is apt to stress the active role played by the journalist in customizing the news piece for the audience.

The concept of audience design highly recalls Tindale's matter of audience identity and audience make up (Tindale 2013, 2015). With reference to Perelman's universal audience and using the concept of "cognitive environment" (Sperber and Wilson 1995), Tindale maintains that "a fixed audience is as obsolete as the idea of a fixed argument, unmoored from the dynamic situation of which it is an integral part" (Tindale 2013: 56). According to him, audience identity is crucial because matters of persuasion and assessment of argument strongly rely on this or can be attributed to it (Tindale 2013: 516).

An argumentative approach allows to understand the audience design not just in terms of the abstract mapping of speakers' anticipations concerning the audience uptake onto the message, but, in terms of a reasoning process which does not take place exclusively at an intra-individual level, but rather that is worked out publicly at a collective level through concrete speaking practices within conference meetings. As a matter of fact, looking at argued anticipatory strategies in the newsroom gives an important contribution to socio-linguistic research on newsmaking, and is complementary to the focus that a large share of it places on audience design (e.g. Bell 1984; Bell 1991), and more generally on message design (e.g. O'Keefe 1991). The analysis of argumentation enables to understand how journalists adapt to their audience because it captures the reasoning that formed the basis of editorial choices and on the basis of this reasoning it allows the reconstruction of the conscious pragmatic theories of journalists, as I will show in the empirical part of the dissertation.

5.1 The centrality of a goal-based reasoning for understanding newsroom deliberation

Anticipatory reasoning emerges in the context of newsroom deliveration. In the present section I provide a goal-based account of newsroom deliberation with a special focus on the activity type of the editorial conference. This account will provide the broader context of practical and evaluative reasoning in which anticipatory inferences about audience uptake are deployed by journalists. Argumentation plays a crucial role in editorial conferences, which are a complex activity type, comprising copious participants and distinct phases that follow a rigid routine. The main goal of editorial conferences is that of making decisions that concern news production; in the end, all decision-making processes aim at establishing which is the best editorial strategy that fulfils the mandate of the newsroom, that in the case of the *SRG* coincides with enabling to promote public understanding. It is exactly during these decision-making processes that argumentation plays a pivotal role. As it is known from literature, editorial conference discussions often employ *practical reasoning* (Zampa 2015: 123), which can be defined as "goal-directed reasoning that culminates in an action" (Walton 2007: 180; Walton and Krabbe 1995: 74). The outcome of practical reasoning is a conclusion that it is good to carry out an action in order to reach a desired goal. The (course of) action is essential to fulfill the goals of the interaction field (*e.g.*, promote public understanding) and has to adhere to the canons and restraints prescribed by it (*e.g.*, editorial guidelines apropos the way in which a news item should be in a specific newspaper). "The interaction scheme applied can be thus labeled 'deliberating on a joint course of action over a matter of common concern', and its outcome is a joint decision on how the action should be performed (*e.g*., on how the given news story should be reported)" (Zampa 2015: 123-124).

The interaction scheme "deliberation" is employed so that it is possible to deliberate about the best way in which journalists should act in order to satisfy the goals of the newsroom. Thus, since the interaction field and the interaction scheme strongly determine the issue at stake, the issue underlying all argumentative discussions in the newsroom can be generally formulated as "what is the most productive way to publish/broadcast a news item that enables to reach the goal of fulfilling the public mandate of the newsroom X?". However, this is the superordinate goal; in order to understand how journalists concretely argue in the newsroom it is necessary to analyse the whole hierarchy of goals, including

also intermediate goals. In Figure 7 I show the hierarchy of goals pursued by the editorial board within editorial conferences in a newsroom:



Figure 7. Journalists' goals' structure in editorial conferences, carried out either via modification or via strengthening of audience emotions and cognitions.

Deliberation and evaluation that supports deliberation in the newsroom deal to improve editorial choices and editorial strategies on the basis of past errors or successes and on the basis of current practices. Improving editorial practices deals to two distinct lines of goals. On the one hand, it deals to produce objective news items (goal 2) that deal to properly inform the audience (goal 3), that in turn deals to let the audience to build an autonomous and balanced view of the reported event (goal 4). On the other hand, it deals to produce attractive news items (goal 2), which in turn deals to capture audience attention (goal 3), which in turn deals to the entertainment of the audience (goal 4). Both the

perlocutionary goals of enabling the audience to build an autonomous and balanced view of the reported event and to entertain the audience in the end aim at promoting public understanding and at fulfilling the public mandate, which is the ultimate and superordinate goal.

It is interesting to notice that that the two distinct lines of goals, namely the one directed at capturing the audience attention and the one directed at enabling the audience to build an a balanced view of the reported event, are carried out through two distinct types of persuasion modes. Firstly, in order to capture the audience attention, the journalist attempts to persuade the audience by *strengthening* the audience (cognitive and/or emotive) attitude, independently from what he believes. Secondly, in order to convey a balanced view of the event, the journalist attempts to persuade the audience also by *modifying* the audience (cognitive and/or emotive) attitude, depending on what he believes. This is part of the journalists' strategic maneuvering, which is therefore due to a conflict of goals, namely being effective by capturing the audience attention on the one hand, and being reasonable by conveying a balanced view of the event on the other hand.

The actions that enable journalists to reach these goals are carried out in the distinct phases of the editorial conference. Editorial conferences are divided in distinct phases that mark a specific function and that are directed towards a specific goal; each phase is characterized by its own interaction scheme, and each passage from a phase to another is marked and signaled by specific utterances. In what follows, I will characterize each type of interaction scheme at stake in each phase of the editorial conference of the newsroom of *CdT*.

An editorial conference begins with the phase in which the responsible for advertisement joins the conference and communicates how many pages are devoted to advertisement and in which section they should be inserted, and the interaction scheme applied can thus be labeled 'notice on the number of pages that should be devoted to advertisement', and its outcome is journalists' becoming conscious of the number of pages and columns of the newspaper that should be devoted to advertisement and of the physical space in which advertisement should be inserted. This is a very important phase, since it is necessary in order to plan all information to be conveyed to the audience and to organize

the layout of each page, of each thematic section and of the whole newspaper. Linguistically speaking, the utterance that signal the entrance into this phase is 'pages', uttered by the journalist who is in charge of the conference and directed to the person who is responsible for organizing advertisement; this utterance marks also the beginning of the conference. The journalist produces this utterance in order to reach the goal of getting the advertisement responsible to tell him the pages that they have at their disposal, thus to know how many and which pages they have at their disposal and in the end to distribute information in a reasonable way.

The next phase is devoted to the evaluation of the news already published in the newspaper of the day. The phase is opened by a declarative speech act taking the form of an utterance like 'Newspaper of today' or 'Observations'. The journalist utters 'newspapers of today' or 'observations' in order to reach the goal to get the other members of the editorial team to inform the whole team of personal judgements of possible observations on past news item or general practices (goal 1), in order to know which items/details of items were a good choice and which not or which practices are fruitful or not (goal 2), in order to make better choices and to improve the quality of the newspaper (goal 3).

The next step is the phase devoted to establish what should be inserted in the front page. The words 'front page' uttered by the journalist in charge of the conference open this phase, which is characterized by the interaction scheme 'deliberation on the news to put in the specific section front page'. The journalist produces this utterance in order to gain the others' attention and more specifically the attention of the journalist who is responsible for the desk/section at stake (goal 1), in order to ensure that in each section the most prominent topics are inserted. Depending on the section on which attention is drawn, the utterance is lead to pick up the most significant news for the respective section.

Then, the journalist in charge of the conference utters the name of the desk for which a decision on the items to publish should be taken in order to start the respective decision-making process: for instance, after having uttered 'front page' in order to introduce the decision-making process aimed at picking the most actual news of the day, he then utters all the names of the desks in order of appearance on the newspaper, aiming at initiating

the sub-phase of decision-making processes of the respective section, namely 'Foreign affairs', 'Confederation', 'Canton' 'News section', 'Sport', 'Economy', 'Culture and show business', 'Web'. Then, the journalist in charge of the conference approaches the end of the conference by uttering 'Other observations', thus aiming at gaining the attention of the whole editorial team (goal 1), in order to ask them if they have any further remarks on some discussed topic or on some topics that have not been discussed yet (goal 2), which in turn aims at improving the quality of the forthcoming/future items (goal 3). At the very end of the conference, the journalist in charge of the meeting utters 'Thanks and good luck with your work', therefore applying an interaction scheme that can be conceived as 'notice of closure of a meeting': the journalist utters it in order to inform the editorial board that the conference is finished and that the editorial team is allowed to leave the place where the editorial conference has taken place.

As we have seen, there are phases of an editorial conference that are devoted to evaluation and other phases that are devoted to deliberation, so that we may find two types of argumentative discussions within an editorial conference; one is a knowledge-oriented discussion, whose participants' primary and direct goal is knowledge of facts of the world (fact-finding goal) and the other is a practical-oriented discussion (decisional goal). The goal of the latter type of discussion is a decision, but the final outcome is a change of the view of some facts of the world, which involves in some way a given degree of knowledge change. Therefore, we can say that both types of discussions influence journalists' cognitive environment, since even a practical discussion has a cognitive effect; indeed, as a result of the discussion itself the view of the world is reshaped and reconsidered. Subsequently, the media products will be influenced in two distinct ways and two distinct perlocutive effects will be reached: firstly, they are modified in a decisional way and secondly they are modified in the sense that the cognitive environment is clearly modified from the consequences of the decisions.

5.2 Anticipatory reasoning: a goal-based approach

Since anticipation is a crucial phenomenon in the newsroom that determines the whole framing given to the news, in this subsection I will illustrate the cognitive psychological principles underpinning the mental process of anticipation.

Cognitive psychologists Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014) maintain that anticipatory reasoning is a crucial mental process of the human mind and mental anticipatory representations of future states of affairs play a fundamental role in everyone's everyday activity, since they enable us to understand the reasons of a huge part of the others' motives, decision-making and planning activities, feelings and behaviors (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Anticipation plays such a central role in human reasoning that the human mind has been defined as an "anticipatory device" (Castelfranchi 2005; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2007; Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014) that acts to anticipate and, in particular, construct and act on anticipatory representations. Mental activity is at stake when an individual succeeds in constructing internally a representation of a certain state of affairs; this signifies that the agent is able to build a representation that is not "the output of current perceptual stimuli, but a 'simulation' of perception" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). This simulative mental representation is usually deployed in order to anticipate a future appropriate stimulus, or a more or less possible/probable consequence of a cause, or a more or less possible/probable action on the world.

In support to the central role of anticipation in the human mind is also Dennet's statement that the fundamental goal of brains is 'to produce future' (Dennet 1991: 177: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Furthermore, we gain confirmation of the key role played out by anticipatory reasoning in the human mind even from studies on memory; put in Schacter's words, "given the adaptive priority of the future planning, we find it helpful to think of the brain as a fundamentally prospective organ that is designed to use information from the past and the present to generate predictions on the future" (Schacter et al. 2007: 660; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Empirical evidence that the mind is prospective and proactive (it tends to anticipate and problems, rather than reacting to themafter they have taken place) has been gained by Bar and Firth (e.g. Bar 2007; Frith 2007: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Therefore, anticipation can be considered a fundamental mental activity that unifies all brain functions.

Moreover, anticipatory representations are a core element underpinning the notion of schema as it used in psychology and cognitive science, as well as that of script (Schank and Abelson 1997: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3) and frame (e.g. Minsky 1975). Scripts and frames are often used to attribute goals to the others: indeed, scripts contain the persons' minds with goals within one framing. The concept of a cognitive activity as a generative process has been present already in Piaget (1926); according to him, every cognitive activity implies an integration of an inner already established schemata with informantion coming from the environment (from the sensorimotor phase to the symbolic phase). Existing schemata are accommodated (changed and/or altered) in light of new information; this is an essential principle common to many theoretical frameworks (e.g. Anderson 1977; Arbib 2003; Bartlett 1932; Neisser 1976; Rumelhart and Ortony 1977: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 4). Anticipation plays a pivotal role in these approaches, since schemata strongly determine the way in which new information is received whereby mental anticipations of the future stimulus, event or action.

Even for what concerns memory, Bartlett (1932) already illustrated the way in which schemata model people's understanding of upcoming information as well as their recall. Put in Huron's words, "the biological purpose of memory is not *recall* but *preparation*" (2006: 219: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 3). Furthermore, our mind does not simply repropose past experience in the future, but rather it is capable of building completely new scenarios, of imagining never-existed alternative worlds. Indeed, the human mind is able to simulate new worlds and not only to retrieve them.

Since anticipatory representations concern the formation of new possibilities, they are usually ascribed an epistemic function. Nevertheless, they do not automatically correspond to epistemic representations. According to Castelfranchi and Miceli "anticipatory representations can tell us not only how the world will be, but also how the world should be, or how the organism would like it to be" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 4). In this dissertation I follow the path traced by Castelfranchi and Miceli in conceiving anticipatory representations as goals that direct the future actions of the agent. More in general, every goal-oriented system is intrinsically anticipatory, because it is guided by

the representation of the goal-state and stimulated by the latter's interchange with the actual state of affairs (e.g. Miller et al. 1960). Anticipation is so much integrated with action that some authors (e.g. Kunde et al. 2007) have put forth the radical statement that no action is possible without anticipation.

5.2.1 The notion of goal

Since goals are a crucial component of anticipatory reasoning and of reasoning within deliberation as a whole, it is wise to specify what I mean by *goal*. Different disciplines such as philosophy, cognitive science and psychology propose what Castelfranchi has defined a "Ptolemaic" perspective of cognition, perpetuating the reductionist idea that information and representation can be said to coincide with 'knowledge'. In line with this view, the main models of goal hierarchies and decision making do not investigate goal-processing step by step and its relations with knowledge processing. Nevertheless, this poses some theoretical problems, since the mind's functioning is based on knowledge and goals. "Moreover, what is missing from this picture is what gives purpose to cognition itself. What is 'knowledge' *for*?" (Castelfranchi 2012: 826).

In this dissertation I will follow the path traced by Castelfranchi according to whom goals should be considered the keystone of cognition. Furthermore, according to him, information and representation do not coincide with knowledge, since goals are also a type of representation with a very peculiar function, namely that of directing action. Put in Castelfranchi's words, "In the end, it's all about goals: -action is for goals (and goals are for potential actions), -knowledge is for goals, -intelligence is for goals (solving problems via mental representations), -sociality is for goals and goal-based, -emotions are goal-centered (Castelfranchi et al. 1996)" (Castelfanchi 2012: 826).

We can say that Castelfranchi re-builds cognitivism on the basis of the Cybernetic principle of goal-directed action, which supports the view of the cognitive mind as an independent, purposive and goal-directed device. In Castelfranchi's view, all the distinct functions that cognitive science ascribes to the mind are produced by the same Cybernetic mechanism that chooses goals on the basis of beliefs and common knowledge, fills the

gap between goals and states of affairs, and induces actions that accomplish goals by reducing the divergences (Pezzulo 2012: 13).

The focus on goal-directed action, in which anticipation plays a major role, is the *fil rouge* that links Castelfranchi's approach to Rigotti's theoretical framework of the ontology of human action, developed within the *AMT* (which is explained in detail in Section 4.3). In the next subsection I will sketch an overview on the ontology of human action as conceived by Rigotti and I will lay stress on the points of overlap with Castelfranchi's approach.

5.2.2 The ontology of human action

In terms of AMT, the reasoning carried out by an individual that wants to pursue a goal and that acts in order to carry out that goal is represented by the *locus from final cause* (Rigotti 2008). Indeed, the *locus from final cause* pertains to the ontological domain of action (as it is shown in Fig. 9 below), which may be characterized in its fundamental components (in an ideal model) as an occurrence deliberately produced by a human being who,

> being aware of the present situation and of a new possible comparatively more convenient state of affairs, which is realizable through a causal chain available to her, is attracted by this new, possible, state of affairs and, taking the decision of applying a causal chain, activates it thus realizing her purpose (Rigotti, 2008; 565).

This is highly similar to what has been claimed by Castelfranchi that anticipatory reasoning results from the comparison of the representation of a goal state with a current state of affairs and is guided by one's desire.

It is clear that the ontological domain of action as conceived by Rigotti presupposes the crucial role of anticipation; indeed, the agent has to anticipate "a new comparatively more conveninent state of affairs" that is still non-esistent, not perceivable and not yet true. This is in line with Castelfranchi's view of 'generative power of the mind', which is able to produce new scenarios, new states of affairs that were never behold before. Furthermore, he says, we can conceive and even try to achieve states of the worlds (pursue as goals) that we never encountered before (Castelfranchi 2012: 827). This is similar to what Rocci states about the humans' ability to refer to other worlds than that in which the

participants live: "this phenomenon relies on the very basic human cognitive ability of thinking that things might be otherwise, that is, thinking of alternatives: states of affairs others than what is the case" (Rocci 2009: 16).

According to Rigotti, it is frequent that many distinct, not instrinsic features become important in the decision-making process: due to the fact that decision-making processes do not take place in a contextual vacuum, the situational factors such as distinct rival desires and distinct costs of the causal succession may lead the individual to leave or modify the purpose. Furthermore,

> the possible positive or negative side effects, comprising the informative and relational implications of action, the possible presence in the causal chain of subservient instrumental actions and the quality of their ends and of their possible side effects turn the action into a complex and hardly manageable process, in which the human subject intensively "negotiates" the realization of its purposes with the surrounding context[27] (Rigotti 2008: 566).

In Figure below (Figure 8) I show Rigotti's representation of the ontology of human action (Rigotti 2008: 566, revised and adapted from Rigotti 2003).

[27] Rigotti's view is very close to Castelfranchi's conception of goals in the mental activity. According to him, the present models of goals lack of a model of goal-processing step by step and of its relation with knowledge processing. Furthermore, according to him, "what is missing […] is what gives what gives *purpose* to cognition itself. What is 'knowledge' for?" [Italics added]. According to Castelfranchi, we must abandon the Ptolemaic view that conceives both epistemic or doxastic 'representations' as synonyms of 'knowledge'. "Representations can have a motivational, axiological, or deontic nature; they tell us not only how the world is, was will be, but how the world *should be*, how the organism *would it like to be*. That is, these representations can be used as *goals* driving the organism's behavior" (Castelfranchi, 2012; 827).



Figure 8. The ontology of human action (Rigotti 2008: 566, reviewed from Rigotti 2003).

In Figure 9 the ovals represent the points of critical scrutiny of the reasonableness of an action, *i.e.* the critical evaluation of the reasonableness of an action: *a)* Does an action corresponds to the hierarchy of goals? *b)* Is the reached state of affairs really desirable? *c)* Does the way in which resources are deployed answer to the priority? *d)* Does the action produce side effects? The rectangles stand for the predicates that are attributed to the agents, they concern the agent's mental life: the agent knows and or believes the past present and future worlds, is affected by a desire concerning the representation of a new responding state of affairs (desire), decides to pursue this goal, and activates a causal chain. The lines that connects the rectangles indicate the presuppositions: for instance, the fact that an agent is affected by a desire presupposes that

he knows and believes the past, present and future worlds. The big arrow represents the shift from the physical dimension to the action: the agent activates a causal chain realizing the representation of a new responding state of affairs (desire).

In the ontology of action, the locus from the final cause centers on the relationship linking the end (goal, purpose) of an action with the action itself. Distinct maxims are produced by this locus. For instance, since the end is a necesary element of every action, the maxim "if a behaviour has no end, it is not an action" can be derived. This maxim is recurrently used in the legal domain when the degree of responsibility of an agent involved in a misfact has to be established. Other two maxims can be drawn from the concept of action: "if the pursued end is impossible, the decision of achieving the action is irrational" and "if the pursued end is evidently harmful for the agent, the action is unreasonable". Moreover, the maxim "if an action is strictly required in order to reach a desired goal, this action should be undertaken" is very close to Walton's primary notion of practical reasoning[28]. Generally speaking, the same logical assumption based on the connection of desirability of a given action due to the desirability of its outcome can be found also in Garssen (1997: 21, quoted in Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoek Henkemans 2007: 166) as a subcalssify of the causal argument scheme. The label used by Garssen (2001: 92) for this logical rule is "'means-end practical argumentation' or 'pragmatic argumentation'". A similar maxim, namely "cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est" ("if the end is good, the thing is good too") can be found already in Boethius (De differentiis topicis, P.L. 64, 1189 D). This maxim is further validated and approved by Abelard (Dialectica 416, 436) and Peter of Spain (Summulae logicales 5.2.7). However, Buridan casts doubt on it (Summulae de dialectica 6.4.13), since he has claimed that no property can be attributed to something that does not exist yet; subsequently, according to him, the end cannot be good or bad, since it does not yet exist before the completion of the action.

[28] Walton classifies two central argument schemes of practical reasoning (Walton 1990: 48): the *necessary condition* and *the sufficient condition* schemes. These enable to recognize crucial components of practical reasoning: the conception of goal and compelling issues stemming from the indivudual's connection with actuality (practicality and side effects).

5.3 Distinct kinds of anticipatory representation in terms of configuration of beliefs and goals

Generally speaking, anticipatory representations have been generally conceived as "expectancies" or "expectations" (e.g. Huron 2006; Olson et al. 1996); nevertheless, it is crucial to shed light on the different kinds of anticipatory representations, since these strongly influence the type of argumentative discussion in the newsroom, that in turn may strongly influence news' framing. I intend to analyse these differences in terms of the configuration of beliefs and goals implied by the various anticipatory representations, because these different compounds are likely to induce journalists to apply different types of reasoning. In order to distinguish the main types of anticipatory reasoning, I mostly rely on Castelfranchi and Miceli's classification illustrated in the book 'Expectancy and emotion' (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014, Chapter 4).

Firstly, I will consider simple anticipatory reasonings, namely mere beliefs of possibility. Beliefs, and especially beliefs dealing with future states of affairs, may vary for what concerns the degree of certainty; if the perceived likelihood that a certain state of the world will be realized is high, then the belief will be more certain. On the contrary, if the perceived likelihood that a certain state of affairs will be realized is low, then the belief will be less certain. Generally speaking, a prospective event *p* that is ascribed up to 0.5 likelihood is simply a possibility. "One's belief about *p* is a hypothesis, or better implies two opposite hypotheses- 'p may happen' and 'p may not happen', each of which does not exceed the chance threshold" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 31). In this situation, the person usually ascribes more likelihood to one of the two hypothesis and favors it. The simple process of hypothesizing augments the perceived likelihood of the hypothesis in that it augments the accessibility of the information at disposal (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1982: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 31). Furthermore, evidence has been given that the simple imagination of a hypothetical future state of affairs, as well as explaining its occurrence, augments the perceived likelihood of that event (e.g. Carrol 1978; Sherman et alii 1983: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 32).

The second type of anticipatory representation is prediction. When an agent makes a prediction, he has a "belief about a future state of affairs in which the chance threshold

has been exceeded" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 32). Generally speaking, a prediction is when an agent considers a future event as probable and not simply possible, therefore ascribing to the event more than 0.5 probability. The agent has some encyclopedic knowledge that enables him to establish that it is probable that the future event will happen; in the empirical part of the dissertation I will show that predictions may be based on loci from past analogy, due to the fact that past evidence may deal as a point of reference for future comparisons. When one agent predicts an event, a certain regularity of occurrence is implied, enabling one to be convinced that *p* will occur. Predictions may have distinct degrees of certainty that convey more or less force to the convinction. In case that the belief that the future event will occur is strong, the agent will wait for *p* in a more intense way and will think that the event 'should' occur. The factors that mainly contribute to ascribe certainty to a prediction are determined by one's deductive knowledge or previous experience with *p*'s likelihood; more specifically, these factors include *a)* the assignment of *p*'s happening to permanent causes (e.g. Weiner 1985: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 33), *b)* the availability of the prediction (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1973: Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 33) and the consensus information (e.g. Olson et al. 1996). Predicting is an intrinsic act of the human being. More specifically, agents "both need to anticipate future events-by knowing what causes will produce what effects- and to find their anticipations validated by facts" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 34). Predictability is indeed the main cognitive element of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982).

The third type of anticipatory representation I will deal with are the interested anticipatory representations, which are different from mere beliefs and predictions. Indeed, interested anticipatory representations imply goals; their constitutive cognitive elements are beliefs and goals about future states of affairs. An interested anticipatory representation according to Castelfranchi and Miceli "is composed of an epistemic anticipatory representation (either a belief of possibility or a prediction proper) about *p*, *plus* a goal about p (or *not-p*)" (2014: 37). Therefore, an interested anticipatory representation, unlike a mere epistemic anticipation, is never a cold anticipation but rather always has a valence. The valence is positive when the epistemic representation is in line with the goal (one has the goal that *p* and anticipates that *p* will occur or one has the goal

that not-*p* and anticipates that not-*p* will occur). On the contrary, the valence is negative when the epistemic representation is not in line with the goal (one has the goal that *p* and anticipates that not-*p*, or vice-versa) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 38-39).

Finally, in terms of valence, the more 'strong' type of anticipatory reasoning is the expectation, which is defined by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 41) as an interested anticipatory representation implying a *prediction* about *p* conjoined with the goal that *p* (or not-*p*). Unlike, interested anticipatory representation, they base on a prediction and a goal and not simply on a belief and a goal.

As previously said with reference to interested anticipatory representations, expectations may have a positive or negative valence. The valence will be positive when the goal is in line with the prediction, whereas it will be negative when the goal is not in line with the prediction. It is known from literature that expectations play a major role in the pre-decision making phase (e.g. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 1987), by strongly guiding intention formation (or maintainance) and pursuit.

If the degree of certainty of a prediction is high and if the goal is very important, then it will be very likely that the agent simulates a state of mind in which *p* appears as if it was already actualized (even though *p* is actually not yet realized). That is, positive expectations- entailing both a deeply-rooted belief that p will happen and the goal that it does happen- encourage the anticipatory impression of prelude of p's accomplishment and the subjective pleasure bound with it (Miceli and Castelfranchi 1997: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 43). Subsequently,

> if *p* doesn't occur and the positive expectation is invalidated, the pain of p's thwarting is likely to be greater than what one would experience either in the absence of any expectations or in the presence of a mere interested anticipatory representation (where the implied epistemic anticipation is a simple belief of possibility rather than a prediction), or in the presence of negative expectations (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 43).

I will show a case of study (the BEBE case) in Section 10, in which it is evident the invalidation of a journalist's positive expectation that his collegues should have followed

the editorial norms; when he realizes that this has not happened and that not following the newspaper's guidelines has had a very negative outcome, he initiates an argumentative discussion and puts forth a negative evaluative standpoint referred to what has been previously made. Indeed, in this case of study, the journalist expects that a dramatic news such as that of the abandonment of a newborn is handled by the editorial team in an empathic and emotional way. He did not expect that the other journalists could have avoid to follow the newspapers' guidelines, stating that news touching people's sensitiveness should be handled in an empathic way, because it is an implicit editorial norm, which *should* tacitily be observed. It is known from literature that when failures are unexpected, they are usually harder to cope with than in case of expected ones (Mellers et al. 1997). The anticipated pleasure of a desired goal increases the pain caused by the goal's non-realization; indeed, if failed acquisitions arise after positive expectations, they can be compared to losses and can be seen as a form of grief.

Nevertheless, a positive expectation does not simply imply a mere prediction conjoined with a goal. In positive expectations, the epistemic 'should' (frequently used in predictions becomes a deontic 'ought' (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2002). "The probabilistic force of predictions, conjoined with the motivational force of goals, produces a sort of normative belief: *p* is no longer viewed as something that should happen because it 'normally' happens, but as something that is 'prescribed' to happen" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 43). The invalidation of a positive expectation has more serious consequences than invalidation of other anticipatory reasonings, since it causes a sensation of abuse, as if a norm was infringed and as if someone would undergo the injustice due to the norm's infringement. The feeling of abuse is directly proportional to the force of the positive expectation; when the positive expectation is particularly strong, the sense of injustice increases a lot. When a positive expectation is invalidated, the consequent emotive reactions comprehend irritation, bitterness, and a sense of unfairness.

Put in Castelfranchi and Miceli's words, x's positive expectation that *p* implies that:

> (a) x's prediction that *p* will occur; (b) x's goal that *p* occurs; and (c) x's implicit normative belief that p ought to occur, produced by the joined force of x's prediction and x's goal (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 4).

In case that *p* involves a human agent, then it is this agent who ought to behave as expected. For example, Sara's expectation that she will have a brilliant future in the Academia will probably imply some tacit norm set on every person who might play a causal role in the event of her moving ahead in the Academia, including herself. Furthermore, "the more the expectant believes *p* to be dependent on some agents' intentional- rather than merely causal- behavior, and consequently holds such agents responsible for p's realization, the more binding will be the norm set on them" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 45).[29]

Until now I have spoken of the normative feature which is typical of positive expectations. Unlike positive expectations, negative expectations do not imply normative features. When one agent has the goal that *p* but makes the prediction that not-*p* (or vice-versa), "one does not set any deontic norm that p or not-p ought to happen" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 46): there is only a mere belief that not-p should (epistemically) happen, even though the agent would like that not-p does not happen. Unlike invalidation of positive expectation, when a negative expectation is disconfirmed, the agent who has the expectation will certainly be taken by surprise, but is very improbable to complain or feel upset. On the contrary, the agent will experience relief and gratification, because his goal *p* has been fulfilled. I will show that the invalidation of negative expectation is closely bound to a downward counterfactual reasoning that consists in the imagination of unrealized worse scenarios (for more details see Section 8.8). In the empirical part of the thesis I will show some case studies that deal with invalidation of negative expectation and counterfactual reasoning (Section 11.5).

There is a tight relationship between violated expectations and counterfactual reasoning. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that violated expectations may easily promote counterfactual thinking (e.g. Roese and Olson 1995b; Sanna and Turley 1996). This is due to the fact that when one agent faces an undesired outcome, one will easily

[29] The framework developed by Castelfranchi and Miceli could benefit from the theory developed by Rocci (Rocci 2017a), in which he states that something is binding for the others in four situations: *a)* if one's own goal is a common goal in one's community, *b)* if by chance my goal corresponds to the other's duty (a norm or a law for example) *c)* if a commitment exists involving the other: if the other has expressed the intention to do something *d)* if a religious thinking is conceived in which God is responsible for everything (Rocci 2017a).

contrast it with 'what might have been' in line with the initial expectation. More specifically, when disconfirmed positive expectations (predictions plus goals) are at stake, not only the "what might have been", but also the "what ought to have been" path is followed. In this case two are the possible ways of interpreting the modal "ought", which in a broad sense can be considered deontic. In one case, a personal deontic based on one's own desire may be at stake; in order to reach the goal, it is necessary that the goal is not impossible and that there is a desire. In the other case, a stronger deontic -a *stricto sensu* deontic- may be at stake, in which a prediction plus a goal plus one of the conditions listed in footnote 21 is involved (Rocci 2017a). In the case of invalidated positive expectations, an upward counterfactual reasoning, simulating a better unrealized state of affairs, will be easily applied. Unlike violated expectations, disconfirmed beliefs and predictions might consist of simple disconfirmed beliefs about future states of affairs. In case of disconfirmed predictions, not only the "what might have been" but also the "what should (epistemically) have been" path is followed.

5.4 Journalists' types of anticipation in terms of audience uptake

By looking at the interaction field of the newsrom, and considering its main goal, namely that of promoting public understanding, it is reasonable to expect that audience uptake anticipation plays a key role in my corpus; indeed, in my corpus I observed the presence of many cases concerning the anticipation of audience uptake. The term 'uptake' has been introduced by Austin, who maintained that the securing of uptake is fundamental to the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1962: 117). Indeed, following Austin (1962: 22, 116), one of the main requirements for an illocutionary act to be "felicitous", to take place, is that it must "secure uptake": this means that the imagined audience for the speech act must both hear and grasp the point of what is said. Therefore, Austin's focus is on the the comprehension of the illocutory act.

The concept of uptake has been investigated under a different perspective by Clark (1996) and Sbisà (2002; 2009), who have a different conception of uptake in comparison to Austin. Indeed, both –and especially Clark- point at the importance of *showing* that the

illocutory act has been understood. In particular, Clark has mainly focused on uptake in joint actions; he states that "uptake is evidence of understanding" (Clark 1996: 200). In his conception, uptake is conceived as evidence of construal, since it provides evidence not only that the hearer understands an utterance, but also of *the way in which* the hearer interprets that utterance. In case that the speaker acknowledges the uptake, that construal can be considered as the joint construal. Furthermore, uptake also displays the level of commitment to an activity: for instance, imagine that Mary says "let's go to the cinema tonight" and that John answers "Ok" or "Yes, it's great!". Finally, uptake gives the speaker the chance to validate or adjust the construal. For instance, imagine that a professor and his PhD student are correcting the student's thesis in the professor's office and the professor says to his PhD student 'would you like to wait out, please?' and the PhD student says 'no, I prefer to wait'. The professor can adjust the construal and say 'it wasn't a suggestion, it was an order'.

As previously said, the notion of uptake has been studied also by Sbisà (Sbisà 2002; 2009). The author claims that "illocutionary acts are conventional, first of all, because they have conventional effects" (Sbisà 2009: 33). According to Sbisà, Austin considered such effects as necessary to illocution and she argues that "the bringing about of conventional effects is bound up with the indispensability of uptake" (Sbisà 2009: 34). The author claims that the classical speech act theory is unable to clarify sequential features, and she focuses on the fact that no dialogue move can give rise to its conventional features if it is separated from its uptake. She says that

> while the role of uptake in illocution has usually been taken as evidence of the intention-based nature of illocutionary acts as opposed to their alleged conventionality, I reinterpret it as stemming from the conventionl status of the effects of illocutionary acts: it is in order for an utterance to produce conventional status of the effects of illocutionary acts: it is in order for an utterance to produce conventional effects that it needs to be understood as bringing about those effects (Sbisà 2009: 34).

Sbisà includes only implicitly the dimension of anticipation in her work; indeed, she asks herlsef "what happens to the illocutionary act, and to its conventional effects, if uptake is not achieved, or if actual uptake does not correspond to the speaker's expectactations?", but she does not develop a full theory on the relationship between speaker's expectations and uptake.

On the contrary, Bakhtin has made explicit the dimension of expectation involved in the uptake, stating that a speaker "talks with an *expectation* of the listener preparing a response" (Bakhtin 1986: 69). Furthermore, Bakhtin explicitly talks about the objects of the speaker's expectation, which range from response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution and so on, as we can read in the following passage;

> all real and integral understanding is actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a response (in whatever form it may be actualized). And the speaker himself is oriented precisely toward such an actively responsive understanding. He does not *expect* passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates his own idea in someone else's mind. Rather, he *expects* response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth (various speech genres propose presuppose various integral orientations and speech plans on the part of the speakers or writers). The desire to make one's speech understood is only an abstract aspect of the speaker's concrete and total speech plan. (Bakhtin 1986:69).

Even though Bakhtin does not speak of argumentation, he implicitly assumes its importance in dialogue; indeed, he speaks of *agreement* and *objection*, which are two commonly used terms in argumentation theory. The former is typically used to refer to an opinion divergence which has been resolved in some way in the concluding stage, whereas the latter is typically used to refer to an argument put forth in opposition to another during the argumentation stage.

Furthermore, in an often quoted passage, Bakhtin says that "utterances are not indifferent to one another and are not self-sufficient; they are aware of and mutually reflect one another" (Bakhtin 1986: 91). Therefore, each contribution to a dialogue is intrinsically 'other-oriented', comprehending an interpretation of previous contributions and at the same time being sketched to involve some sort of prolongation, thus also comprising a prospective interpretation, or anticipation, of what is going to follow.

The analyzed authors -in particular Clark and Sbisà- have in mind a conversational situation in which the audience uptake is evident, whereas in the context of news media the audience uptake is not evident at all.

In what follows I show a typology of audience uptake anticipation in terms of 'objects of anticipation' classified on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, the locutionary and the perlocutionary level, as it is shown in Figure 10;



Figure 10. Typology of audience uptake anticipation on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, the locutionary and the perlocutionary level.

As it is shown in Fig. 10, we can distinguish between *a)* anticipation of audience interpretation, which deals with either the locutionary or the illocutionary force and a *b)* anticipation of audience persuasion, which can aim to modify the audience attitude (acting either on the cognitive or on the emotive uptake of the audience or on both) or the audience behavior, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The notion of uptake in literature on linguistic acts is situated inbetween locution, illocution and perlocution: I conceive uptake in a broad sense, dealing with the whole scope of locutionary and perlocutionary effects. I am particularly interested in cognitive and emotive effects and not in conventional effects, since persuasive effects are the most important ones in the context of news media. Indeed, uptake's signals from the audience are indirect and limited in journalism, differently from the conversations analyzed by Clark for instance.

Anticipation of persuasion is the most prominent type of anticipation in the newsroom, since journalists' ultimate goal is that of capturing the most possible number of readers or TV-viewers in order to promote public understanding (Perrin 2013): this goal is reached whereby a persuasive appeal that deploys the journalists' emotions and that acts on the audience attitude and/or behavior. In fact, also according to Aristotle, persuasion may be reached thanks to the reciprocal and mutual action of *ethos* (persuasive appeal bound to the persuader's character and moral fiber), *logos*, *i.e.* persuasion through "the

arguments (*logoi*) when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case" (1356a, 39), and *pathos* (the consideration of the emotions of the audience). Following Aristotle, there is persuasion

> through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly on all subjects in general and and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuading (*Rhetoric* 1365a).

On the contrary, *pathos* alludes to persuasion that takes place "through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion […] by the speech" (*Rhetoric* 1356a, 38) and is defined as "putting the audience in a certain frame of mind" (Rhetoric 1356a). In the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, we find a positive view of persuasion, since Aristotle claims that persuasion is a means that may help to convey truth. In the journalism domain, we can say that cognitive and emotive anticipation are a sub-type of audience persuasion, since journalists try to modify or strengthen the audience emotions or cognitions to reach the final aim of persuading the audience to think and consequently to act in the way that journalist deem convenient and desirable.

At a first glance, it may be difficult to distinguish between audience interpretation uptake and audience cognitive uptake; in order to explain the difference I retake Rocci's distinction between pragmatic (communicative) inferences and argumentative (communicated) inferences (Rocci 2006); following Rocci (2006)

> marrying argumentation theory and inferential pragmatics can help us to distinguish two kinds of inferential processes involved in argumentative discourse – corresponding respectively to what we can call the communicative and the persuasive dimensions in argumentation- and to elucidate the interplay between these two kinds of inference, on which the *interpretation* and *acceptance* of argumentation rests (Rocci 2006: 418-419).

In line with Rocci's distinction between communicative and communicated inferences, I will consider journalists' audience interpretation uptake that deals with the locutionary force as based on communicative (pragmatic) inferences, and journalists' audience interpretation that deals with the illocutionary force as well as journalists'

anticipation of audience cognitive and emotive uptake as based on communicated inferences, namely on those further inferences that arise from the initial comprehension of the journalistic product. Differently from communicative inferences, which deal with the change of the comprehension of communicative intentions, communicated inferences deal with the proposal of an inferential path, whose result is a change of belief in the audience: in short, if communicative inferences deal with a change of understanding, communicated inferences deal with a change of belief. In order to clarify this point, I will now insert some examples of audience interpretation that deal with both locutionary and illocutionary force.

An example of audience uptake interpretation dealing with the locutionary level of a linguistic act can be found in the retrospective verbal protocol made to the journalist that has written an item on a prolonged duel for a seat between Venezuela and Guatemala concercning the election for five-nonpermanent countries for the United Nations Security Council. In the following exerpt, in which the journalist refers to his collaboration with the cutter, we can see how the focus of his anticipatory reasoning is the language and its comprehensibility itself in view of the audience uptake;

Obviously I look with an eye what he is doing/ and i try even to shorten my text a little bit/ I try to improve the language (0359-0362)(RVP,sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt)

In a similar fashion, in a subsequent passage of the same retrospective verbal protocol, the journalist points at the importance of modifying some linguistic aspect in order to make text implicatures more comprehensible for the audience:

Especially in languages/ that we understand well/ […]/ when in the background you can hear english/ that he says one thousand and eight hundred eighty/ and we say one thousand and nine hundred eighty/ even when it is meant one thousand and nine hundred eighty/ yes this is tricky/ we can correct this a bit with the tone down/ so that we do not hear it/ because it has no sense/ to confront people

with such a linguistic error(0513-0526) (sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt)

In this interesting passage, in which the journalist faces a content error in the text of the interviewed person, he attempts to convey a coherent information to the audience. In particular, the interviewed person utters a wrong figure in English (one thousand and eighty hundred eighty) and the journalist corrects it in German (one thousand and nine hundred eighty): the item looks like an ambiguous multimodal text. The journalist translates into German the correct figure, namely what the interviewed person should have said (according to the truthfulness of facts) but that has not said. However, this juxtaposition creates a situation in which two contradictory messages to the audience are conveyed; the journalist seems to be aware of the fact that it would be detrimental to convey two contradictory messages simoultaneously to the audience. Therefore, the journalist decides to eliminate all doubts on the propositional content by lower the tone, so that the message will be clear, correct and truthful.

For what concerns illocutionary audience uptake interpretation, journalists often reflect on the illocutionary effect of style, text genres, layout and graphical disposition on the audience interpretation of the news. This deals with the communicated inferences of texts. In my corpus, I have found that quotations often play a crucial role in this sense; the way in which they are disposed acts as a semiotic tool to reach a journalist's desired communicative inference instead of another. The issue of how journalists should adequately contextualize a given quotation in order to enable the audience to understand the reported news is not new in literature on rhetorics of the news (Cramer 2011; Haapanen 2016; in press 2017a; in press 2017b). In particular Haapanen conveived the quoting process as an intertextual chain and devoted his work to find out how these quoting practices link the original interview discourse into the final quotation discourse. In what follows I show an excerpt of a retrospective verbal protocol in which the journalist argues that the quotation should be attached to the item in a coherent way;

the quotation cannot simply be attached/ but rather there should be a connection/ sometimes it is difficult to make connecting passages/ because it is a big danger/ if you

say something in one sentence that says/ what you can hear afterwards in the discourse/ sometimes you also have to do that/ because perhaps the quotation is not so comprehensible/ you must a bit help/ at the beginning you could have attached the quotation directly/ I think/ it would be a further difficulty for the hearer/ because it is everything so quick/ he has to comprehend it then (0441-0454)(sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt)

Also in the following passage of the same retrospective verbal protocol the journalist uses quotations' *dispositio* as a semiotic tool that should help the hearer to better understand the news;

these two quotations/ what you can make in certain cases/ and what we also make/ i have now found that here it is not so good/ it is-/ they have to be placed into each other/ they have to be strictly connected among each other in order that it functions/ otherwise the comprehension is relatively difficult(0604-0612) (sf_ts_061018_1300_strub_sicherheitsratabstimmung_verbal.txt)

Also style can be used by journalists as a semiotic tool in order to reach their communicative objectives. We see an example of how the style contributes in helping the journalist to reach his communicative intention in the subsequent excerpt of the retrospective verbal protocol. In the retrospective interview a journalist reflects on a news piece concerning the famous Austrian circus Roncalli for the program *Tagesschau*;

here I have reflected on how/ how i come to this poetry/ how i make the connection/ i had „poetry"/ i am now arrived to eroticism/ and he speaks then afterwards about poetry again/ how do i guide the hearer to that/ or the viewer/ and he has talked frequently of poetry/ always with reference to the circus/ in the circus poetry for him means that and that/ therefore I have now retaken the word

"circus"/ […]/ but now I am thinking all the time/ what they connect with the word/ or with the keyword poetry/or with the concept/ that in roncalli is so strong (0765) (RVP, sf_ts_061031_1930_rierola_roncalli_verbal.txt).

In this case the journalist inserts the term "poetry" in order to be coherent with what the interviewed person has said, namely an artist of the circus; he has decided to repeat the word "poetry" because it is a keyword and it has a very important meaning in the circus.

Turning to the graphical layout in the newspaper, this can also be can function as a semiotic tool for enabling audience understanding, as we can see the FORM case[30], dealing with a case of study of the *CdT* corpus, in which there is a divergence of opinion among two journalists concerning the positioning of the title imposed by a given layout template. The debated issue concerns the understandability of the identitity of the interviewed person. The journalist who is contrary to keep the layout template says that the layout should not be kept because one starts reading from "Coming back from Sundance festival" which is on the left side/ and then one must go down to the headline to find the name of the speaker (0284-0288). This journalist thus supports the standpoint that the audience will not understand easily the identity of the interviewed person. On the contrary, the journalist in favor of the questioned layout says that the layout should be kept because this template is hard to dispense with/ it allows to make a full-page opening/ when we have a photo/ that if we would put in five columns/ in this format it would become unacceptable (0306-0311).[31] This is a clear example of how journalists can conceive graphical elements as semiotic tools and use them to lead the audience to a better understanding of the news. (Editorial conference, cst_cdt_130128_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx).

[30] I will go into more details of this case study in chapter 11.6 when I will analyse the case of study as a case of downward counterfactual reasoning.
[31] For a detailed analysis of the FORM case see Luciani, Rocci and Zampa 2014.

After having illustrated some examples of audience uptake anticipation dealing with the locutionary and illocutionary level, I will now present some examples of the anticipations of the audience uptake that deal with the perlocutionary level. In every case journalists' anticipations concerning the effects of news products' details on the audience all lead to persuasion; indeed, they often anticipate the best ways in which the audience may be persuaded to think and behave in the way that they deem correct or convenient, in such a way that the audience uptake will be updated forming an image of the situation that they deem to be appropriate or expedient. Indeed, there is a journalist's effort to give an expedient and correct view of the world. Journalists' anticipations can deal with the audience's changes of belief, of emotive or evaluative stance: sometimes they even concern the imagination of behavior's changes, both in punctual as well as in general terms. For instance, journalists attempt to change the audience behavior in a punctual way when they anticipate that a detail of a news item will convince them to watch a given news program or to read a given news item. Differently, journalists will attempt to change the audience behavior in a general way when they anticipate that the audience will stop having racial prejudices if they broadcast/ publish news in a certain way instead on another. It is important to notice that the audience behavior is always inevitably mediated by a change of beliefs and of evaluative attitudes: there cannot be a change of behavior if there is not a change of cognitive and/or emotive attiude before. Indeed, journalists' persuasion is supposed to act at the level of audience opinion formation that in turn may influence audience behavior. The anticipation of persuasion that aims at modifying the audience behavior is the most perlocutionary type of anticipation, since it aims at modifying an action of the audience and not simply an opinion or an attitude. With reference to this point, it is wise to remark that usually promises, threats, prises and punishments are used in order to persuade someone to carry out a certain action; journalists do not have these tools at their disposal in order to lead the audience to change its goals. All in all, the anticipation of persuasion can be said to be the superordinate kind of perlocutionary anticipation, since it comprehends both cognitive and emotive anticipation of audience uptake, as it is shown in Figure .

Anticipating others' emotions and cognitions is an instrument to state in advance which goals the others want to pursue and to regulate consequently one's own behavior correspondingly. Furthermore, the possibility to know how the others will behave gives the chance to have a certain effect or to exercise some power on them. Indeed, if one has the possibility to know in advance the others' cognitions and/or emotions, one has the possibility to reach the desired effect on the other; it is a complex kind of anticipation, since it is not a simply antcitipation of what the others might do, but rather it is an anticipation of an effect of a possible action, of what the others might do as an answer to one's possible action. It is an anticipation of a perlocutive effect 'if I say this thing, the audience might feel threatened'; it is not only a simple anticipation that regulates my actions, but rather it is a simulation of the effects of one's actions, it is a simulation of the effects of a prospective behavior that is not still present.

After having said why the anticipation of persuasion can be said to be the superordinate type of anticipation of audience uptake with reference to perlocutionary effects, I will now analyse into details its subordinate components related to the attiude, namely the cognitive uptake anticipation and the emotive uptake anticipation.

Firstly, journalists may anticipate the audience cognitive uptake when they want to predict how the audience could logically understand and cognitively elaborate a certain content or layout template of a news. The objects of this type of anticipation are all the mental activities that the audience uses in the acquisition of knowledge and information as well as in understanding. I will show an example of this type of anticipation in Chapter 8, which is a case in which emotive and cognitive anticipation are strictly intertwined, and in Chapter 6 (the PIAZ case), in which the cognitive anticipation is explicitly subordinated to the anticipation of persuasion, in which the persuasion is aimed at modifying the audience action.

Secondly, journalists may anticipate the audience emotive uptake, in which the object of their anticipation are the emotions. I will devote a particular attention to this type of anticipation in subsection 5.4, since anticipation of audience emotive uptake is pervasive in the data and since it often plays a crucial role in arguing editorial decisions. Journalists anticipate the way in which the audience will emotionally react to the news;

they anticipate whether the audience could be struck, shocked and impressed. Certain editorial decisions concerning the topic, the content and the way of presenting a news may be more or less emotionally involving and may lead to distinct emotive reactions.
An important way of anticipation of how to modify the audience's attitude is represented by journalists' attempt to anticipate the way in which the audience may interpret news' contents depending on how they are proposed; this type of anticipation represents what is usually called 'news' framing' in media studies. All the definitions of news framing that are given in media and journalism studies are vague, conceiving news framing as a simple mode of presentation of information, as it is witnessed by the following definition by Scheufele and Tewksbury;

> As a macroconstruct, the term ''framing'' refers to modes of presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This does not mean, of course, that most journalists try to spin a story or deceive their audiences. In fact, framing, for them, is a necessary tool to reduce the complexity of an issue, given the constraints of their respective media related to news holes and airtime (Gans, 1979) (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 12).

However, news framing is much more than a simple mode of presenting information. At a fine-grained analysis 'news framing' appears to involve journalists' argumentation in favor of an implicit standpoint. With reference to this, I follow Van Eemeren's idea that "framing always involves an interpretation of reality that puts the fact or events referred to in a certain perspective" (Van Eemeren 2010: 126). Following the path traced by Greco Morasso (2009), he emphasizes that the theoretical consideration on frames illustrates that the linguistic characterization of a point in question cannot be impartial, since the way in which we define a given issue is always profoundly intertwined with its interpretation and is always valenced, namely it depends on the value that we ascribe to it. Following Greco Morasso, in fact, "there is a strong interrelation between frames and cultural premises, which may be then used in argumentation to build up arguments in favour of a certain standpoint" (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). Following Greco Morasso I argue that news framing, whereby the choice of certain presentational devices, acts as a generator of cultural premises "which are then used by the journalist to support a certain standpoint" (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). In addition to this argumentative framing, there is also a conception of framing derived by the linguistic analysis of Fillmore *et alii*,

who investigate the microlevel of framing. They have made many examples of frames (Fillmore 1976; Fillmore and Atkins 1992); the use of certain verbs and nouns instead of others can evoke a particular scenario without making every term belonging to the frame explicit. From a cognitive perspective, this means that frames do not necessarily require to be complete, since journalists can rely on their audience contextual and encyclopedic knowledge to fill in gaps (Van Dijk 2004). A conception of the framing in Fillmorian terms may also play a role in journalists' arguing in favor of an implicit standpoint; the evoking of a given perspective instead of another may act as a *datum* in the argumentation. After this brief overview on argumentative news framing, it becomes clear why journalists aim at modifying the audience attitude whereby the anticipation of the audience emotions and cognitions as effects of their potential news products; depending on the way in which journalists decide to frame the news and therefore to argue in favour of their own individual –often implicit- standpoint, the audience will imagine and conceive the reported event in a certain way instead of another and will build a more or less desirable opinion (desirable in view of the journalist's goals and desires) of the reported event.

In the empirical part of this dissertation I will show four major case studies that deal with the above mentioned distinct types of journalists' anticipation of audience uptake. To a large extent I will deal with anticipation of persuasion that can encompass the change of the audience attitude and/or behavior, as I have shown in subsection 5.3. In table 3 I show a list of these major case studies. To each of them is devoted an entire Chapter, in which I analyse from a contextual and argumentative point of view both newsmaking texts and news products.

Table 3. Major case studies analysed in the dissertation, classified on the basis of the type of medium, type of interaction and type of anticipation.

	Type of medium	**Type of data**	**Type of anticipation**	**Topic of the case of study**	**Argumentative issue**
TEMPO case	*TV* (SRG, *10vor10)*	Editorial conference, informal discourse, Retrospective verbal	Anticipation of audience emotive uptake	News concerning a girl run over by a car in a residential area.	Should we publish the item highlighting the adjusted speed of the car or not?

		protocol (RVP)			
JUGE case	*TV (SRG, 10vor10)*	Editorial conference, Restrospective verbal protocol (RVP)	Anticipation of audience emotive and cognitive uptake	News about youth aggressiveness against elderly people.	Should we make another topic on youth aggressiveness?
BEBE case	*Press (CdT)*	Editorial conference	Anticipation of audience emotive uptake	Evaluation of a published news on an abandoned baby.	Was the way in which we handled the news of the baby good?
PIAZ case	*Press (CdT)*	Editorial conference	Anticipation of persuasion (behavior), anticipation of audience interpretation	Discussion about how to promote TV-political debates on the newspaper	How should we frame the item in order not to make a less journalistic thing?

In Chapter 9 I will focus on a case (the TEMPO case) in which the anticipation of emotions leads to a rhetorically constructed item and implements a strategic maneuvering. In Chapter 7 I will focus on a case of study (the JUGE case) that deals with journalists' reliance on previous positive outcomes for predicting the impression that a news could have on the audience. Finally, in Chapter 10 a case of study will be shown in which the journalist negatively evaluates the way in which a previous item was handled and proposes to adopt a new way of handling touching news, in such a way that cares of the emotional impact on the audience. Further examples of audience anticipation will be examined in Chapter 11, with an empirical part which focuses on the interaction between anticipation and counterfactual reasoning. As it becomes clear from the table above, journalists' anticipation of emotions is a widespread tendency in the data I have analysed. Therefore, in the following subsection I will analyse into more detail the theoretical mechanisms of emotive anticipation, a very peculiar type of anticipation.

5.5 Anticipating emotions

As previously said, journalists' anticipation of audience emotions is the most prominent type of anticipation in newsroom activities: therefore, I will briefly explain the way in which anticipatory representations of possible future emotions function. Anticipated emotions are future emotions that are not present at the moment of the anticipation. For instance, Paola may anticipate that she will be happy when her friend Margherita will go to her place to visit her after that they have not met for a long time. Future emotions are the objects of this type of anticipatory representations. Further distinction can be made between anticipation of one's own emotions and anticipation of other subjects' emotions: for instance, Margherita may anticipate that her friend Paola will be happy when she will go to her place to visit her after that they have not met for a long time. Anticipation of audience uptake is by definition anticipation of others' emotions.

There are different types of emotions' anticipatory representations; each emotion can be the object of a belief, of a possibility, of a prediction, of an interested anticipatory representation and of an expectation.

As stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli,

> An emotion may be the object of either a belief of possibility, when a future emotional state is assigned up to 0.5 probability, or of a more or less certain prediction, when the chance threshold has been exceeded. An emotion may also be the object of a (positive or negative) interested anticipatory representation or expectation proper when the epistemic anticipatory representation (either a belief of possibility or a prediction) about a future emotion is associated with the *goal* to feel or not to feel that emotion (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 184).

Anticipated emotions can be said to be complex mental states, since they are composed of "mental states about mental states" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 184). This ability to reason and anticipate own and others' states of mind corresponds to what in literature is known as 'theory of mind', namely when an agent "imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others" (Premack and Woodruf 1978: 515).

Emotions' anticipatory representations are made up by beliefs and goals about a particular kind of future *mental states*, namely emotions. They not only involve beliefs and goals about future state of affairs, but rather they involve beliefs and goals about future

states of affairs and belief and goals about emotions. In the following figure I will schematize the anticipation of one's own emotions with an anticipatory epistemic attitude;



Figure 11. Epistemic anticipatory attitude of one's own emotions.

As we can see from the Figure 11, in this case a mental state of one's own mental state is at stake; the agent has an epistemic anticipatory attitude (based on a belief) concerning one's own emotions concerning a given state of affairs.

The situation will be different in case that an agent anticipates his own future emotions concerning a given state of affairs and in case that he has the goal of feeling these emotions, as I show in Figure 12;



Figure 12. Anticipatory attitude based on goals of one's own emotions.

A different path is followed in cases that one agent's anticipation does not deal with his own emotions but rather with another agent's emotions. In cases that one agent does not simply anticipate his own emotions, but rather in cases that he anticipates the emotions of another agent, a mental state of another agent's mental state concerning a state of affairs is at stake, as I show in Figure 13 below:



Figure 13. Epistemic anticipatory attitude based on beliefs of another agent's emotions.

In the case of an epistemic anticipatory attitude (based on beliefs) the agent of the mental state of another agent's mental state concerning a state of affairs is at stake. A person X has an epistemic anticipatory attitude (belief) concerning another agent's emotions (Y) concerning a given state of affairs. In the journalism domain, this could be the case when a journalist has an epistemic anticipatory attitude towards the audience's emotions concerning a given state of affairs.

Differently an agent may have not only a simple belief but rather a goal that another agent feels a given emotion with reference to a given state of affairs, as I show in Figure 14;



Figure 14. Anticipatory attitude based on goals of another agent's emotions.

For instance, in the journalistic domain, journalists may have the goal of inducing the audience to experience disappointment; journalists may anticipate the audience's emotions in response to a certain news.

Generally speaking, in order to predict others' behavior and to communicate with them it is important not only to recognize and evaluate the others' emotions (e.g. Salovey and Meyer 1990; Salovey and Grewal 2005), but also to anticipate their future emotions (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 194). In particular, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014) claim that "both understanding people's concurrent feelings and predicting the feelings they will experience are a means for predicting their goals" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 194). Therefore, it goes without saying that predicting others' goals by anticipating their emotions is instrumental to modify their behavior and to influence them, it is a means for

persuading. Journalists' anticipation of audience emotions may be a means to induce the audience to build a certain opinion on the reported event. In the next subsection I will focus on the tight relationship between emotions' anticipation and persuasion.

5.6 Anticipating persuasion

That anticipating the others' emotions may be a means of persuasion is clear since from Classical Rhetoric. Indeed, in his Rhetorics, Aristotle highlights that it is desirable to modify the audience's emotions whenever there is the necessity, therefore giving an implicit example of *pathos* and implicitly delineating the first psychological theory of the audience;

> So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely (Aristotele, Retorica, II, 1383a. 13-17).

Aristotle has a positive conception of persuasion: the word Πίστις (pistis) plays a crucial role in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Depending on the distinct contexts we can translate it into reliability, consideration, reasonable adhesion, proof, argument or persuasion. It is bound to the indoeuropean root *bheid- that conveys the meaning of trust (Rigotti 1995, 1997, Benveniste 1976: 89). In ancient greek, πιστός means "faithful", πείθομαι means "obey", πείθω «persuade» that originally according to Benveniste's reconstruction means "to make someone obey you". In Latin πίστις means *argumentum,* and πείθω means *(per)suadeo,* which is a verb bound to an indoeuropean root that vehiculates the meaning of 'sweetness' (lat. *suavis*, ted. *Süß*, ingl. *sweet*) (Rocci 2017b 91). The attention to persuasion in the rhetorical study of argumentation can be traced back to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any case the available means of persuasion" (Rhetoric I, 2, 1355b 26-27), and in rhetorical studies derived from Aristotle arguments are nearly always considered as means of persuasion. The bond between the positive conception of persuasion and anticipation of another agent's emotions is very

tight; indeed, when a rhetor wants to persuade and to make someone trust and follow him, his communication will attempt to modify the audience beliefs by anticipating the emotion that the audience will feel as a consequence of his discourse.

According to Aristotle, persuading through rhetorics is useful, since it helps to reach truth. If truth is not reached, this is due to the fact that the speaker has not succeeded in bringing it to light and in showing it:

> It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is outside the subject, and have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. Nevertheless, rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible (*Rhetoric* I, 1355a)

Furthermore, Aristotle argues in favor of persuasion, since he maintains that it is praiseworthy to defend oneself with words instead that with the body, since language is unique to humans.

> Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend onself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body. If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm. (*Rhetoric* I, 1355b)

Moreover, Aristotle also claims that there is a tight interrelation between argumentation and persuasion;

> It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion (*Rhetoric* I, 1355b).
>
> […]
>
> … It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism (*Retorica* I, 1355b).

In more recent times, looking at the contributions from argumentation it is not infrequent to find occurences of the word 'argument' designated by remarking notions of persuading, for instance van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 43 and all chapter 3), Johnson and Blair (1977: 3), Johnson (200: 168), and Pinto 1995 (reprinted in Pinto 2001: 32), as stated in Pinto (Pinto 2003: 1).

In particular, Pinto sees arguments as "invitations to inference" (Pinto 1996: 168), and as "a set of statements or propostitions that one person offers to another in the attempt to induce that other person to accept some conclusion" (Pinto 2001: 32). According to him, an argument presented in a given communicative context is persuasive *per se*, since it can produce modifications in that context, and can act on the behavior and duties of participants in that context (Pinto 2003:1).

This interdependent relationship between argumentation and persuasion fits very well the definition of persuasive intention given by Castelfranchi and Miceli, that conceive the persuasive intention as an "intention to modify, through communication, another's beliefs as a means for modifying (generating, activating, or just increasing the value of) the other's goals" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 195; Miceli et al. 2006). In particular, with reference to persuasion through emotions, they refer to a persuasive intention that uses the others' emotions. The peculiarity of this particular type of persuasion is that in emotional persuasion the persuader P uses emotions (and not other means) in order to attempt to change the recipient's beliefs and, subsequently, his goals. I will show an interesting case in which journalists try to emotionally persuade the audience by anticipating the TV-viewers emotions in Chapter 9.

6. Anticipating persuasion in an editorial conference discussion

6.1 Argumentative analysis of a journalists' discussion on news' framing

The case of study presented in this Chapter is based on a Monday morning editorial conference, held on the 21st January 2013 in the newsroom of *CdT*. Typically, during Monday morning editorial conferences, journalists argue newsmaking decisions about news items for the upcoming week. In the case under investigation, the discussion is focused on the way in which the newspaper should cover two political debates to be broadcasted on TV. The two debates deal with the incoming local elections in Switzerland, to be held in April 2013, for the renewal of the Executive and of the Legislative of the Municipality of Lugano. The coverage of the TV debates by *CdT* also has a promotional side. In fact, the local TV- station *Teleticino* is owned by the same media company controlling *Corriere del Ticino* and the concerned political talk-show, *Piazza del Corriere,* employs the same brand of the newspaper *CdT*. In the Monday morning editorial conference journalists discussed the way in which the two debates could have been promoted via newspaper articles. In table 4 I list the four news items (A, B, C, D) concerning the town elections:

Table 4. List of the news items published on *CdT* and respective TV debate broadcasted on TeleTicino.

Date	***CdT* article**	**Debate**	**Article discussed during January 21 editorial conference?**
25 January 2013	A)	First TV debate	no
26 January 2013	B) article about 1st debate	Second debate	yes
	C) article about 1st debate	Second debate	yes

	D) article about 2nd debate	Second debate	no

One newspaper item was published the day before the first debate, enticing people to watch the first debate (A). The other three newspaper items was published the day after the first debate and before second debate (B, C, D). (B) reported the main highlights of the TV-debate broadcast on the previous evening, (C) provided complementary information on the topics being debated, and (D) had the function of promotional item for the TV debate of the 27th January. The debate during the editorial conference focuses on articles B and C. It is interesting to stress that the case study deals with the interweaving of print-journalism and TV-journalism; indeed, we observe an inter-media chain in the editorial conferences, which can be found also in the news items published in the newspaper.

As typically for Monday conferences preparing the news budget for the week, the interaction scheme is deliberative. The participants to the analysed discussion are two journalists: one of them is the desk editor of the news section and the other one is the desk editor of the Canton section and will also lead the forthcoming TV-debate on TeleTicino. The interaction field is the *CdT*, but also the entire media group TImedia to which both the newspaper and the TV station belong. Journalists aim at taking a decision on how the items on the town elections debates should be framed. Since the news section has the duty of publishing news concerning daily topics, and since *CdT* has the goal of not publishing pure summaries of events, the issue is all focused on the news' framing. The issue at stake in the discussion is: "how should we frame the items on town elections?" The issue at stake can be inferred from the following textual elements:

(1) X1 0001: On the basis of the program kindly received from [name of the show's host]/ 0002: as news section in order to avoid to do a truly un-journalistic thing/ 0003: we discussed also with [name of the show's host]/ 0004: that is just saying yesterday evening teleticino did electoral debates.

By looking at extract (1), we notice the journalist's intention not to insert an article that simply repeats what has been said about electoral debates on TeleTicino and not to make an un-journalistic thing, meaning a news devoid of newsworthy content.

The desk editor of the news section goes on highlighting the importance of inserting an interview on the same topic of that discussed in the television studio but to other politicians with respect to those present in the television studio:

(2) 0010: however in short starting from the twentyfive when you will go on the air/ 0011: on the twentysix we will say yesterday evening etcetera etcetera/ 0012: and then we will hear other politicians in respect to those present in the television studio/ 0013: with a brief declaration on that topic/ 0014: and we will interview people/ 0015: more or less interested in the topic

In so doing, journalists can reach two distinct but interwined aims: on the one hand, they can reach a promotional aim, namely the cross-medial promotion, and on the other hand, they can guarantee the journalistic quality by avoiding to make a mere summary. It is thanks to the focus on the same topic of the TV-debate deepened by other politicians that the newspaper article can be truly complementary to the TV-debate: if the newspaper handled a different topic, it would not reach the promotional aim, whereas if the newspaper made a mere summary of what had happened during the TV-debate, it would not satisfy journalistic quality.

Then, the discussion concentrates on what to pusblish in the period of time that goes between one debate and the other, and focuses on news item B. Let us now analyse journalists' discussion on the news item B. Journalists project themselves to the moment after the first and before the second debate and they raise the problem of how they can avoid to be redundant with respect to TV and of how they can be synergical with it. The final standpoint, put forth by a journalist of the news section, is the practical standpoint "we should publish an article presenting complementary information on the debate topics, interviewing other politicians (with respect to those presente in the TV studio) on the same

topic and announce to our readers that this article will be forthcoming", that can be identified thanks to textual traces:

(3) 0021 there will be a support we will say yesterday we spoke about this/ 0022 and we will make a complement of information on the newspaper.

The journalist who has put forth this practical standpoint supports it with an argument that appeals to audience comprehension:

(4) 0023: so that it is not something that navigates on its own.

In this passage it is clear that the journalist's worry is that the readers may not cognitively understand an article that may seem to handle a different topic. However, the journalist's main worry is to stress the added value that the newspaper should give to the audience, and more specifically the worry focuses on giving something tha should be *perceveid* as valuable by the audience, as we can read in excerpt (5):

(5) 0024: but above all it is not the newspaper that makes the simple summary of a debate/ 0025: that if one has yet seen the debate/ 0026: it is useless to read it the day after/ 0027: indeed we give something more to the debate/ 0028: saying that there was the judge that there was this host and this.

Furthermore, the journalist says that a complement of information is necessary in order to entice people to watch the second TV-debate:

(6) 0029: and finally speaking with the collegues we said/ 0030: in this way we force people to watch the debate/ 0031: probably not the first/ 0032: but one for sure wants to see the subsequent/ 0033 there is the game given by the confrontation).

In excerpt (6) the journalist uses the anaphor 'in this way' with reference to the complement of information and via the insertion of interviews from other politicians with respect to those that were present in the television studio: in this way people will be invited

to watch the second TV-debate, because journalists' complementary information will have raised curiosity and opened a debate in the readers' minds and among readers. Therefore, the journalist predicts that people will be interested in watching also the second debate, since they will be interested in looking at the differences with the first debate (`0033 the game given by the confrontation`).

Let us now reconstruct how the journalists argues in favor of the necessity to interconnect in an interesting way the information given in the newspaper item with the information given in the TV- item as a means to reach anticipated audience persuasion. In Figure 15 I show the argumentative reconstruction:



Figure 15. Argumentative reconstruction of the standpoint that the journalist supports.

As we can see from the Figure above, the argumentative structure in favour of the journalist's standpoint is multiple and subordinative. The journalist asserts that it is necessary to add some new and complementary information with respect to what is said on TV via the insertion of interviews to other politicians with respect to those that were present in the television studio, in order to avoid to make an un-journalistic news (0002), meaning devoid of newsworthy content (1.1a). In order to be newsworthy, news must be considered by a journalistic community interesting enough for the audience. While the first argumentative line deals with the necessity to follow to publish something un-journalistic, the second argumentative line (1.2) supports the need to make something coherent with the TV debate, something logically linked with the information already given on TV.

Looking at the whole argumentation structure, we notice that the third argumentative line takes a different direction, focusing on incentivizing the newspaper audience to watch the TV debate. Two are the main goals: *a)* avoiding redundancies between TV and newspaper and therefore giving value to the newspaper and improving journalistic quality and *b)* guaranteeing the connection TV-newspaper and therefore promoting TV. In order to reach the main goal, journalists interview different politicians, whereas in order to guarantee the connection TV-newspaper journalists focus on the same issue both on TV and in the newspaper. In the first and second argumentative lines the journalist refers to the already broadcast TV debate and pays attention not to publish a summary of the debate, then the journalist gives reasons on how to make a reasonable connection of the information given on the newspaper item with that already given on the TV. Finally, in the third argumentative line the journalist completely concentrates on the way in which the audience could be persuaded to watch the forthcoming TV-debate, so that the newspaper item becomes a means of persuasion. The fourth argumentative line is an argument from authority "we discussed it also with [name of the show's host] and he has approved that (0003)" (1.4); the show's host is an authoritative figure in the field, since he is a prominent figure in the editorial board of *CdT* and he has a leading role in the TV-program.

The show's host intervenes in the debate immediately afterwards (0035-0039) and confirms the necessity for connecting TV and newspaper in order to reach a cross-medial promotion:

(7) 0035-0039: on the day of the debate as previously planned/ we will make the classical promotional news item in the news section of Lugano and Mendrisio/ as we make for the normal program of piazza del corriere/ and in the first page I have ordered to insert the cross-media announcement (Italian: *strilloncino*)[32].

The analysis conducted above enables us to identify the correlation between the deliberative editorial conference as a place of reflection and the emergence of a practical standpoint based on the journalists' anticipated audience uptake concerning audience persuasion. In this case the anticipatory inferences on the audience persuasion represent the basis of a practical argumentation, *i.e.* the argument for a practical standpoint.

Let us now move to the analysis of the inferential configurations underlying the arguments in Figure 16. I will now sketch the Y-structure of the first argumentative line of the argumentative structure shown in Fig. 15 "we should make a complement of information since in that way we can avoid to make an un-journalistic thing and above all it is not the summary that makes the summary of the debate" (1>1.1a, 1.1b). The inference is based on a locus *from final cause*:

[32] The Italian term *strilloncino*, diminutive of *strillone* (lit. cryer), originally meant a newspaper hawker, or paperboy crying out the day's most sensational headlines.



Figure 16. We should make a complement of information interviewing other politicians on the same topic because we should avoid to make an un-journalistic news item.

In this Y-structure we notice that the *endoxa* consist of a belief, *i.e.* an implicit editorial norm (un-journalistic items, *i.e.* pure summaries, do not interest the audience) and of a goal (not making pure summaries is a desirable goal for *CdT*). It is an argumentatively constituted endoxon. If un-journalistic items do not interest the audience and if not making a summary of a debate is a desirable goal for a newspaper and for *CdT* (*endoxa*) and if creating a complement of information enables not to make a mere summary of the debate (datum), then not making a summary of a debate via a complement of information and via interviews to other politicians on the same topic allows the journalist and the newspaper to achieve a desirable aim (first conclusion/ minor premise). Therefore, assuming that if X has a goal Y and Z is the best means to achieve Y, then Z must be undertaken (maxim form the final cause), the journalists should make a

complement of information and interview other politicians on the same topic (final conclusion).

Moving to the subordinate argumentation 1.1b> 1.1b.1-1.1b.2, which can be classified as a *locus from termination and setting up*, we can observe the presence of a compound *endoxon* based on the belief that pure summaries of events already reported to the audience are useless (belief) and on the goal not to publish news items that are useless for the audience, as I show in Figure 17;



Figure 9. *CdT* should not publish news items as summaries of the debates because it would be useless for the audience.

The *datum* deals with the actual possibility of raising disinterest by carrying out an action (publishing the news in form of a summary of a debate) that would be useless for the audience. The conjunction of the statements of the *endoxon* and *datum* creates an inferential effect leading to the first conclusion "Publishing pure summaries of TV debates would be useless for the audience and counterproductive for *CdT*". This conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and, conjoined with it, allows inferring the standpoint. We know from the maxim that "if an activity X is counterproductive for Y, then Y should not undertake it", and from the first conclusion/minor premise that "publishing the news in form of a summary would be useless for the audience". Therefore, the journalist is forced to conclude that they "should not publish news items as summaries of the debates".

In the third argumentative line the journalist argues in favor of the need to add new information in order to foster curiosity and therefore to persuade the audience to watch the TV-debate (1.3). Again, according to the taxonomy of *loci*, this argument concerning the anticipation of persuasion can be classified as a *locus from final cause*. Generally speaking, in editorial conferences "the *locus from the final cause* can be expected to recur frequently because deliberative discussions aim at fulfilling institutional goals, therefore arguments will draw upon a standpoint's validity in relation to such goals" (Zampa 2015: 125).

In the figure below I analyze more in depth the argument scheme under investigation by producing another Y-structure:



Figure 18. *CdT* has to make a complement of information interviewing other politicians on the same topic because this forces people to watch the TV-debate.

Referring to the *locus from final cause* through the Y-structure allows us to observe the presence of an *endoxon* based on a goal centered on the desirability of persuading readers to watch the TV debate. The *datum* is focused on the prediction that making a complement of information would force people to watch the TV-debate. On the vertical level of the structure the conjunction of the *endoxon* and of *datum* creates an inferential effect leading to a first conclusion, which is determined by the positivity of the action (making a complement of information), which permits to achieve a desirable goal, namely forcing people to watch the TV-debate; the first conclusion that is obtained from the material starting point is equally exploited by the procedural starting point. Indeed, this conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and, conjoined with it, allows inferring the standpoint "we need to make a complement of information on the

newspaper". We know from the maxim that "if an action X fulfills a goal of an institution Y, then Y has to undertake X" and from the first conclusion/minor premise that "making a complement of information on the newspaper would achieve *CdT*'s goal to force people to watch the TV-debate on the program *Piazza del Corriere*". As a result of this, the journalists can conclude that "*CdT* has to make a complement of information on the newspaper". This inferential configuration is clearly based on an expectation, since it involves the presence of a goal and of a prediction.

6.2 Verifying journalists' anticipatory strategies in the newspapers' items

At this stage of the analysis, a test of journalists' anticipatory reasonings discussed in the editorial conference, *i.e.* of the attempt to frame the news in a certain way in order to persuade the newspaper audience to watch the first and the second debate (`in this way we force people to watch the TV-debate/ probably not the first/ but one for sure wants to see the subsequent/ there is the game given by the confrontation 0030-0033`), is carried out. On the day of the first TV-debate, namely on the 25th January 2013, a promotional newspaper item with the participants to the debate and with the most intriguing issues of the election campaign is published (A), as we can see in Figure . On the day after the first TV-debate, namely on the 26th January 2013, three newspaper items are published (B, C, D); one is a news item directly concerning the broadcast TV-debate (B) (Figure 21), the second is a news appendix (C), which represents a complement of information to the other item and to the TV-debate (Figure 24), and the third is a promotional item concerning the second TV-debate (D).

Firstly, following the chronological order of appearance on the newspaper, I focus on the promotional item published before the first TV-debate (A) (Figure 19).

Figure 19. News item A, published on the 25th January 2013.

Starting from the title "Elections Is Lugano the center of the world?" (Nr. 1 in Fig. 19)[33], the news item aims at raising interest in the audience on topics that highly involve citizens.

In Fig. 20 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the promotional news item;

[33] We translate.



Figure 10. Argumentative reconstruction of the news article A.

As a whole, this news article can be seen as an argumentation, and the argumentative reconstruction in Figure 20 displays the argumentative aspects of the persuasive strategy, therefore showing the argumentative dimension of the text that is aimed at sustaining a promotional strategy. The first argumentative line acts on raising the audience interest (1.1), by focusing on the attractive topics bound to town elections via a semantically strong idiom, which compares the elections of Lugano to the world's center, inducing the audience to construe Lugano as the place in which the most important political debates of the country, hyperbolically 'of the world' take place. The second argumentative line (1.2) points at the added value given by the TV debate via a series of thematic comparisons. The third argumentative line (1.3) is an argument from authority and the fourth

argumentative line (1.4), via the explicit invitation to the readers to send a feedback via e-mail or via twitter, aimes at enticing the audience to get involved and to be responsive.

At this point we need to analyze also the other items of the intertextual chain (B, C, D) and to look at the news items published on the day after the first debate, in order to have an overview of the promotional nature of the intertextual chain.

The items published on the 26th January, discussed in the editorial conference, represent the fundamental clue of the persuasive nature of the anticipatory strategy planned by the journalists in the editorial conference. This strategy can be verified by observing the news article (B) about the debate of the 25th of January (Figure 21) and the news appendix referred to this news article (C) (Figure 24).

Firstly, we will focus on the news article (B), handling the contents of the TV-debate of the 25th January, which is shown in Figure 21;

Politica **La Città scommette su Lombardia ed Expo 2015**

L'obiettivo è profilarsi nel nord Italia grazie a qualità e servizi

MATTIA BERTOLDI

Il rapporto di Lugano con le altre realtà locali, cantonali e internazionali: era questo il tema prefissato della prima puntata di «Piazza del Corriere - Speciale elezioni comunali», andata in onda ieri sera su TeleTicino. Ma il giornalista del CdT Gianni Righinetti non ha potuto esimersi dall'introdurre fin dai primi istanti l'argomento che ha infiammato la settimana politica: il ritiro dalla corsa all'Esecutivo luganese della socialista Patrizia Pesenti.
«Io penso che se uno si ritira dalla campagna elettorale – ha affermato il candidato al Municipio **Raoul Ghisletta** (PS) – è poco motivato o poco interessato alla carica. Se si va in pista per il Municipio bisogna aspettarsi dei dibattiti intensi e avere la pazienza di presentare le proprie idee. Soprattutto in seno al Partito Socialista».
L'attuale sindaco **Giorgio Giudici** ha invece glissato («Non ho la sindrome degli avversari» ha detto) e spiegato perché la Città non si iscriverà alla neonata Assemblea dei Comuni ticinesi (ACT), riunitasi per la prima volta giovedì. «È una precisa scelta del Municipio poiché non vogliamo unirci a Comuni che ancora non hanno capito come si costruisce il futuro». L'uomo forte del PLR ha inoltre regalato due veri scoop. Il primo: «Settimana prossima riceveremo la bozza del messaggio sulla promozione turistico-alberghiera a Campo Marzio. Ci sono in ballo sette diversi progetti, ma crediamo nell'importanza del Palazzo dei Congressi». Il secondo: «La città di Lugano ha in serbo qualche sorpresa per Expo 2015 che potrebbe portare diversi benefici all'intero Cantone».
Il rapporto tra Ticino e Lombardia ha tenuto banco per diversi minuti e sul tema è intervenuto anche **Paolo Pamini** (AreaLiberale) che, in linea con il collega Alberto Siccardi (vedi a lato) ha affermato: «Dobbiamo prendere la palla al balzo e sfruttare l'attuale debolezza italiana. Bisogna quindi sviluppare dei poli d'eccellenza, promuovere specificità e servizi e profilarci in ambito culturale e industriale».
Angelo Paparelli (Lega) ha invece minimizzato sulla proposta del suo partito di edificare un muro a Chiasso contro l'invasione padana («Era solo una battuta») e ha ribadito: «La Lombardia non è un problema fintanto che abbiamo sotto controllo chi entra. Se ogni giorno attraversa la frontiera il doppio degli operai che ci servono, a pagarne le conseguenze è la manodopera ticinese. Sono questi i problemi reali da affrontare». Il leghista ha inoltre lanciato l'allarme sulla speculazione edilizia che presto «porterà le persone nate a Lugano a non potersi costruire una casa, perché i cinesi e i russi acquistano gli immobili a 3000 franchi al metro quadro».
Un concetto ripreso da **Michele Malfanti** (PPD) che ha invitato la Città a sfruttare le opportunità che le prossime elezioni comunali porteranno: «La grande Lugano si arricchirà di territori nuovi da sfruttare e valorizzare, specie nel settore del turismo interno».
Il democentrista **Yves Wellauer**, infine, ha ricordato che «nelle aggregazioni ci vuole coerenza. Il prossimo passo potrebbe essere rappresentato dall'inclusione di Canobbio nel processo aggregativo, così da completare la scia dei Comuni ubicati in Valcolla».

Figure 21. News item (B) published on the 26th January 2013 about the TV debate of the previous evening.

This news item (B), published on the 26th January casts new light on the topics handled during the TV-debate; the title 'Politics; The town bets on Lombardy and Expo 2015'is not just a mere summary of the main contents handled on TV, but it represents an implicit positive stance taken by the journalist towards the need for an active involvement of the Canton in Expo 2015 and in the institutional relationships with Lombardy. Looking at the news item, we observe that the title represents a standpoint, supported by an argument represented by the highlight, as shown in Figure 22;



Figure 22. Argumentative reconstruction of title and highlight.

This argumentation hints at the future developments of the relationships of the Canton with Lombardy and Northern Italy in general and fosters people to watch the second TV-debate, in order to see what will happen.

Furthermore, it is interesting to notice the presence of a concessive counter-argumentation in the lead paragraph;

> **(8)** Lugano's relationship with the other local, cantonal and international realities: this was the established topic of the first episode of 'Piazza del Corriere- Special town elections', broadcasted yesterday evening on TeleTicino. However, the CdT journalist Gianni Righinetti could not exempt himself to introduce since from the first minutes the topic that has inflamed the political week: the retirement from the candidacy to the Luganese Executive of the socialist Patrizia Pesenti.

This concessive counter-argumentation signals the journalists' will to present the broadcast debate as a program that has changed the scheduled contents of the discussion in favor of more intriguing and interesting topics, namely the retirement from the candidacy to the Luganese Executive of Patrizia Pesenti; in so doing, the journalist presents *Piazza del Corriere* as an attractive program that handles unexpected and very exciting topics. In Fig. 23 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the concessive counter-argumentation:



Fig. 23. Concessive counterargumentation in news item B (see Fig. 25): Audience's implicit standpoints drawn due to the journalist's arguments.

As we can see in Fig. 23, if we conceive arguments as invitation inference (Pinto 2006), the body of the text preceding and following the concessive *however* can be seen as arguments from which the audience can draw two implicit standpoints. Thanks to the connector *however* the journalist prepares the audience to the major relevance of the second datum, namely that the program has focused on a newly emerged topic.

In the body of the text we observe six quotations of the politicians who were present at the debate; these quotations do not simply have the function of summarizing what was discussed during the TV-debate, but rather they deal to support the journalist's standpoint and are framed by him in an individual way.

In the editorial conference that we have analyzed in the previous subsection (6.1) the journalist puts forth a standpoint in which she states that there is the need to make also a complement of information to the TV-debate and to the article about the TV-debate. We

can observe the result of this editorial strategy by looking at the news appendix published on the 26th January (C) right on the left of the article about the TV-debate 'Politics The Town bets on Lombardy and Expo 2015'; this appendix handles the same topics discussed on TV and reports opinions of other experts in comparison to those interviewed on TV. Consider Figure 24:

IDEE A CONFRONTO

LUGANO E IL GOVERNO

È giusto che la Città abbia un canale preferenziale di dialogo?

ROBERTO BADARACCO (PLR)

«Lugano ha 60.000 abitanti e una grande forza finanziaria. Con tutto il rispetto per gli altri Comuni, è giusto che la Città abbia un canale preferenziale con il Governo. Non è un privilegio, ma una necessità per evitare conflitti. Per un cantone piccolo come il Ticino, la cosa peggiore è quella di essere in conflitto con la sua città-polo».

LUGANO E GLI ALTRI COMUNI

Lugano investe da sola in opere di cui beneficia tutta la regione: serve una nuova ripartizione delle spese?

CRISTINA ZANINI BARZAGHI (PS)

«In generale è giusto che i Comuni partecipino a questi investimenti. Sul LAC, ad esempio, Paradiso avrebbe dovuto fare la sua parte. Sono convinta che le aggregazioni potranno dirsi concluse solo quando a Lugano si uniranno i Comuni importanti già integrati a livello territoriale, ma fino ad allora servirà più collaborazione».

LUGANO E BERNA

La Città viene considerata abbastanza dalla Confederazione, ad esempio nei sussidi per le opere viarie?

ANGELO JELMINI (PPD)

«La Confederazione ci ha dato 207 milioni di franchi per la galleria Vedeggio-Cassarate, ma il finanziamento era legato al piano viario del polo: una misura fiancheggiatrice che proprio Berna aveva imposto al Municipio e al Consiglio comunale di approvare al fine di garantire la vivibilità in centro. Ora ci aspettiamo un sostegno adeguato per il progetto del Tram».

LUGANO E TICINO TURISMO

Per la Città è meglio fare da sola, o collaborando la promozione è più efficace?

FEDERICO HAAS (UDC)

«Come luganese dico che sì, sarebbe meglio fare da soli. Ticino Turismo dovrebbe avere un ruolo di coordinamento delle varie politiche regionali. Poi, la Svizzera come nazione dovrebbe avere un Ministero del turismo. Il Comune di Lugano, con il suo dicastero, è ancora una volta precursore».

LUGANO E LA LOMBARDIA

Come migliorare il rapporto con le realtà economiche o politiche della fascia di confine?

ALBERTO SICCARDI (AREA LIBERALE)

«Bisogna attirare nuove aziende italiane pubblicizzando il Luganese oltre confine, anche se molte oggi arrivano da sole. Il punto più critico comunque è la grande differenza dei costi: facendo la spesa in Lombardia, ma anche acquistando un'auto o rivolgendosi ad artigiani italiani, si risparmiano un sacco di soldi. Il problema è che in Svizzera ci sono troppe lobby».

LUGANO E IL MONDO

Rapporti con la Cina e altri Paesi: la città ne trae beneficio?

MICHELE FOLETTI (LEGA)

Figure 24. News appendix (C) published on the 26th January 2013.

Starting from the title of the column "ideas in comparison" the attempt of raising audience's attention on an open discussion on political issues seems to be the main aim: this is what the journalist considers the complement of information in the editorial conference and this news appendix is the item in which some interviews to other politicians in respect to those of the TV debate are shown.

Every subtitle is underlined in red and followed by a question, which is answered by a politician. All the six main areas of intervention bound with Lugano are covered: the government, the other municipalities, the relationships with Bern, Lugano and tourism, Lugano and Lombardy, Lugano and the world. In order to build an inter-media connection between newspaper item and TV-debate, the journalist keeps an analogy as regards the number of interviewed experts; the appendix is composed of six brief interviews, like the number of politicians interviewed on TV. Even though at a first glance we may think that the journalist simply quotes the answers of the interviewed, the journalist consciously uses these quotations in order not to make a simple summary of the TV debate and to promote the discussion of ideas. More specifically, by inserting the interviews to other politicians on the same topic discussed in Tv, the journalists invite other licit participants to the interaction field, to the political discussion, in line with the main goal derived from *CdT*'s mission with reference to the public sphere, namely the improvement of the free circulation of ideas.

The structure of this third news item, by presenting direct questions followed by the answers of other experts in respect to those of the broadcasted debate, opens a space for argumentative reasoning also in readers' minds and fosters interest, leading them to go on in deepening the raised issue, and therefore persuading them to watch the next TV-debate. These questions attempt to create a critical space for the debate and the politicians' answers are highly argumentative. In Fig. 25–26-27-28 and 29 I show the argumentative reconstructions of the answers of the interviewd politicians:



Figure 25. Argumentative reconstruction of the first interviewed politician (Roberto Badaracco) of news article C.



Fig. 26. Argumentative reconstruction of the second interviewed politician (Cristina Zanini Barzaghi) of news article C.



Fig. 27. Argumentative reconstruction of the third interviewed politician (Angelo Jelmini) of news article C.



Fig. 28. Argumentative reconstruction of the fourth interviewed politician (Federico Haas) of news article C.



Figure 29. Argumentative reconstruction on the six interviewed politician (Alberto Siccardi) of the news article C.

A confirmation of this journalistic intention comes also from observing that a promotional item with the contents of the next forthcoming TV-debate is published on the 26th January (D), on the bottom of the same page of the news item and of the news appendix analyzed, as we can see in the Figure below;

TELETICINO A FUOCO

TeleTicino **Riflettori su Francesca Bordoni**

VERSO APRILE Francesca Bordoni Brooks ospite domani di Prisca Dindo. (Foto Crinari)

Francesca Bordoni Brooks è la seconda protagonista di «La mia Lugano», la nuova trasmissione di approfondimento di Teleticino che ci accompagnerà fino alle elezioni comunali cittadine di aprile, in onda domani sera, domenica 27 gennaio, alle 20.45.
La consigliera comunale e granconsigliera in carica, candidata del Partito Popolare Democratico in corsa per il Municipio della città illustrerà i punti forti del suo manifesto politico, stimolata dalle domande di Prisca Dindo e dei suoi colleghi giornalisti.
A porre le domande in studio, insieme alla direttrice dell'emittente di Melide, vi saranno la responsabile del settore «inchiesta» della Regione Simonetta Caratti; il giornalista della redazione di Lugano del Giornale del Popolo John Robbiani e Alessio Moretti, giornalista del portale Ticinolibero.
Tra i temi sul tavolo, l'ipotesi di una aumento del moltiplicatore d'imposta, i tagli proposti ad alcune manifestazioni culturali per contenere il deficit del preventivo 2013. Appuntamento domani sera alle 20.45.

Figure 30. Promotional item (D) published on *CdT* concerning the TV-debate to be broadcasted on Teleticino on the 27th January 2013.

The argumentative analysis carried out has illustrated that journalists' anticipatory reasonings concerning the ways in which the audience may be persuaded strongly influence the news items' framing.

In the next Chapter I will present another case of study that deals with another type of anticipation, namely with anticipation of audience interest, which can be considered as a subtype of anticipation of emotions.

7. Journalists anticipating the audience interests on the basis of past experience

In this Chapter I focus on a case study that deals with a sub-type of audience emotive anticipation, namely journalists' anticipation of audience interest. When journalists have to decide about which item to publish in order to interest their audience, they have many alternatives at their disposal and they may rely on past experience in order to make probability predictions on audience uptake. Indeed, as it is known from literature, direct experience is istinctively recognized as the best guarantee of knowledge's certainty (Castelfranchi and Poggi 2002).

Firstly, I look at the role played by past items' evaluation in journalists' anticipation of audience interests. I will show that journalists may use past analogy to support a prediction concerning a future news piece. I will show that the references to past experience can correspond to inferential processes of analogical nature. More specifically, I will focus on the way in which evidence derived from past experience can lead to reasonable decisions and may be a crucial component of editorial gatekeeping in the newsroom; in this case, journalists can base their editorial decisions on the comparison of future items with past ones. I will show that past items that are positively evaluated and that have led to positive audience reactions in the past may contribute to the selection process of forthcoming news.

Secondly, I will look at the role played out by analogy based on multiple evidences that lead to a conclusion.

I will examine a complex argumentation in an editorial conference at the newsroom of the Swiss German program *10vor10*. The case deals with the news of an 88-year-old man thrown in a pond by three adolescents that had been reported on the day before and that had had a positive impact in terms of audience; journalists positively evaluate the topic of the previous item and keep in mind the past audience reactions. On the basis of this positive evaluation of the past item on youth aggressiveness, they decide to broadcast another time an item with the same topic of the old man thrown in the pond, but they

decide to focus on other aspects of the event. Editorial evaluations of past items, based on arguments linked with deeply rooted *endoxa*, represent a starting point for decision-making processes concerning future items. The evaluation of the previous audience reactions functions as a starting point for a future prediction.

7.1 Argumentation based on past news' evaluation in the newsroom leads to probability predictions on audience uptake anticipations

The present case of study[34] is based on a morning editorial conference, held on December 6th 2006 in the newsroom of the Swiss German program *10vor10* broadcasted by the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SSR SRG), and on the respective news item discussed in this editorial conference. The original language is Swiss German, whereas the present analysis is based on a Standard German transcription translated into English. This gilts for all other cases concerning the Swiss German part of Switzerland[35].

The mission of the program is both that of informing audience on how things are going in the world and that of interesting people by going deeper into handled topics, fulfilling the mission of contributing to public understanding, as we can see in the program portrait: "as a program that uses to give news our aim is to make expert and emotioning contributes and to furnish discoursive material for public debates. […] What distinguishes the program are the **deeply investigated** background stories, the surprising viewpoints and strong reportages. Typical of this program are the key points and series, that enlighten an item from different perspectives" (*10vor10* mandate).

This is confirmed also in the frame interview (for more details on frame interview see Section 2.4) by the journalist that has composed the item, in which he points to the priority of the program, consisting in deepening the topic of the day and in actualizing already handled topics;

[34] The acronym of the case of study under investigation in the official nomenclature of the Project is 'JUGE CASE'.
[35] TEMPO case.

(1)[for me the meaning of *zehn vor zehn* is/ what we have made/ to deal with trending themes/ to convey the most important things of the day/ possibly also by using a background/ by adding it/ with further information/ that perhaps in other/ in another more restricted daily magazine/ like perhaps the tagesschau/ or like short contributions on the radio/ is not deepened/ so it is important that what we present/ consists in deepening topics of the day on the one side/ and by presenting also latent trending themes (0117-0132).

At this point it should be clear that the newsroom of *10vor10*, all focused on handling already presented topics, represents an ideal object of study for understanding journalists' past experience's influence on editorial decisions in the newsroom. On the basis of past experience, journalists feel able to predict how the audience should react in a future analogous situation.

The editorial conference lasts about fifty minutes and involves the producer, the managing editor and eight journalists. In the first half part of the editorial conference, the editorial board decides the first news to broadcast, then the journalists start discussing about what should come next. Firstly, the journalists discuss many alternative topics, that they exclude since the information concerning the alternative news comes from an uncertain or unreliable source, like in the case of a sexual abuse committed by a child in a primary school and in the case of a sexual abuse committed by a famous sportsman, as we can see in the following excerpt of the editorial conference:

(2)[X6: what do you mean by a sexual abuse/ X7: something that has happened during schooltime/ during the pause/ he is eight years old/ she is seven years old/ […]/ P:yes it is interesting/ but we should clarify this better before/ […]/ like we did yesterday/ what we also yesterday decided not to report/ because it was a bit/ on a strange level/ yesterday the swiss national trainer of taekwondo […]/ has been

suspended/ due to sexual abuse/ […]/ but the notice did not come from the association/ but rather from a third party// this is also a news story/ that we could broadcast but/ that we should deepen more precisely before (0839-0875)].

Again, journalists discuss the case of a killer mother as an alternative news, but they exclude it, since the information is still unclear, as we can see in the continuation of the previous excerpt of the editorial conference:

(3)[X5: the killer mother/ (xxx) was attributed to/ this should be simply clarified/ R: yes that's good/ we will clarify/ but we cannot do that today/ I think that's clear (0882-0888)].

At this point the producer proposes to broadcast again something on the topic of youth aggressiveness and another journalist says that it was a very good choice:

(4) [P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic on youth aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported the other/ that had thrown in the pond/ the eighty years old man/ we have made also an interview/ X3: it was a very good choice 0885-0889-0894].

Then the producer goes on to argue in favor of reproposing a topic on youth aggressiveness:

(5) [P: however the topic on youth aggressiveness is obviously/ then we have received/ I think we have received another message/ about adolescents in another circumstance/ I have the feeling/ this is now a topic that interests people/ because this happens every two days/ you hear read something and so on/ and the general climate I have the feeling/ is shifting slowly against adolescents/ yesterday we could a little bit convey this impression/ more impressive or-/ we have spoken about this yesterday/ you begin slowly/ the feet

in the tram/ by disturbing elderly people/ and yesterday it was really a crass day 0895-0911].

After a few minutes the editor in chief reinforces the producer's opinion that the general climate is shifting against adolescents:

(6) [R: you can feel how the elderly perceive the miserable disregard/ the lack of respect/ is something that you feel when you travel by tram/ when you travel by tram/ it is perceivable/ Zurich is really-/ X5: at my place in hongg they precipitate always inside/ because there are elderly people/ that you cannot come out anymore (0957-0965)].

The journalists discuss the reasons why the forthcoming item should deal with youth aggressiveness, and one of the main reasons is that they believe that youth aggressiveness is becoming more and more problematic and that this is perceived by people. Journalists are aware that they have the possibility to handle a topic that is already known in the audience and they believe that it is positive to reinforce this knowledge.

In this case there are two types of argumentative discussions, namely a practical and a knowledge/evaluative argumentation. In the following sections of this chapter (subsection 7.2.1), I will illustrate into details these two types of argumentative discussion, by presenting the argumentative reconstruction and the inferential structure of some focal argumentative moves. Furthermore, I will verify journalists' discussed editorial strategies by analyzing the news piece with the same methodology.

7.2 Argumentation based on past experience supporting editorial gatekeeping: towards a practical reasonableness

In the first type of argumentative discussion at stake in the editorial conference under investigation, namely the one situated in the interaction field of the newsroom, the participants to the interaction are the journalists discussing which item to broadcast. Since the interaction field determines the pertinent issue at stake (Rigotti & Rocci 2006), the

interaction field of the newsroom determines the issue "which topic should we choose for a forthcoming item?".

In the editorial conference, among many alternatives, the topic concerning youth aggressiveness has been chosen on the basis of two criteria;

a) journalists have the certainty that this topic has already proved to be good for the audience, and in the ingroup there is a shared rooted *endoxon* that the aspects of the item that have proved to be good for the audience should be proposed again, as we can see from the excerpt below:

(7) [P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic the topic on youth aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported the other / that had thrown in the pond/ the eighty-eight year old man/ we have had also an interview/ X3: and it was a very good choice (0889-0894)]

b) the other alternative topics do not come from a reliable source. Indeed, the predictability of positive outcome of the other hypothetical news proposals is uncertain, as we have shown in the previous excerpts (excerpts (2) and (3) in Section 7.1).

As we can see in Figure, journalists aim at reaching a reasonable decision on which topic to choose and at framing the news in such a way that should be coherent with the audience expectations. The participants to the argumentative confrontation include the producer (P), the managing editor (R), and three journalists (X1, X3 and X5). As we can see in Figure and in Fig. 30, we are in front of two contradictory standpoints, the positive one [Figure 30, (1)], advanced by the producer and another journalist, and the negative one, advanced by another journalist, [Figure 29 (2.)]. The antagonist's standpoint contradicts the positive standpoint of the protagonist concerning the possibility of choosing another item with the topic of youth aggressiveness, *i.e.* the same topic of the previous day. The antagonist (the journalist identified as J) doubts about the possibility to propose again another item with the same topic, and supports his standpoint with arguments concerning the need for a novel approach to the already chosen topic. Let us

now reconstruct the confrontation stage, in which the two contradictory standpoints emerge:

	Producer P	Journalist J
Standpoint	We should choose again the topic on youth aggressiveness	We cannot make another time the topic on youth aggressiveness against elderly people

For what concerns the opening stage, the starting points shared by the journalists of the newsroom of *10vor10* can be identified not only in the need to capture the audience attention but also and above all in the need to fulfill a public service mission aiming at promoting public understanding. Indeed, as states Perrin

> experienced journalists contribute to promoting public understanding by emergent solutions based on their tacit knowledge. Locally, they prove that mandate and market demands can be bridged with appropriate attitudes, knowledge, and methods (Perrin 2013: 35).

The practical standpoint 'we should make another time the topic of youth aggressiveness against elderly people' is advanced by the producer (protagonist), and marks the beginning of the discussion concerning the possibility to propose again a topic on youth aggressiveness. Within the newsroom of *10vor10*, the producer controls the whole newsmaking process and is "responsible for the production processes and the content and dramaturgy of the daily issues. […]" (Perrin 2013: 13).

7.2.1 "Should we propose another time a topic on youth aggressiveness?"

As we have seen above, during the editorial conference journalists actively discuss the possibility of proposing again the topic of the item of the day before, basing their anticipatory inferences on what they have done in the past; then, the argumentative discussion revolves around the reasonableness of conveying the well-known topic of youth aggressiveness. In Figure 31 we can see into details the argumentative reconstruction of the argumentative discussion under investigation. We can notice that there are four co-

arguers (two journalists -X3, X5-, the producer -P-, the editor in chief –R-) that constitute an argumentative coalition:



Figure 31. Argumentative reconstruction of the whole argumentative discussion of the editorial conference including a subordinate knowledge-oriented discussion and the superordinate practical-oriented discussion.

In Figure 31 we notice an argumentative line (1.1a and 1.1b) focused on the success of the item on youth aggressiveness of the day before. This reinforces the decision of reproposing it. The second argumentative line (1.2) lays stress on the repetitivity of aggressive facts committed by adolesccents: indeed, the journalists say that they have received another message of an event performed by other adolescents, therefore stressing the high frequency of violent episodes involving young people.

The third argumentative line (1.3) is a complex argumentation: in this argumentative line the journalist points at the main goal of every newsroom, namely interesting people. By saying that 'it is a topic that interests people' because 'it happens every two days' (1.3.1) and because 'the general climate is shifting against adolescents' (1.3.2), the journalist introduces a new explanatory/ evaluative issue. Indeed, the argument 1.3.2 can be considered an explanatory/evaluative sub-standpoint, answering an issue such as "how are things going with youth aggressiveness?"; this is a typical issue of knowledge oriented-argumentation. This argumentative line aims at supporting the opinion that youth aggressiveness is increasing and that people are perceiving this feeling; furthermore, they say that it was a good choice to stress this impression in the item of the day before. Here the argumentation acts as a sort of generalization to be conveyed in the audience.

In this subordinate discussion, the interaction field is not the newsroom anymore, but rather the public sphere, since the argumentative interaction involves the journalists and the imagined audience. The interaction field of the public sphere determines the pertinent issue: 'How are things going? Which are the relevant aspects of social reality in which we live? Which are the important things about the world that citizens must know? How do people perceive adolescents?'. This is a knowledge-oriented argumentation, since journalists argue in order to know how things are going in the world and whether it would be good or not that the audience would know certain things; journalists act for the common weal of all the audience in accordance with the public mission of their newsroom of promoting public understanding.

As we can see in Figure 31, the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 "I have the feeling that the general climate is shifting slowly against adolescents (they are increasingly perceived as more and more aggressive against elderly people)" is an explanatory-evaluative sub-standpoint, attempting to answer the knowledge-evaluative oriented issue. It is interesting that three out of the four arguments supporting the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 are reasons that signal the increasing of youth aggressiveness against elderly people based on journalists' multiple past experiences that confirm the hypothesis made in the sub-standpoint. In 1.3.2.2 the producer simulates a possible gesture of disrespect carried out by adolescents in the tram, in 1.3.2.3 and in 1.3.2.4 a journalist and the managing editor advance two

arguments based on their personal experience; in 1.3.2.3 the journalist X5 tells that adolescents always disturb elderly people in the tram where he lives in Hongg and in 1.3.2.4 the managing editor states that in Zurich it is a common experience to perceive adolescents' disrespect against elderly people. All the three participants to the discussion put forth the same typology of arguments based on their generalization of a personal experience or perception concerning youth aggressiveness and adolescents' disrespect towards elderly people.

In Figure 31 we see that the sub-standpoint 1.3.2 and its subordinate arguments support the sub-standpoint 1.3 'it is a topic that interests people', that in turn supports the implicit predictive standpoint (1. It is probable that the topic youth aggressiveness will have positive outcome on the audience). In the argumentative passage 1.3.2.1->1.3.2 we notice that journalists again rely on past experience, indeed they rely on the fact that it had been possible to convey to the audience the general societal negative feeling towards adolescents, which they implicitly evaluate in a positive way. This attitude of conveying information that fits with audience expectations is in line with the mission of the program, namely that of deepening already handled topics, and with the public mandate of SRG, namely that of promoting public understanding. Journalists' objective of transmitting an already known topic in the audience leads to a certain framing of the news that is coherent with the audience rooted beliefs concerning audience aggressiveness.

As previously said, journalists' argumentation in favour of publishing an item on youth aggressiveness is very strong and is advanced by editorial members with important roles in the newsroom. On the contrary, the implicit standpoint of the antagonist "we cannot make another time the topic youth aggressiveness against elderly people" is advanced by a journalist with no direction role:

(8)[in order to have a news story/ you should have another case/ or you should deepen the case of yesterday of the pond/ you should go there and show/ and search/ you can also do that boulevard/ you should search the old woman/ and she should tell (0914-0922). Let us now look at the argumentative reconstruction of the antagonist's standpoint:



Figure 11. Argumentative reconstruction of the argumentation in favour of the standpoint of the antagonist.

As it is clear from the argumentative reconstruction, this negative standpoint is supported by a weak argumentation.

Journalists' will of choosing a topic that is known from the audience is evident also in another type of data, namely in the review interview made to the journalist that has composed the item. In the review (for more details on review see subsection 2.4) the researcher asks the journalist why they had chosen the topic on youth aggressiveness and the journalist justifies his choice by arguing that they had proposed the topic of the previous day due to the high sensitiveness that it had produced in the audience;

(9) the topic has come out on the basis of a message of the police/ we briefly proposed the topic yesterday in the program/ because in the last days with the case seebach/ youth aggressiveness and youth assaults provoke a high sensitivensess / both in people working in the media and

probably also in the people/ that watch our program/ (0017-0022)[36].

It becomes evident that the journalist decided to choose the topic 'youth aggressiveness' since it concerned a social phenomenon that was increasing, that was already known in the audience, and that had proven to be interesting for the audience. Furthermore, in the review we observe that when the journalist was explaining to the producers of the program what they could add to the forthcoming item on the same topic, he specifies that an important aspect was the increase of victims, confirming and reinforcing the information already given the day before, as we can see in this excerpt of the review interview;

(10) how the case is developing/ I told him today we can add/ there are still more victims today/ new victims have contacted us (0077-0080).

7.3 A generic argumentation structure of the interplay between past experience and prediction

As we can see in Fig. 31, the final practical standpoint is supported by a hierarchical argumentative structure, involving an evidential basis and an implicit predictive standpoint. The evidential basis consists in past experience and in journalists' past evaluation of audience reactions. Past experience functions as an argument supporting an implicit predictive standpoint with an evaluative component, based on the probability that the audience will react in a positive way, as it was the case for the previous news piece. Indeed, past experience "is only the origin. A fully developed mind is able to build never-sceen scenes, new possible combinations of world elements never perceived; it is a real building and creation (by simulation) not just memory retrieval" (Castelfranchi 2005:

[36] Excerpt from the review made to the journalist that has composed the item.

259). This expectancy dimension of the predictive standpoint perfectly meets the definition of this kind of standpoint given by Palmieri *et al.*

> predictive standpoints are argumentatively defended when reasons are provided that make an expectation, forecast or 'any forward looking statement' more plausible. [They] refer to future state of affairs (Palmieri *et al*. 2015: 126).

The prediction in turn supports the overall practical standpoint, aimed at deciding the most suitable item to broadcast; it answers the final journalists' question "what should we broadcast?", and it has an evaluative component since it presupposes the reasonableness of a qualitative evaluation of the future (Palmieri *et al*. 2015: 126).

In Figure I sketch the generic argumentation structure of the investigated editorial conference. The evaluation of a past item and of past audience reactions determines the implicit predictive standpoint "it is probable that another hypothetical forthcoming item on the topic of youth aggressiveness will be good", *i.e.* an intermediate standpoint concerning the prediction of the effect of the news on the audience. This intermediate standpoint in turn deals to support the final practical deliberative standpoint "we *should* make another time the item with the topic on youth aggressiveness", as we can see in Figure 33;



Figure 33. Generic argumentation structure of the editorial conference under investigation.

This generic argumentation structure, based on the abstraction of the concrete case, shows the presence of a prediction that mediates between the evidential basis and the final editorial decision. The implicit predictive standpoint is based on the journalists' anticipatory reasonings and it reasonably connects the evidential basis and the final standpoint; it represents an interplay between evidence and expectation.

More specifically, some sort of regularity of occurrence is implied in journalists' prediction of audience reactions that allows them to believe that the items chosen on the basis of previous experience and positively judged should produce another time positive audience reactions.

Indeed, journalists need to anticipate future audience reactions (they have to know which item will produce what audience reactions) and hope to find their anticipations

concerning audience uptake validated by facts. Predictability is crucial in journalists' argumentative discussions revolving around audience uptake, since journalists' possibility to predict –at least in principle- future audience reactions on the basis of past experience enables them to know-ahead of the time- with a more or less high degree of certainty if their items will fit with audience expectations. Due to its efficacy in anticipating future states of affairs, predictability can also be considered to be one of the most important cognitive components of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982); therefore, journalists' predictability on future audience uptake increases their beliefs about the efficacy of the future items that are in some way similar to the ones that have proved to be good.

Finally, the prediction supports the overall final practical standpoint; The whole argumentative discussion can be classified as a practical argumentation, since journalists aim at reaching a decision concerning which item to broadcast, and their reasonings can be evaluated as reasonable since their premises are played out in the specific context of the editorial newsroom, in which certain starting points are shared by the whole journalistic ingroup of the newsroom for *10vor10*.

7.4 Inferential analysis of a focal argumentative move based on past experience; an evidential basis favoring editorial gatekeeping

Until now I focused on the argumentation structure; however, in order to prove that journalists' reliance on past experience in the newsroom represents a reasonable way to make predictions on the outcome of future items and to take decisions, it is necessary to make a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential configuration of arguments. Indeed, the analysis of the inferential structure of arguments following AMT enables to grasp the missing link represented by the implicit premises and to find out why certain traditionally considered weak premises – like premises based on similar past experiences may at a first sight seem to be- can lead to reasonable conclusions in a journalist's reasoning process.

7.4.1 Argument from past analogy; journalists' past experience and future news' choice

In this sub-section I focus on an argument from past analogy, in order to show how journalists' past experience enables them to predict the outcome of future items. As stated by Greco (2014),

> in the AMT, analogy is included in the extrinsic loci. Intrinsic and extrinsic loci, namely the two fundamental categories of the typology proposed by the AMT, are distinguished on the basis of a criterion based on the 'proximity' of the (world of the argument) to the world of the standpoint […]. In the case of intrinsic loci, standpoint and argument belong to one and the same possible world. […] Contrastingly, with extrinsic loci, the argument and the standpoint belong to different worlds (Greco 2014: 508).

For example, the argument from past analogy in our example is based on an analogy between a past experience and a hypothetical future experience, and more specifically, it is based on the analogy between a past news piece and a future news piece. However, the two constitute two logically distinct worlds, one belonging to the past and one belonging to the future.

Many scholars have highlighted that the crucial problem with argumentation from analogy can be identified in the comparability of the interested entities or state of affairs. Some authors claim that argumentation from analogy is based on a *functional genus*, which is a pragmatic category including both entities, and not a genus in the traditional Aristotelian sense of this word (see in particular Macagno and Walton 2014). As stated by Greco (2014), "in an AMT perspective, the functional genus is functional precisely because it connects two possible worlds, working on an extrinsic locus such as analogy is" (Greco 2014: 509).

In his account of argument schemes, Whately (1828 [1963]85-86) considers that in argumentation from analogy there is an explicit connection to a common class that comprehends both analogues, and that this common class (which arguably corresponds to the notion of functional genus) is actually a relation: the two elements (the one from which, and the one to which, we argue) are not, necessarily themselves analogous, but have similar relations with some other elements. This means that "the common genus which they both fall under, consists in a relation" (Greco 2014: 509). Therefore, the past news

piece and the future hypothetical news piece are not in themselves alike, but they are linked by a like relation based on the possibility of the topic of youth aggressiveness of generating a positive reaction in the audience.

Let us now look at the argumentative line 1.1a-1.1b->1 (in Figure 31) since this is the crucial passage in which the journalist makes explicit his reliance on the evaluation of the previous item. This argumentative move, based on the *locus from past analogy*, allows journalists to predict the probability of producing positive audience reactions in re-proposing an item with a topic that had already proved to be good, as you can see in the Y-structure produced in Figure 34;



Figure 12. It is probable that another item on the topic of youth aggressiveness will produce a positive reaction in the audience because yesterday journalists broadcasted an item on youth aggressiveness and it was very good.

The *endoxa* at stake in this inference are: *a)* the forthcoming item that journalists may decide to publish belong to the topic 'youth aggressiveness', as the one published the previous day, *b)* items that have proved to be good will probably be good again. These premises are shared by the editorial board of the newsroom of *10vor10*. Furthermore, on the left branch of the Y-structure we find the presence of a *datum*, the belief established on the basis of actual evidence; the *datum* 'yesterday journalists broadcasted an item on youth aggressiveness and it was very good' represents the actual piece of evidence on which journalists base for reaching their conclusion. The conjunction of the statements of the *endoxon* and of the *datum* creates an inferential effect leading to a first conclusion 'the item on youth aggressiveness published yesterday was very good, and it handles the same theme of the candidate hypothetical forthcoming item'. This conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and conjoined with it, allows inferring the final practical standpoint. We know in fact from the maxim that 'if the past situation PS and the future situation FS belong to the same functional genus and X held for PS, it is probable that X will hold for FS as well' and from the minor premise/first conclusion that 'the item on youth aggressiveness published yesterday was very good, and it handles the same topic of the candidate hypothetical forthcoming item'. Therefore, journalists are led to predict that 'it is probable that a forthcoming item on the topic of youth aggressiveness will have a positive outcome on the audience'. The connection of the material and the procedural starting points illustrates the way in which distinct kinds of premises are linked in real argumentation, and in the present case study it shows how a reasoning based on an analogy with past experience can lead to a reasonable conclusion.

This analysis indicates not only the soundness, but also the reasonableness of this act of inference of the journalists' reasoning in choosing the forthcoming news' topic: the soundness is established thanks to the correctness of the semantic-procedural premises, whereas the reasonableness thanks to the appropriateness of the contextual premises in the Y-structure. In this sound and reasonable inferential structure, we do not observe a manipulation of the *datum*, but we simply observe an interaction of the *datum* with a certain expectation. On the contrary, the *datum* may be altered and manipulated when the

world of volition overcomes the world of uncertainty-certainty (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014).

In the extracts that I have analyzed, some evidence is given that analogical reasoning in the newsroom leads to an implicit or explicit prediction, but the analogy is never the ultimate basis on which a journalist decides to publish/broadcast or not publish/not broadcast a news, but it is part of a more complex reasoning process that aims at establishing whether an item should be re-proposed or not in order to answer to the topics of interest of the Swiss German cultural community, as it is clear from the already quoted producer's words in the editorial conference: I think we have received another message/ about adolescents in another circumstance/ I have the feeling/ this is now a topic that interests people/ because this happens every two days/ you hear read something and so on/ and the general climate I have the feeling/ is shifting slowly against adolescents (0895-0904. This is not surprising; when journalists have to decide whether to broadcast a given news or not, they have to decide under conditions of uncertainty; in such situations analogy is useful, since it allows them to anticipate the audience reactions to a news, by comparing the hypothetical future reactions to other previous similar cases.

The conclusion of the analogical reasoning (implicit prediction) serves as a datum for the final reasoning process that aims at establishing whether an item helps to fulfill the goals of the institution: in Figure 35 I show the inferential analysis of the final argumentative move that leads to the ultimate decision to broadcast the item, that in the end is based on an expectation (1'>1). Indeed, the endoxon consists of a goal and the datum consists of a prediction:

Figure 35. *10vor10* should broadcast another time something on the topic of youth aggressiveness against elderly people because the forthcoming item on youth aggressiveness will have a positive outcome on the audience.

In this sub-section I have shown the fundamental role played out by journalists' past experience in deciding about the broadcasting of forthcoming items in a practical-oriented discussion.

7.5 How the study of argumentation in context can help us in understanding the reasonableness of journalists' argumentation based on past experience

In order to understand the role of journalists' argumentation based on past experience and on generalization in editorial decisions, it is important to remark that the interaction field determines the issue at stake and the starting points emerging in the

opening stage. In this case of study two types of interaction fields are at stake. In the overall practical argumentative discussion based on past experience, in which the journalist argues in favor of editorial gatekeeping (*a*), the interaction field is the newsroom since the interaction takes place between two or more journalists; the interaction field of the newsroom determines an issue concerning the choice of the news piece to broadcast: P: but perhaps we should choose again the topic on youth aggressiveness/ I mean yesterday we reported the other/ that had been thrown in the pond/ the eighty-eight year old man/ we have had also an interview/ X3: and it was a very good choice (0889-0894).

In the knowledge-oriented argumentation based on multiple past experiences, journalists focus on establishing whether youth aggressiveness' increase is perceived by people: and the general climate I have the feeling/ is shifting slowly against adolescents/ yesterday we could a little bit convey this impression/ more impressive or-/ we have spoken about this yesterday/ you begin slowly/ the feet in the tram/ by disturbing elderly people/ and yesterday it was really a crass day (P 0904-0911). The editor in chief and another joiurnalist add some personal experiences that contributes to support the editorial team's standpoint that "youth aggressiveness is increased and this is perceived by people": you can feel how the elderly perceive the miserable disregard/ the lack of respect/ is something that you feel when you travel by tram/ it is perceivable/ Zurich is really-/ X5: at my place in hongg they precipitate always inside/ because there are elderly people/ that you cannot come out anymore (0957-0965).

In this case the interaction field is the public sphere since the interaction takes place between the journalists and the imagined audience; the interaction field determines a type of issue aimed at understanding the truth and reasonableness of an event on which a news should be constructed. Furthermore, the interaction field determines also the starting points emerging in the opening stage, determining the significant common ground of the arguers. In the overall practical argumentation (*a*) the interaction field of the newsroom

determines as starting points the need to capture the audience as well as to fulfill the public service mission, whereas in the knowledge-oriented argumentation based on multiple past experiences (*b*) the interaction field of the public sphere determines as starting points the journalists' commitment towards truth and common weal.

In order to understand the reason why such types of argumentation can legitimately be considered the basis for reasonable decisions and can open a space for a critical discussion, we need to introduce what we mean by reasonableness. As stated by Greco Morasso "most decisively, what defines a reasonable attitude is the commitment to finding a resolution of the difference of opinion that is worthy of the *human quality* of the interlocutors" (Greco Morasso 2011: 116). This turns out to be clear when we investigate an argumentation based on past experience and generalization, in which pure rationality is insufficient for understanding the dimensions involved in an argumentation that may be based on weak premises; a more complicated disposition of reason is needed, which must consider the actual complexity of all contextual elements. Apparent weak or wrong premises can turn out to be strong and sound in a specific context of use.

In this Chapter I have claimed that argumentation based on past experience and on generalization aiming at anticipating audience interests in the newsroom can be reasonable, since an argumentative interaction is produced in a specific context and between specific participants: the analysis of the argumentative exchanges and of the hidden premises of the focal argumentative moves of the discussion under a contextual perspective has enabled us to show that this type of argumentation aims at reasonableness. More specifically, in this single case study I have shown the presence of two distinct types of argumentation at stake in the editorial conference (practical argumentation and knowledge/evaluative argumentation based on past experience) aiming at two distinct types of reasonableness (*practical reasonableness* and *knowledge/evaluative-oriented reasonableness*). Firstly, journalists pursue *a)* a *practical reasonableness* when they aim at reaching the most reasonable decision in order to broadcast the most reasonable news piece, taking into account their need to fulfill a public service mission, which is a shared value of their newsroom. Secondly, journalists also pursue *b)* a *knowledge/evaluative-oriented reasonableness*, when they aim at understanding the most reasonable state of

affairs of a certain event of the world, at judging the most reasonable way to convey it to the audience, and at understanding whether it can be reasonable to broadcast a news that is in line with the audience previous knowledge.

7.6 Verifying journalists' reliance on past experience in the news product

At this stage of the analysis, I make an argumentative analysis of the news piece discussed in the above investigated editorial conference and broadcasted on the 6th December 2006, which conveys the news of the old man attacked by some adolescents near a pond. The topic had been briefly handled on the day before, and journalists chose to propose it again, also adding new elements and adding further cases of elderly people attacked by adolescents. Journalists' objective of reinforcing the information already conveyed to the audience (analyzed in Section 7.4) can be observed in the respective news product, in which we can find argumentative and linguistic traces that signal the journalists' will to convey topics concerning audience already rooted *endoxa* and already known topics, perfectly matching the strategy discussed in the editorial conference. In what follows I show the transcript of the item:

001 M: ***gestern*** haben wir berichtet über einen elfjährigen
Yesterday *we reported on an 11-year-old*

002 und zwei vierzehnjährige jugendliche
and two 14-year-old youths

003 die im aargauischen reinach
who in Reinach, Aargau,

004 betagte menschen angegriffen
attacked elderly people

005 und einen mann in einen weiher gestoßen hatten
and pushed a man into a pond.

006 heute haben wir erfahren
Today we have learned

007 ***dass dieselben täter***
that the same offenders

008 ***gewalt noch gegen weitere opfer angewendet***
used force against further victims,

009 zum beispiel einer älteren frau
for example, an older woman

010 mit der faust ins gesicht geschlagen haben
whom they punched in the face.

011 michael perricone hat sich bei der KAPO aargau erkundigt
Michael Perricone has talked to the Aargau cantonal police.

012 A: ***aufgrund der medienberichterstattung***
Because of the media coverage

013 ***haben sich weitere drei personen gemeldet***
three more people have come forward.

014 sie haben dargelegt
They stated

015 dass sie ebenfalls
that likewise they -

016 im bereich dieses weihers
in the area around this pond -

017 von diesen drei burschen geschlagen worden seien
had been beaten by these three kids.

018 noch wissen wir nicht genau
We do not yet know

019 was vorgefallen ist
what happened.

020 wir haben diese leute
We have (summoned) these people

021 auf den polizeiposten vorgeladen
to the police station,

022 müssen sie dann dort genau befragen
[and] have to carefully question them then.

023 I: ***wie viele betroffene gibt es jetzt***
How many victims are there now?

024 A: ***insgesamt haben wir jetzt acht betroffene personen***
In total we now have eight victims,

025 ***acht vorfälle***
eight incidents,

026 die wir untersuchen und abklären müssen
that we are investigating and have to clarify.

027 O: rund um den weiher
Around the pond

028 im sonnenberger wäldli
in "Sonnenberger" woods

029 ***sind insgesamt acht senioren und seniorinnen***
a total of eight senior citizens

030 bedrängt und geschlagen worden
were bullied and beaten.

031 drei jugendliche haben ***unterschiedliche spaziergänger***
Three youths attacked ***various walkers,***

032 ***während fast zehn tagen angefallen***
for almost ten days,

033 und es dabei auf alte menschen abgesehen
and targeted older people.

034 mitarbeiter des reinacher forstdienstes
Employees of the Reinach forest service,

035 haben sich nach eingang einer anzeige auf die lauer gelegt
after receiving notification, laid in wait,

036 um die täter in flagranti zu erwischen
in order to catch the offenders in the act.

037 A: wir haben den wald abgeriegelt
We sealed off the forest,

038 bei jedem eingang zum sunneberg ist jemand gestanden
had someone standing at every entrance to the "Sunneberg" -

039 zusammen mit der polizei haben wir das gemacht
we did this together with the police -

040 und haben beobachtet
and observed

041 wer alles in den wald hineingelaufen ist
everyone who entered the forest

042 und haben über funk miteinander kommuniziert
and [we] communicated with each other via radio.

043 wenn eine verdächtige person gekommen ist
When a suspect came along,

044 dann haben wir zugeschlagen
that is when we struck.

045 O: so konnte der haupttäter,
This is how the main offender

046 ein vierzehnjähriger türke
a 14-year-old Turk

047 und seine zwei schweizer helfer
and his two Swiss helpers

048 dingfest gemacht werden
were taken into custody.

049 einen achtundachtzigjährigen senioren
An 88-year-old senior

050 hatten die burschen in den weiher befördert
had been manhandled into the pond by the kids.

051 nur dank der hilfe seiner zweiundachtzigjährigen frau
Only thanks to the help of his 82-year-old wife



052 konnte ***der rentner***
could ***the pensioner***

053 dem achtzig zentimeter tiefen gewässer entsteigen
get out of the 80-centimeter-deep pond.

054 A: es hat sicher noch fünfzig zentimeter schlick am boden
There is at least 50 centimeters of mud on the bottom

055 wo diese person natürlich eingesunken ist
that this person naturally sank into.

056 I: ***dann ists schwierig rauszukommen***
Then is it difficult to get out?

057 A: ***dann ist es sicher schwierig rauszukommen ja richtig***
Then it is certainly difficult to get out, correct.

058 O: im schulhaus homberg bei reinach
At the Homberg school close to Reinach

059 haben zwei der drei täter
two of the three offenders

060 die schulbank gedrückt
were enrolled.

061 ***beide sind sekundarschüler***
Both of them are secondary school students.

062 zwar sind sie auf freiem fuß
They have been released,

063 müssen aber mit einer maßnahme der schulbehörden rechnen
but have to reckon with measures by the school board.

064 zur unterstützung der lehrkräfte hat der schulleiter
To support the teaching staff the principal has

065 ein care-team angefordert
requested a care team.

066 A: die lehrerschaft war sehr überrascht
The teaching staff was very surprised.

	067		und entsprechend ist die betroffenheit sehr groß *And accordingly their consternation is very great.*
	068	I:	was passiert jetzt mit diesen schülern *What will happen to these schoolboys?*
	069	A:	diese schüler sind heute bis zu weihnachten *These schoolboys have - from now until Christmas -*
	070		vom unterricht ausgeschlossen dispensiert worden *been expelled from classes, have been exempted*
	071		sie werden betreut durch die schul-sozialarbeiterin *They are under the supervision of a school social worker*
	072		und werden mit hausaufgaben versorgt *and are being given homework*
	073		damit sie nicht ferien haben *so that they are not on vacation*
	074		sondern ihre leistung trotzdem erbringen müssen *but rather still have to perform.*
	075	O:	gegenüber 10vor10 sagt der achtundachtzigjährige rentner *To 10vor10 the 88-year-old pensioner*
	076		der in den weier gestoßen wurde *who had been pushed into the pond*
	077		***für ihn sei die sache abgeschlossen*** ***(said) that for him the issue is settled.***
	078		heute nachmittag ***habe sich einer der schüler bei ihm entschuldigt*** *This afternoon one of the students apologized to him.*

The journalists' will to convey an idea of adolescents as more and more aggressive leads them to frame the news in such a way that presents adolescents as more and more violent aggressors and elderly people as more and more passive victims; in so doing, they aim at informing the audience about events involving adolescents' violence against elderly people in the most reasonable way, since events concerning youth aggressiveness are increasing. This is in line with the mandate of the SSR SRG, that as a public service institution has to fulfil the mandate of promoting social integration and of promoting public understanding. "In their programs SRG SSR promotes understanding, coherence, and exchange among the parts of the country, linguistic communities, cultures, religions,

and social groups […]" (Translation of the programming mandate 2007, article 2, paragraph 2). However, as stated by D. Perrin, as a media organization, "SRG SSR is subject to market and competitive forces. Losing audience would mean losing public importance. Therefore, the mandate presupposes that reaching the public will promote public understanding" (Perrin 2012: 402). In this sense, we can observe that the journalists maneuver strategically when they choose the presentational devices for their standpoint; indeed, they choose to give a perspective that suits the audience and that is coherent with the general societal climate, using "the communicative means that have the most beneficial effects on the audience" (van Eemeren 2010: 94). This news' adaptation to the audience psycho-social perception of youth aggressiveness is shown in the reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the news product, which I show in Figure .



Figure 36. Argumentative reconstruction of the news piece.

As we can see in Figure 36, the argumentative structure of the news piece mostly consists of narrating data that support the explanatory/evaluative standpoint "Adolescents are becoming more and more aggressive": in the first argumentative line (1.1) the host remarks that the day before they had given a news concerning an old man pushed into a pond by three adolescents, and then he shifts the focus to the present moment by giving the information that "the same offenders used force against further victims". It is interesting to notice how this incipit of the news product is rhetorically constructed, since it perfectly mirrors the journalists' will to convey a news that fits with the audience previous knowledge on the topic; it aims at giving evidence that there is a continuum between past and present violent acts performed by adolescents against elderly people.

The subordinate arguments supporting 1.1., namely 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, all concern the increasing number of people attacked by adolescents. It is interesting to notice that 1.1.1 consists of an interview made by the journalist to the police officer of the area, conveying authority to the information; the journalist selects a piece of interview in which the police officer remarks that 'three more people have been beaten around the pond', conveying the idea of repetition of the violent acts also by using the adverb *more,* presupposing that in the past other people were involved. By selecting a certain piece of interview, the journalist implicitly takes a stance and frames the news product in such a way that the audience perceives the increasing aggressiveness of adolescents; this is even more evident in the argument 1.1.2, in which the journalist asks to the interviewed police officer about the actual number of victims, so that his precise answer with the exact number of all victims 'we have now eight victims' can be considered a strong argument (a *datum*) supporting the fact that youth aggressiveness is increasing. Furthermore, the interviewer, by asking "how many victims are there now?" presupposes that there had been other victims in the past, conveying an idea of repetition, perpetuating the conception of elderly as victims. Therefore, we can see how the journalist has an active role in framing the event; we find evidence of the journalist's role of knowledge mediator even in the retrospective verbal protocol, in which the journalist explicitly refers to his role of moderator;

(11)[here I hear the interview/ because I select from what the interviewee says/ the police officer/ the graser/ and I'm doing that in detailedness/ because the moderator/ has to write his moderation starting from this quotation (RVP 0001-0007)].[37]

In the subordinate argument 1.1.2.1 the journalist comes back on the eight victims and stresses the repetitiveness of the violent acts and the big amount of attacked elderly by using linguistic markers that convey the idea of repetition and increase, such as a *total of*, *various walkers*, *for almost ten days*, *targeted other people*. In the second argumentative line 1.2, the journalist comes back on the already mentioned case of the old

[37] Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: the journalist as knowledge mediator.

man pushed in the pond, showing the will to remark the violent fact; the subordinate argument 1.2.1 reinforces the idea of victimization of the old man, by describing the difficulty of the old man in getting out the pond.

As a whole, it becomes evident that the journalist gives a particular framing to the news piece, by highlighting the role of the elderly people as victims and the role of adolescents as violent aggressors; this is a direct consequence of journalists' editorial decision and this is coherent with the audience psychosocial perception. This framing becomes even more evident by comparing the linguistic markers used in the intermediate drafts of the item (observed thanks to the desktop recordings) and those used in the final news piece. For instance, the journalist in the first draft of the item writes 'Round this pond in Sonneberger woods in the end of November three adolescents *have attacked some* elderly people', whereas for the final product the journalist chooses to insert 'Round this pond in Sonneberger woods *a total of eight senior citizens were bullied and beaten*'; the passive form stresses the aspect of victimization of the elderly who passively undergo the violent actions performed by the aggressors. Furthermore, in another passage of the news, the journalist changes the nominal phrase 'the *vigorous* pensioner' of the first draft into 'the Ø pensioner' of the final draft, therefore eliminating the adjective, in order to avoid to invalidate the frame of the old man conceived as a victim. Another linguistic marker underlines the role of the adolescents as aggressors; with reference to the young aggressors, the journalist changes the first draft 'both *attend* the secondary school' into 'both *are students* of the secondary school'; the use of the *nomen agentis* stresses the social role and the agentivity of the authors of the attacks, therefore contributing to build the frame of youth aggressiveness.

In another passage of the final draft of the item the journalist chooses to write '*During* almost *ten days*, *distinct* walkers have been *over and over* attacked'; here, the journalists emphasizes *a)* the progressive and durative aspect of the attacks (*during ten days*, *over and over*), and *b)* the multiplicity, quantity and diversity of the attacked people (*distinct walkers*), therefore contributing to reinforce contents that the audience already knows.

With reference to this point, we have further evidence of this editorial strategy also from the retrospective verbal protocol. Indeed, in the retrospective verbal protocol the journalist explicitly expresses his will to convey to the audience an idea of repetition of the violent acts;

(12) now I insert 'different'/so that it is clear that/ they did not attack always the same people/ **in the first sentence one could understand**/that in one time they attacked eight elderly people/ but with the second sentence it is clear that/ there were more people/ distinct people/ in distinct moments/ distinct temporal points (0121-0130).[38]

In this passage of the retrospective verbal protocol it is clear that the journalist wants to convey not only the idea of repetition but also he wants that the TV-viewers understand the right unfolding of the events, namely that different people in different temporal moments have been attacked. The journalist uses a counterfactual thought that refers to the past situation in which he was reflecting on the audience uptake, but he uses the present tense: he says 'if I had left the first sentence in the way it was, one *could understand* that in one time they attacked eight people', but in fact it is as if he said 'if I had left the first sentence in the way it was, *one could have understood* that in one time eight people were attacked'. In this case, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning, hypothesizing an unrealized worse scenario, namely the audience's uncorrect comprehension of the reported event. In Figure 37 I show the inferential configuration of this passage;

[38] Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: the journalist's will to frame the news in a reasonable way.



Figure 37. I have chosen to insert the word "different" because otherwise one could have understood that in one time they attacked eight elderly people, therefore misunderstanding the event.

In this downward counterfactual reasoning the locus from final cause and alternatives is applied. If *a)* inserting the word "different" and not inserting it are two alternative actions in the composition of an item and if *b)* when a journalist composes a news piece he has the goal not to lead the audience to misunderstand events (endoxa); and if journalists have chosen to insert the word "different" that has led the audience not too misunderstand the event (factual datum) and if it was possible to choose not to insert the word "different" and it would have led the audience to misunderstand the event (simulative datum), then the first conclusion arises that "among the two alternatives journalists have chosen the alternative that leads the audience not to misunderstand the event, disregarding the alternative that would have led to misunderstand it". The first conclusion, which consists in an invalidation of a negative expectation. The first conclusion functions as a

minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final cause and alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that "if between two alternatives X, Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable *ceteris paribus* to choose Y rather than X". Therefore, the final conclusion that "we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one" can be drawn, which represents a postitive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience possible relief.

In Fig. 38, we have observed that the journalist gives a reason that does not only refer to factual outcomes but rather it refers to how things might have been otherwise; I will overtly face this topic in chapter 8 from a theoretical point of view and in chapters 9, 10 and 11 I will show some case studies in which counterfactual reasoning plays a major role.

Finally, it is wise to add that the fact that audience's correct comprehension of the events is not the only reason on the basis of the journalist's decision to insert the word 'different'; indeed, it is evident that the journalist wants to convey to the audience the idea of multiplicity of attacked persons. The framing of the news perfectly mirrors the editorial strategy discussed in the editorial conference, and confirms the journalists' will to convey a news that fits the audience conception of the reported event. The journalist swings between capturing the audience attention and conveying a balanced view of the event. This is clear by looking at the following excerpt of the retrospective verbal protocol;

(13)(to me it has been suddenly clear that/ i must bring the quotation before/ then it is good hacked down/ and then you can attach it behind/ and then you do not expect anymore/ such an awesome story behind it/ **if I had begun with the pond/ then I have the feeling/ you raise an attitude of expectation**/ that then the topic cannot satisfy 0052-0061)

In this passage it is interesting to notice the use of downward counterfactual reasoning, namely the type of counterfactual reasoning that leads to consider unrealized worse hypothesis. The journalist considers an unrealized worse hypothesis since he is asked to give the reasons for his choice, which are presupposed to be good. More

specifically, the journalist gives the reason why he has decided that the item should have not begun with the framing of the pond; he sustains that the audience would have had a distorted perception of the event occurred, which would have appeared more dramatic than what it actually was. Subsequently, according to the journalist's hypothesis, the audience would have developed a wrong expectation, an expectation of a very dramatic item in which someone may eventually also have died in the pond; however, this expectation would have been invalidated by the actual contents of the reported events, that simply consists in a caper acted out by some adolescents. The worse hypothesis that has fortunately –from the viewpoint of the journalist- not been carried out is then that of having invalidated the TV-viewers' expectation. This point is very interesting, because we notice that the journalist is aware of the fact that it is unproductive to raise expectations in the audience that cannot be satisfied; he makes a sort of metapragmatic reflection on audience expectations. In Figure I show the inferential configuration of the counterfactual argument used by the journalist in support of his explanatory-evaluative standpoint concerning the fact that it was necessary to begin with a quotation and insert later the framing of the pond. In this case a reasoning from alternatives and final cause is applied, which accounts for the alternative chosen in view of the goal of not producing wrong expectations in the audience. As we can see in Figure, if *a)* putting the framing of the pond at the beginning and not putting it at the beginning are two alternative actions when one agent composes a news piece and if *b)* the goal of journalists when they compose a news piece is not to raise wrong expectations in the audience (*endoxa*); and if *a)* we have chosen not to put the framing of the pond at the beginning (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible to choose to put the framing of the pond at the beginning of the item and it would have led to raise wrong expectations in the audience (retrospective prediction, simulative datum), then "among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative that has led not to raise wrong expectations in the audience, disregarding the alternative that would have led to raise them" (first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). The first conclusion functions as a minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final cause and alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that "if between two alternatives X and Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other

(X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X". Therefore, the positive evaluative standpoint is drawn that "we have chosen the best alternative disregarding the better one" (final conclusion), leading to experience possible relief.



Figure 38. It would have been different (worse) if the item had been published putting a the framing of the pond at the beginning because the TV-news piece would have produced wrong expectations in the audience.

It is interesting to notice that the journalist shifts the verbal tense from the past to the present: out of context, this sentence would be ungrammatical, but whithin the context of the retrospective protocol, it provides a crucial function by allowing the journalist to merge the two worlds of the past in which he reasoned and the present moment in which he is reflecting and anticipating the audience probable feelings and expectations. The present tense symbolizes and represents the act of anticipation of the audience uptake: the past becomes present and the present symbolizes the imagined audience expectations and feelings. The past experience is embedded within the present moment of enunciation (*you*

raise an attitude of expectancy). The past moment of reflection is made present by the act of talking.

As we have seen in the two excerpts of retrospective verbal protocol analyzed above, downward counterfactual reasoning seems to play an important role in this type of datum; in the following excerpt it is evident that the journalist hypothesizes an unrealized course of action that would have led to a worse scenario in order to support his explanatory-evaluative standpoint;

(14)(I have left it away because of the subdivision/ that with the vigorous pensioner/ and the concrete fall into the pond/ this has now to do with the pictures/ **if I had already spoken of the vigorous pensioner/ and of the pond/ I should have already used the pictures of the pond/** I wanted to keep the pictures of the pond/ I must insert my people now/ because now the first quotation arrives 0153-0163)

The journalist remarks that speaking of the pensioner in a first moment would have been a wrong choice, since it would have obliged him to insert the framings of the pond and this would have been a worse scenario, since he believes that it was better to insert the framings of the pond in the moment in which the quotations of the experts would have been inserted. Not using the framings of the pond at the beginning, before the quotations of the expert, was the action that enabled the journalist to reach the better goal of having a better impact on the audience.

7.7 Newsroom reasoning basing on past experience results in a reasonable framing of the news text

The editorial board's decision of acting on the basis of past experience is not simply an unwitting reasoning played out in a mechanistic way, but rather past experience deals as a trigger that incentivizes the participants' discussion. Indeed, *a)* it enables journalists to

better understand how things are going in the world and *b)* it is used as an object of communication for the audience, enabling to convey an already known psycho-social phenomenon. Therefore, analogy based on past experience opens a space for critical discussion in the newsroom, being it anchored on reasonable arguments with premises that are sound within the ingroup of the specific editorial newsroom of *10vor10*. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that journalists rely on argument from past analogy when journalists have to decide for a future item and this favors editorial gatekeeping, but editorial decisions are always integrated with a bringing up to date of the themes in the present time and with the projection of the topic in the future. The journalist wants to convey an already known topic and a topic that has already proved to be effective, but he wants to cast a new light on it, by conveying the actual and present state of affairs of a social phenomena such as youth aggressiveness. We find a confirmation of this in the retrospective verbal protocol, in which the journalist explicitly expresses that a new aspect of the already known topic is inserted in the forthcoming item in order to actualize it;

(15) now I inserted it because of the contribution/ journalistic thought/ we have to put up-to-date data at the beginning/ because in the end the topic that we have/ is a bit featureless/ and so we need to give force at the beginning/ by telling with up-to-dateness an advancement of the case (0021-0028).[39]

[39] Excerpt from the retrospective verbal protocol: importance to cast new light on an already handled topic.

8. Counterfactual reasoning

Look in my face; my name is Might have been;
I am also called No-more, Too-late, Farewell.
-Dante Gabriel Rossetti

Practical reasoning based on audience uptake often involves counterfactual reasoning. In the newsroom corpus also reasoning about evaluative standpoints concerning past editorial decisions and reasoning about journalists' choices in retrospective interviews is rife with counterfactuals. The interplay between counterfactual reasoning and emotions is particularly noteworthy. On the one hand the reasoning might envisage a counterfactual emotional uptake of the audience (*e.g.* 'people wouldn't have empathized with that'). On the other side, the very process of counterfactual reasoning might result in outcomes that are emotionally charged (*e.g.* 'that would have been terrible indeed! Thanks God we did not publish that'). As we will see, evaluative standpoints resulting from counterfactual reasoning are accompanied by the reflective emotions of regret or relief according to the 'simulation direction' of counterfactual reasoning. Upward counterfactual reasoning concerns the imagination of better unrealized states of affairs, whereas downward counterfactual reasoning concerns worse unrealized states of affairs. Indeed, in order to anticipate emotions it is often necessary a counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual resoning necessarily involves a retrospective anticipation, whose object is "what might have been but has not been", *i.e.* of the unrealized mental simulation. Since many cases of studies on anticipatory reasoning were focused on counterfactual reasoning, I decided to devote a part of this thesis to counterfactual reasoning including two case studies in which counterfactual reasoning plays a major role in journalists' anticipation of audience emotive uptake (Chapters 9 and 10) and four minor case studies in which different uses counterfactual reasoning are at stake (Chapter 11).

8.1 What counterfactual reasoning is

At this point, it is necessary to give a more careful definition of counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual representations belong to the broad category of irreal worlds. *Irrealis* refer to such modal verbs as *could*, *would*, *might*, *can*, and *may* that indicate non asserted facts. Bybee and Fleischmann (1995) give an interesting definition of *irrealis*; they characterize *irrealis* as a prototype category, "at the semantic level, expressing a spectrum of meanings that signal a speaker's lack of belief in or lack of commitment to any of the following; the reality or referentiality of a situation; the possibility that an agent's wishes, hopes or intentions will effectively be realized; the authenticity of an utterance or a chunk of discourse; or the normalcy of a discourse or of a communicative situation" (Bybee and Fleischmann 1995: 12-13). Utterances in which irrealis appears (also called "irreal" or "irrealized utterances") are typically considered by grammarians to be non factive; this means that they obligate the speaker neither to the truth nor the falsity of the proposition (Lyons 1977; 795). The assertion "Margaret went to Washington" becomes irrealized when modal verbs or non-factive phrases are added to indicate the contingent or the hypothetical nature of the statement:

(1)
Margaret could go to Washington
Margaret may have gone to Washington
Perhaps Margaret went to Washington
It's possible that Margaret went to Washington
What would happen if Margaret went to Washington?

In such cases, "the speaker is offering the proposition as hypothesis, expecting strong challenge and having little evidentiary support" (Talmy Givon 1984:121). In this thesis I will zoom on the types of propositions known to be false that are entertained as hypothesis to examine their consequences (contrary to fact hypothesis), and I will therefore refer to counterfactuals as to contrary to facts conditionals.

Put in Chrisholm's words:

> There is a variety of types of situation where the use of the contrary-to-fact conditional appears to be the most natural means of expressing what we claim to know. First of all, of course, there are those occasions where we assert a conditional statement, knowing or believing its antecedent to be false. I may contend, for example, that had we followed a different policy toward Germany in the 1920's, the second World War would not have occurred. […] Equally important, from the point of view of knowledge, are those subjunctive conditionals which we assert, not knowing whether the antecedents are true or false. I try to avoid faling through the ice because I believe that if I were to fall I should get wet. Since I believe the conditional to be true, I endeavour to prevent the realization of the conditions mentioned in the antecedent. […] Still another use of this type of conditional is what has been called its 'deliberative use'. When we prepare for-a crucial experiment, we review the situation and consider what would happen if our hypothesis were true and what would happen if it were false. The subjunctive conditional is essential to the expression of these deliberations. In defending a hypothesis, I may employ a subjunctive conditional even though I believe the antecedent to be true; I may say, 'If this were so, that would be so; but, as you see, this is so. . .'. (Chrisholm 1946: 290-291).

Albeit there is common agreement on the grammatical function of irrealis, their pragmatic function is still debated. It is acknowledged that irrealis have a subjective and phenomenological character; following logicians, irrealized utterances have the power to evoke possible or alternative worlds. As Lewis puts it:

> I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is incontrovertibly true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could be otherwise than they are. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. (Lewis 1973: 14)

In editorial conferences irrealis and –more precisely- upward counterfactual reasoning have a special function, namely that of fruitfully prolonging the discussion by directing it toward more strategic ways of constructing a news piece starting from past errors or reviewing and correcting present unproductive editorial strategies (to suggest that things might be otherwise) (for more details see 8.7 and 11.1.5). Upward counterfactual reasoning enables journalists to take the distances from unproductive discussions based only on the belief that "since things are as they actually are, what can be done?". As the Austrian scientist Von Foerster would put it, irrealis helps to improve the journalists' possibility to widen the number of choices (Von Foerster 1992). An extract from the editorial conference of the case of study that will be presented in Section 10 illustrates the special role of irrealis in editorial conferences that evaluate past items:

(2) 0020 but this was the news about which everyone was speaking/ 0021 not only us but the whole Canton/ 0022 a news that has hit people and that emotions/ 0023 even though it is through that the next day we have deepened the religious topic/ 0024 **this was a thing that should have been developed in many ways**/ 0025 we **should have made** the interview with the psychologist to say why one **does** that

In this excerpt it is clear that the journalist focuses on how the news should have been handled and on how it has not been handled; this shifts the focus of the discussion directing it towards more fruitful ways of handling the news in future similar situations, such as making an interview to the psychologist saying the reasons why one person may abandon a child.

We can speak of *irrealis* in a broad sense when a propositional content is not asserted as a fact of the world. The category of *irrealis* is very broad and contains distinct types of propositions that all deal with non-asserted facts. Firstly, there are propositions entertained as *epistemically uncertain a)*, in which a probability assessment is at stake, such as 'If I put myself on a diet, perhaps I would lose weight'. Secondly, there are propositions entertained for the sake of hypothesis without regard for their epistemic status (*mere hypothesis*) *b):* an example can be "If a civil war broke out in Switzerland, there would be no more work for anyone". These propositions do not have arguments in favour of them and who utters them is not interested in the probability assessment but rather wants to examine only the consequences: it is presupposed that the probabilities that the antecedent happens are very low. Thirdly, there are propositions known to be false that are entertained as hypothesis to examine their consequences (*contrary to fact hypothesis*) *c),* which can be subdivided in *eternally impossible* ("if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bike") and in *possible in the past*, which can be further specified in *depending on human action* ("If I had not eaten red meat, I would not have developed

cancer") and in *not depending on human action* ("If there had been no earthquake, my house would be intact"). The classification of irrealis is shown in Fig. 39;



Figure 39. *Irrealis* and their classification.

In short, when the antecedents concern future, we face a case of *irrealis*; whereas when the antecedents (alternatives) deal with the past, then we face a counterfactual proper, as it is when we utter "it might have been…". In this case we deal with things that were possible in the past but that have not been realized. On the one hand, if the possibility of realizing a certain unrealized state of affairs depends on human action, then one may experience regret, which is given by one's possibility (and subsequent responsibility) of taking a certain course of action and not having taken it. On the other hand, if the possibility of realizing a certain unrealized state of affairs does not depend on the human action, then one may experience disappointment, which is provoked by external factors that interfere with one's goals.

Folk psychology considers thoughts concerning unrealized states of affairs as strongly connected with negative emotional consequences. Indeed, people who ruminate on possible states of affairs that never were, that is on counterfactual alternatives of past experiences, are condemned to suffer from an experience of grief and of irreducible loss due to the fact that what has been lost cannot be recovered anymore, as it is clear in the well-known utterance of a sonnet belonging to the 'The house of life' by Dante Gabriel Rossetti "Look in my face; my name is Might have been; I am also called No-more, Too-late, Farewell" (The House of life: 97, 1870).

This topic is often to be found in literary narratives such as in Flaubert's Madame Bovary ("if only Madame Bovary had not married the boring Charles Bovary…") and in Rostand's Cyrano ("if only Cyrano had had enough courage to declare himself to Roxanne")[40]. The most illustrious words on that topic have been written by the poet and essayst John Greenleaf Whittier in his poem 'Maud Muller' in 1898: "For all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these: 'it might have been'". In philosophy the ambiguous and criptic function of counterfactuality has also been studied; the term counterfactual itself was coined by the philosopher Nelson Goodman (Goodman 1947). Goodman's words below point at the core of counterfactuals, namely they make it clear that counterfactuals' antecedents did not occur:

> "Let us confine ourselves to those in which antecedent and consequent are inalterably false-as, for example, when I say of a piece of butter that was eaten yesterday, and that had never been heated, *If that piece of butter had been heated to 150 F., it would have melted*. Considered as truth-functional compounds, all counterfactuals are of course true, since their antecedents are false. Hence *If that piece of butter had been heated to 150 F., it would not have melted would also hold*. Obviously, something different is intended, and the problem is to define the circumstances under which a given counterfactual holds while the opposing conditional with the contradictory consequent fails to hold. And this criterion of truth must be set up in the face of the fact that a counterfactual by its nature can never be subjected to any direct empirical test by realizing its antecedent." (Goodman 1970: 4)

It is only in recent times that social psychology has examined this topic indepth; one strand of research has highlighted how negative emotions give rise to counterfactual reasoning, whereas another strand of research has shown that counterfactual reasoning

[40] For more details see Flaubert (1857/1950) and Rostand (1898/1971).

may have beneficial effects in terms of suggesting better choices on future courses of action (Roese 1997). In the present dissertation I will follow the path traced by this strand of research that argues in favor of the fact that "short-term negative affect may be offset by inferential benefits that may aid the individual on a longer term basis" (Roese 1997: 133). Indeed, counterfactual reasoning is often used as a reply to negative occurences that one would like to change; in this circumstances corrective thought would be very advantageous.

In counterfactual reasoning a crucial factual result usually represents the basis for the counterfactual hypothesis (*i.e.* Madame Bovary's boredom and Cyrano's anxiety). Later, an agent can simulate a change of some factual antecedent (for example Madame Bovary could have considered what would have happened if she had not married Charles; Cyrano could have considered what would have happened if he would have had the courage to declare himself to Roxanne) and evaluate the effects of that modification. Therefore, counterfactuals consist usually in conditional propositions; indeed, they are composed by an antecedent and a consequent (for example if Madame Bovary had not married a boring husband, she would have been more content; if Cyrano had tried to seduce Roxanne, he might have felt more realized). In particular, a proposition can be defined as counterfactual when its antecedent is false (Goodman 1983). By contrast, the consequent might or might not be false; in the case that the consequent is false, the change of the antecedent invalidates the factual result. Most of the examples of counterfactual reasoning that I analyse in my case studies concern alternative versions of the past, so I will refer to counterfactuals as to negations of established facts and not to present states.

One effective categorization of counterfactuals relies on their direction of comparison (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and McMullen 1993; McMullen, Markman and Gavanski 1995; Roese 1994). Counterfactual reasoning can assume alternative hypothesis that are judged to be better than reality (*i.e.*, *upward counterfactuals*) or that can be judged worse alternatives than reality (*i.e*., *downward counterfactuals*). For instance, when John rethinks to his exam, he may assume that it might have been better (*e.g.* If I had studied more, I would have got a better grade- upward counterfactual reasoning) or that it might have been worse than reality (*e.g.* If had not studied this topic

that the Professor has asked me, I would have failed the exam- downward counterfactuality). The direction of counterfactual reasoning is very important because it determines the function played by this type of reasoning in terms of future planning of course of action. On the one hand, upward counterfactual reasoning without rumination suggests "causal conclusions that illuminate paths to future success" (Roese 1997: 133), as I will show in Chapter 10, whereas downward counterfactual reasoning evokes relief and does not create a stimulus for the continuation of the discussion, as I will show in Chapter 11 (subsection 11.5). I will show two case studies in which it is evident that counterfactuals with these two distinct directions of comparison create the conditions appropriate for two different discussion outcomes. Following some scholars, upward counterfactual thoughts entail or incarnate causal conclusions that tend to offer fruitful instructions for efficient coming action (M. K. Johnson and Sherman 1990; Roese 1994); this is consistent with what can be observed in my corpus. To illustrate, imagine that the journalist XY has published a news item with an unattractive layout and then realizes that he would have produced a more attractive layout if only he had used another layout, he has pinpointed a causally powerful antecedent that might be consequently used to improve prospective behavior. Roese (1997) stresses that this kind of comparisons are well attested in the socio-psychological literature:

> Indeed, as it is known from socio-psychological literature, upward social comparisons (i.e. comparisons of self with a better-off other) are shown to yield negative affect but also positive motivational and informational effects (Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Taylor et al. 1990; Wood 1989), whereas downward social comparisons (i.e. with a worse-off other) have been theorized to fulfill self-enahncement goals because such comparisons, like downward counterfactual comparisons with a hypothetical worse state of affairs, may evoke positive affect via a contrast effect. (Roese 1997: 134).

Upward counterfactual reasoning and downward counterfactual reasoning have two opposed evaluative polarities and the consequent is always false: however, there is also indifferent counterfactual reasoning, in which the consequent may is indifferent, such as "if I had studied more, the result would have been the same". In the contextual domain of the newsroom editorial conference, the counterfactual reasoning's direction of simulation strongly influences the argumentative discussion at stake. On the one side, upward

counterfactual reasoning is productive, since it gives rise to a discussion that deepens other topics and invites journalists to sift through other options and solutions: it is strongly bound to future deliberative decision-making. On the other side, downward counterfactual thought is unproductive, since it does not give rise to a fruitful prosecution of the discussion, but rather it acts in order to confirm the conclusion already reached. Downward counterfactual reasoning is bound to an interaction scheme in which someone must justify what he has done, it is an interaction scheme of justification, it deals to adjudicate and establish who was right and who was wrong. I will show two case studies (see 11.5), in which downward counterfactual reasoning has appeared in the final part of the argumentative discussion, complementing and confirming what has been said before.

8.2 The main triggers of counterfactual reasoning

In order to understand the function of counterfactuals, it is necessary to understand the factors that may activate them. Apparently, spontaneous downward counterfactuals are produced very rarely, whereas upward counterfactuals are produced more often; a study of Roese and Olson (Roese and Olson 1997) has found out that only 10% of the spontaneously registered counterfactuals produced after recent life happenings were downward. This is consistent with the data examined in my dissertation; in spontaneous interactions such as editorial conferences and other types of disourses, journalists used almost only upward counterfactuals; only in guided retrospective interviews, when they were asked to explain what they had done and when they were induced to retroactively imagine an interaction with the audience, they used downward counterfactual reasoning, in order to justify their editorial actions. For instance, during an editorial conference at *CdT* a journalist negatively evaluates a previous item about the old and isolated monastery of Claro and sustains that it would have been better if they had published an item about the more modern monastery of Cademario (for more similar and detailed examples see Chapter 10, sections 11.1 and 11.2). On the contrary, during a retrospective interview, a journalist of *10vor10* says that it would have been wrong to put a quotation in a previous

moment because if he had done this, he would have caused a wrong attitude of expectancy (for more similar and detailed examples see 7.5, 8.3.2, 8.4, 9.5).

According to the psychological literature (Roese 1997; Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014), three are the main activators of counterfactual reasoning, namely negative emotions, expectations and closeness: in what follows I will explain them in details.

One of the main factors that lead to activate upward counterfactual thinking are negative emotions. Negative emotions foster counterfactual reasoning (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 2000) and Roese has observed that negative emotion are "the chief determinant of the mere activation of counterfactual processing" (Roese 1997: 135, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 17). Furthermore, Baumeister *et alii* (2007) suggest that the main function of very intense emotions is not to directly influence behavior. Put in Castelfranchi's words, "emotions serve as a stimulus to cognitive processing (about the situation, one's own and others' mental attitudes and recent behavior), thus facilitating a more advantageous future behavior" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2016: 17-18).

The second factor that induces the activation of upward counterfactual reasoning are violated expectations (e.g. Roese and Olson 1995a; Sanna and Turley 1996). Expectations always imply a goal. In particular, positive expectations, especially when undoubted and imagined for a long time induce *"a view of the implied goal in terms of maintainance*" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2002; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). Put in Castelfranchi and Miceli's words, positive expectations contain the prelude of the desirable imagined event and connected contentedness (Elster and Loewenstein 1992; Miceli and Castelfranchi 1997), and therefore an *in nuce* fictive accomplishment of the goal is already present in them. The achievement of the goal is perceived as if it was already given, "*maintained"*, rather than "*acquired"*, as Castelfranchi and Miceli put it (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). When the positive expectation is invalidated, one suffers a form of grief due to the loss of the fictively already reached contentedness, as I have said in Chapter 5 about anticipation (for more details see page 132). Thus, disappointment will be bound with a sense of injustice. Indeed, as it is known from literature, two distinct forces are at stake in the formation of the perceived in the sense of injustice; since expectations are formed by a prediction plus a goal (Castelfranchi and

Miceli 2014: 41), on the one hand, there is the 'probabilistic force' usual in predictions, and on the other hand, there is the 'motivational force' typical of goals (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 43). The conjunction of the probabilistic force plus a motivational force gives rise to a normative force. When one forms an expectation about a future state of affairs, the imagined future state of affairs is not perceived anymore as something that should happen because it habitually happens, but as something that must compulsorily happen. As Castelfranchi and Miceli put it,

> because a maintenance goal tends to be implicitly viewed as grounded on some right, and a positive expectation favors a representation of the implied goal as a maintenance one, people are likely to feel entitled to obtain what they expect, and perceive a sort of right infringement when their positive expectations are invalidated (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64).

Applied to counterfactuals, this means that when one anticipates something that "might have been" but that has not been, one experiences the desirable imagined event as real and therefore one fictively reaches the desirable goal; the contrary to facts antecedent is therefore fictively experienced as accomplished and the invalidation of the already reached goal produces a feeling of loss and infringement. When we face a disappointing and unexpected outcome, we will probabily compare it with 'what might have been' according to the initial expectation.

A distinction can be made following Castelfranchi and Miceli between disconfirmed predictions and disconfirmed expectations. In the case of disconfirmed predictions "not only the 'what *might* have been' but also the 'what *should* epistemically have been' path is followed" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64). Differently, when disconfirmed positive expectations (predicitons plus goals) are at stake, "not only the 'what might have been' and the 'what should have been', but also the 'what ought to have been'path is followed" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 64).

This cognitive phenomenon may be bound to the so-called *counterfactual fallacy*. According to Miller and Turnbull (1990) the counterfactual fallacy consists in a natural disposition of the human mind, that is based on turning 'what might have been' into 'what ought to have been' (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 65). Therefore, violated expectations may often produce disappointment, regret and other emotions, mainly negative emotions.

In the empirical part of the thesis, I will show some case studies in which it is evident that journalists' disconfirmed expectations produce regret (see Chapters 9 and 10).

In Chapter 10 I will show a case (codenamed BEBE), in which a *CdT* journalist's invalidated expectation about the way in which a news piece should be handled produces regret. According to the editorial guidelines of *CdT* news items should be written with an emotional and empathic attitude and all journalists have the professional duty to follow the editorial guidelines. Nevertheless, an important news piece about an abandoned baby has been handled by the editorial team in a 'cold' way without empathy, even though there was the active possibility of producing the news in an empathic and emotional way, following editorial guidelines. The case study is all focused on the journalist's regret. In a similar way, in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9) journalists' upward counterfactual reasoning is caused by a disconfirmed expectation that leads them to experience regret as well as a sense of injustice.

Another important activator of upward countefactual reasoning is closeness (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson 1996). Closeness points at the perceived proximity to the achievement of a goal; the more one agent was close to the achievement of a goal, the more he had the possibility to act in order to realize the goal. Therefore, closeness is an activator of counterfactual reasoning, since it points at the active possibility of having carried out an action that has not been carried out. For instance, for a PhD student that has to deliver his PhD thesis and that has not been able to respect the deadline, a deadline missed by 2 days will probably produce more easily upward counterfactual thoughts than the same deadline missed by 9 months. Indeed, closeness is bound to the possibility of action and regret may be experienced when one possibile action could have changed the actual and worse state of affairs. With reference to this point, it is interesting to notice that, in an interaction between two agents, counterfactuals that are too far from the possible achievement of the goal are often refused, since they are perceived as irrelevant and unuseful for future decisions. For instance, consider the idiom "if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bike", that is often used in everyday discussions (note that we used this sentence earlier as an example of eternally impossible counterfactual). This idiom is often a critical reaction to a too far counterfactual, namely

to a counterfactual that is perceived as irrelevant since it does not have a sufficient closeness. For example, if Leonella says to Alberto that it would have been better that they had bought four houses instead of having bought only one small house, and if they had no money for buying even a second house, Alberto may refuse Leonella's counterfactual and say "if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bike", therefore implying that there was no possibility at all to buy four houses. If one agent wants to persuade another to consider and evaluate a choice, the degree of closeness is very important and one should produce a counterfactual with the possibly highest degree of closeness; therefore, with reference to our example, in order to persuade Alberto, Leonella should have used a counterfactual that was closer to the possibility of the achievement of the goal, such as "it would have been better if we had bought one bigger house". In this way, Leonella will probably lead Alberto to reconsider the choice that they have made.

Also the effect of closeness on counterfactual triggering is useful; indeed, it seems sensible "to focus on near misses rather than far misses because they probably represent a more efficient locus for future improvement" (Roese 1997: 137). In order to reach a goal that has failed for a very small distance or amount, it will be necessary to make only very small and precise changes to make it as successful or effective as it should be.

From a psychological point of view negative emotions, violated positive expectations and closeness have been indicated by Roese as antecendents that enable counterfactual reasoning's activation, whereas from a pragmatic point of view these features can be considered the pragmatic and argumentative felicity conditions of counterfactual reasoning. Until now I have focused on the determinants of the counterfactuals' activation. In the next sub-section I will look at the determinants of counterfactual content.

8.3 The main determinants of counterfactual content: normativity and controllability

In the previous sub-section I illustrated the factors that trigger counterfactual reasoning. At this point, since counterfactual processing may focus on an almost countless set of antecedents, I focus on the issue of how an agent chooses the antecendent. The agent will

choose the antecedent on the basis of proximity to existing norms and controllability, which are two features of closeness. An antecedent is chosen and it is then reshaped in some way; this modification is the instrument by which the crucial outcome is 'invalidated' (Roese 1997: 137). For instance, if Jane has metastatis in the whole body, she might confront his actual bad medical situation, mentally undoing his bad situation by having chosen another doctor (if only I had gone to that other famous physician) or by changing his choice on the therapy (if only I had chosen that other new chemotherapy), or by having made cancer prevention with preventive screenings (if only I had done a sonography some months before). All these alterations proceed to the same consequent ("then my medical situation would be much better and maybe I would not have metastasis"). At this point we may wonder which one of the many alternatives will she choose and on which basis. Which alternative will represent the starting point for a counterfactual reasoning?

There are very salient antecedents, such as norms: one chooses a norm as a privileged antecedent due to the fact that one has an expectation that is right and/or normal to follow norms both from an epistemic as well as from deontic point of view. Indeed, as it is known from literature, one of the main determinants of counterfactual content are existing norms (Kahnemann & Miller 1986). Indeed, counterfactuals' content reiterates normality (Roese 1997: 137). That is, divergences from established norms or expected behavior usually give rise to counterfactual reasoning; counterfactual content eliminates the divergence and brings back the situation to a 'normal' *status*. In case that Jane's choice to go to that physician was very atypical (for instance if all other patients with Jane's pathology choose the other famous physician), then this antecedent should be the preferred way of departing from neglect reality: If only Jane had gone to that other famous phyisican where all other patients with her pathology go, she would have had a better medical condition. Copious experiments support the claim that counterfactual content is due to experienced normality (e.g. Kahnemann & Miller 1986; Kahnemann and Tversky 1982; Miller, Turnbull, & Mcfarland 1990; and Wells et al., 1987). In case that an anomaly from a norm is retrieved, the anomaly is eliminated and a normal state is restablished in the

resulting counterfactual reasoning: on the basis of the choice of the antecedent there is a reasoning from efficient cause.

This way of reasoning based on the re-establishement of normativity, conceived as normality, gives rise also to another main determinant of counterfactual content; due to the fact that *the normal (regular) course of action* is what we usually have in mind, and that *actions that diverge from the norm* may be conceived as brusque divergences, then actions that diverge from the norm might incarnate counterfactual content to a bigger amount than normal (regular) courses of action.

A figure/ ground relationship is at stake in the choice of the antecedent; indeed, agents will often choose as antecedents those elements that are part of the figure and not of the ground of the considered frame, *i.e.* elements that are characterized by closeness, by a minimal shift from reality. For instance, if there has been a scandal at the University of Messina due to a Professor's public speech, it will be easier to say "if Professor X would not have held that speech, there wouldn't have been any scandal" rather than saying "if this would not be a University, there wouldn't have been any scandal". Put it in semantic terms, one agent will construct a counterfactual on the basis of a background that diverges as little as possible from stable structures of reality. From a psychological point of view, we can say that when one agent constructs a counterfactual he will attempt to alter those aspects of reality that appear as unusual and that mostly diverge from normality.

Another crucial element that determines the choice of the counterfactual's content is the controllability of the antecedent. Since antecedents that are capable of being controlled are alterable in an easier way than antecedents that are not controllable, "people are more likely to make mental alterations to features that can be directly manipulated" (Miller et al. 1990; N'gbala & Branscombe 1995; Roese 1997: 137). Moreover, a study by Girotto, Legrenzi and Rizzo (1991), using stories regarding a travel from work to home that is interrupted by different occurrences, has shown that counterfactual changes focused on events that could have been controlled (for example delaying for meeting a friend) rather than on those that could not be controlled (for example delaying for being stuck in the traffic due to an unannounced demonstration).

In short, counterfactual thoughts focus on actions that can be directly controlled by individuals: these actions are even more in foreground. More specifically, they focus on actions that could have been subjectively manouvred to avoid the result at issue (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & Ellard, 1996; Mandel & Lehman 1996). It is exactly the fact that counterfactual reasoning center on inner intentions and on behaviors that can be controlled that mostly explains their function: indeed, these kinds of antecedent events are the ones that are maximally useful for leading to better future outcomes by choosing more fruitful states of affairs (Weiner 1986).

8.4 A theoretical reflection on the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and loci

Counterfactual reasoning and all its related psychological consequences are due to two basic mental processes: "contrast effects and causal inference" (Roese 1997: 140). Concerning contrast effects, they arise when a judgement is emphasized by comparing a state of affairs with some reference coordinates or standard state of affairs (Sherif & Hovland 1961). For instance, if a Professor examinates a normally intelligent student, he will judge him as less intelligent than what he actually is, by contrast, if the Professor has just examined a highly-gifted student. Likewise, "a factual outcome may be judged worse if a more desirable alternative outcome is salient and better if a less desirable outcome is salient" (Roese 1997: 140). Which consequences do these contrast effects have? First of all, they strongly determine affective experiences if the counterfactual option is evidently better or worse in comparison to reality. Upward counterfactual reasoning may easily generate regret (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014), whereas downward counterfactual reasoning may easily generate relief (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014). Secondly, counterfactual contrast effects guide social judgements, which are influenced by the affect implied in the contrast. For instance, in judgements involving people's victimization, considering that an accident that has caused a victim could have been avoided represents a crucial upward-comparison standard, inducing to conceive the accident even more negative and distressing. As a whole, we can say that contrast effects act when

counterfactual points of reference represent better or worse state of affairs. These points of references may then cause an extremization of the consequent affective and judgemental responses (Roese 1997: 140). The psychologist Roese has claimed that the contrast-effect mechanism mainly produces or fosters negative emotions, and that, on the contrary, causal inferences mainly have beneficial effects (Roese 1997: 141). Thanks to the analysis of counterfactual reasoning via AMT I will show that this is not the case and that the discriminating feature is the comparison of 'what could have made a difference in reaching a goal', resulting from the final causal inference, with what has been chosen; a better or worse alternative that is evaluated as positive or negative with reference to a given value system of a given social community. In the case of the newsroom implicit and explicit editorial norms are at stake. The comparison of 'what could have made a difference' with a better alternative 'that has not been chosen' causes negative emotions that may nevertheless illuminate future planning (upward counterfactual reasoning), whereas the comparison of 'what could have made a difference' with a worse alternative 'that has been avoided' causes positive emotions that may eventually produce self-enhancement and confirmation of one's convinction. Therefore, contrast effects and causal inferences can be said to be strictly interdependent mechanisms at stake in counterfactual reasoning.

We have seen how violated expectations, negative emotions and divergence from norms may easily generate the thought of 'how things might otherwise have been'. Therefore, counterfactual reasoning let people imagine hypothetical situations and alternative realities; hypothetical situations, being they a subtype of virtual situations, are strictly bound with extrinsic *loci*, namely "all those *loci* that that are bound to the standpoint through a relation of alternativity" (Greco Morasso 2011: 131). Counterfactual reasoning involves on *extrinsic loci*[41], since relationships in which a difference could have produced a better or worse outcome are at stake. As I have said in Chapter 4.3, according to AMT, the category of *extrinsic loci* relies on the linguistic category of paradigmatic relations, namely relations *in absentia*. In this category, all *loci* are regrouped that refer to the comparison of one or more alternative possible worlds, such as *locus from opposition*

[41] Extrinsic loci are called paradigmatic loci by Eddo Rigotti.

based on different types of opposition, *locus from analogy*, *locus from alternatives*, *locus from all the more and all the less*, *locus from termination and setting up*.

When counterfactual reasoning is at stake, however also a causal inference is always produced; therefore, in terms of AMT, a locus from efficient cause is applied in all cases of counterfactual thought, in which the causal-reasoning implications stem from the connection of antecedent with the end result within a counterfactual conditional. More specifically, this connection may evoke a causal reasoning involving 'something that *makes a difference* in the result of an outcome and that has not been carried out'. For example, Margaret is persuaded that if her mother, who has died for a pancreatic cancer, had never eaten red meat (which is widespread acknowledged as being cancirogenic), she wuold still be alive today. In this case 'not eating red meat' is a cause that may (or is believed to) 'make a difference' in terms of preventing cancer. This causal inference is necessary for the subsequent mental reasoning applied in counterfactual reasoning, namely a mental operation of contrast, in the shape of a locus from alternatives in both types of counterfactual reasoning.

8.5 Upward counterfactual reasoning and regret

In view of the forthcoming case studies, it is important to highlight the connection between upward counterfactual reasoning and the complex emotion of regret. Regret presupposes a counterfactual reasoning, since it is not possible to experience regret for a being that is not able to make complex mental representations such as counterfactuality. It is known from literature that "regret is a counterfactual emotion that heavily relies on comparison processes" (Zeelenberg & Pieters 2007: 5). The reason of regret is "a bad decision in that, according to the agent's counterfactual thinking, some alternative was available which would have led to a better outcome" (Castelfranchi & Miceli 2014: 88).

Regret implies at least two mutually exclusive goals, one of each has been selected (among two or more possibilities) and converted into an intention (put into practice in the shape of a course of action) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88). The agent has

transformed a possibility into an intention and then in an action thanks to a positive expectation about the accessibility and opportuneness of the goal. As stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli,

> convenience implies that the costs of intention p's pursuit and achievement (including negative side effects of *p*'s realization as well as of the possible renunciation to other goals) are supposed to be lower than the benefits it can provide. In addition, when a comparison with alternative goals is involved, *p* is assumed to be more convenient than such other goals (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88).

Nevertheless, after a consideration made *a posteriori*, the initial positive expectation is undone or weakened; the discarded goal is re-evaluated and judged as either more accessible or more appropriate and convincing compared with the one that has been effectively adopted and with the result to which it has led.

Therefore, regret presupposes a situation in which, once a particular alternative has been chosen, it is no longer possible or convenient to invalidate it, that is in cases in which one has 'missed the boat' for choosing the alternative goal: indeed, if that could be the case, it would be easy to carry out the discarded goal without regret or with less regret. However, "that choice can be viewed as unmodifiable not only when the intention has already been pursued, but also when the conditions for unattainability or convenience of the alternative goal no longer apply" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 89).

To experience regret it is not necessary that the alternative goal is active, *i.e.* present in the individual's mind at the moment of the choice. It happens frequently that one alterantive goal is not explicitly rejected, but rather that it is simply *overlooked*. In these cases no actual choice between the two depicted alternatives has occurred at the time of the intention formation. However, an agent may take into account a possible alternative *q* in a subsequent moment, which may then be preferred to *p* (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 89). For instance, Elisa regrets having studied cultural heritage, whereas she might have become a good pedagogue, even though when she chose the degree course 'cultural heritage' she didn't even consider the possibility of studying pedagogy. Elisa is considering it now, since she cannot find a permanent job. She regrets having disregarded the option of becoming a pedagogue, even though at the time of choosing the degree course she did not take into account that option.

Anyway, "what matters for feeling regret is that the individual represents- even *a posteriori*, the situation as a choice" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 89). If one agent returns to the time when the intention was constructed and retrospectively takes into account alternative goals (that were possible at the time of the choice), and *now* favours one of those options, he may experience regret.

At this stage of the literature review on regret, it should be clear that regret may arise only if an agent assumes that two or more alternatives were available in the moment in which the intention was formed. Regret strictly builds upon the accessibility of counterfactual options (e.g. Seta et al. 2008).

Another focal component of regret, presupposed by the concept of choice is the self-ascribed responsibility for one's decision. Indeed, one cannot feel responsible for his choices if he believes that he could have not contemplated some alternative during the decision-making process. There are distinct degrees of regret: regret is experienced in a more intense way when there was an active possibility of making a choice that is considered more desirable *a posteriori*; on the contrary, when there was only an abstract possibility, the experience of regret is less intense. Subsequently, we can say that if a possibility was not active at the time of the choice, it is more difficult that one attributes himself responsibilities.

The function played by responsibility in regret has been highlighted in recent psychological contributions (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Regret correlates with the agent's possibility of controlling a situation and with the perception that some actions may be self-generted (self-agency) (Frijda et al.1989; van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2002). Furthermore, regret may be correlated with feelings of self-blame, which is the cognitive processs in which an individual attributes the occurrence of a bad event to oneself: the agent may easily reflect on his error may desire to remedy by invalidating his choice (e.g. Roseman et. al. 1994; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead et al. 1998: quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91).

Three are the types of responsibility at stake when one agent regards himself as responsible for a bad or suboptimal outcome that provokes regret. Firstly, an agent may experience a causal responsibility since *a)* he caused the bad or suboptimal outcome in an

explicit or implicit way. Secondly, an agent may experience a goal responsibility, since *b)* he had "the goal or intention proper of causing it" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91) Thirdly, *c)* if the agent did not have the goal of causing the outcome, at least he had the "the power to predict or prevent it (avoidance responsibility) but omitted (that is, did not have the goal) to do so" (Miceli 1992; quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91). Avoidance responsibility is a very important factor in regret. Indeed, put into Castelfranchi and Miceli's words:

> whereas one does not typically have the goal of obtaining a bad (or less than optimal) outcome, it is more common that one self attributes responsibility with respect to a further goal, namely that of bypassing the negative or suboptimal implications of one's choice whenever one has the power to do so, lest one is regarded as responsible of careless and negligence (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91).

The self-blame that is correlated with regret is focused on credences such as 'I should have considered that alternative chance' or 'I should have foreseen the negative (or sub-optimal) repercussions of my decision'. From this viewpoint, regret entails "a mistake by omission, as long as one considers the moment when the choice has been made" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 91).

In particular, in regret one feels responsible because one perceives himself as able to avoid the outcome, and to choose a better alternative. More specifically, one important feature of regret is the need for 'utility maximization' (Schwartz et al. 2002). One agent may feel regret even after reaching a positive result (such as a having passed an exam), in case that he is convincted that he could have had a better result by choosing another alternative (such as getting a higher grade by studying more) (Carmon and Ariely 2000). This pinpoints at Gabriel Rossetti's unrealized foregone, and the convinction that one should have done '*q* rather than *p*' is the core of regret. In Figure 40, taken from Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 92) we can see the genesis of regret arising from the decision-making process;



Figure 40. The genesis of regret in the decision-making process (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 92).

8.6 Downward counterfactual reasoning and relief

In view of the forthcoming case studies, it is important to highlight the connection between downward counterfactual reasoning and relief. If regret is clearly correlated with upward counterfactual reasoning, relief can be said to be strictly bound to downward counterfactual reasoning. Indeed, if regret is elicited by invalidated positive anticipatory reasoning and invalidated positve expectations, relief is often elicited by invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning and by invalidated negative expectations. When one individual imagines a foregone worse alternative and thinks to 'what might have been', he experiences relief. But what is relief? Generally speaking, relief is when one feels a decrease in (physical or psychological) affliction. Nevertheless, a more composite type of relief can occur: the emotion produced by an invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning or by an invalidated negative expectation, that Castelfranchi and Miceli label anticipation-based relief (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 102). I will focus on anticipation-based relief, since this is the type of relief generated by downward counterfactual reasoning that I have found in editorial conferences and in retrospective verbal protocols. A correlation exists between relief produced by the avoidance of an unpleasant experience and downward counterfactual reasoning (Sweeny and Vohs 2012). According to Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014), the cognitive primary elements of anticipation-based relief are an "anticipatory belief (either a belief of possibility or a prediction proper about a future event) and a goal (or intention), followed by the invalidation of the original expectation" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 104). Anticipation-based relief originates from a negative invalidated anticipatory reasoning or from a negative invalidated expectation; there is always a more or less clear contrast between the affliction faced in a previous moment and the ongoing state of affairs in which the feeling of affliction has decreased. In anticipation-based relief, the core of the comparison is centered on the divergence between the ongoing state of affairs, namely "what is" and an anticipated negative one that has not actually taken place but that is only imagined, namely that "might have been". Differently, in basic relief the two compared states of affairs concern the ongoing situation, namely "what is", and a past actual situation that has taken place, namely "what has been". In case of anticipation-based relief derived from downward counterfactual reasoning, there is always a *retrospective* anticipatory representation. For instance, when Sara, who is walking alone by night in a

desert street in Detroit and is insulted by some drunk strangers, realizes that she might have been raped, she feels retrospective fear, implying the negative anticipatory reasoning concerning the "possible rape" together with the goal "not to be raped", and subsequently experiences retrospective relief (given by the invalidation of the negative anticipatory reasoning "thanks God it did not occur!"). Relief experienced in retrospect implies a simulation of the anticipatory reasoning, by going back to the time when it could have been developed. Applied to the newsroom, anticipation-based relief is often perceived by journalists when they anticipate a fictive unrealized alternative of having broadcasted or published items producing a bad or sub-optimal impact on the audience, as it is the cases in downward counterfactual reasoning producing relief in retrospective verbal protocols and in editorial conferences. For example, journalists may experience relief when they have opted for an editorial choice that has enabled not to damage the audience and when there was the possibility to opt for that choice, that however has been avoided.

8.7 Counterfactual reasoning in the newsmaking domain.

What is the role of counterfactual reasoning in journalism and, more precisely in newsroom activities and in news items?

To answer this question I will take inspiration from an existing analysis of counterfactuality and irrealis in a specific kind of media discourse. Gaik (1992) examines possible worlds in a very specific mediatized genre "talk show therapy". An example of how certain kinds of epistemic possibility and conditionality are functional to the goals of an activity type can be found in Gaik's paper on possible worlds in radio talk-show therapy (Gaik 1992). By observing this mixed kind of therapeutic discourse, in which listeners call in during a radio talk show for a short therapy session with a psychotherapist, Gaik discovered that the therapeutic intervention of the psychotherapist within the "talk-show therapy" activity type can be arranged following two very different interaction schemes in terms of model of communication in context, which are at stake in usual psychotherapeutic contexts: *therapy* and *counseling*. In the therapy interaction scheme, the doctor attemps to bypass "any prescriptive or directive role – in the interest of motivating the patient into

further introspection, self analysis and eventual autonomy" (Gaik 1992: 276). Counseling, on the contrary, is an interaction scheme that deals to furnish *advice*: "What shall I do?" is the typical issue of this interaction scheme. The psychoterapists' and the patient's shared goal is therefore to answer this question and the psychotherapist has the role –and the duty- of carefully guiding the patient in answering this question.

Gaik notices that certain types of epistemic possibility and conditionality, which he calls irrealis, deal to improve the therapy: they "present the caller with alternative hypotheses about the sources of his or her anxiety" (Gaik 1992: 279) and give incentive to further introspection. On the contrary, irrealis are not used in the counseling interaction scheme, since they are not functional to answer practical issues.

A parallel can be drawn between this situation and the newsmaking context. In the next empirical chapters I will show how counterfactual reasoning may be functional to this context and its different interaction schemes. For example, the use of counterfactual reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences seems to be functional to the goals of the activity type at stake. In fact, counterfactuals may be seen as markers of the subtype of editorial discussion 'evaluative editorial conference'; thus, they are employed to change the interaction scheme within an editorial conference: they signal the switch from the interaction scheme 'deliberation' to 'evaluation' or viceversa. I will also show the very distinct functions of upward counterfactual reasoning and downward counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom.

In Sections 9, 10 and in sub-sections 11.1-11.2 I will show two case studies in which journalists apply upward counterfactual reasoning and experience regret. In one case of study regret seems to be productive and to remedy to the previous mistake by applying the counterfactual unrealized alternative by analogy in future similar situations (BEBE case in Chapter 10). On the contrary, in the TEMPO case in Section 9 I will show a case of detrimental regret, namely of regret that does not have beneficial and productive effects, since there is no possibility to apply the foregone counterfactual alternative in a future similar situation. In sub-sections 11.5, 11.6 and 11.7 I show two case studies of downward counterfactual reasoning.

9. The framing implications of anticipating emotive uptake: from editorial conference to news item

9.1 The rethorical aspect of journalists' anticipation of audience emotions

In the previous Chapter I have introduced the theoretical foundations of counterfactuality in view of the present and of the forthcoming case studies. Indeed, if in the previous analyzed case study (JUGE case) counterfactual reasoning played a minor role. In the case study[42] illustrated in this Chapter it plays a crucial role. The anticipation of "what might have been" is discussed in an excited way in the editorial conference and is chosen by the journalists as the *leitmotiv* of the news piece to be broadcasted. In the case studies that I will analyze in Chapters 10 and 11 the role of counterfactual reasoning will be even more evident.

Here counterfactual reasoning is intertwined with the anticipation of audience's emotive uptake (for more details see Chapter 8), which represents the most prominent type of anticipation of audience uptake in the newsroom. Its peculiarities depend on the object of anticipation, namely emotions. In Section 4.2.2 I have underlined the rhetorical dimension of journalists' anticipation; in this Chapter I will show how journalists can decide to frame the news piece on the basis of their anticipatory inferences concerning the possibility to emotionally impact the audience. In short, we can say that audience's emotions are anticipated and predicted in order to be modified through rhetorical means in the news piece: this is a means to persuade people in line with the journalists' opinions, beliefs and value systems and to change or foster their opinions about a reported event. I take into consideration the whole intertextual chain (editorial conference, final news product and writing processes). As previously said, the study of intertextual chains has

[42] The acronym of the case of study under investigation in the official nomenclature of the Project is 'TEMPO CASE'.

been clearly recognized as an important resource for studying the effects of discourse in different contexts of interaction (Krieg-Planque 2009).

9.2 A case of study from Swiss-German tv-journalism: an argumentative analysis of an intertextual chain

On the 8th December 2006 the Swiss-German tv-program *10vor10* broadcasted a "bad news" item about a girl run over by a car running too fast in a suburban area. As I have said in Chapter 7, *10vor10* is not a prototypical news reporting program, but rather it can be classified as "infotainment", inbetween a news reporting genre and an entertainment genre. As a consequence of that, journalists at the same time have the duty of being interesting and exciting as well as informative, as specified in the program's mandate.

The program is characterized by two distinc types of journalistic voices. Martin and White (2005: 173) distinguish between a reporter voice and a writer voice. The first is either a voice without authorial "unmediated inscribed judgement", or a voice in which, if there is some judgement, this is attributed to an external source (such as interviews to experts). The writer voice involves some kind of inscribed authorial judgement. These two distinct types of voices are co-present in the program *10vor10*, even though the reporter voice is predominant. We might hypothesize that the anticipation of the audience emotive uptake becomes prominent, since it enables to overcome the limits imposed by the genre of news reporting and it enables to adopt rhetorical constructions that entertain the audience.

The newsmaking interaction data on which I will focus consists of the extract of an editorial conference at *10vor10* (sf_zvz_061208_1000_redaktionskonferenz_ discourse_1.doc, lines [0042-0714]). From the point of view of the activity type, I consider an editorial conference as an activity type. According to the model of context, the interaction field of this activity type is at a wide level *SRG* and at a closer level of zooming the program *10vor10*. In particular, the editorial conference under investigation is an evaluative editorial conference, since the interaction scheme is evaluation; more specifically, the object of evaluation of the editorial conference at stake is whether it is

positive or not to broadcast the news item highlighting or not a crucial detail of the accident.

The discussion took place on the 8th of December 2006, starting at 10.00 am. The whole editorial conference lasts 56:13 minutes. The participants to the editorial conference are the producer (P), the editor in chief (R) and other eight journalists (X1 to X8). I will focus on a part of the editorial conference that concerns a polylogue, namely a many-to many discussion (Lewiński 2010: 101). The participants to the argumentative confrontation include the producer (P), the chief editor (R), and four journalists (X1 to X4). During the editorial conference, journalists start by discussing other events that could become news and then they begin discussing about the girl run over by the car. The discussion concerns the car's speed and the fact that if the driver wuold have gone slower, the accident would not have happened. The girl has been run over by a car that was going 53 km/h: the legal speed limit on that road was of 50 km/h, but the journalists decide to center the news on an invented benchmark corresponding to the speed of 30 km/h (for more details on the speed see Fig. 59). The main issue of the journalists sounds: 'Should we broadcast the news highlighting that the driver was going 40-50 km/h instead of 30 km/h in order to interest and involve the audience? Is this detail crucial or not?'. The standpoint is explicitly expressed by the producer at the beginning of the discussion:

(1)

0441 P: aber ich finde den fall noch interessant
but i think the case is still interesting

0442 eben mit dieser angemessener fahrweise
precisely because of this adjusted manner of driving.

Afterwards, journalists reflect on the way in which they had previously handled this news, as we can read in excerpt (2).

(2)

0518 R: also es steht ein mädchen am strassenrand oder
there is a girl at the border of the street or
0519 wenn ich das richtig sehe
if I see right
0520 J: genau
exactly
0521 R: und dann kommt ein offroader
and then an offroader comes
0522 man hat es damals mehr zu der offroaderproblematik gemacht
it was focussed mostly on the problem oft he offroader
0523 ich würde sagen das ist schon auch ein thema
I would say this is also a topic

Then, the editor in chief, the producer and another journalist say that focusing on the issue of the speed would have been more interesting for the audience, since the accident could have been avoided if the driver had gone slower, as we can read in excerpt (3):

(3)

0524 aber ich würde eher jetzt auf diese geschwindigkeit bringen oder
but i would rather shift the focus on the speed or
0525 J: ja ja
yes yes
0526 R: das finde ich eigentlich noch fast spannender
I think this is even more exciting

0527 also da kommt ein offroader
then here comes an offroader
0528 und kann mit-
and can with-
0529 fährt fünfzig
goes fifty
0530 J: fährt äh dreiundfünfzig bis siebenundfünfzig
goes fiftythree to fiftyseven
0531 R: (xxx)
0532 J: also (xxx)
then
0533 R: fünfundfünfzig oder so
fiftyfive or something like that
0534 J: jaha
yes
0535 R: und wenn er vierzig gefahren wäre
and if he would have gone fourty
0536 hätte er bremsen können
he could have stopped
0537 J: wenn er dreissig gefahren wäre
If he would have gone thirty
0538 hätte er bremsen können
he could have stopped
0539 R: dreissig
thirty
0540 J: ja
yes
0541 X6: mhm
mhm
0542 J: dann wäre er eineinhalb meter vor dem mädchen
then he would have stopped

0543 zum stillstand gekommen
one meter before the girl
0544 R: (xxx)mit dreissig hä
(xxx)with thirty yes
0545 X6: das weiss man aufgrund von bremsspuren und so
this is known from brake traces and so.

However, we can identify another minor issue that can be phrased as: ‘is this event newsworthy or not?’. The intermediate standpoint concerning the validity of the news is explicit ‘the news is interesting because it is newsworthy’ and is explicitly expressed by the journalist R as we can see in line 0562 of the transcription.

(4)

0561 R: also von dort haben wir wirklich gutes material
we have very good material from there

0562 und es ist schon interessant
and it is very interesting

0563 weil allgemeingültig natürlich
because it is universally valid

[…]

0565 ich meine ich wohne ja in einer dreissigerzone
i mean i live in a 30 km/h area

0566 in der einfach ((schüttelt den Kopf))
in which ((shakes the head))

0567 nonstop vierzig und fünfundvierzig gefahren wird

oder nonstop
one drives no-stop fourty and fourty-five

0568 noch mal ein thema (xxx)
that's another theme (xxx)

0569 P: ja
yes

0570 R: an vielen orten oder
in many places

0571 P: ja
yes

0572 J: mhm
mhm

0573 R: an vielen orten wird (xxx) dreissig (xxx)
in many places one drives thirty (xxx)

0574 das könnten wir dann mal allenfalls als geschichte nachziehen
this we could tell as a story

[…]

0577 du siehst überall- überland haben sie radar und so
you see everyone- everywhere they have radar and so

0578 aber in einer dreissigerzone überprüfen
but in an area with speed limit 30 km/h
0579 das tut man nicht
no one checks

In Figure 41 we can see the argumentative reconstruction in support of this intermediate standpoint;



Figure 13. Argumentative reconstruction of the editorial conference: intermediate evaluative standpoint concerning the validity of the news.

Here we notice that an evaluative standpoint concerns the interest of the news: a news is considered to be interesting, since it is a universally valid news, it is a classical

example of news value. The validity of the news is judged on the basis of the value system of the editor in chief, who uses an argument from analogy (1.1.1): indeed, he refers to his personal experience and compares the driving habitude of people living close to him to that of people of the whole world. This argument is supported by another argument that concerns the common usage to drive 40/50 km/h in areas where there is no supervision.

Then, the journalists' discussion revolves on how to evoke the tragedy and produce an emotive impact on the audience: journalists say that the family and the girl have many problems and expenses that they would not have had if the accident had not happened, as we can read in excerpt (5).

(5)

0589 R: aber dann kannst du die tragik davon
but then evoke the tragedy
0590 dass die da so geld haben und probleme
saying that they have money problems
0591 J: mhm
mhm
0592 R: ausgaben haben und probleme
that they have paid and they have problems
0593 weil es niemand finanziert ist natürlich (xxx) oder
because noone finances or
0594 J: mhm
mhm
0595 R: und die krankenkasse würde nur für heilungskosten-
and the health insurance would pay only for cure costs
0596 oder die unfallversicherung von ihnen würde nur-
or the accident insurance would pay only
0597 vorläufig für die heilungskosten aufkommen
for the cure costs
0598 J: mhm

mhm

0599 R: hat es denn noch personal das es braucht

then there is also some personal problems

0600 J: ja nein sie braucht jetzt einfach zum teil eben so so-

yes nos he needs now simply

0601 in kleinklassen muss sie zum teil unterrichtet werden

to stay in small classes

0602 also spezielle schulen

then special schools

0603 sie überlegen sich jetzt auch

they reflect now also

[…]

0608 eben ob sie jetzt in eine privatschule müsse das mädchen

if she has to go in a private school

0609 weil sie hat einfach mühe in der volksschule

because she simply tires herself out

0610 R: mhm

mhm

In particular, journalists compare the good psychophysical conditions of the girl before the accident with her bad conditions after the accident as well as the better economic situation of the family before the accident with the increase of expenses after the accident:

(6)

0611 J: sie hat eben konzentrationschwächen und alles

she has also concentration weaknesses and much more

0612 und äh das das kostet natürlich dann auch wieder

immens geld also-
and this is again very expensiv
0613 R: das hat sie vorher nicht gehabt
this is something that she did not need before
0614 J: die probleme nein also ((schüttelt den Kopf))
these problems no ((shakes the head))
0615 so wie sie sagen sei sie ganz ein normales mädchen sie-
how they say she was a totally normal girl
0616 R: ah soweit bekannt mhm
ah as far as we know
0617 J: mädchen gewesen ja
she was a normal girl yes

The journalists, forming an argumentative coalition, all argue that the girl and the family would not have had these problems if the driver had gone slower:

(7)

0618 R: und das gutachten ist- sagt verkehrstechnisch
And the report is- from a technical point of view
0619 der unfall wäre nicht passiert
that the accident would not have happened
0620 wenn der nicht übersetzt gefahren wäre
if he had not exceeded the limit
0621 J: wenn der mit dreissig gefahren wäre
if he had gone thirty
0622 X6: ja nein (xxx) also ja übersetzt stimmt ja nicht
no then exceeded the limit is not true
0623 J: also mit angepasster geschwindigkeit
then with adjusted speed

Journalists make a contextual framing of the news that should lead the audience to support their standpoint. This operation is known in literature: "contextual framing starting from presentational devices – in the case of written journalism, from the linguistic characterization of an issue – creates cultural premises which are then used by the journalist to support a certain standpoint" (Greco Morasso 2012: 200). The final evaluative standpoint that answers the issue of how to frame the item is supported by many arguments acting on emotions, which are personally experienced by the journalists and then attributed to the audience. In Figure 42 I show the whole argumentative reconstruction of the discussion under investigation:



Figure 42. Argumentative reconstruction of the editorial conference: the final evaluative standpoint concerning interest of the news for the audience.

We notice a coordinative argumentation (1.1a-1-1b), which is further developed in subordinate arguments; the first argumentative line (1.1a) acts on the negative emotions of regret and anger evoked in the audience by countefactuality (for more details on the theory of counterfactuality see Chapter 8), which opens a possible hypothetical positive scenario (the avoidance of the accident), which has not taken place due to the high speed. This argument is further sustained by an argument from authority conveying authoritativeness to the statement (1.1a.1.1). Furthermore, in the whole argumentative reconstruction (Fig. 42) it is evident that journalists attempt to find the best way to maximize the possibility to let the audience experience regret. In the first argumentative line (1.1a) they argue via counterfactual reasoning that the accident would not have happened with a lower speed and in the subordinate arguments they give all the subsequent reasons for that (1.1a.1) by saying that the car would have stopped two meters in front of the girl; furthermore, they put forth an argument from authority (1.1a.1.1) that conveys authoritativeness to the previous statement ("it is known from the report, from brake traces and other things"). In so doing, journalists decide to frame the driver as a daredevil author of the accident, inducing the audience to blame him by paying attention to the presumed mistake that he has made and to the hypothetical belief that he should have considered to go slower. Therefore, they entice a feeling of regret in the audience. In fact, following Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 92) we know that "regret typically implies a mistake by *omission*, as long as one considers the moment in which the choice has been made". What is more, in the second argumentative line (1.1b) journalists argue that the parents and the girl would not have had expenses and problems, therefore inducing the audience to imagine the unrealized hypothetical better scenario. The argument 1.1b, focused on the expenses due to physical and psychological problems caused by the accident is particularly effective in the Swiss German environment, in which economic prosperity is an important and acknowledged value. In Switzerland there are no public health services: on the contrary, private health coverage is mandatory for all those that reside in Switzerland. Health coverage pays for the expenses of medical treatment and hospitalisation of the insured. The Swiss healthcare system is organized in such a way that Swiss are asked to pay for primary health insurance, which pays for various basic cures. Next to the basic

insurance, there is the option to purchase a supplementary insurance, which covers (only partially) some services that are not part of the basic insurance cover such as dental care or free choice of doctor when spending time in hospital. Therefore, with reference to the case study under investigation, the girl's special cures are very expensive, since she needs therapies that are not included in the basic insurance, but that are rather included in the supplementary insurance, that in turn pays only partially for unconventional therapies.

9.2.1 A reflection on counterfactual reasoning and regret

In this argumentation structure (Fig. 42) we observe that counterfactual reasoning triggers a cognitive process called simulation heuristics. The simulation heuristics was recognized by Kahnemann and Tversky in their works on heuristics and on the way in which heuristics support people in complex reasoning by using simple mental procedures (Kahnemann and Tversky 1982). The simulation heuristic represents a type of the availability heuristic that accounts for the reason why humans feel regret and employ counterfactual reasoning. In short, the simulation heuristic concerns the degree of likelihood perceived by an agent concerning the realization of an outcome. The authors maintain that the ease with which you can simulate an outcome "is used to judge the propensity". In a counterfactual assessment, the simulation involves the way in which occurrences would have happened in a distinct manner *if and only if* one element of the situation had been altered. The authors make an example about Nazi Germany: if Nazi Germany had succeded in fabricating the atomic bomb, what would have been result on World War II? (Kahnemann and Tversky 1981). With reference to the case study under investigation, the cognitive mechanism of simulation heuristics causes that the audience imagines what could have happened if different courses of actions had taken place, *i.e.* if the accident would have been avoided. Concerning a negative event, the easier you can imagine a different course of events, the more intensely dramatic emotions will be perceived. In our case, the outcome would have been different if the driver was driving 30 km/h instead of 50/53 km/h: The imagined unrealized better scenario 'avoidance of the accident' results from an only slight decrease of the speed (20 km/h). Similarly, in the second argumentative line (1.1b) (Fig. 42) the

journalists argue that they want to deploy the drama evoked by the consequences of the accident in order to emotionally hit the audience: journalists predict that this framing of the news will have a high emotive impact on the audience, because 'if the accident had been avoided, the family and the girl would not have had problems and expenses'.

It is interesting that journalists argue that the item is more interesting saying that the accident *could have been avoided* and that the girl and the family would not have had dramatic consequences; an intermediate implicit predictive standpoint is at stake that predicts that 'the audience will feel *regret* by highlighting that the accident could have been avoided thanks to the high speed' (1') (Fig. 42). Indeed, journalists induce the audience to feel *regret* for the accident: they lead the audience to be angry with the driver, because he has driven 40-50 km/h, even though the alternative of going slower was possible –according to them.

It is wise to remark the fact that journalists want to induce a sort of regret in the audience, and not another similar emotion like sadness or discouragement. According to Castelfranchi and Miceli

> regret is a special kind of disappointment that implies an invalidated positive expectation in which the involved goal is an intention. Differently from discouragement, which is focused on one's lack of power to realize the intended p, the focus of regret is on one's own choice (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88).

However, in our case study we do not deal with a case of pure regret, as intended by the above mentioned authors. It is a case of empathic regret: if we consider that journalists have empathized with the family and the girl, we can say that it is a sort of regret transferred on a third person. When one agent empathizes, he suspends his Self and takes the perspective of the other.

Regret results from realizing that the present state of affairs is in an unfavorable comparability relation with a hypothetical and unrealized better state of affairs (Sugden 1986: 86). With reference to this point, Bell argues that the degree of regret depends on "the difference in value between the assets actually received and the highest level of assets produced by other alternatives" (Bell 1982: 963, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 88).

In this case of study, we know that the driver was going 53 km/h in a residential area and that the legal speed limit was 50 km/h; however, we also know that going 50 km/h would not have avoided the accident and that in turn going 30 km/h would have avoided it. The journalists induce the audience to expect that the accident could have been avoided, by considering the possibility that the driver could have chosen to go 30 km/h instead of having gone 50 km/h. However, the speed limit on that road was of 50 km/h… how could the driver have decided to go slower in order to prevent the accident if the legal speed limit was 50mkm/h? Journalists are arguing on a hypothetical reality that has not taken place; they are exaggerating the driver's possibility of *choosing* to go slower. The speed limit that journalists imagine as the right one, namely 30 km/h, has neither legal nor public value, but rather it is gathered from their counterfactual reasoning. They come up with a fictive speed limit (30 km/h) towards which the driver's action is relevant. The imaginary limit of 30 km/h is rationally constructed; journalists have imagined the reasonable limit of 30 km/h on the basis of an analogy that has been created having in mind one similar situation in another place. A relevant alternative difference is constructed referring only to later facts and it is not an alternative that the driver has actually considered, as it is shown in Figure .



Figure 43. Mental spaces at stake in the construction of a relevant difference between the actual speed 53 km/h, the legal speed limit 50 km/h and the fictive speed 30 km/h.

As I show in Figure 43 following the theory of mental spaces by Gilles Fauconnier (1994), journalists build a relevant counterfactual alternative and an ethically right speed limit; the legal limit is not important anymore to them, since it is judged as not right in an ethic sense. The mental space 1 represents the deontically admissible version, in which the driver hypothetically drives 50 km/h and in which the legally and publicly relevant speed limit is 50 km/h. The mental space 2 represents the actual version of the accident, namely that the driver goes 53 km/h and that the legal speed limit is 50 km/h. The difference that arises from these two mental spaces, namely between the legally acceptable situation and the actual situation is not relevant. This irrelevant difference (mental spaces 1 and 2) acts as a concessive counter-argumentation; it is as if journalists were saying 'yes, it is true that the driver was going 53 and not 50 but it is not important, it does not make any difference (the accident would have equally happened); on the contrary, if he had gone 30 km/h the accident would not have happened'. At this point we notice that the speed limit of 30 km/h enters in journalists' reasoning; they retake this speed limit from an analogical situation

deriving from one journalist's experience about a place near where he lives. It is at this point that the mental space 4 is created, in which the legal speed limit of 50 km/h is retaken from the mental space 2 and the fictive limit 30 km/h is analogically retaken from mental space 3. The outcome of the mental space 4 is the accident, since driving 50 km/h instead of 30 km/h has caused an accident. The mental space 4 is opposed to mental space 5, in which a world is imagined in which the driver goes 30 km/h, the legal speed limit is 30 km/h and there is no accident; the opposition between mental space 4 and mental space 5 creates a relevant difference, a relevant counterfactual alternative with an ethically right speed limit that makes the difference in terms of 'happening/avoiding the accident'. Journalists' desire to emotionally strike the audience brings them to build a relevant difference. However, the better unrealized alternative that journalists offer to the audience has no legal nor public value, and it was not immediately available to the driver. Furthermore, the driver's decision of going 53 km/h is almost justifiable by the legal speed limit fixed at 50 km/h. A justifiable decision can be only barely regretted, since "the less justifiable the decision, the more regret will be experienced" (Zeelenberg et. al 2002, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 93). Therefore, we can say that journalists induce in the audience a regret that comes from an imaginary injustifiability of the driver that has not respected a fictive speed limit without public relevance. Indeed, the possible alternative of going slower has been considered *a posteriori* in the journalists' minds: they are considering it in the light of the dramatic results of the accident, even though this alternative was not an active possibility for the driver at the moment of the accident. They *do not* rely on an evidential basis. Journalists regret that the driver has neglected the option of going slower: indeed, they present the driver as an agent that has to choose the speed and that has to choose among many alternatives that *were possible* (according to them). This is the focal center that enables us to understand that journalists decide to frame the news piece in a way that presents some risks of manipulatory deviation. This way of presenting facts is not manipulative *per se*, since it does not induce the audience to make false inferences (for instance to think that the legal limit is 30 km/h); however, the whole item is constructed around an invented speed that presents the driver as the only guilty. Therefore, it presents some risks of manipulation, since the TV-viewer is led to focus on

a hypothetical and imaginary speed limit and on its preferable consequences that have not taken place; journalists choose to impose the *regret* frame as unique frame. At this point of the analysis, it should be clear that journalists seem to be aware of people's ability to feel regret depending on the availability of counterfactual alternatives (Seta et al. 2008 quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 90) and of "people's natural tendency to focus on the foregone" (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007: 4).

Concluding, journalists' reasoning concerning how to induce regret in the audience a propos of the driver's possibility to choose to go slower can be summarized with the argumentative reconstruction presented in Figure 44;



Figure 44. Argumentative reconstruction of journalists' reasoning that reflects the mental spaces at stake in jounralists' discourse illustrated in Fig. 42.

In Figure 44 I show the argumentative reconstruction of journalists' reasoning that reflects the mental spaces at stake in journalists' discourse illustrated in Figure 42; 'if the journalist would have gone 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h, the accident would not have happened (the outcome would have been different) and this will cause regret' (1.1). Therefore, 'constructing the item mentioning this speed is more interesting and exctiting' (1). The regret in the audience will be due to the audience possibility to imagine a distinct possible and preferable alternative that has not taken place, but that, according to the journalists, was actively possible in the driver's mind (1.2). The accident could have been avoided; the audience's positive expectation (the avoidance of the accident) is invalidated (1.3). And finally, according to the slightly manipulatory framing made by the journalists, the accident could have easily been avoided since the driver had at his disposal an active possibility of going slower (1.4).

9.3 Analysis of the inferential structure of one focal argumentative move: why is it desirable to let the audience experience regret?

Until now I have focused on the argumentative reconstruction; however, in order to prove the crucial role played out by journalists' anticipation of the audience regret, it is necessary to make a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential structure of arguments. In this sub-section I illustrate the analysis of the inferential configuration of one focal argumentative move of the editorial conference analyzed in the previous section following AMT: this enables us to grasp the missing link represented by the implicit premises.

In the analysis shown here, the journalists' argumentation is reconstructed as a three-phases argumentative sequence; the first and the second step are founded on the *locus from efficient cause*, whereas the last step is founded on the *locus from definition*. The argumentation chain is the following: 'the news piece is more interesting underlining that the speed was 40-50 km/h instead of 30 km/h' (1 in Fig. 42), which is supported by the implicit predictive standpoint 'the audience will experience regret if we highlight the high speed' (1' in Fig. 42), which in turn is supported by the counterfactual argument that 'the

accident could have been avoided if the driver had gone 30 km/h instead of 50 km/h' (1.1a in Fig. 42).

We show here below in Figures 45, 46 and 47 the Y-structures of the single argumentative moves that constitute the argumentation. In Figure 45 I show the first argumentative step, which applies the locus from efficient cause, that deals with the activation of a certain causal chain (Rigotti 2008);



Figure 45. It could have been different if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km because the accident would not have happened (1.1a.1>1.1a).

From the analysis of the first Y-structure we can observe the presence of an emotive endoxon and of a simulative datum, due to the fact that it is not observed in reality, but that it has been imagined. The conjunction of the statements of the emotive endoxon and simulative datum creates an inferential effect leading to an 'evaluative' first conclusion

‘A hypothetical lower speed of 30 km/h would have been (*ceteris paribus*) a sufficient condition for crediting a significantly more desirable situation (for making a difference)’. This conclusion perfectly meets the condition established by the maxim and conjoined with it, allows inferring the evaluative counterfactual standpoint. We know in fact from the maxim that ‘if the sufficient cause of a state of affairs is the case, then also the state of affairs is the case’ and from the minor premise/first conclusion that ‘a hypothetical lower speed of 30 km/h would have been a sufficient condition for crediting a significantly more desirable situation (for making a difference)’. Therefore, we are led to conclude that ‘it could have been different (better!) if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h because the accident would not have happened’. This passage enables us to understand the implicit premises that lead journalists to positively evaluate the hypothetical course of action that has not taken place.

However, we need another Y-structure in order to understand how journalists infer the implicit standpoint ‘the audience will experience regret highlighting the high speed’ starting from the fact that it could have been different if the speed was 30 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h. Here the maxim at stake can be said to be ‘if the sufficient cause of a state of affairs is the case, then also the state of affairs is the case’. The maxim is conjoined with the line of reasoning originated in the endoxon ‘regret is caused by a bad decision that has disregarded some alternative that would have led to a better outcome’. The *datum* coincides with the final conclusion of the previous Y-structure ‘it could have been different if the driver had gone 30 km/h instead of 50 km/h’. In Figure 46 I show this Y-structure:



Figure 46. Inferential analysis of the second step of the argumentation (1.1a>1'). The audience will experience regret highlighting the high speed.

By observing this Y-structure, it is clear that the prediction is made on the basis of what may cause the feeling of regret, namely the fact that the driver had the possibility (even though it was not an active possibility) to choose to go 30 km/h and has instead chosen to drive 50 km/h.

In the ultimate part of the argumentation supporting the final standpoint of the whole reasoning process, namely 'the item is more interesting highlighting the adjusted speed' the *locus from definition* is applied. The *locus from definition,* dealing with the relation between the definition and the defined, also appears to play a crucial role in editorial conferences, since when journalists argue about the preference for certain editorial choices instead of others, they refer themselves to the value system that defines their world.

Journalists pay attention to the characteristics of a certain event and compare them with their editorial value system, then they establish the degree of salience of this event and of its details, classifying them as more or less newsworthy/interesting/apt for a certain type of audience. In Figure we notice that the datum originates from the previous Y-structure, namely from the fact that 'a lower speed would have avoided the accident affects the evaluation of the accident';



Figure 47. Y-structure showing the last argumentative step of the discussion (1'>1). The item is more exciting and interesting highlighting the high speed because it will probably provoke regret in the audience.

On the vertical level of the analysis, the conjunction of endoxon 'by definition interesting news items are those that provoke emotions in the audience (especially bad

emotions)' and of the datum 'the item highlighting the high speed will probably provoke regret in the audience' creates the inferential effect leading to a first conclusion 'that the item highlighting the high speed will probably provoke regret in the audience meets the definition of an interesting news piece'. This conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim and conjoined with it allows inferring the standpoint 'the item is more exciting and interesting highlighting the high speed'. Finally, this evaluative standpoint will support an implicit practical deliberative standpoint such as 'we should broadcast the item highlighting the high speed', since this is interesting for the audience.

In the next sub-sections I will show that journalists' anticipation of audience emotions, based on their own emotions, acts as starting point for producing an individually re-framed – and emotionally charged- news, therefore playing a crucial role in news editing.

9.4 Anticipation of audience emotive uptake: effects on the news product

After having made an argumentative analysis of the editorial conference in which journalists discuss detailed issues related to the news piece in the previous sub-section, let us now look at how the journalists' discussions have influenced the news piece. In this sub-section I look at the final news product. In subsection 9.4.1 I will look also at the previous intermediate versions sketched by the journalist, which are observable thanks to the recordings of the journalist's desktop.

The final news piece, published by SRG at *10vor10* on the 8 December 2006 concerns the bad news of the at the time eight-year old girl run over by the car running fast in a suburban area, as previously said. It is wise to say that the main source at journalists' disposal when they construct a news is often represented by interviews; in this case by the interviews made with the parents of the girl right before the trial. On the basis of these interviews the journalist builds the item, which is made up *–a)* by an introduction of the host contextualizing the whole story,

```
001   M:    der fall
            The case:
```

002 auf einer quartierstraße
On a neighborhood street

003 wo die geschwindigkeit auf fünfzig stundenkilometer beschränkt ist
where the speed is limited to 50 km/h

004 wird ein autofahrer von einem kind überrascht
a car driver is surprised by a child

005 das auf die straße tritt
that steps onto the street.

006 er kann nicht rechtzeitig bremsen
He cannot brake in time

007 und verletzt das damals achtjährige mädchen schwer
and injures the, at the time, eight-year-old girl severely.

008 in erster instanz erhält der fahrer nur ein kleine buße
In the lower court the driver only receives a small fine

009 weil er drei stundenkilometer zu schnell fuhr
because he was driving 3 kilometers per hour too fast.

010 vom hauptvorwurf der schweren fahrlässigen körperverletzung
From the main charge of grievous, negligent personal injury

011 wird er freigesprochen
he is acquitted.

012 heute kam dieser fall vors zürcher obergericht
Today this case was heard at the Zurich superior court.

013 die eltern des mädchens hofften auf eine verurteilung
The parents of the girl were hoping for a conviction.

014 auch, weil ihnen sonst
Also because, otherwise,

015 wesentliche entschädigungs- und genugtuungsleistungen
substantial compensation and reparation payments

016 vorenthalten bleiben
would be withheld from them.

017 matthias rusch berichtet
Matthias Rusch reports.

-*b)* by some introductory parts of the journalist framing the interviews to the mother and to the father of the girl,

018 O: heute mittag
Today, at midday,

019 kurz vor dem gang zum obergericht

shortly before the walk to the superior court.

020 zu hause in urdorf
At home in Urdorf

021 studiert das ehepaar merlo nochmals die unzähligen unterlagen
the married Merlo couple again studies the countless documents

022 zum fall ihrer tochter
on the case of their daughter.

023 in vier jahren haben sich sechs ordner mit akten angesammelt
In four years six binders of files have accumulated;

024 für die familie eine lange leidensgeschichte
for the family a long tale of woe.

-*c)* by the the interview to the parents,

025 A: ja der unfall hat natürlich
Yes the accident has of course

026 auch einen großen teil unseres lebens zerstört
also destroyed a large part of our life

027 und auch sehr stark eingeschränkt
and also limited [it] a lot.

028 wir waren wirklich
We were truly -

029 also ich hätte vorher sagen können
well I could previously say

030 ich war glücklich
I was happy,

031 ich war ein zufriedener mensch
I was a content person

032 und das fällt heute halt schon noch schwer
and today that still just remains difficult

033 das einfach so rauszubringen
to simply say it like that.

034 und dann eben zu sehen
And then just to see

035 wie das kind leidet
how the child suffers.

-*d)* by a reproduction in black and white slow motion of the accident and -by a simulation in black and white slow motion showing what happened to the girl, integrated with actual photos of the accident and of the girl in coma:

036 O: passiert ist der unfall
The accident happened



037 am einunddreißigsten mai zweitausendundzwei
on May 31st 2002.



038 die achtjährige sabina macht sich auf den weg zur schule
The eight-year-old Sabina starts off on her way to school,



039 will die straße überqueren
wants to cross the street.

040 plötzlich taucht ein auto auf
Suddenly a car appears



041 mit über fünfzig stundenkilometern
[going] over 50 kilometers per hour.



042 der jeep cherokee rammt sabina auf kopfhöhe
The Jeep Cherokee hits Sabina at head level



043 und schleudert sich acht meter weg
and catapults her eight meters away.

044 diagnose schädelbasisbruch
Diagnosis: basilar skull fracture

045 und ein schweres schädelhirntrauma
and a severe head injury.

046 obwohl sabina sofort mit der REGA ins spital geflogen wird
Even though Sabina is immediately flown by REGA to the hospital



047 liegt sie sieben monate lang im koma
she remains in a coma for seven months

048 und leidet heute noch
and still suffers

Then, the item goes on with *e)* another brief journalist's introduction to the interview to the father that says why it is very hard and expensive to help the child:

049 an den folgen des unfalls
from the consequences of the accident.

050 gleichgewichtsstörungen
Balance disorder,

051 konzentrations- und lernschwierigkeiten
problems with concentration and learning,

052 emotionale schwankungen
emotional instability

053 und probleme mit der feinmotorik
and problems with the fine motor skills.



054 die eltern von sabina lassen nichts unversucht
Sabina's parents are leaving nothing undone

055 um ihrer tochter zu helfen
to help their daughter.

056 doch das hat seinen preis
But that has its price.

057 A: also wir reden hier von einem sechsstelligen betrag
So we are talking about a six-figure amount

058 den wir aufgewendet haben
which we have spent

059 bis zum heutigen zeitpunkt
up to the present time.

060 das ist die betreuung von der sabina tagesbetreuung
That is the care for Sabina, daily care.

061 dann haben wir da fahrspesen
Then we have driving expenses.

062 wir haben selbstkostenbehalt von der versicherung
We have the deductible from the insurance

063 den wir selber tragen müssen
which we have to pay ourselves.

064 dann zusätzliche therapien
Then additional therapy

065 die wir der sabina zugestehen
that we allow Sabina.

Then, there is *f)* a short passage showing the parents that go to the trial and that pass on the place of the accident:

066 O: auf dem weg zum gericht
On the way to court.

067 die eltern von sabina hoffen auf eine verurteilung des autofahrers
Sabina's parents are hoping for a conviction of the driver

068 damit dessen versicherung die volle haftung übernehmen muss
so that his insurance will have to assume full liability.

069 A: also wenn ich da immer an der stelle hier vorbeifahr
So whenever I drive past this spot here

070 ist es für mich natürlich zum teil schon noch
it is of course for me sometimes still

071 dass mir das immer wieder hoch kommt
that this comes back to me over and over.

072 und jetzt haben wir tempo dreißig
And we now have a [speed] limit of 30.

073 und es ist natürlich schon sehr sehr belastend
And it is of course a very, very heavy burden

074 wenn man davon ausgeht
if you consider

075 dass wenn das damals schon gewesen wäre
that, if this had already been the case back then,

076 hätte der unfall sich vielleicht vermeiden lassen können
the accident maybe could have been avoided,

077 oder die schwere wäre nicht so schwer gewesen vom unfall
or the severity of the accident would not have been so severe.

078 O: genau zu diesem schluss kommt heute das obergericht
That is exactly the conclusion the superior court reached today.

079 ein gutachten hat ergeben
A report has shown

080 der unfall wäre vermeidbar gewesen
that the accident could have been avoided.

Then the item goes on with *g)* a simulation in black and white slow motion of what would have happened if the driver had gone 50 km/h instead of 30 km/h:

069 A: also wenn ich da immer an der stelle hier vorbeifahr
So whenever I drive past this spot here

070 ist es für mich natürlich zum teil schon noch
it is of course for me sometimes still

071 dass mir das immer wieder hoch kommt
that this comes back to me over and over.

072 und jetzt haben wir tempo dreißig
And we now have a [speed] limit of 30.

073 und es ist natürlich schon sehr sehr belastend
And it is of course a very, very heavy burden

074 wenn man davon ausgeht
if you consider

075 dass wenn das damals schon gewesen wäre
that, if this had already been the case back then,

076 hätte der unfall sich vielleicht vermeiden lassen können
the accident maybe could have been avoided,

077 oder die schwere wäre nicht so schwer gewesen vom unfall
***or the severity of the accident would not have been so** severe.*

078 O: genau zu diesem schluss kommt heute das obergericht
That is exactly the conclusion the superior court reached today.

079 ein gutachten hat ergeben
A report has shown

080 der unfall wäre vermeidbar gewesen
that the accident could have been avoided.



081 damals habe zwar noch tempo fünfzig gegolten
Even though [the] 50 limit was in force back then



082 die geschwindigkeit sei den unübersichtlichen verhältnissen
the speed was, with respect to the unclear conditions

083 auf der quartierstraße nicht angepasst gewesen
on the neighborhood street, not adjusted.

084 wäre der autolenker nur

If the driver had been

085 dreißig statt der gemessen fünfzig gefahren
driving 30 instead of 50 as measured,

086 er hätte den wagen
he could have (brought) the car



087 laut gutachten
according to the report

088 zwei meter vor dem kind zum stillstand gebracht
- two meters in front of the child - to a standstill.

089 der jeep-fahrer wird wegen fahrlässiger schwerer körperverletzung
The Jeep driver, because of negligent grievous personal injury,

090 vom obergericht
(is sentenced) by the superior court

091 zu einer bedingten gefängnisstrafe von zwei monaten verurteilt
to a conditional imprisonment of two months.

092 zudem ist er verpflichtet
Additionally, he is obliged

093 dem opfer schadenersatz und genugtuung zu zahlen
to pay the victim compensation and reparation.

094 A: ich erhoff mir
I am hopeful

095 dass dies einen wegweisenden charakter hat
that this has a groundbreaking quality

096 und dass man wirklich auch
and that one really also

097 auf die schwächeren teilnehmer auf der straße rücksicht nimmt
shows consideration for the weaker participants on the street

098 und nicht nur das gefühl hat
and does not just have the feeling

099 man sitzt im auto
one sits in a car

100 und man könne jetzt Gas geben und habe das vortrittsrecht
and can step on the gas and have right of way

101 auf jeden fall

			in every case.
	102		und ich denke *And I think*
	103		es hat ein umdenken stattgefunden in der gesellschaft *there has been a rethinking in society.*
	104		und es hat auch *And there has also*
	105		ein umdenken in den gerichten stattgefunden *been a rethinking in the courts.*
	106		und darüber bin ich natürlich sehr froh *And I am of course very glad about that.*
	107	O:	der verteidiger des autofahrers *The car driver's defense attorney*
	108		will dieses urteil allerdings nicht akzeptieren *does not want to accept this verdict.*
	109		die geschwindigkeit sei der situation angepasst gewesen *The speed had been adjusted to the situation.*
	110	A:	wir prüfen im moment *We are investigating at the moment*
	111		eine nichtigkeitsbeschwerde ans bundesgericht *a nullity appeal at the federal court*
	112		wegen verletzung von bundesrecht *for breach of federal law.*
	113	O:	das ehepaar merlo hat heute einen ersten sieg errungen *The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory*
	114		doch es wird noch lange zu kämpfen haben *but they will have to fight for a long time.*

In Figure 48 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the whole item; we can identify an overall implicit descriptive-evaluative standpoint '1 (the parents and the girl are innocent victims and the driver is the only guilty)', which is supported by many distinct argumentative lines and by other two explanatory-descriptive sub-standpoints (1.2 and 1.6).



Figure 48. Argumentative reconstruction of the whole item.

The argumentative reconstruction of the final product confirms the considerations previously emerged from the analysis of the editorial conference; it becomes clear that the journalists' anticipation of the audience emotions has led them to frame the news in such a way that the audience is induced to feel regret.

The argumentative line 1.1 concerns the actual economical inconveniences that the family should face if the driver is not condemned; this is an argument that was widely discussed in the editorial conference and that relies on the high cultural value attributed to prosperity in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.

Then, in the second argumentative line (1.2 and subordinate arguments) we observe the journalist's sub-standpoint concerning the family's long story of suffering (1.2.1).

Furthermore, there is the interview with the mother (1.2.2) that serves the function of reinforcing the journalist's sub-standpoint. Here the focus is on long legal sequences, heavy psychological distress and on the child's physical impairment. In the interview, the mother expresses her pain for the consequences of the accident, and in particular she compares the positivity of her state of mind before the accident with the negativity of her actual state of mind due to the negative life conditions of the girl. The analysis of the informal meeting between the journalist and the cutter confirms the journalist's will to stress the side of emotionality. In the discurse the journalist states in a self-confident way that the best choice to do would be that of inserting the quotation of that particular piece of the interview to the mother concerning her emotive state:

(3) (X) 0143-0147 ah now we should quickly insert [the parents'] statements/ I think that now we should insert/ I think that **it would be better** to begin with**/ with the emotive statement of the mother/ who has talked really very good**

The journalist evaluates the possible insertion of the emotive statement of the mother as the best solution to begin the item. In argumentative terms we observe an evaluative standpoint 'it would be better to begin with the emotive statement of the mother', signaling the journalist's will to emotionally hit the audience.

The third argumentative line (1.3) presents the driver as responsible of the accident, since he has suddenly appeared in front of the gir.

In the fourth argumentative line (1.4) the journalist shifts his narration from the past to the present moment and brings the TV-viewers' attention on the current girl's sufferings and on the heavy consequences caused by the accident. The tragedy is evoked also in the fifth argumentative line (1.5), in which the journalist underlines the parents' efforts not to leave anything undone, specifying that this has a high price: here a piece of interview with the father of the girl is inserted (1.5.1), in order to support the journalists' sub-standpoint (1.5).

In Figure 49 I separately illustrate the sixth argumentative line with the sub-standpoint 'the accident *could* have been avoided', since it is the focal point of the item

that has been excitedly discussed in the editorial conference. Indeed, counterfactual reasoning is crucial and journalists insert the interview with the mother, in which she remarks the sense of injustice for what has happened and could have been avoided, according to her retrospective expectations. Put into Castelfranchi and Miceli's words:

> As noted by Folger (Folger 1987, 1993; Folger et al. 1983), the relative deprivation phenomenon can be accounted for by a perceived discrepancy between one's actual outcomes (or general standard of life) and what one believes one should get according to one's own expectations (either prospective or "retrospective"; that is, simulated by going back to a previous time when they could have been formulated) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 72).

In a similar fashion, "counterfactuals may play the role of anchor for comparison – (*e.g*. Olson et al. 2000)" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 72): the mother narrates their life before and after the accident, makes a comparison with the past and both she and we are prone to experience a sense of loss of their past happy life. The journalist decides to insert exactly the piece in which the mother stresses that what has happened could have been avoided and what transpires from her narration is the sense of injustice. As it has been specified in the theoretical chapter on counterfactuals (see Section 8), invalidated positive expectations entail some right infringement, which according to Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 74) lies in our "intolerance of invalidation". By quoting this interview to the mother and by constructing the item in a peculiar way, journalists clearly point at the refusal of the present situation and emphasize a form of resentment that favors the wrong causal attribution that the jeep driver was necessarily fully responsible of the accident. This embittered attitude used (and perhaps also perceived) by journalists induces the audience to remain fixed on the critical event and on its 'injustice': this produces a high emotive impact on the audience, and all other aspects of the accident are backgrounded. In Fig. 49 I show the argumentative reconstruction of the interview to the mother: This last argumentative line (1.6 and subordinate arguments, shown in Figure) consists of the interview with the mother made on the place in which the accident had occurred and of the successive accident's simulation in black and white slow motion. This scene physically

imitates the foregone but mentally evokes the better ideal -fictive- condition of a never happened accident: this contrast creates a very strong emotive impact. In the interview the mother says that they are driving 30 km/h at the moment and she remarks that if the driver would have gone 30 km/h, the accident could have been avoided.



Figure 49. Argumentative reconstruction of the sub-standpoint 1.6 (interview to the mother).

Interestingly, the whole argumentative line is based on counterfactual reasoning and is not only based on an actual *datum* but rather also on a simulative *datum*, namely on the fact that the accident *could* have been avoided *if* the driver had gone 50 km/h instead of 30 km/h (argument 1.6.3 in Figure 49). This argumentation perfectly mirrors the editorial strategy discussed in the editorial conference. Adopting van Eemeren's (2010) strategic maneuvering perspective on rhetorical choices, we can observe that the importance given to the sixth argumentative line does not coincide with its importance in terms of

argumentative force, since this premise is not the most relevant for justifying the guilt of the driver. Indeed, as we can see in Figure 48, according to the news, the driver should be condemned because the speed was not adapted to the situation (and because the accident could have been avoided) and not because he has slightly exceeded the legally allowed speed limit (he was driving 53 km/h), *i.e.* the driver should be condemned for a hypothetical assumption based on simulations and not on actual facts. We observe the presence of a misalignment in considering an actual normative speed-limit and a hypothetical counterfactual imagined speed limit: the former is underestimated whereas the latter is overestimated due to journalists' will to base the news on what would have happened if the speed woul have been 30 km/h.

Chronologically speaking, after the interview to the mother, the line of reasoning concerning the speed changes its focus; indeed, for the first time the focus shifts from the actual speed 'how far was driving the car?' and the allowed speed 'was it allowed to go at that speed?' to the the adequacy of the speed 'was the speed adequate to the street conditions?' (argument 1.6.1.2 in Figure 49). It is on this shifted focus that the whole item acts, in an attempt to persuade the audience to empathize with the journalist's overall standpoint that the family and the girl are the only victims and that the driver is fully guilty. Indeed, the sub-sub-standpoint 'the accident could have been avoided' (1.6) is supported by the argument 'the speed was not adjusted to the unclear conditions of the street' (1.6.1.), which is also the main focus of the argumentative discussion of the editorial conference analysed in the previous paragraph. We observe a shift of issue from what is allowed to what is adequate: the journalist supports the adequacy of the lower speed with the argument that the report states that with a lower speed the car would have stopped two meters in front of the girl (1.6.1> 1.6.1.3). Adopting van Eemeeren's (2010) strategic maneuvering perspective on rhetorical choices in arguments, we can observe that this argument is not the strongest one for justifying the adequacy of a lower speed and subsequently the guilt of the driver, but can be seen as functional to maneuvering with audience demand. Proving that a lower speed would have avoided the accident is not a very good reason to support the inadequacy of the speed of the car driver, but it acts on audience feelings and on its expected emotions of pity and empathizing.

9.4.1 Intermediate news drafts and final news product: a useful comparison

In the previous paragraphs I analysed the editorial conference and the final news item: In this paragraph I compare the final news piece with previous intermediate news drafts, gained from the observation of journalists' desktop recordings, since this comparison can offer further proofs of journalists' reasoning on the audience uptake.

By looking at the difference between the same news passage of the final version and of an intermediate version of the news piece, we notice that in the final news piece the journalist attempts to convey to the audience a clearer and more explicit point of view concerning the avoidability of the accident. In the initial draft the journalist used the question 'could the accident have been avoided if the jeep driver would have gone 30 instead of 53?', that could leave some doubts on the actual possibility of a better scenario; in order to eliminate any doubt, in the final draft of the news product the journalist substitutes the question with the affirmative statement 'the accident could have been avoided' followed by the argument of authority 'an official report has shown this'. The journalist evaluates the two possible writing strategies in view of the anticipated inferences of the audience. He interprets the potential versions as two different arguments from which the audience could draw an inference to an implicit standpoint:



Figure 50. Inferred audience's standpoints 'in response' to the journalists' arguments.

In the first case the TV-viewers could have thought that the fact that the accident could have been avoided was only a weak possibility, whereas with the affirmative statement in the second version the journalist attempts to induce a strong degree of certainty referring to the fact that the accident could have been avoided: in short, an initial version with a simple assumption becomes a final version with a strong statement.

Furthermore, an interesting observation can be made with reference to the commentary of the journalist that follows the interview with the mother; in the interview, the mother remarks that the accident could have been avoided and the journalist says (`that is exactly the conclusion the superior court reached today/ a report has shown/ that the accident could have been avoided 078-080`). If we look at the intermediate drafts of the news, we observe a shift from an initial draft 'this exactly was the **point at issue** in front of the court', to an intermediate version 'this exactly is the **object of the negotiation**', to the final version 'this exactly is the **conclusion** the superior court reached today'. With this last formulation the journalist stresses the certainty of the decision of the superior court.

In order to give further evidence of how journalists' frame the news on the basis of their own emotions and of the anticipated audience emotions, I illustrate further passages of the intermediate drafts of the news piece observed thanks to the journalists' desktop recordings and I compare them with the final version of the news product.

Firstly, at the beginning of the item, during the part that precedes the interview with the mother of the girl, the journalist changes the initial draft '**The parents of the girl** again **study** the documents on the case of their daughter' into '**The married Merlo couple** again **studies** the countless documents on the case of their daughter (021-022)' of the final news product. This implies a change of perspective in the construal of the protagonists of the story, indeed the father and the mother are conceived as couple rather than as parents, as a unity aiming to win the painful trial. Furthermore, the journalist conveys the idea of difficult effort that the parents are making in facing the trial whereby the use of the verb 'to study' that suggests a demanding mental task; this is reinforced via the insertion of the adjective *countless* in the final version 'The documents > the **countless** documents'.

Furthermore, in the final version the journalist adds the sentence 'in four years six folders with acts have been *accumulated*: for the family a long tale of woe': this reinforces the causal chain that has led the family to suffer a lot. All these additions contribute to give force to the journalist's sub-standpoint 'For the family it was a long tale of woe' (1.2 in Fig. 48), which in turn supports the overall implicit news' standpoint '1 (the driver is fully guilty and the parents and the girl are the victims)' (Fig. 48).

Journalists' will to frame the family and the girl as victims is witnessed also through the modification of the verb '*to fight*' in the intermediate version into '*to suffer*' in the final version with reference to the girl's coping with the accidents' consequences: 'the girl *fights* **still today** with the consequences of the accident' > 'she *suffers* **still today** the consequences of the accident' (048-049). By looking at the semantics of the two verbs, we are able to grasp the core difference of framing conveyed by them: the verb '*to fight*' presupposes a battle against something that can be faced and overcome, whereas the verb '*to suffer*' presupposes that someone passively undergoes events against her/his will: it underlines the impossibility to act against the painful event, implicitly denying the possibility of a full healing.

In order to increase the framing of the family's victimization, the journalist also exactly specifies the precise date of the accident, changing the sentence indicating an approximate lapse of time 'the accident happened *four years ago*' into 'the accident happened in May 2002' and then into the sentence 'the accident happened on the 31st May 2002 (036-037)' that precisely specifies the exact date of the event: the exhaustiveness of the date signals the boundary that delimits the life of the girl and of her family before and after the accident, it remarks that their life has dramatically changed on that day.

Furthermore, the dramatic framing of the event is conveyed through the change of the sentence 'Sabina <u>is</u> on the way to school' into 'Sabina **is about** to go to school (038)', creating an expectation in the reader that suddenly something bad would happen.

Finally, the journalist reinforces the dramatic framing of the event also by specifying the model of the car in the final draft; with the nominal phrase 'the <u>Jeep-Cherokee</u> (<the car) smashes into Sabina at the level of the head and throws her eight meters away', the

journalist sheds light on the big size of the car and better conveys the dramatic effect of the accident on the little body of the girl.

In this sub-section I have observed the differences between intermediate drafts and final versions of the news item: I have shown the journalists' will to increase the dramatic framing of the item. In the next sub-section I will show how journalists increase the dramatic framing via concessive counter-argumentation.

9.4.3 Journalists using concessive counter-argumentation and dramatic framing: which relationship?

In the analyzed news product, which is characterized by a dramatic and slightly unfair framing, journalists use many concessive counter-argumentations: I claim that this increases the dramatic framing of the news all focused on the girl's victimization. The journalist uses the two parts of the concessive sentences in view of the anticipated inferences of the TV-viewer. Indeed, if we think of arguments as 'invitations to inference' (Pinto 1996: 168), we can say that he uses the two parts of the sentence bound by the concessive connectors as two different arguments from which the audience could draw an inference to two implicit standpoints.

For instance, during the black and white slow motion of the simulation of the accident, journalists increase the pathos to be conveyed to the audience with the sentence 'even though she has been immediately brought with the elicopter in the hospital, she lies seven weeks in coma (046-047)'. Indeed, the connector *even though* marks the first datum as concessive, signaling out the second datum as argumentatively relevant, underlining the passive suffering of the victim and the impossibility to avoid heavy consequences *even though* all possible solutions had been taken into account:



Figure 51. Audience's implicit standpoints drawn due to the journalists' arguments.

Thanks to the connector *even though* the journalist prepares the audience to the major relevance of the second datum, namely that the girl has undergone heavy consequences due to the accident. This increases the victimization's framing.

The journalist goes on with another concessive counter-argumentation: "`Sabina's parents do not leave anything untried, **yet** this has its price (054-056)`". The adversative *yet* marks the second part of the sentence (the parents' attempts to fight for the girl have a high cost in terms of sufferings and efforts) as the most relevant for the TV-viewer;



Figure 52. Audience's implicit standpoints inferred starting from the two journalists' arguments.

In this case the journalist again uses the two parts of the sentence bound by the connector *yet* as two different arguments from which the audience could draw two inferences to two implicit standpoints. The standpoint drawn from the argument following the connector 'but' is marked as the most relevant: in the end, the final conclusion is that for the parents it is very hard to not leave something untried. This is a point that is then further developed with the insertion of the father's quotation, which as a whole represents a complex argument supporting the inferred TV-viewers' standpoint conveyed by the journalists' words that 'Sabina's parents are doing everything not to leave something untried, but this has its price', as we can see in Figure 53:



Figure 53. Implicit journalists' and inferred TV-viewers'standpoint conveyed by the father's arguments.

Towards the end of the item we find an interview with the mother in which the focus is on the injustice of judging only on the basis of the 'allowed speed'. The court after the trial has decided that the driver should be considered guilty even though the allowed and legal speed limit was 50 km/h and the mother is satisfied. The item ends with a two-lines summary '`The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory, but it will have to fight for a long time (113-114)`': we can hypothesize

two potential unexpressed evaluative standpoints inferred by the TV-viewers starting from the journalists' arguments, as shown in Figure 54.



Figure 54. Implicit inferred TV-viewers' standpoints conveyed by the journalists' arguments that 'The Merlo couple today scored an initial victory, *but* they will have to fight for a long time'.

The victory of the couple is only an initial -and not a definitive- victory, and the efforts and sufferings deriving from a predicted indefinite and long lapse of time are presented as a stronger reason to believe that the Merlo couple is the victim and to empathize with them. In other words, the use of *but* marks the first line of argument as a concessive representation of the point of view of an hypotethical antagonist identified in the TV-Viewer potentially imagining a positive situation for the couple, and the second line of argument is the one endorsed by the protagonist, namely by the journalist and coinciding also with the TV-Viewer potentially imagining a negative situation for the couple. This mental battle instantied by the journalist in the TV-viewers' mind is supported also by the evocation of the metaphorical frame of the war through the lexicon, and more specifically through the use of the verbal phrase *win a victory* and of the verb *fight*. We find evidence of this dramatic framing even in the square where journalists use to save the reminder of the items' quotations: in order to choose a label for the mother's interview, he chooses 'mother of the **victim** of the accident'.

As a result of this analysis on concessive counter-argumentations in the final news product, we can conclude that concessive counter-argumentations are deployed by the journalists to increase the dramatic framing of the reported event, in which the girl and her family are conceived as victims and the driver as fully guilty. Nevertheless, by looking

exclusively at the intermediate and final versions of the news product, it is hard to assess the extent to which journalists frame the news: to what extent do journalists frame the news item in an individual way according to their own emotions and to the consequent audience expected emotions and to what extent do they try to convey a balanced view of the news? I will attempt to definitely answer this question by analyzing the retrospective interviews made to the journalist in section 9.5.

9.5 How the study of journalists' writing processes shows a continuous struggle between capturing audience attention and conveying a balanced view

In order to understand journalists' reasoning that have led them to make a dramatic framing of the news item, I also analyse the *retrospective verbal protocol*: this type of interview offers insights that are revealing both of the journalist's will to capture the audience attention via a dramatic framing and of his will to convey a rebalanced view of the news. Thanks to the fact that we can identify explicative standpoints in retrospective interviews, which reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation (that the journalist has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting on what he had previously written), the journalists' reasoning about writing choices is explicitly shown.

In the retrospective verbal protocol we find evidence that the journalist is torn about whether to give priority to capture audience attention or to convey a re-balanced view of the news. Indeed, by looking at the retrospective verbal protocol, it is clear that the journalist critically reconsiders his initial stancing towards the dynamics of the accident and we clearly understand that the journalist believes that the initial draft of the item was too much framed towards the victimization of the girl and her family and the stigmatization of the car driver than the final news item.

The data from the retrospective verbal protocol cast new light on the situation emerging from the analysis of the news product and of the desktop recordings of the journalist, since they enable us to clearly understand the journalists' reasonings at stake in the anticipation's phenomenon. In the interview the journalist comments on the central issue of the speed and on the difficulty of conveying the misalignment of the two

alternative standpoints concerning the actual/allowed speed and the adjusted/auspicable speed;

(4) 0195-0220 I reflected/ *how it would have been more logic/* ***how the TV-viewer would have understood it better***/ that it was like saying/ this was above all the problem/ that it was an area with speed limit 50/ and that the driver was driving 53/ slightly too fast/ and the judge however believes that/ due to the fact that the issue on the residential street is not so clear/ that driving with a speed of 50 should be illegal/ even though officially it was an area with speed limit 50/ and I have had some interruptions/ there were too many figures to compress in a unique sentence/ therefore I have written/ before I have written/„area with speed limit 50"/ for him it has been measured a speed of 53/ and I have thought/ that there were too many figures/ then I face the TV-viewer/ and therefore I deleted it/ and I changed it/ I tried to *reformulate it in a more comprehensible way*

In this excerpt we notice the interweaving of emotive and cognitive anticipation, since the journalist firstly anticipates the cognitive uptake of the audience, which is however subordinate to an anticipation of an emotive uptake aiming at the audience persuasion. With respect, in particular, to the passage above, it is interesting to observe how the journalist evaluates the two possible writing strategies in view of the anticipated inferences of the audience. Indeed, in the excerpt above, the journalist makes very explicit his difficulty in choosing the issue that he intends to convey and the way in which the issue should be conveyed in view of the audience reaction. The journalist asks himself whether he should underline that it was an area with speed limit 50 km/h and that the driver was going 53 km/h, or whether he should underline that driving 50 km/h in a residential

area should be illegal even though the speed limit was 50 km/h (therefore avoiding to write the actual speed). In Fig. below (Figure 55) I show the argumentative reconstruction of the above excerpt of the retrospective verbal protocol, showing the two hypothetical alternative ways of proposing the item;



Figure 55. Two distinct argumentative reconstructions of the journalist's reasoning in the retrospective verbal protocol based on counterfactual reasoning (excerpt 4).

As we can see in Figure 55, these two argumentative reconstructions are based on counterfactual reasoning, in a typical fashion of retrospective verbal protocols. The journalist is indecided on how the audience would have understood better the issue of the different speed. In order to choose the better linguistic strategy, he anticipates and simulates both scenarios. He asks himself: "will the audience understand better the core issue of the event by specifying the adjusted speed and avoiding writing the actual speed of 53 km/h or by writing the allowed speed 50 km/h and the actual speed of 53 km/h?". Counterfactual reasoning is deployed to choose the best alternative available that would have enabled a better audience comprehension; the journalist decided to avoid to write the actual speed 53 km/h due to the fact that the difference with the legal speed limit 50 km/h

would have been irrelevant, since the accident would have equally occurred, as previously explained and shown in Figure 43. Conveying to the audience a relevant difference instead of an irrelevant one was the better editorial strategy chosen by the journalist thanks to the simulation produced by counterfactual reasoning. I have provided a full explanation of the combination of these different mental spaces at stake in the construction of a relevant difference between the actual speed 53 km/h, the legal limit 50 km/h and the hypothetical right limit 30 km/h in Fig. 50, in the first part of this Chapter in which a similar issue is at stake during the editorial conference.

In the following passage of the retrospective verbal protocol, we find further evidence that the anticipation of the audience emotive uptake, often carried out whereby counterfactual reasoning, plays a crucial role in journalists' reasoning and in their attempt to frame the news in an audience-oriented way. In this passage the journalist comments on a hypothetical insertion of a crash test simulation, which has not been carried out due to spatial constraints and to the fact that in order to insert the simulation of the crash test, it would have been necessary to do an intrigue;

(5) 0226-0245 then there was also the fact that/ that christian düschler has said to me/ that **I should have built also a framing**/ of a 'crash' test/ […]/ it **would have been a crash test**/ in which **we should have seen**/ how a jeep crashes with a doll/ and then this doll begins to **whirl** in the air/ and this **would have been a *strong picture***/ therefore ***we would have put it gladly***/ **but** then I noticed/ it did not fill/ **I should have done an intrigue**/ in order to construct the picture

By looking at this passage, it is evident that the journalist positively evaluates a hypothetical choice to put a piece with a crash test simulation, due to the strong emotive effect that it would have had on the audience, therefore underlining the continuous journalistic tendency to anticipate audience emotions that in this case was functional to

persuade it about the guilt of the driver and the victimization of the girl. However, the journalist decided not to insert a simulation of a crash test, since he should have done an intrigue (a chaotic mix of news pieces) to construct the picture, and so he had to opt for preserving the major goal of respecting space and time limits imposed by the program rules as well as for proposing the news in an ordered way. The journalist has decided not to insert the framing of a simulated crash test because it was the only alternative that did not require making a chaotic mix of news pieces: this has led to the positive outcome of enabling the audience to fluently follow the item.

The journalist applies a downward counterfactual reasoning based on the locus from final cause and alternatives. In Figure I show the inferential relation of this reasoning:



Figure 56. It would have been different (worse) if journalists had inserted a crash test because they should have done an intrigue that could have confused the audience.

Inserting a crash test and not inserting it are two alternatives when an agent composes a news piece and the goal of journalists when they compose a news piece is not to do intrigues that confuse the audience (endoxa). Considering these endoxa and the data

that “we have chosen not to insert a crash test which has led not to do an intrigue that confuses the audience (factual *datum*)” and that “it was possible to choose to insert a crash test and it would have led to do an intrigue that could have confused the audience” (simulative datum and retrospective prediction), then among the two alternatives they have chosen the alternative that has led not to do an intrigue that could have confused the audience, disregarding the alternative that would have led to do it (first conclusion/ minor premise and invalidation of negative expectation). The merge of the first conclusion/ minor premise (and invalidatioin of negative expectation) with the inferential force given by the maxim from the reasoning of final cause and alternatives “if between two alternatives X and Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable *ceteris paribus* to choose Y rather than X” gives rise to the final conclusion that “we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one”, which is a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience possible relief.

In excerpt (5) we can observe that the journalist uses both downward counterfactual reasoning and upward counterfactual reasoning (for more details on this distinction see Chapter 8). Firstly, the journalist uses upward counterfactual reasoning and imagines a better scenario in which the framing with the crash test would have had a high impact on the audience. Later, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning in order to say that in order to insert a crash test simulation, a chaotic mix of news pieces should have been inserted.

The two utterances containing distinct simulation directions of counterfactual reasoning (one pointing at a hypothetical unrealized better alternative and one pointing at a hypothetical unrealized worse alternative) are connected by the disjunctive conjunction *but*: and this **would have been a *strong picture***/ therefore ***we would have put it gladly***/ ***but*** then I noticed/ it did not fill/ **I should have done an intrigue (0241-0245).**

The utterance that follows the connector *but* dealing with the fact that an intrigue would have been necessary in order to insert the framing of the crash test is presented as more important than the utterance preceding the connector *but* that is focused on the fact

that a framing with the crash test would have been nice. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice the shift in tense from past to present tense after having applied upward counterfactual reasoning (it **would have been a crash test**/ in which **we should have seen**/ how a jeep **crashes** with a doll/ and then this doll begins to **whirl** in the air). This is a further proof that upward counterfactual reasoning stimulates cognitive process; in this case it actualizes the moment of the choice and it enables to connect the world of the past in which there was the possibility to insert a framing with the crash test and the world of the present in which the journalist re-experiences the impact of the nice framing. Also in this case, upward counterfactual reasoning seems to stimulate imagination and to let journalists imagine the outcomes of past hypothetical editorial strategies in the present moment.

Until now, it is clear that the journalist's priority is to produce a news with a high emotive impact on the audience. Interestingly, at a certain point in the retrospective verbal protocol we notice an inversion of tendency: the journalist's priority becomes that of conveying a more balanced viewpoint. Indeed, the journalist explicitly states that the first draft of the item was framed in a slight unfair way, due to the usage of the word 'causer of the accident'. As soon as he acknowledges that the news framing was unfair, he decides to modify the news item in a more balanced way:

(6) 0433-0455 R: now you delete „causer of the accident" (Unfallverursacher)/ J: „jeeep driver" (Autofahrer) yes this is a bit/ this is/ I had the feeling that/ what had I put/„author" I had put/ in that case I eliminated it because-/ well the judge has concluded that/ that he is guilty/ *but then I have thought how*/ author of the accident/ *even the girl has suddenly appeared from behind the bush*/ this is a bit like/ *finally in order to make an accident we need two persons so to say*/ so I had the feeling that/ **yes I have preferred writing jeep driver/ rather than causer of the accident/** this is ***this would have***

been a bit like his total sentence/ even though he has been declared guilty now/ *but it is not fully clear/ how much the girl has contributed* [to the accident]/ when *she has suddenly appeared from behind the bush* ((yawns))/

In excerpt (6), the journalist clearly expresses his difficulty to reach and convey a balanced view of such a delicate news. The journalist reframes his previous implicit standpoint 'The driver is the only guilty' and reformulates it in such a way that may comprehend also a responsibility of the girl, such as 'The driver is guilty and the girl is the victim, but she may have a part of responsibility in the accident'. The journalist critizes his previous linguistic choice (causer of the accident), which would have invalidated a balanced view of the situation, inducing the audience to attribute full responsibility for the accident to the driver. In Figure I show the argumentative reconstruction of excerpt (6):



Figure 57. Argumentative reconstruction of excerpt (6) of the restrospective verbal protocol.

The journalist attempts to «lessen» the driver's guilt using the appellative «jeep driver» instead of «causer of the accident», therefore bringing to the foreground also other factors of the situation, such as the sudden appearing of the girl from the bush. It is clear that the journalist is trying to convey a critical view of the event to the audience and that

he is aware that formulating the news in a way instead of another can influence the audience opinion in a decisive way. Again, in one focal argumentative move of exerpt (6) the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning: "this would have been a bit like his total sentence". The journalist' s hypothesis of a worse unrealized scenario in which the driver could have been considered fully guilty is used in order to support his decision to write 'jeep driver' rather than 'causer of the accident'. This was the best alternative to give a balanced view of the event; writing 'causer of the acident' would have made the difference in attributing guilt to the driver, whose plain guilt had not been demostrated. In order to show the missing link represented by the implicit premises, I show the inferential configuration of the focal argumentative move containing downward counterfactual reasoning in Figure 14. Reasoning from final cause and alternatives has been applied, as we can see in Figure 14;



Figure 14. It would have been different if the nominal phrase 'causer of the accident' had been used (worse), because by using the nominal phrase 'causer of the accident' and not 'jeep driver' the driver would have been unfairly considered fully guilty by the audience.

If *a)* writing "Autofahrer" (car driver) and writing "Unfallverursacher" (causer of the accident) are two alternative actions in the writing of an item and if *b)* when a journalist composes a news piece he has the goal not to make an unfair framing of the news (*endoxa*); and if *a)* journalists have chosen to write "Autofahrer" that has led not to make an unfair framing of the news (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible to choose to write "Unfallverursacher" and it would have not led not to make an unfair framing of the news (simulative datum, retrospective prediction) then, among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative that leads not to make an unfair framing of the news, disregarding the alternative that would have led to make an unfair framing of the news (first conclusion/ minor premise and invalidation of negative expectation). Regarding the intersected topical constituent, the maxim stemming from the locus from final cause and alterantives "if between two alternatives X, Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X" conjoined with the first conclusion acting as a minor premise leads to the final conclusion "we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one". This final conclusion is a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience possible relief.

Furthermore, in one consecutive passage of the retrospective verbal protocol, the journalist widens the scope of his explanations to the judiciary cases in general, being aware of the consequences that every wrong word can have in the subtype of news genre 'news concerning judicial cases';

(7)[…] 0455-0481 R: yes/ J: this is a bit- I think/ still a bit exceptional/ in this text/ because *it is a judiciary case/ we must think/ we must ponder every word/ how can we write/ in a way that then a party/ does not feel in some way judged/ or that does not feel misunderstood/* or even always/ yes here all the legal field is concerned/ ehm in all these legal situations (xxx)/ *we must always pay a lot of attention/ not to damage/* in the formulation/ if

it would have been a portrait/ or a feature/ then **you could write in a fanciful way/ simply like that/ and the damage would not be big/ in another context you should not/ have weighted every word**/ **but** rather in these cases *you must look good*/ that *the statement really arrives with the right meaning/ and that it is not understood in a false way*

Again, the journalist uses downward counterfactual reasoning in the externalization of his inner reasoning. He imagines a different situation in which it could have been possible to write in a more fanciful way without severe consequences. However, he maintains that in the context of news concerning judiciary cases this is inadequate, since it is indispensable that every word is conveyed to the audience with its instrinsic meaning acception and without ambiguous polisemies that could convey wrong meanings. The disjunctive conjunction *but* signals that the positive scenario imagined for another journalistic context is not valid for journalism dealing with judiciary cases in which every word must be weighted. The counterfactual reasoning is used to make a comparison, to open another hypothetical world in which words can be used without thinking too much: this alternative world is compared with the actual world in which the journalist must ponder every word.

Afterwards, the journalist remarks that he had been influenced too much by his own emotions and that he had framed the news in an unfair way, in such a way that was too much shifted on the emotional side;

(8) 0545-0556 in this point in which the parents had this feeling/ I reformulate it differently/ this does not add anything/ because she says it also in the interview/ ***and it would have been too heavy***/ *so a bit too much on the track of the emotions/ it says something that/ in the end I have already said*/ here the mother hopes/ that they can reach a

total sentence for the driver/ so that then even from the insurance of the driver/ they can receive some money

Again, in this passage it is interesting to notice the presence of downward counterfactual reasoning; the journalist hypothesizes a worse scenario in which the news is presented as redundant and emotionally heavy for the audience. In this case we observe a chain of subordinate arguments that the journalist uses to give always more specific reasons of why a different reformulation was the only possible alternative to reach a better goal, namely producing an interesting but not too heavy item. Indeed, reformulating the mother's statements about her feelings was the best alternative to reach the main goal of not being heavy and redundant. In Figure 15 I show the locus from final cause and alternatives;



Figure 15. It would have been different (worse) if the interview had not been reformulated because the interview would have been redundant in terms of audience emotive uptake.

The reasoning works as follows: if *a)* reformulating a piece of interview in a different way from what was already said and not reformulating it are two alternatives when a journalist composes a news piece and if *b)* journalists have the goal of not producing heavy and redundant news pieces for their audience (endoxa); if *a)* we have chosen to reformulate the interview differently which has led not to produce a heavy and redundant news piece for the audience (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible too choose not to reformulate differently the interview and it would have led to produce a heavy and redundant news piece (simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, among the two alternatives we have chosen the one that has led not to produce a redundant and heavy news piece, disregarding the alternative that would have led to produce it (first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). The latter acts as a minor premise, whose major premise is "if between two alternatives X,Y in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X". This leads to the conclusion that "we have chosen the better alternative, disregarding the worse one". This final conclusion coincides with a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead the audience to experience relief.

After his becoming conscious of this, the journalist reconsiders the priorities of his item that according to his new viewpoint should be less emotionally charged and more informative about the actual sequence of events. In the light of this new reconsideration, the piece of news that is believed to be too much shifted on the emotional track and that would strike too much the audience is considered useless, since it does not add any relevant information for the audience comprehension of the actual sequence characterizing the event.

All these excerpts of the retrospective verbal protocol have shown the journalist's awareness of having framed the news in a slightly unfair way and his consequent desire to give a rebalanced, fair view of the event, more comprehensive of all factors at stake, aiming at conveying a critical view of the news.

9.6 Conclusions of the case study

Concluding, in this Chapter, I have focused on the way in which journalists reason on the audience emotive uptake in TV-journalism, *i.e.* on journalists' anticipatory inferences concerning audience emotive uptake, which determine an explicit framing of the news piece, that is highlighted by specific argumentative and linguistic choices in the news.

The analysis of the whole intertextual chain has shown that journalists continuously struggle between capturing the audience attention on the one side and conveying a balanced view of the event on the other side. In this case of study it is clear that journalists have implemented a strategic maneuver (for more details on strategic maneuver see 4.2.1). The rhetorical dimension inevitably affects the argumentativeness of the news products, provoking a strategic maneuvering between *a)* the needs of criticality and *b)* the wish to capture the audience attention. Journalists want to be at the same time reasonable and effective; in order to do that, they make three distinct types of choices.

Firstly, they make specific topical choices: the arguments concerning the fictive speed limits, acting on regret, represent the main sources for justifying the journalist's overall standpoint that the driver is the only guilty. Hence, the car driver is presented as a hit-and-run driver who *could* choose to go slower and who has destroyed the life of a whole family: the audience is induced to think that he could have actually decided to go slower. However, at the same time, journalists also attempt to produce an item that conveys a more rebalanced view of the situation, namely diminuishing the guilt attributed to the driver, for example by changing the linguistic label from *Unfallverursacher* (causer of the accident) into *Autofahrer* (car driver). Counterfactual reasoning plays a fundamental role in inducing the audience to feel regret for the possibility to avoid the accident.

Secondly, journalists have chosen "how to adapt the argumentative moves made in the strategic maneuver to meet the 'audience demand', the requirements pertinent to the audience that is to be reached" (Van Eemeren 2010: 94). The journalists aim at capturing the audience attention, by highlighting emotional aspects of the dramatic story, also via usage of many concessive counter-argumentation, as I have shown in sub-section 9.4.

Thirdly, journalists make a very peculiar usage of presentational techniques in this news item. Indeed, all arguments in the final news piece support the standpoint in favor of the full guilt of the driver and of the victimization of the girl and of her family: they are presented in a manner that makes the driver's guilt more prominent. Indeed, all journalists' standpoints or sub-standpoints are then supported by further arguments gained from interviews with the family members. In the end, we can say that journalists dispose arguments in such a way that is more strategic for reaching the journalistic purpose of capturing the audience attention.

10. "If only I had…": Journalists' use of unrealized better scenarios in evaluating past editorial choices

10.1 A journalist negatively evaluates a previous news piece and imagines a better unrealized outcome: the BEBE case[43]

The case of study that I analyze in this Section is based on a Monday morning editorial conference at *CdT*, held on the 21st January 2013. As it is usual in morning editorial conferences, the daily topics of the newspaper are organized and the items of the previous newspaper are evaluated. The case involves a long argumentation by one journalist (MF) focussing on the evaluation of news piece from the previous week about the abandonment of a newborn in Tessin. This evaluation is supported by many counterfactual arguments; more specifically, these arguments consider past hypothetical better unrealized alternatives, being therefore upward counterfactual reasonings (McMullen, Markman & Gavanski 1995: Roese 1994). This negative evaluation is preceded by the journalist's positive evaluation of a news' piece concerning Lugano's cathedral: according to him the news on the cathedral has been handled in the right way, since journalists have paid enough attention to a theme that concerns citizens' life and have deepened it. This is seen as perfectly congruent with the function of the local journalist, as we can read in the extract below:

(1) 0001-0010 MF: I would like to make some observations/ i agree with what you have said on the service on the cathedral/ it is an interesting service and we should do others/ starting from the observations of citizens' life/ **beyond the news coming from press releases** and so on/ what interest us is to talk about things that people grasp/ and

[43] cst_cdt_130121_1030bernasconi_ed disc1.

than people take care and we should develop them/ this is a classical example but there are many others/ the **function of the local journalist is also that of having this sensitiveness/ and not only the function of reporting news**

In **Error! Reference source not found.** I show the argumentative reconstruction in support of the positive evalutation:



Figure 60. Argumentation in favor of the standpoint 'The service of the cathedral is interesting and we should make others starting from the observations of citizens' life'.

Immediately after this digression on the news of the cathedral, MF introduces his negative evaluation of the news on the abandoned baby. Indeed, he uses the positive evaluation of the news on the cathedral (**Error! Reference source not found.**) as a starting point for criticizing the way in which the past item on the abandoned baby had been handled. MF says that he had found perplexing the way in which the news of the abandonment of the baby had been handled by the editorial team.

He argues that the way in which this news was handled was doubly wrong; firstly, it was a mistake because the other local newspaper 'La Regione' had handled it one day before in comparison to them, and secondly it was a mistake because they had not

developed the news in many ways and they did not write the news in an empathic way, as we can read in the following excerpt of the editorial conference:

(2) 0011-0038 the second thing I must say is that **it has left me very perplexed/ how we have handled the news of the baby/** look that **we have made a mistake/ because it has been la regione to handle it first/ and then the day after we have mistaken the service/** when one year and a half we have presented the **new guidelines of the corriere/** there was a very important and simple sentence/ that said that **we should give more we should also think to the emotive emotional aspect of the news/** we do not have to become sensationalist/ but this was the news about which everyone was speaking/ not only us but the whole Canton/ a news that has hit people and that emotions/ even though it is true that the next day we have deepened tha religious topic/ **this was a thing that should have been developed in many ways**/ we **should have made** the interview to the psychologist to say why one **does** that/ some website has done this/ **a piece of someone with an appeal to sensibility** and say/ but **how is it possible that I cannot** have a child/ how **can one do something** like that/ the precedents what happens in the other countries and in other cantons/ if there are the wheels of the abandoned babies/ […]/ if you understand that it hits people's sensitiveness/ is is so strange and new in Tessin/ that it should have been prepared in a distinct manner

The issue at stake is 'was the way in which we handled the news of the baby good?', and the discussion is elementary, with MF's standpoint 'the way in which we handled the news of the abandonment of the baby has left me perplexed' opposed by a doubt that the other journalists may not agree. MF's standpoint is supported by a multiple argumentation (Figure). Differently from the news on the cathedral, that was not a simple report of facts

and that was emotionally charged, the news on the abandoned baby has been perceived by MF as a pure reporting without any empathic emphasis. As previously said, the negative evaluation of the news of the baby stems from the very fact that the news was handled first by *La Regione* (and hot topics should be handled quickly and in preview by a prestigious newspaper). What is more, the negative evaluation is accentuated by the fact that not only the journalists published the news in delay after another newspaper, but also they handled the news in a wrong way, since they did not develop it in many ways. In fact, they did not insert; *a)* an interview with the psychologist that explains which are the psychological reasons that induce a mother to make such an apparently illogical and unreasonable gesture, *b)* an interview with a woman that cannot have children and *c)* they did not recall similar cases occurred in other Cantons and and/or in other countries. In Figure I show the whole argumentative reconstruction of MF's digression;



Figure 61. Argumentation supporting 'The way in which we handled the news of the abandonment of the baby has left me perplexed'. Blue arrows indicate the lines of argument whose inferential configuration I analyze.

Here we notice that a coordinative argumentation supports the journalist's negative evaluation (1.1a-1.1b). The second line of argument (1.1b), which acts as an evaluative sub-standpoint supported by six argumentative lines (1.1b.1 to 1.1b.6), is the most developed one, since the journalist believes that the editorial team had the possibility to publish a news of higher quality. Moreover, that a news piece could have been handled in a more empathic way is not only a mere epistemic belief in the journalist's mind, but rather it is an expectation, since *CdT* journalists have the duty and the goal of publishing empathic news pieces according to *CdT* guidelines. Furthermore, there is also the

prediction that a news written following *CdT* guidelines will have a positive impact on the audience. Therefore, in MF's mind "it was possible not to handle it in a wrong and unempathic way" becomes "that the news should not have been handled in a wrong an unempathic way". All the subordinate arguments (1.1b.1-2-3-4-5-6) give reasons for MF's evaluation that the news has been handled in a wrong way. In the first argumentative line (1.1b.1) the journalist relies on the authority given by *CdT* newsroom editorial guidelines. The second argumentative line (1.1b.2) acts on the acknowledged fact that news with topics that interest many people should be handled in an accurate way by definition: this news had a widespread and strong impact on the whole Canton. The third argumentative line (1.1b.3), all focused on upward counterfactual reasoning, deals with the journalist's regret of not having developed the news in many productive ways. Here, the counterfactual is of deontic nature, signalling the editorial team's failure of not having handled in a deep and articulated way a news that makes appeal to sensitiveness: journalists have infringed one of their professional duties.

The argumentative lines 1.1b.4 and 1.1b.5 refer to the importance of editorial strategies that should lead to fulfill the newspaper's mission. The fourth argumentative line (1.1b.4) is very interesting and is entirely based on upward counterfactual reasoning; the journalist criticizes the sterile way in which the editorial team has handled the emotional news and he considers the emotive impact that an emotive news –handled in a proper way- could have had on the audience. According to him, a news that hits people's sensitiveness should be carefully prepared and deepened; here, again, the journalist makes the endoxon 'if you grasp that a hypothetical news touches people's sensitiveness, you should prepare it in a different way' explicit. The fifth argumentative line (1.1b.5) is focused on the unproductivity of publishing something analogous to what has been published on the websites; here, MF explicitly states that in that way the newspaper mission fails, being it contradicted by not publishing original and in preview news. Therefore, journalists experience regret for 'not having published something different from what websites had published on the day before'.

Again, in the sixth argumentative lines (1.1b.6), the journalist makes appeal to the lack of empathy and to its consequences, in a similar way as in the fourth argumentative

line (1.1b.4): the focus is on the fact that the empathic news should be put in the front page.

As a whole, MF's argumentation serves the function of shifting the editorial team's attention from the previous mistaken news to new ways of improving future news that may easily touch people's sensitiveness.

10.2 "We have made a mistake in handling the news": opposition to an editorial norm

If we look at the argumentative line 1.1 b.1>1.1b, we notice that it is all focused on the mistake made by not having followed the guidelines of the newspaper. This is a focal argumentative move, since it contains one of the fundamental reasons given for the fact that the news was handled in a wrong way; therefore, I analyse its inferential configuration (Figure). In this case the journalist applies a reasoning from opposition.



Figure 62. We have made a mistake in handling the news since the article has been published without following *CdT* guidelines.

In this inferential configuration it is interesting to notice that the *endoxon* is made explicit, indeed the journalist states that they should have thought more to the emotional aspects following *CdT* guidelines. *Endoxa* are generally made explicit when they are weak or when the arguer feels the necessity to remember them to the community to which he is talking, as in this case. If newspaper items must be published following editorial guidelines and if *CdT* guidelines state that emotional aspects must be included in news (*endoxon*), and if the article on the abandoned baby has been published without following *CdT* guidelines that state the need to include emotional aspects (*datum*), then publishing an article with such characteristics is the contrary of what is required by *CdT* (first conclusion). The first conclusion acts as minor premise of a topical syllogism that relies on the locus from opposition, from where the maxim is drawn that 'if P is a requirement for correctness, and Q entails not P, then Q is wrong, incorrect'. Therefore, they conclude that they have made a mistake in handling the news (final conclusion).

10.3 Remedying to the error: looking forward by looking backward

Now I will focus on the the third argumentative line (1.1b.3) and on the sixth argumentative line, which are the most important ones in order to understand the crucial role played out by arguments based on upward counterfactual reasoning in supporting a negative evaluative standpoint referred to some editorial decisions taken by journalists.

Focusing on the third argumentative line (1.1b.3) and subordinate arguments, it is interesting to notice that the journalist uses four counterfactual arguments (as it is shown in the argumentative reconstruction in Fig. 81) in order to support his negative evaluation concerning how they have handled the news of the baby. By using so many times counterfactual reasoning, the journalist asks his colleagues to compare two distinct worlds. He asks his colleagues to imagine a past world, namely the world in which the wrong decision has been made and a present world in which there is the possibility to remedy. In re-experiencing the past, the journalist considers an hypothetical better alternative (handling a news in an empathic and emotional way) that was possible at the moment of the editorial decision (*CdT* guidelines state that news must pay attention to people's sensitiveness) and that has been omitted. This omission of the concrete possibility to choose the other alternative is what causes him to feel regret; indeed, as I have explained in section 8.7, regret depends on the availability of counterfactual alternatives at the time in which the choice has been made. In fact, if an agent assumes that no alternative were available at the time of the decision-making process, he should not feel regret. The journalist MF identifies *a posteriori* some alternatives that were in principle 'available' at the time of the editorial decision, thinking to the development of the news in many ways. In particular, journalists 'should have put an interview with the psychologist in order to explain *the reason why* the mother does that' (1.1b.3.1), they 'should have put a piece of someone with an appeal to sensitiveness like the deposition of a mother' (1.1b.3.2), they 'should have put past analogous cases' (1.1b.3.3). With reference to the argument 1.1b.3.1, the journalist stresses the importance of giving a reason in order to explain why a mother may abandon her baby, therefore demonstrating to have perfectly understood the audience

expectancy for a reason. As I have said above, in lines 1.1b4-5 the journalist abandonds the use of the past tense used in argumentative lines 1.1b.3 and shifts to the present tense '*we should*' '*the mission fails*' (1.1b.4-5). In this argumentation it is interesting to notice a shift in verbal tense; in a first moment we find a counterfactual reasoning expressed with the past tense "*we should have developed*, *we should have put*…" (1.1b.3), whereas in a subsequent moment we notice the use of the present tense "if you *grasp* that a hypothetical news *touches* people's sensitiveness, you *should prepare* it in a different way" (1.1b.4) and " if the day after you *publish* something.. the mission *fails*" (1.1b.5). The co-presence of the two verbal tenses in the same argumentative discussion allows the journalist himself and the recipients to have access to two worlds of inferencing simultaneously: the past in which an error about a news piece was made and the present in which some other alternative is imagined in order to remedy the mistake. By actualizing the past mistake and by actualizing a situation that occurred in the past, the journalist embeddes the past experience within the present moment of enunciation. This is done in such a way that the past situation is made present by the act of talking (*if you grasp that…/ the mission fails*). In this case the whole editorial team experiences St. Augustine's "present of past things" in memory as well as "present of present things" in straight perception (Confessions XI: 20; Lyons 1977: 811). To be more precise, the pragmatics of irrealis in evaluative editorial conferences must be examined within the higher purpose of the activity type at stake, namely evaluating past items in order to produce better future news pieces that fulfil the insitutional mission of the newsroom. The justapposition of a past counterfactual world and of an actualized past which becomes present requires this sort of double-perception or double-experience described by St. Augustine and Lyons (Jauss 1982: 92). Therefore, in evaluative editorial conferences in which there is a negative evaluation of a past item, the use of upward counterfactual reasoning and of irrealis may be productive and may deal as a trigger for finding new solutions and for not repeating previous mistakes. By contrast, I will show in chapter 11 (subsection 11.5) that when downward counterfactual reasoning is used in evaluative editorial discussions in order to support a positive evaluative standpoint, it is not instrumental, but rather it simply deals to confirm the positive esit and evaluation of a past item, and it acts as a reinforcer that does not foster further discussion.

As a whole, we can conclude that the whole argumentative discussion is not simply a veiled suggestion to the editorial team, but rather it is a request for action to produce better news pieces in future, therefore demonstrating the productive role that upward counterfactual reasoning may have by opening the path to new scenarios by learning from past mistakes.

At this point, I analyse the inferential configuration of the argumentative line 1.1b.3.1> 1.1b.3 . The third argumentative line is a crucial one, since it focuses on the actual ways in which the news could have been improved and that have been disregarded or omitted. His counterfactual reasoning is based on a locus from final cause and alternatives.

The locus from final cause and alternatives is shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** below :



Figure 63. We have mistaken the news because we should have developed the news in many ways, and it would have been better.

If *a)* developing the news in many ways and not developing it are alternative actions when one agent composes a news piece and if *b)* the goal of journalists when they compose a news piece is to have a high emotive impact on the audience (*endoxa*); if *a)* journalists have chosen not to develop the news in many ways, which has led not to have a high emotive impact on the audience (factual datum), and if *b)* it was possible to choose to develop the news in many ways and it would have led to have a high emotive impact on the audience (simulative datum and retrospective prediciton), then among the two alternatives journalists have chosen the one that does not realize the goal of having a high emotive impact on the audience, disregarding the alternative that would have le realized it (first conclusion). The conjunction of endoxa and data, resulting in the first conclusion gives rise to an invalidation of positive expectation. The first conclusion functions as a minor premise of a topical syllogism that stems from the locus from final cause and alternatives, from where the maxim is derived that "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X". Thus, the final conclusion is drawn that we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one (the news would have had a high emotive impact on the audience if it had been developed in many ways). This is a negative evaluative standpoint that may lead the journalists to experience possible regret. At this point of the analysis it has become clear why the journalist believes that the news was a mistake: the core of the negativity is bound to the journalists' disregard of potential better alternatives.

10.4 'If only we had written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart in an empathic way'

Again, in the sixth argumentative line, we find another counterfactual argument: 'we should have written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart in an empathic way' (1.1b.6). Here, the arguer does not focus on the potential better content of the news as in the argument 1.1b.3, but rather he chooses to focus on the potential better – and unrealized- disposition of the article and on the empathic attitude that could have been

conveyed: the article could have been put in the front page and written with an empathic way and this was not the case. In Fig. 64 I show the inferential nature of this counterfactual argumentation, based on a locus from final cause and alternatives:



Figure 64. We have mistaken the news because it would have been different (better) if we had written a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude.

If *a)* writing a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude when a news deals with an emotive topic and not writing it are alternative actions when one agent composes a news item and if *b)* the goal of journalists when they compose a news item is to have a high emotive impact on the audience (*endoxa*); if *a)* journalists have chosen not to write a nice piee in the front page with an empathic attitude, which has not led to have a high emotive impact on the audience (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible to choose to write a nice piece in the front page with an empathic attitude and it would have led to have a high emotive impact on the audience (simulative datum and retrospective

prediction), then among the two alternatives we have chosen the one that does not realize the goal of having a high emotive impact on the audience, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it (first conclusion and invalidation of positive expectation). The first conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim 'if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X' (maxim from the locus from final cause and alternatives), and conjoined with it allows to infer the final conclusion 'we have chosen the worse alterantive disregarding the better one' Again, this is a negative evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience regret. In particular, as in every argument based on counterfactual reasoning, a part of the datum is simulative: this means that it is not an actual evidence, but rather it is a simulative evidence. A simulative datum can be considered a datum, since it concerns an alternative that has not been chosen, but that was *possible* and present at the time of the decision. In the case of upward counterfactual reasoning, considering better unrealized hypothesis, the datum coincides with a possible better unrealized state of affairs.

In this case we observe an upward counterfactual reasoning of deontic nature: "we should have written an empathic news and put it in the front page ..". Indeed, a given editorial value (interesting news should be developed in many ways and should be put in the front page) acts as a norm to which the journalist should adhere. The journalists have infringed an editorial norm and thus MF feels legitimate to negatively evaluate the past news piece. Indeed, in all his counterfactual arguments the journalist repeats six times the deontic verb *should* (*the news should have been developed in many ways*, *we should have put an interview*, *we should have put a piece of someone with an appeal to sensitiveness*, *we should have written a nice piece in the front page written with the heart*). The negative evaluative standpoint referred to an evaluation that is directed to the self (***we*** *have made a mistake*…) is supported by an argument based on upward counterfactual reasoning of deontic nature and induces regret in the other journalists.

This missed opportunity that could have been gathered clearly induces to feel regret, which is worsened by the "self attributed responsibility for one's choice", which is a very important component of this emotion, as stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli (Castelfranchi

and Miceli 2014: 94). In the analysed discussion the frame of the regret dominates, and this is witnessed not only by the counterfactual reasoning but also by the presence of linguistic markers such as the verbs *left perplexed*, *mistake*, *make a mistake*, *fail* and prepositional phrases such as *in a better way*, *in a different way*: all these linguistic markers imply a comparison between two distinct states of affairs, that in this case are the actual negative one and the better and unrealized –but possible- one.

With reference to the feeling of regret, even though MF is not responsible in first person for the mistaken news on the abandoned baby, he assumes the full responsibility of it, being he part of the editorial board, which is considered as a unique *kritès* in terms of editorial decisions. In particular, he feels responsible for the whole editorial board because he believes that the journalists had the "power to avoid the negative outcome and to opt for a better alternative", which is a crucial point in the mechanism of self-attributed responsibility (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 94). In this discussion it is clear that the journalist is aware of the impact of certain editorial choices on the audience: the journalist is perfectly aware that a better structured and empathic article would have had a better impact on the audience. In Figure I show the newspaper article that has been the object of MF's criticism, in order to illustrate the the unempathic and unemotional attitude and the purely reporting style with which the news was written.

Besso **La madre resta agli arresti**

Prosegue a ritmo sostenuto l'inchiesta sul neonato abbandonato in via Montarina
La ventottenne, detenuta e in stato confusionale, sarà sottoposta a perizia medica

Il giudice dei provvedimenti coercitivi ha confermato l'arresto della giovane madre del neonato trovato abbandonato in una busta di plastica e in un grave stato di ipotermia, mercoledì scorso da una pattuglia della Polizia comunale di Lugano all'interno di un'auto posteggiata in via Montarina a Besso. La donna, 28 anni cittadina svizzera difesa dall'avvocato Olivier Ferrari, dopo essere stata fermata è stata visitata da uno psichiatra e si trova in una situazione di grande confusione dando segni evidenti di non aver ancora compreso la gravità del gesto compiuto. Proprio per questo motivo verrà con tutta probabilità sottoposta nei prossimi giorni a una perizia medica con l'obiettivo di comprendere se era in grado di intendere e volere al momento dei fatti e se soffra di qualche patologia o forma di depressione. Intanto l'inchiesta coordinata dalla PP Marisa Alfier prosegue a ritmo sostenuto. Tra le ipotesi di reato a carico della 28-enne, come noto, vi sono quelle di tentato omicidio e tentato infanticidio. Si tratta tuttavia di una vicenda difficile e insolita dal profilo giuridico per cui non si esclude che possa cambiare la fattispecie che si configurerà a dipendenza degli sviluppi della vicenda.
La donna in sede di interrogatorio aveva dichiarato di non aver avuto intenzione di fare del male al bimbo o di ucciderlo ma di voler solo nasconderlo, che non si sapesse della sua esistenza. E proprio sui motivi per cui la 28.enne abbia tentato in ogni modo di celare il proprio stato di ragazza madre si stanno ora concentrando gli inquirenti, ricostruendo il contesto sociale e familiare dell'imputata, il suo passato, le sue relazioni.
Tra le piste battute da polizia e magistratura – come anticipato sull'edizione di sabato – vi è anche quella religiosa. La giovane donna potrebbe infatti aver voluto celare la presenza del bimbo a familiari e conoscenti. In questo ambito non si esclude che possa aver subito pressioni importanti da parte di persone a lei vicine, legate alla fede e al fatto di essere una ragazza madre. Pressioni talmente insistenti da spingerla in un momento di spaesamento e forte disagio personale al grave atto d'incuria. Parallelamente resta però aperta anche una seconda ipotesi, quella della depressione postparto: la giovane avrebbe infatti dato alla luce il bimbo in totale autonomia senza ricorrere a nessuna forma di assistenza sanitaria. Dopo la nascita sarebbe tornata tranquillamente a lavorare, lasciando il bimbo incustodito.
Quest'ultimo, ritrovato in grave stato di ipotermia, era stato affidato dagli agenti di polizia alle cure dei sanitari della Croce Verde che avevano immediatamente provveduto a ricoverarlo al reparto di neonatologia dell'Ospedale Civico. Le sue condizioni di salute sono fortunatamente velocemente migliorate al punto che, già venerdì, il bebè era stato dichiarato fuori pericolo. Sul suo destino dovranno ora esprimersi i servizi sociali che ne decideranno l'eventuale affidamento. GI.M/GR

FUORI PERICOLO Il bebè trovato in grave stato di ipotermia è ora fuori pericolo. Sul suo destino dovranno esprimersi i servizi sociali. *(Foto Keystone)*

ROMA-LUGANO

Riciclaggio: processo CPC rinviato

L'udienza preliminare prevista nei giorni scorsi a Roma per le ipotesi di reato di associazione a delinquere finalizzata al riciclaggio relativa al procedimento penale a carico di Banco Desio Lazio e del Credito Privato Commerciale (CPC) di Lugano, entrambe gruppo Banco Desio, e di alcuni dipendenti dei due istituti, è stata rinviata per la terza volta (la prima risale al marzo 2012, la seconda il 5 ottobre scorso) al 19 aprile prossimo. L'accusa riguarda in particolare una dozzina di quadri superiori del gruppo che, tra il 2008 e il 2009, avrebbero costituito un'associazione a delinquere finalizzata al riciclaggio per aiutare clienti facoltosi a esportare 20 milioni non dichiarati al fisco. Tra gli indagati c'è anche un ex dirigente della CPC di Lugano, l'istituto di credito di via Zurigo finito in liquidazione dopo la mancata fusione con una società di Agno, e all'epoca dei fatti contestati controllato da Banco Desio, che ora balzato alle cronache nel luglio scorso dopo il licenziamento di 27 dipendenti.

Figure 65. News piece on the abandoned baby published on *CdT*.

As we can see, the item has a cold title '*The mother remains under arrest*' and the highlight points at reporting the developments of the inquiry and at explaining the mental conditions of the woman: '*The inquiry on the abandoned baby in Montarina street continues apace. The 28-years-old woman, incarcerated and in confusion will undergo a medical examination*'. Therefore, we can notice that already in the title and highlight journalists have chosen a purely reporting style. The whole item is constructed around the

developments of the inquiry and on the minor or major guilt that should be attributed to the woman depending on the psychiatric reports and on the police's interrogatories.

Concluding, this case of study has enabled to gain evidence that counterfactual reasoning and irrealis in general are a fundamental strategy used by journalists in the persuasive rhetoric of their editorial conferences. The case of study has shown that thanks to counterfactual reasoning the journalist makes a request to the other journalists, namely that of thinking to future possibilities of improving the way in which similar news pieces should be handled. The other journalists can imagine and anticipate how the past item could have looked in the present and how a future similar news should be treated in a more fruitful way, therefore experiencing St. Augustine's "present of future things" as well as his "present of past things" (Confessions XI: 20; Lyons 1977: 811). The editorial team can recall the past into the actual present existence and can reflect on better options to choose in future similar situations. It is an invitation to reflect and to inference, in such a way that widens the number of choices, giving the possibility to elaborate a better – and previously unexplored- solution in future.

11. Journalists applying distinct types of counterfactual reasoning

11.1 Editorial norms' infringement determining upward counterfactual reasoning

Similarly to the BEBE case, the case of study that I present in this subsection (the ACCI case[44]) illustrates a case of journalists' consideration of unrealized better alternatives in the evaluation of a previous item's editorial choices. In particular, in the case under investigation a journalist negatively evaluates the fact that the editorial team has given too little prominence to a quite important news concerning a railway accident occurred in another Swiss Canton. Indeed, this news has been put in a picture news (it. *fototesto*), which is a particular component of *Corriere del Ticino*'s front page, and which is usually used to insert news that do not have great importance. More specifically, as defined by Zampa and Bletsas, the picture news is a multimodal component "made up by a visual component (a photograph) and a textual component (a title and a caption)" (Zampa and Bletsas 2018). This discussion about the low importance given to this news by putting it in the picture news has occurred during a morning editorial conference at *Corriere del Ticino*, which has taken place on January 10, 2013. The participants to the argumentative discussion are three journalists: MC, FB and X1. During this editorial conference the journalist MC argues that the choice they made to put a picture news on the railway accident was wrong. According to her, the whole editorial team has underestimated the event of the railway accident; as we can read in the excerpt of the editorial conference below, the journalist uses a collective "we" that includes the whole editorial team and that considers it as a unique entitiy to which full responsibility for what has happened can be attributed, even though it is the Conferedation desk that is responsible for the news from the other Cantons and for the whole Switzerland. According to Margaret Gilbert, a joint commitment and a shared responsibility are at stake when we use the collective "we"

[44] the ACCI case: cst_cdt_130110_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx.

(Gilbert: 2014), as it becomes clear from reading the following excerpt of the editorial conference of the ACCI case;

(1) 0003-0019 MC **we have a bit underestimated the railway accident**/ to put a picture news on such a railway accident/ that is happened in Switzerland in which there are twentyseven injured persons/ according to me **it's not enough/** FB: twentyseven slightly injured/ let's say that between picture news and the opening of La Regione/ there is a middle way/ MC: the splash is perhaps excessive but it is not what i thought/ **but i always make this reasoning/ if this thing had happened in Tessin/ i wanted to see if we would have put it in a picture news/** eh **however the sense of the operation is the same/ there is a crash/** there is a railway line that is very congested and it is blocked/ there are people that have had a ugly time/ X1: let's say that in our layout either you choose the splash/ or you give this emphasis here [with picture news] there is nothing in the middle honestly

At the beginning, the issue at stake is thus 'was it a bad choice to choose to use a picture news for the news on the railway accident?', with MC's standpoint 'it was not a good choice to use a picture news for the news of the railway accident'. Then, FB intervenes by saying '0008-0009 ***let's say*** that ***between*** picture news and the opening of La Regione/ there is a ***middle way***', therefore opening the path for a shift of the issue. The newspaper *La Regione* has made a full page opening and the journalist FB compares it with *CdT*' s picture news to say that even though *La Regione* has exaggerated, *CdT*'s picture news was not adequate, and other types of handling the news staged inbetween a full page opening and a picture news could have been used. Indeed, the issue becomes "was it the only possible choice to use a picture news for the news on the railway accident?". MC does not pick up FB's invitation to reformulate

the standpoint and conceives FB's words as an objection (0010 **the splash is perhaps excessive but *it is not what i thought***). Therefore, she continues to put forth arguments in order to support the fact that it was a bad choice to use a picture news for the news of the railway accident. Afterwards, X1 advances the standpoint that 'let's say that in our layout either you choose the splash/ or you give this emphasis here [with picture news] there is nothing in the middle honestly 0018-0019'. According to X1 the choice was due to the fact that they had no other available alternative layout at their disposal. MC and X1 have two misaligned standpoints that are interdependent but that answer two distinct issues. MC's standpoint is supported by multiple argumentation, as we can see in Figure :



Figure 66. Argumentation supporting MC's standpoint 'the way in which we handled the news on the railway accident was wrong'.

Firstly, MC states that the editorial team has underestimated the news of the railway accident (1) because it has been wrong to put a picture news on a railway accident happened in Switzerland where there are twenty-seven injured (1.1); there is a traffic congested railway line and it is blocked (1.1.1) and there are people that have suffered a lot (1.1.2). In the second argumentative line MC argues that the news would have been handled differently (more prominence would have been given to the news) if the accident had happened in Ticino (1.2).

I zoom on the counterfactual argument, since it is the focal argumentative move that enables us to understand why the journalist negatively evaluates the way in which the news has been handled: here, MC applies a reasoning from final cause and alternatives, exactly as in every case of upward counterfactual reasoning.

In Figure I show the way in which the relationship between the standpoint and the argument 1.2 is accounted for from an inferential point of view by a locus from final cause and alternatives, in a similar way to the BEBE case.



Figure 67. It would have been different if the event had happened in Tessin because journalists would not have used a picture news and it would have been better.

Again, we notice that the locus from final cause and alternatives accounts for how a possible and disregarded alternative would have made a difference and how it would have produced a better result. Using a picture news or not using it for an important news are alternative courses of action when journalists compose a news piece and the goal of composing a news piece is to give prominence to important news (endoxa). The data can be subdivided in a factual datum and in a simulative datum; *a)* journalists have chosen to use a picture news, which has not led to give prominence to an important news occurred outside Tessin (factual datum) and *b)* it was possible to choose not to use a picture news for an important railway accident occurred outside Tessin and it would have led to give prominence to it (simulative datum and retrospective prediction). The conjunction of endoxa and data gives rise to a first conclusion, which is an invalidation of a positive expectation. The conjunction of the first conclusion and maxim derived from the locus from final cause and alternatives "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X" gives rise to the final conclusion that "we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one", which represents a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience possible regret.

Again, as in the BEBE case, it becomes clear that the negative evaluation is given taking into account the editorial more or less implicit norms or habitudes that journalists share in their community.

11.2 Journalists' negative evaluation of visual elements' choice in a past item[45]

In this sub-section I will show another case of study that is similar to the BEBE case and to the ACCI case; in fact, this case of study contributes to shed light on the argumentative foundation of counterfactuals in supporting negative evaluative standpoints referred to decisions taken by the journalists themselves.

[45] FOTO case, cst_cdt_130206_1030_editorial_discourse.1.docx.

The FOTO case is based on a discussion within a morning editorial conference at *CdT* that has taken place on February 2nd, 2013: the journalists evaluate a news piece published on the previous day. In this case the journalists discuss about whether it was a good choice or not to put a very old photo of Berlusconi and Maroni (two Italian politicians) as a splash of the foreign affairs section without a caption telling the moment in which the photo had been taken off. The vice-director LT argues that it was not a good choice, since according to him it gives a cheap idea of the newspaper and it has no sense since it is not understandable for readers; according to the journalist, the editorial team should have put a caption in order to make explicit the time in which the photo had been taken off. In terms of anticipation, this is a case of anticipation of the audience interpretation, acting on the illocutionary level according to the typology that I have shown in the theoretical section 5.3. Indeed, the omitted tagging line is conceived by the journalists as a semiotic tool, useful to enable the audience's understanding and contextualization, as it becomes clear by reading the excerpt below:

(2) 0001-0013 LT: i wanted to say that on **the photo that we have put on the opening of the foreign section/ honestly it is a photo of twenty years ago/** maroni has short pants and berlusconi does not have hairs/ it is very old/ due to the fact that we know that berlusconi's hairs grow again/ **my opinion is that honestly it gives a cheap idea of the newspaper**/ **we are not so poor we can find a photo of these days/** if we do not have the two of them together/ **we can put** berlusconi with maroni of these days in the square/ **i give a** look and/ **otherwise we should put a caption saying that it was them twenty years ago/** because **putting the photo in** this way it does not make sense/ if it is referred to those days it is fine otherwise we should explain

In this excerpt we notice that the journalist actualizes the past by using the counterfactual 'we should put a caption' instead of 'we should have put a caption',

even though he refers to a past decision. In this case the journalist applies an upward counterfactual thought, therefore imagining a better course of action that has not taken place (having put a caption under the old photo), which would have led to a better outcome (not giving an unprofessional idea of the newspaper to the audience and favoring a better comprehension by the audience of the reported event). This upward counterfactual reasoning follows some sentences that are uttered in the present tense ('if we do not have the two of them together/ we *can* put Berlusconi with Maroni of these days in the square/ I *give* a look and..'). The shift in tense provides a crucial function by allowing the journalists to have access to two worlds of inferencing simultaneously: the past one, in which the item was written and a mistake by avoiding to put a caption was made ('I wanted to say that on the photo that *we have put* on the opening of the foreign section'), and the present one, in which the journalist is evaluating the past item and has the possibility to find more functional solutions for the future. Furthermore, the present tense is used by the journalist when he is imagining the audience uptake, in a sort of re-experience of the past in view of future similar situations. The past experience is embedded and examined within the present moment of utterance, in view of the shared goals of the activity type 'evaluative editorial conference'. The past experience can be made present by the act of talking '*we can put.. / I give a look and…/ we should put a caption'*; the actualization of the past serves the function of examining past errors in the present time and to project their solution to future analogous situations.

As I have said, in order to anticipate a possible audience uptake, the journalist imagines to be a reader

(3) (`I give a look 0010`).

Furthermore, he speaks in the present tense for the most part of the discussion (`we can put Berlusconi and Maroni 0008-0009`), in order to argue about what they should have done in the past to make so that this photo was comprehensible to the audience. Here, it is interesting to notice that the journalist is already projected towards the future; indeed, the use of this present tense signals that he is trying to learn from the previous mistake of not having put a caption explaining

the different timing of picture and article under the photo. In Figure I show the argumentative reconstruction of LT's argumentation in favor of his negative evaluation.



Figure 68. Argumentative reconstruction of LT's argumentation of the negative evaluative standpoint 'Putting this old photo as a splash was not a good choice'.

As we can see, two are the focal parts of the argumentation: the first one is based on the mistake of having chosen a too old photo that conveys a poor idea of the newspaper (1.1), anticipating the emotive impact on the audience, whereas the second one is based on the counterfactual reasoning that is used to argue the very fact that it had no sense to put a photo in that disposition since a caption under the photo was missing (1.2). In the argumentative reconstruction shown in Fig. 91 I have used the past tense 'we should have

put a line' because the journalist refers to a past choice, even though actually he uses the present tense (`0011 otherwise we should put a caption saying that they were twenty years ago`), as previously said. The journalist believes that it was possible to choose to put a caption at the moment of the decision; nevertheless, it was a possible choice that has been omitted by the journalists of the Foreign affairs desk. LT's upward counterfactual reasoning is based on the locus from final cause and alternatives, as we can see in Fig. 69:



Figure 69. It could have been different (better) if journalists had put a caption under the photo because the article would have been more comprehensible.

If *a)* putting a caption under a photo taken in a distinct temporal moment and not putting it are alternative actions when one agent composes a news item and if *b)* the goal of composing a news item is to increase the audience comprehension (endoxa); if *a)* journalists have chosen not to put a caption under the photo taken in a distinct temporal moment, which has not led to increase the audience comprehension and if *b)* it was

possible to choose to put a caption under the photo taken in a distinct temporal moment and it would have led to increase the audience comprehension (data), then among the two alternatives journalists have chosen the one that does not realize the goal of increasing the audience comprehension, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it (first conclusion and invalidation of positive expectation). The conjunction of the first conclusion with the maxim from the loci from final cause and alternatives "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X", leads to the final conclusion that "we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one" (final conclusion). This coincides with the final positive evaluative standpoint that may lead the audience to experience relief.

This example has contributed to understand the mechanism at stake in upward counterfactual reasoning and has confirmed the observations made in the BEBE case and in the ACCI case; journalists' imagination of better forgone alternatives leads them to take into account the mistakes they have made for remedying or simply improving in future similar situations. Furthermore, evidence is given that a simulative datum can be considered a piece of evidence, since it is referred to a choice that *was possible* at the moment of the decision, even thoug it has been omitted.

11.3 Regret caused by upward counterfactual reasoning may be constructive: it may favor journalists' anticipatory activity and planning of future news

At this point of the analysis I propose a reflection on the functional and effective role played out by upward counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom. In order to do that I briefly explain when a counterfactual thought (either or not accompanied by regret) may be detrimental and when it may have advantages in terms of future planning. I shall start by saying that regret may entail a high rate of upward counterfactual reasoning, since the person experiencing it may be focused on 'what might have been and cannot be anymore', which according to some scholars may be associated with rumination (Rachman et al

2000), which is correlated with depression and anxiety (Cox et al. 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema 2000). However, there is also evidence that not all kinds of counterfactual reasoning are correlated with depressive symptoms; it has been highlighted that depressive symptoms were associated with counterfactual reasoning only when the the counterfactual alternative concerned an uncontrollable feature of the self, rather than controllable features, such as counterfactuals based on human actions (Markman and Miller 2006). Indeed, counterfactual reasoning may be useful and constructive or useless and unconstructive (Watkins 2008), depending on whether or not it enables to find out the reasons of one's mistake or suboptimal outcome (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 99).

Counterfactual reasoning may be detrimental if it does not help in identifying the reasons of one's mistake, and in particular, if it "fails to produce intentions (either because the foregone alternatives are no longer available or because one feels unable to pursue them)" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 99); in these cases one cannot but think about an hypothetical better alternative that is no possible anymore and that will not be possible in future similar conditions. For instance, a big error that has caused some consequences that cannot be remedied anymore, as in the TEMPO case, may cause rumination and may produce detrimental effects; journalists are aware of that and use this awareness to generate regret in the audience.

On the contrary, upward counterfactual thought may be constructive in the case that it is able to influence intentions. As suggested by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 99), "mistakes and the associated negative affect are likely to activate counterfactuals ('I should have done action *b* rather than *a*'), which in turn (whenever possible) activate intentions to perform specific actions and take specific decisions ('next time I will do *b*')" concerning the matter of the counterfactual reasoning (Smallaman and Roese 2009), and, as it is known from literature, intentions trigger behavior (e.g. Gollwitzer 1993, 1999; Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). This is the reason why we find a verbal tense shift (from past to present tense) in utterances that follow upward counterfactual reasoning in which a reason for the mistake can be identified; this is to due to the projection to the future. Therefore, upward counterfactual thought may have a positive function (accompanied or not by regret), since "*it improves subsequent problem solving and behavior aimed at*

obtaining better outcomes" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 100). In fact, a direct consequence of regret is modifying one's choice in similar future situations (Zeelenberg and Pieters 1999). As stated by Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014: 100), "the general principle of following *successful and maximizing* strategies and modifying unsuccessful (or less successful) ones, especially if sustained by *accurate* counterfactual reasoning, seems to serve a functional role".

Therefore, we can say that upward counterfactuals and regret may be productive in the newsroom. In fact, in all the three case studies on upward counterfactual reasoning presented above (BEBE case, ACCI case and FOTO case) we have observed that upward counterfactual reasoning leads journalists to the acknowledgement of their mistakes and to reconsider unrealized better alternatives that have been disregarded or omitted, but that can be considered for future similar situations. In those cases, 'journalists' learning by their mistakes' is highly beneficial, since they have the chance to understand what was wrong and could be different and thus they are fostered to think 'next time I will do in that other way that has not been the case this time'.

In the BEBE case (Section 10), as we have seen, the journalist feels regret when he negatively evaluates the past item, so that he focuses on the better foregone unrealized alternative. It is exactly *the awareness of the difference that could have been made* that could foster the journalist to activate that distinct course of action in a future analogous situation. In these cases the journalist will reason like that; 'next time when I will face an interesting event that touches people's sensitiveness, I will develop the news in many ways and write a nice piece in the front page written with the heart in an empathic way'. This hypothetical future purpose is strongly influenced –if not determined- by the content of the counterfactual thought and aims at maximizing successful editorial strategies; a hypothetical similar event will be developed in many ways and written in an empathic way.

Similarly, in the ACCI case (subsection 11.1), the journalist MC argues in favor of the negative evaluation of the past item concerning a railway accident in Switzerland, so that she focuses on the better foregone unrealized alternative. Again, the journalist is aware that a better choice could have been made at the moment of the editorial decision, because

there is an implicit editorial norm that regulates the way in which important events should be handled in terms of editorial layout ('we should not have used a picture news for such an important news and we could have done it'). This awareness could foster the journalist to activate the more functional course of action (not using a picture news for an important news- even though it occurs outside Tessin) in a future analogous news dealing with an important event that has not occurred in Tessin.

Also in the FOTO case, the journalist FB argues in favor of the negative evaluation of the past item. He focuses on the better alternative of having put a caption under a photo that would have made the timing more comprehensible. Again, the journalist is aware of the possibility that a better choice could have been made at the time of the editorial decision ('we should not have put an old photo without a caption and we could have not done it'), due to the presence of an implicit editorial norm that prescribes to contextualixe photos that have been taken off in a different temporal moment in respect with the reported event. This awareness could foster the journalist to activate a more functional course of action (putting a caption under an old photo) in a future analogous situation in which he deals with an old photo that has been taken off in a distinct timing from that of the news.

Concluding, all three case studies have shown that upward counterfactual reasoning dealing with journalists' anticipation of the audience uptake may improve problem solving and decision-making processes, since journalists' focus on unrealized better counterfactual situations leads them to take future decisions related to the content of the counterfactual thought 'next time I will do in this way that I have disregarded but that was preferable'. This serves the function of improving editorial practices and of reaching journalists' ultimate goal, namely promoting public understanding.

11.4 When counterfactuals do not trigger intentions as in the TEMPO case: 'journalists crying over spilled milk'

In this sub-section I illustrate the other side of the coin of counterfactual reasoning: its potentially detrimental effect. In order to do that, I will rely on the TEMPO case that has been analyzed in Chapter 9. In the TEMPO case journalists experience regret for the fact

that the accident could have been avoided if the car's speed had been lower and they are aware that conveying this feeling to the audience will increase the probability of producing a high emotive impact. In this case of study, upward counterfactual thought has distinct consequences than in the three other cases analyzed (BEBE, ACCI- and FOTO- case); in fact, in these three cases counterfactual thought had a beneficial effect on journalists' performance improvement, whereas in the TEMPO case counterfactual thought has a clear detrimental effect that induces to rumination. It is exactly this detrimental effect that represents journalists' main objective of communication and that represents the *leitmotiv* of the whole item; indeed, journalists speak in a excited way and many different times of the fact that if the speed was different the accident could have been avoided (see 9.2, 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 for the analysis of the editorial conference and of the other interviews), and the whole item is pervaded by the sense of 'what might have been if ...' (see 9.4 for the analysis of the item). In this case there are no beneficial effects of counterfactual thought, because neither journalists nor the audience can imagine a distinct course of action such as 'next time the driver will go slower and will avoid the accident'; the better alternative is no longer available. Furthermore, even hypothesizing a future scenario of another hypothetical accident with the same driver, the journalists could not decide to pursue the foregone better alternative; in fact, they cannot decide for the driver, because the driver's actions are not under their control. This is an evident case in which counterfactual thought is unconstructive, since the unattained goal (avoiding the accident) cannot be changed anymore. It is a dysfunctional thought that leads (both journalists and the audience) to rumination and psychological distress. It is journalists' awareness of this perceived 'ruminative regret' (*i.e.* repetitive counterfactual thought) induced by the possibility to avoid the accident that has led them to predict that the news highlighting the high speed would have had a higher emotive impact on the audience. What is more, in this case of study, the counterfactual argument is of epistemic nature 'the accident *could* have been avoided' focusing the attention on the possibility; on the contrary, in the BEBE case and in the FOTO case, the counterfactual argument is of deontic nature, as we have seen, since the journalist underlines the divergence from an implicit editorial norm.

11.5 Journalists considering unrealized worse alternatives and positively evaluating a past item in editorial conferences: two case studies concerning downward counterfactual reasoning

In this sub-section I analyze a different type of counterfactual reasoning from the one that I have shown in the TEMPO, in the BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case; in fact, in the above mentioned case studies I have analyzed upward counterfactual reasoning, whereas in this subsection I consider two cases of downward counterfactual reasoning (PEDO case[46] and FORM case[47]). Downward counterfactual reasoning implies the consideration of worse alternatives, and which stems from the avoidance of bad or suboptimal experiences. The two cases both deal with journalists' positive evaluation of past editorial choices supported by downward counterfactual thought. In looking at these two cases, following Markman et al. (2008), I will distinguish not only between upward and downward counterfactual reasoning (simulation directions), but also between simulation modes, namely between the evaluative versus reflective mode of simulation of counterfactual reasoning. The evaluative mode consists in the "individual's focusing on the outcome implied in mental simulation, which is used 'as a reference point against which to evaluate oneself or one's present situation' (Markman et al. 2008: 422)" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). On the contrary, when one assumes a reflective mode, one is centered on the counterfactual itself, and "temporarily experiences the counterfactual as it were real" (Markman et. al. 2008: 422). Put in terms of mental spaces, in the evaluative mode one focuses on the actual world, whereas in the reflective mode one focuses on the unreal world opened by the counterfactual, namely on *what might have happened*. This distinction will enable us to understand the way in which downward counterfactual arguments may determine journalists' positive evaluation of past editorial choices.

[46] cst_cdt_130131_1730_editorial_discourse_1.docx.

11.6 Downward counterfactual reasoning focusing on the better actual situation

The first case of downward counterfactual reasoning that I analyse in this section is the FORM case[48] and is based on a Monday morning editorial meeting at *CdT*. This case of study has been analyzed under a distinct perspective in the paper "Capturing editorial gatekeeping through the analysis of argumentation in editorial conference discussions" co-authored with Andrea Rocci and Marta Zampa (Luciani, Rocci, Zampa 2015) and in Zampa (2015): the analysis presented in the present case study are partly based on this work. The discussion starts with an utterance about possible observations on the ongoing topic of the newspaper proposed by the vice-editor in chief, who leads the editorial conference. The vice-editor in chief (X1) says:

(4) 0232 wanted to present an item for discussion

We are in front of a single mixed difference of opinion concerning a layout sample utilized for an interview in the Culture section. The issue is: "is the layout solution adopted in the interview OK?". The arguers advance two contrary standpoints. On the one side, X1 advances the subsequent standpoint: "the layout template adopted for the interview is not effective/ expedient".

[48] cst_cdt_130128_1030_editorial_discourse_1.docx.

SPETTACOLI

Di ritorno dal Sundance, parla del cinema indipendente USA, dei film italiani, di quelli svizzeri e dell'imminente «Primavera locarnese»

66° Festival del film Locarno 7–17 | 8 | 2013

UBS aet MANOR swisscom

«LA BELLA E LA BESTIA 3» Il manifesto del 66. Festival di Locarno, opera dello studio Jannuzzi Smith di Londra/Lugano, presentato sabato a Soletta.

L'INTERVISTA CARLO CHATRIAN

«L'America è ancora da esplorare»

Il direttore artistico del Festival di Locarno era alle Giornate di Soletta

Ottimo riscontro di pubblico e molti applausi per le numerose produzioni o coproduzioni ticinesi recenti (*La tua casa è la mia città, Il comandante e la cicogna, Tutto parla di te, Hannes «Pussy» Schmidhauser, Tutti giù*, per citare solo le principali) presentate tra venerdì e ieri alle 48. Giornate di Soletta. Manifestazione che – come di consueto – è coincisa con il primo appuntamento con i responsabili del Festival internazionale del Film di Locarno. Ecco cosa ci ha raccontato il neodirettore artistico Carlo Chatrian.

ANTONIO MARIOTTI

SOLETTA Lei è appena sbarcato dal Sundance Festival di Park City, che impressione le ha fatto?
«Per quel che riguarda i film che potrebbero interessarci, è ancora troppo presto per parlarne. Sundance sta evolvendo in modo molto interessante: è nato come strumento di promozione per il cinema indipendente, ma negli ultimi dieci anni il cinema indipendente è diventato il cinema americano *tout court* e quindi il Sundance ha dovuto differenziarsi. Nel concorso internazionale oggi si vedono film che vent'anni fa nemmeno sarebbero stati considerati indipendenti ma si trovano ancora produzioni realizzate con piccoli budget e senza star in modo veramente indipendente. Rimane quindi un sismografo dell'annata americana, anche se non c'erano ovviamente i grossi nomi come Tarantino o Kathryn Bigelow che fanno un altro percorso».

Alle grandi rassegne ci sono sempre meno produzioni delle major statunitensi

Un festival importante il Sundance perché Locarno punta a farsi conoscere ancora di più proprio negli USA?
«Sì, è un percorso che è già stato intra-

Da Sundance a... Soletta: quali sono i suoi rapporti con il cinema svizzero?
«Mi incuriosisce molto. È un cinema che conosco meglio in alcune sue parti, come il, documentario, mentre conosco meno il cinema di finzione e mi aspetto di avere delle risposte interessanti proprio dall'area germanofona».
Altro territorio ostico per Locarno, l'Italia...
«Sull'Italia ci sono due ragionamenti da fare: il primo è legato al periodo in cui si svolge Locarno, che non si può cambiare e che ci rende la vita molto complicata riguardo a molti film italiani, non tanto per la concorrenza di Venezia ma perché agosto è un periodo oggettivamente di chiusura totale in Italia. Anche qui però si è sviluppato un cinema indipendente che ha delle carte da giocare e che può interessarci. Da parte mia ci sono quindi un'attenzione e una sensibilità molto forti, ma non voglio certo ritrovarmi a prendere un film italiano tanto per prenderlo, senza che abbia le qualità e le caratteristiche di tutti gli altri selezionati».
Piazza Grande: croce o delizia?
«La vedo come uno spazio molto interessante. Per ciò che riguarda la programmazione mi piacerebbe avere una grande varietà di film, ma i film della Piazza devono soprattutto far bene al pubblico della Piazza più che al festival: riprendere due o tre film già passati altrove non sarà un dramma per me».
Ora siete impegnati anche nell'organizzazione de «L'immagine e la parola», il capitolo cinematografico della «Primavera Locarnese», in programma dal 24 al 27 marzo. Come procede?
«Mi pare nella giusta direzione, partendo dai due elementi dati – l'immagine e la parola – abbiamo pensato di svilupparli in senso didattico, da una parte con l'importante collaborazione di Castellinaria e dall'altra coinvolgendo allievi di scuole di cinema svizzere che parteciperanno a due atelier con altrettanti registi (Paolo Benvenuti e Richard Dindo) che presenteranno i loro nuovi film, che sono già scritti ma non ancora filmati, tra parola e immagine. Una fase molto interessante dove tutto è ancora possibile. Ci saranno poi degli eventi pomeridiani, legati o a scrittori o a film che hanno a che fare con la scrittura, e tre serate dedicate ad anteprime svizzere con una tavola rotonda finale al Monte Verità. Sarà un evento mirato soprattutto al territorio ma penso che, da come vanno le cose, ci sarà un interesse anche da parte della stampa svizzera e italiana».

Fig. 70. News item. The highlight is circled in red.

In the highlight of the interview piece one reads:

> **(5)** Di ritorno dal Sundance parla del cinema indipendente USA dei film italiani di quelli svizzeri e dell'imminente "primavera locarnese". [Coming back from Sundance Festival he talks about independent USA cinema, of Italian and of Swiss movies, and of the upcoming "Locarnese spring"].

The verb 'parla' (talks) lacks an explicit subject –which is perfectly fine according to Italian grammar as long as a clear subject can be attributed either anaphorically or deictically. In fact, X1 mainly criticizes the fact that the highlight comes before (in the

predicted reading order) the title. Therefore, according to this point of view, the identity of the quoted person is not comprehensible from the beginning. Undeniably, the subject of 'parla' in the highlight can be recognized afterwards in the reading process, presuming that one reads from top to bottom and from left to right.

On the other side, X2 (the responsible for the culture section), puts forward the standpoint that "the layout template adopted for the interview is ok/ not a problem". In excerpt (6) I show the part of X2's argumentation in favor of this standpoint:

(6)

X2: 0261 this is a template we use

[…]

0268-0269 allows to highlight various elements/ that you often cannot put into headlines

[…]

LT:
0293 I ask myself if it is opportune
0294
X2: ((laughs)) for me it can be abolished
0295 it's been used for years
0296 nobody ever raised this issue

[…]

0301 this graphical template has been approved
0302 by everybody I imagine
0303 I have not invented them ((laughs nervously))

LT:

0304 I have not said that they are not admitted
0305 I have said that I put the thing under discussion

X2:
0306 the problem is that
0307 it allows us to do a full-page opening
0308 with a photo
0309 that if we would put on five columns
0310 would be unacceptable
0311 this would swallow a lot more of text
0312 and we would only have a thin strip of text left
[…]
0316 this template is hard to dispense with

For the purpose of the present investigation I will focus only on the positive evaluative standpoint put forth by X2. The journalist X2 supports his standpoint via three argumentative lines as shown in Figure :



Figure 71. Argumentative reconstruction of the standpoint in favor of the chosen layout.

First of all, X2 proposes an argument that deals with the convenience of the used layout, which

(6) 0268-0269 allows to highlight various elements/ that you often cannot put into headlines.

What is more, he proposes another argument – that he repeats and further specifies three times – dealing with the idea that the layout hints at a well-established implicit editorial rule,

(7) 0261 this is a template we use
(ma è uno schema che usiamo).

Since the layout has always been accepted, why should the editorial team put it into question now? Furthermore, the journalist X2 repeats that it is more conveninent to keep the layout also for what concerns the productive process (2.3), considered from the point of view of the journalist conceived as a sender of the communication to the readers. I will focus on this argumentative line, since it is the one in which the journalist makes use of two downward counterfactual arguments, by imagining a worse scenario that could have happened if journalists had not had the questioned layout at their disposal. Here, the journalist again applies a reasoning from final cause and alternatives, as we can see in Figure , in which I analyse the inferential configuration of the argumentative move 2.3.1> 2.3:



Figure 72. It would have been different (worse) if journalists had not used the layout Y because not using the layout Y would have produced an item without a full-page feature with a photo (an unacceptable outcome).

The reasoning works as follows: if *a)* using a layout Y that enables to produce a full-page feature with a photo for an important news and not using it are two alternatives when an agent composes a news piece, and if *b)* journalists have the goal of avoiding to publish important news without a full-page feature with a photo (*endoxa*); and if *a)* journalists have chosen to use a layout that enables to produce a full-page feature with a photo for an important news which has led to avoid to publish an important news without a full-page feature with a photo (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible to choose not to use a layout Y that enables to produce a full-page feature with a photo for an important news and it would have led to publish an important news without a full-page feature with a photo (simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative that has led to avoid to publish an important news without a full-page feature with a photo, disregarding the alternative that would have led to produce it (first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). This first conclusion, conjoined with the maxim stemming from the reasoning from the final cause and alternatives "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X" leads to draw the final conclusion that "we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one". This final conclusion coincides with the positive evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience relief.

In this case it is interesting to notice that the journalist's counterfactual reasoning is focused on the better actual situation, namely on what the layout Y allows them to do, namely a full-page opening with a photo. This focal argumentative move is further supported by another more specific downward counterfactual argument (2.3.1.1):

(8) this would swallow a lot more of space and we would only have a thin strip of text left (0311-0312).

This subordinate argument gives further evidence that eliminating the questioned template would produce an inadmissible outcome.

In this case we notice that the downward counterfactual argument closes the argumentative discussion, acting as an argument of reinforcement of what has been argued before; it leads the discussion to a conclusion phase, differently from upward

counterfactual reasoning that fostered the discussion and projected it into the future. In this case the focus is on the present positive outcome, *i.e.* on the fact that thanks to the adopted layout a full-page opening has been possible. Therefore, relief is experienced. From the datum, we can understand that the reasoning is focused on the better factual outcome, therefore representing a case of evaluative mode.

In this case downward counterfactual reasoning is used to defend the *status quo*, which has been put into discussion: the journalist thinks to the alternatives at stake if the *status quo* is put into discussion. According to the journalist, the actual state of affairs is for sure better than what could have been produced by the change: the change could produce even worse consequences of the *status quo*.

Furthermore, it serves a mood repair function, but is devoid of motivating force in that one just focuses on the better actual situation. Nevertheless, even though downward counterfactual reasoning may have a mood-repair function, it can also have a pedagogical function. Indeed, the journalist imagines –anticipates- for a moment that the result could be unacceptable (if they do not use the chosen layout) and so he experiences relief as a consequence of the invalidated negative expectation; this may also "foster *learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future circumstances*" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). The journalist anticipates how it could be in future without that layout (it will be impossible to make a full-page feature) and *fosters* learning about situations in which he could or not use that layout.

11.7 Downward counterfactual reasoning focussing on how things might have been worse: the PEDO case[49]

In this sub-section I show an example in which a downward counterfactual reasoning is at stake in an argumentative discussion occurred within an editorial conference that has taken place on the 31st January 2013 at the newsroom of *CdT*; it is an evaluative editorial conference, in which journalists evaluate the items of the previous day. In this case of

[49] Cst_cdt_130131_1730_ed disc.

study journalists discuss about an item of the day before concerning a case of sexual abuses on minors perpetrated by a chauffeur of a school bus in Tessin. The chauffeur is very well known in the local community, since the chauffeur that drives children to school is very a well known figure in small villages of Tessin. Furthermore, he is very well known to jounalists, since he had committed other abuses.

(9) 0001-0013 L: in these cases names can be made or not/ MC: it is a legitimate question/ **the problem is that he is plurirecidive and we have never written his name/** above all because the children on which the man has acted are minors/ and therefore it is not possible to write the name/ because there are children between six and ten years/ L: Bomio we have made it/ MC: yes but they were minors at the time of the abuse/ but at the time in which he has been declared guilty they were not minors anymore/ whereas here/ L: **it would enable to identify victims/** MC: eh **yes it would enable to identify victims/** since he was chaffeur at the XYZ

This discussion is of evaluative-explanatory nature: indeed, the journalist who is in charge of the meeting (L) asks if they can quote names in news of sexual abuse involving minors. The other journalist involved in the discussion (MC) answers by exemplifying the case of the chaffeur-pedophile. The initial general issue 'in this delicate cases names can be quoted?' shifts to 'was it good not to mention the name of the pedophile in the case of the chauffeur-pedophile?'. The final standpoint 'we did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was a good choice)' is evaluative and is supported by three argumentative lines; the first argumentative line (1.1a-b) is based on a legal norm that protects minors' provacy in cases of news that involve minors; indeed, a legal norm exists that prohibits to divulge elements that may directly or indirectly remind to victims' (minors') identities. The second

argumentative line (1.2) is based on a downward counterfactual argument, which induces the other journalists to focus on the worse unrealized scenario that consists in victims' identification. In Figure I show the argumentative reconstruction of MC's argumentation in favor of the standpoint 'we did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was good)':



Figure 73. Argumentative reconstruction of MC's argumentation in favor of the standpoint 'we did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was good)'.

The focal argumentative move of the argumentation represented in Fig. 97 is the one based on downward counterfactual reasoning; indeed, this move enables to anticipate the bad consequences that may have happened if the names had been made. A reasoning from final cause and alternatives has been applied, as it is shown in the analysis of the inferential configuration in Figure 74;



Figure 16. We did not mention the name of the pedophile (and it was a good choice) because this would have enabled to identify victims (it would have been worse).

The reasoning works as follows: if *a)* mentioning the name of a pedophile in a newspaper article in which minors are involved and not mentioning it are two alternatives when an agent composes a news item, and if *b)* journalists have the goal of not enabling victims' identification when minors are involved (*endoxa*); and if *a)* journalists have chosen not to mention the name of the pedophile in a newspaper article in which minors were involved which has led not to enable victims' identification (factual datum) and if *b)* it was possible to choose to mention the name of the pedophile and it would have led to enable victims' identification (simulative datum and retrospective prediction); then, among the two alternatives journalists have chosen the alternative that has led not to enable victims' identification, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it (first conclusion and invalidation of negative expectation). This first conclusion, conjoined with the maxim stemming from the reasoning from the final cause and alternatives "if between

two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X" leads to draw the final conclusion that "we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one". This final conclusion coincides with the positive evaluative standpoint that may lead journalists to experience relief.

Furthermore, it is interesting that the journalist uses the present tense "this *would enable* to identify victims" to refer to a past decision. She uses a present conditional for a counterfactual reasoning that is however referred to the past, since the news piece has been produced and published in the past and is now object of evaluation. As we observed in the BEBE (Chapter 10) and in the FOTO case (subsection 11.2), the journalist quickly shifts from the past tense to the present tense, inducing the editorial team to experience the past in the present time. However, in this case of study we are dealing with a case of downward counterfactual reasoning, and we notice that the counterfactual reasoning does not lead to further fruitful discussion as when upward counterfactual reasoning is used, but rather it leads to closing the discussion, it leads to confirm what has been said before. In this case, the way in which the item has been handled is judged in a positive way by the journalist; therefore, the use of the downward counterfactual serves the function of confirming the positivity of the judgement. Instead of reference to a possible new world in which a news piece may be changed and improved, downward counterfactual reasoning induces journalists to deal with the realities of a given item that has been produced and that in future should not be improved but rather eventually reproposed in a similar manner.

Again, as in the FORM case, journalists have attempted to defend the *status quo*, which had been put into discussion: `bomio we have made names (0007).` Downward counterfactual reasoning has an important function, since by re-saying reasons, journalists can avoid that the force of habit becomes the only reason. It is a way of confirming the positivity of the attaked *status quo* and of disauthomizing normal decisions: it has a function of organizational learning in the newsroom.

In this case it is probable that journalists experience relief due to the positive evaluation of the editorial choice, due to the awareness of having avoided victims' identification; indeed, as it is known from literature relief may be referred to "the feeling

stemming from the avoidance of an unpleasant experience" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 104). More specifically, in this case, journalists evaluate an editorial decision (not quoting names) that has been taken in the past. Therefore, it can be considered a case of anticipation based relief that presupposes a retrospective anticipatory representation. When the journalist, who has published a newspaper article on a sexual abuse on minors anticipates via counterfactual reasoning that he could have risked to publish the item in such a way that minors could have been identified (by quoting names), and realizes that he might have caused a moral damage to the minors that could have been identified and scarred for life, he may have experienced retrospective fear and guilt (including a negative IAR; that is, the belief "possible/likely enabling of victims' identification" together with the opposite goal "not enabling victims' identification"), and subsequent retrospective relief (the invalidation of that negative IAR: "thank goodness we did not enbled victims' identification!"). These retrospective emotions imply anticipatory representations. "Their difference from the non-retrospective ones lies in the fact that the IAR (or expectation) is *simulated*, by going back to the time when it could have been formulated" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 104). With reference to relief, "the intensity of relief (as the intensity of any counterfactual emotion) might be simply related to 'the ease of imagining' (Kahneman and Tversky 1982: 203, quoted in Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 105) some alternative outcome" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109).

Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that in this case of study, as in the FORM case, the invalidated negative IAR or expectation is expressed in the present tense (making names *would enable* to identify victims); this would support Castelfranchi and Miceli's claim that "negative IAR or expectations (and the consequent relief) may foster *learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future circumstances*" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109).

For what concerns the simulation mode, this case of study is a case of evaluative mode of downward counterfactual reasoning; indeed, the journalist compares the counterfactual standard (having enabled to identify victims) with the factual outcome (not having enabled to identify victims), and positively evaluates the present situation ("good!"). Journalists did not focus on the counterfactual itself, *reflecting on what*

might have happened if victims would have been identified, as it would have been the case in a reflective mode.

> The consequences of such orientations are quite apparent. *Evaluative* processing of downward counterfactuals seems to serve a mood-repair function, but is devoid of motivating force in that one just focuses on the better actual situation, and on enjoying it. Conversely, *reflective* processing of downward counterfactuals, by focusing on how things might have been worse, may enhance motivation, persistence, and actual performance (Markman et al. 2008), aimed especially at *preventing* negative outcomes (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109).

For that reason,

> relief, if associated with *reflective* downward counterfactual thinking, might foster 'preventive' learning. However, it is still to be ascertained whether this motivational implication is to be ascribed solely to reflective downward counterfactual thinking or also to the feeling of relief. Actually, relief, as a positive feeling, might best fit with the *evaluative* (rather than reflective) processing of downward counterfactuals (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109).

11.8 Upward and downward counterfactuals: four case studies in comparison

For what concerns counterfactual reasoning, I have analysed six case studies involving distinct types of counterfactual reasoning; four case studies concern upward counterfactual reasoning (TEMPO, BEBE, ACCI, FOTO case) and two case studies deal with downward counterfactual reasoning (FORM, PEDO case).

With reference to upward counterfactual reasoning, I have analysed a case of study in which a positive evaluative standpoint not referred to the Self was at stake (TEMPO case) and three case studies in which a negative evaluative standpoint referred to the Self was at stake (BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case). In table 5 I show an overview of the analyzed case studies and of the argumentative analysis that I have made:

Table. 5. Types of loci at the roots of upward counterfactual reasoning supporting negative and positive evaluative standpoint with reference to the BEBE, ACCI, FOTO and TEMPO case.

Type of standpoint	Positive evaluative standpoint	Negative evaluative standpoint

Evaluation referred to the Self/ not to the Self	Evaluation *not* referred to the Self	Evaluation referred to the Self
Type of locus involved	Locus from efficient cause and definition	Locus from final cause and alternatives
Type of simulation of the counterfactual argument	Argument with upward counterfactual thought (considering unrealized better alternatives) not attributed to the Self	Argument with upward counterfactual thought (considering unrealized better alternatives) attributed to the Self
Case study	TEMPO case: the positive evaluation depends on the possibility to convey regret to the audience	BEBE case, ACCI case, FOTO case: the negative evaluation depends on not having considered a better alternative, possible at the moment of the decision

It is interesting to notice that in the BEBE, ACCI and FOTO case the negative evaluative standpoint referred to the Self is supported by an argument with upward counterfactual reasoning that is based on a complex locus from final cause and alternatives; the negative evaluation depends on the fact that when one agent does not follow a norm of whatever nature that he considers relevant, he experiences regret. In the case studies under investigation journalists had not followed editorial norms; in the BEBE case they had not respected the editorial guidelines stating that delicate news must be handled in an empathic way, in the ACCI case they had not given prominence to a quite important news therefore not following a spontaneous editorial norm, and in the FOTO case they had not put a caption under an old photo therefore hindering a good audience comprehension and infringing another spontaneous editorial norm.

Differently, in the TEMPO case, the positive evaluative standpoint not referred to the Self is supported by an argument with upward counterfactual reasoning that is based on a reasoning from efficient cause and a locus from definition. The positive evaluation is due to the journalist's adherence to a norm; indeed, the journalist has produced a news that has had a high audience impact (by inducing regret in the audience), and producing news that have a high audience impact follows a well established editorial norm.

With reference to downward counterfactual reasoning, I have analyzed two case studies (PEDO and FORM case) in subsections 11.6 and 11.7. In both case studies there is a more or less implicit positive evaluative standpoint ("we did not mention the name of the pedophile [and this was a good choice]" in the PEDO case and "this layout is hard to dispense with [and this was a good choice]" in the FORM case). As I show in Table 6, the positive evaluative standpoint is in both cases supported by an argument with downward counterfactual reasoning, which is based on a complex locus from final cause and alternatives; the positive evaluation depends on the imagination of a worse unrealized alternative and on the very fact that the realization of this worse alternative has been hindered and that the best -often the only acceptable- alternative has been chosen.

Table 6. Types of loci at the roots of downward counterfactual reasoning positive evaluative standpoint with reference to the PEDO and FORM case.

Type of standpoint	Positive evaluative standpoint	Positive evaluative standpoint
Evaluation referred to the Self/ not to the Self	Evaluation referred to the Self	Evaluation referred to the item
Type of locus	Locus from final cause and alternatives	Locus from final cause and alternatives
Type of simulation of the counterfactual argument	Argument with downward counterfactual reasoning (considering worse alternatives)	Argument with downward counterfactual reasoning (considering worse alternatives)
Case study	PEDO case	FORM case

Journalists' reasoning in the PEDO case is all focused on how things might have been worse; having hindered the realization of a worse hypothesis (enabling victims' identification) is a reason to positively evaluate an editorial decision (not having mentioned names) that enables to reach a positive goal (protecting minors from identification). On the contrary, in the FORM case the journalists focus on the resulting better actual situation; having promoted a better state of affairs (making a full-page

feature with the layout Y) than what would have resulted from other alternatives (not making a full-page feature with the layout Y) is a reason to positively evaluate an editorial layout template.

12. Conclusive considerations and future research strands

The present Chapter is structured in three parts: in the first part I answer the research questions listed in the Introduction, in the second part I show the results emerged from the research and in the last part I propose future research strands. The main goal of this dissertation was to explore the newsroom as a highly argumentative field of interaction and, more specifically, as a context where arguments based on the anticipation of audience uptake play a major role. The study of the entire newsmaking processes under an argumentative perspective had largely been ignored by argumentation scholars, with the exception of the research carried out within the project "Argumentation in newsmaking process and product". Research conducted within this project and the present dissertation have shown that journalists' argumentation about audience uptake plays a fundamental role in reconfiguring news products. Indeed, journalists individually and collectively shape their news pieces on the basis of audience uptake anticipation, in line with their goals of capturing audience attention and promoting public understanding. As we saw in Chapter 5, anticipatory representations of goal states can be considered the cornerstone of cognition. In the rhetorical tradition the ability to anticipate the uptake of the audience – especially in terms of emotions (cf. Aristotle Rhetoric II)- is a key skill of the rhetor. And modern media professionals are not dissimilar in the way in which they consider anticipation an important element of their repertoire of professional skills (see Chapters 4.2.2, 9). Thus, my goal was to understand whether and how journalists argue about anticipated audience uptake, and the kinds of anticipatory reasoning journalists deployed both in terms of configuration of beliefs and goals (see Chapter 5) as well as in terms of audience uptake dimensions (see Chapter 5.3). More specifically, my goal was to understand the role of anticipation in newsmaking and its function in news framing.

As the investigation progressed, some theoretical issues became central to account for the journalists' anticipatory reasoning. In particular, the study of counterfactual reasoning and of its inferential configuration became prominent. Consequently, this dissertation also constitutes a theoretical contribution to studies of anticipation and

counterfactual reasoning, which advances the state of the art on these topics which receive limited attention in argumentation theoretic literature (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 8).

12.1 Answering the research questions

12.1.1 The importance of studying journalists arguing anticipated audience uptake

A central goal of my dissertation was to understand the role played by journalists' argumentation about anticipated audience uptake in the newsroom. This goal was expressed by research question **(RQ1)**:

(**RQ 1**) *How do journalists reason about audience uptake in television- and print-journalism before producing news items?* (**RQ1a**) *How do journalists argue about the way in which the audience will react to the news pieces they will produce?*

By investigating editorial conferences, retrospective verbal protocols and news pieces, I found articulated examples of journalists' argumentation about anticipated audience uptake, both in TV- and print-journalism. Journalists' anticipation of audience uptake can be considered as a subtype of hermeneutic argumentation, since it is a way of interpreting how the audience will react to a potential news item or to a potential news detail; journalists try to construct the item that best fits with their audience cognitive and emotive characteristics on the basis of their individual and shared beliefs, predictions and expectations. I have shown that when journalists have a valenced anticipatory reasoning, *i.e.* a goal is implied, they are determined to support their standpoint regarding how a news piece should be published/broadcast so that it has a desirable impact on the audience. Because newsmaking decisions always involve complex issues implying a consideration of audience uptake, the argumentative discourse developed by journalists in editorial conferences and in retrospective verbal protocols is pragmatic in nature. It therefore mainly deals with what it is desirable and expedient to do in order to reach the widest audience possible and to promote public understanding. However, pragmatic argumentation is very often supported by knowledge-oriented argumentation, the goal of

which is to determine whether a statement is true or not. Indeed, journalists must continuously understand and establish whether a potential news event is true, whether its source is reliable, and whether and how certain possible social phenomena are perceived by the audience. An example can be found in the JUGE case discussed in Chapter 7, where I have shown that journalists made their pragmatic inference to broadcast an item on youth aggressiveness, after having evaluated that adolescents are becoming more and more aggressive, a point perceived by the audience.

12.1.2 Practical, evaluative and explicative standpoints in the different journalistic places of reflection

As I have said in the previous section (12.1.1), journalists' pragmatic inferences are often supported by knowledge-oriented argumentation, and therefore by evaluative-explanatory standpoints. However, different kinds of standpoints in terms of their propositional content and functions can be found to arise in different places of reflection of the newsroom.

(**RQ 2**) *Which types of standpoint do journalists put forth when they anticipate audience uptake?* (**RQ2a**) *Is there a correlation between the specific place of reflection, such as evaluative/ deliberative formal or informal editorial meeting and a specific kind of standpoint?*

Practical standpoints are clearly the final step of the argumentative chain in the newsroom, since a journalist's main aim is producing news pieces that promote public understanding. However, practical standpoints must be argumentatively supported by evaluative-explanatory sub-standpoints. Indeed, to decide to disseminate a certain news piece, this news must be evaluated as valuable news worthy of public consumption. Practical standpoints emerge in deliberative editorial conferences (the aim of which is to make decisions concerning the news production process), where journalists make decisions on the items to choose, usually supported by evaluative standpoints. In fact, in this context journalists' practical standpoints are usually based on material starting points that need to be ascertained. On the contrary, in evaluative editorial conferences, where the main aim is to evaluate past news items, the evaluative-explanatory standpoint is more

common. In this place of reflection, journalists usually judge and evaluate previous items and may question usual editorial practices. I have shown how this evaluative process is functional to better face future analogous situations and how it works to make better decisions in future: in this activity type a major role is played by counterfactual reasoning (for more details see subsection 8.7).

In informal editorial meetings, we find both practical and evaluative standpoints, in a similar fashion to formal editorial conferences explained above.

In retrospective interviews, made to the journalists after that they had composed their news items, explicative standpoints proved to be the most prominent type of standpoint at stake. Explicative standpoints reproduce practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation (that the journalist has spontaneously given himself while he was reflecting on what he was writing), so that journalists' reasoning about writing choices is explicitly shown. The retrospective interviews can be considered as a live soliloquy by the writer, whose decisions may be subject to change, reformulation, questioning and critical evaluation. Retrospective interviews are highly reflective moments in which journalists' inner argumentation emerges. In retrospective interviews, journalists argued with themselves and their reasoning and conscious writing strategies became clear. For instance, as shown in the JUGE case (excerpt (11) in Section 7), the journalist clearly says that he has to write his news piece starting from interviews.

We can conclude that correlation exists between the place of reflection and type of standpoint, even though practical (explicit or implicit) standpoints occur in every place of reflection and constitute the ultimate overall standpoint. Indeed, the evaluative standpoints of the evaluative editorial conferences support a practical standpoint in view of a practical decision, whereas the explicative standpoints of retrospective interviews reflect practical standpoints of soliloquial argumentation.

12.1.3 Different types of anticipation of audience uptake based on different premises

A central concern of my dissertation involved the correlation between distinct types of premises and distinct aspects of audience uptake. As such I asked:

(**RQ 3**) *Which types of anticipation of audience uptake can we identify?*

I have observed that journalists attempt to predict *a)* how people can be persuaded (for instance how people can be persuaded to read a news piece) –anticipation of audience persuasion, *b)* how people will react from an emotive point of view (for instance whether a content could hurt people's sensitiveness) –anticipation of audience emotive uptake, and *c)* how people will react from a cognitive point of view (for instance whether a content would represent an excessive cognitive load for a certain typology of audience) – anticipation of audience cognitive uptake, in order to build a news item that avoids undesired audience reactions. However, anticipation of persuasion seems to be the superordinate type of anticipation, including cognitive and emotive anticipation, which underlie it: in the end, every journalists' anticipatory reasoning concerning the audience uptake is aimed at persuading the audience of a given point of view.

At the level of topical choices, the anticipation of audience uptake is bound to distinct kinds of premises at stake.

After having carried out an argumentative analysis on all case studies I have observed that journalists' anticipation of audience emotive uptake, being a subtype of anticipation of persuasion, is mostly based on the locus from final cause. This is since persuasion in the end "is an intention to modify, through communication, another's beliefs as a means for modifying (generating, activating, or just increasing the value of) the other's goals" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 195). In this case the object of modification (or reinforcement) is the other's emotive state. Another locus applied in anticipation of audience emotive uptake is the locus from termination and setting up, in which a desirable goal has already been reached (thanks to a productive activity) and should be simply maintained (terminated) or a desirable goal is hindered by an ongoing counterproductive activity and should be terminated. For example, in Chapter 6.2 it is clear that an ongoing activity is counterproductive and does not lead to a desirable goal and thus it should be interrupted. With reference to audience emotive uptake, I found many loci from analogy, and especially from past analogy. This is because when a previous similar news item or item's detail has created a desirable audience emotive state (a desirable goal), it is good to repropose it. Furthermore, the locus from definition has also been applied when journalists

reason about their audience's emotive uptake. In this case, a given editorial norm or habitude per definition activates or reinforces a certain emotive state in the audience, as is the case in the inferential configuration shown in the TEMPO case (Figure in Chapter 9.3).

Concerning the anticipation of persuasion on the level of behaviour, journalists applied reasoning from final cause, which was obviously due to inducing the audience to a modification of its behaviour, considered a desirable goal of the newsroom. An example can be found in the PIAZ case, within which the journalist aimed at persuading the audience to watch a TV-debate by reading a newspaper article (Figure and Figure in Chapter 6).

12.1.4 Audience emotive uptake as the most prominent type of anticipation in journalistic reasoning

(**RQ 4**) *Which role does anticipation of audience emotive uptake plays in audience uptake oriented argumentative discussions in editorial conferences as well as in other types of data?*

In Chapter 5.4 I characterized the anticipation of the audience emotions as the most prominent type of anticipation in journalistic reasoning. I further characterized the anticipation of audience emotive uptake as a subtype of the anticipation of persuasion, which may act at the level of attitude (in turn subdivided in cognitive and emotive attitude) and/or at the level of behaviour (for details see Figure in subsection 5.3). The anticipation of audience persuasion and comprehending the anticipation of audience emotive uptake, has the aims at modifying the audience's attitude (cognitions and/or emotions) or audience behaviour, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The frequency of journalists' anticipatory reasonings concerning anticipation of audience emotive uptake shows that this is 'the most prominent type of anticipation of the most prominent type of anticipation'. Indeed, if anticipation of persuasion is the most prominent type of anticipation, anticipation of audience emotions is the most prominent type of anticipation of persuasion (much more than anticipation of cognitions and behaviour anticipations). In Chapter 9 I dealt with the TEMPO case, which was focused on the anticipation of audience emotions

in the whole intertextual chain. Journalists' reasonings in the editorial conferences, in retrospective interviews and in informal discourses all pointed to the importance of acting on the audience emotions, inducing them to experience regret and empathy with the victims of the accident.

(**RQ 4a**) *In which way does audience emotive uptake influence the quality of reporting?*

Anticipating emotive uptake is a means to persuade the audience, either by reinforcing a certain emotion that was already present or by modifying their emotions (via the modification of its epistemological premises) to think or make what the journalist wants. As concerns the anticipation of the audience's emotive uptake, it is interesting to note the peculiarity of the content of the desired or undesired consequence in this type of uptake: in appealing to anticipated emotions, the content concerns the feeling of a certain emotion rather than the fact that a certain state of affairs is realized.

As I showed in the TEMPO case, journalists may aim at capturing audience attention, but doing so emotionally may lead them to frame the news in a slightly unfair way. An unfair framing of a news occurs when journalists lead the audience to make false inferences about a certain reality. A simple risk of manipulatory attitude occurs when journalists produce an item that may lead the audience to make ambivalent inferences about a certain reality, as I have shown in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). In all other cases, journalists' anticipation of audience emotive uptake has proved to be perfectly functional for the creation of audience-adequate news pieces that enable journalists to capture audience attention and promote public understanding, in other words to carry out their main goal.

12.1.5 The crucial role played by counterfactual reasoning in the newsroom

Journalists not only use actual premises in arguing about audience uptake, they also use simulative premises, *i.e.* premises not based on actual evidence, but rather on a cognitive projection of an imagined state of affairs that does not exist in reality. Indeed, they often attempt to anticipate the possible ways in which the audience may have reacted if another

news had been broadcasted/published, or if a certain news item had been published/broadcasted in a distinct manner (for instance specifying or avoiding other details). Furthermore, they often ask themselves how the audience may have reacted if a distinct course of action had taken place, which could have radically changed a certain news. These kinds of audience uptake centred discussions are all based on counterfactual reasoning, since journalists try to imagine possible alternatives to past audience reactions that may have been different *if*.. . These reflections all deal with the imagination of a better hypothesis that could have been realized had a distinct course of action had taken place.

Since journalists often try to anticipate the possible ways in which the audience could have reacted if another news had been broadcasted/published, I have focused on the role of counterfactual reasoning in this kind of argumentative discussions.

(**RQ 5**) *What role does counterfactual reasoning play in journalists' argumentative discussions centered on audience uptake?*

Journalists' counterfactual reasonings are mostly based on the imagination of possible alternative audience reactions to already spread news pieces that may have been different *if*…

To exhaustively answer (**RQ 5**), two types of counterfactual reasoning must be distinguished on the basis of the simulation direction, namely upward counterfactual reasoning (simulation of better unrealized scenarios) and downward counterfactual reasoning (simulation of worse unrealized scenarios).

Upward counterfactual reasoning. Journalists' upward counterfactual reasoning, dealing with better unrealized alternatives, is found in the shape of *a)* implicit counterfactual reasoning expressed via question like "How would have the audience reacted if we had published the other news instead of this?/ and "How would have the audience reacted if we had broadcast the news emphasising the other detail?" or, *b)* statements directly concerning the audience's uptake, such as 'If only we had put this detail/ handled the news in this way..', as it happened in the BEBE case (Chapter 10), for example; or *c)* the consequent does not refer to the audience uptake but to another event which may have an indirect connection with the audience uptake: 'If the actor of the event X would have acted in a distinct manner, then the event X would have had a distinct

outcome', as happened in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). Upward counterfactual reasoning may occur in evaluative editorial conferences, when journalists negatively evaluate a past item, an editorial practice, or a certain framing given to the item. This may lead them to experience regret for not having chosen an alternative that would have produced better audience uptake. Furthermore, upward counterfactual reasoning may occur in deliberative editorial conferences in cases where a negative evaluation of a past item supports the deliberation via past analogy (we should publish the item in the way X because it would have been better if that other time we would have published the item in way X), or in cases where the imagination of unrealized better alternatives acts in an indirect way on the audience uptake, such as in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9). It is important to note that in order to experience regret, journalists must have had the *possibility* of carrying out an action that has not been carried out, even though the alternative was not considered at the moment of the choice, but only *a posteriori* in the light of a negative or sub-optimal result. Therefore, journalists' experience of regret strictly depends on the availability of counterfactual alternatives.

Upward counterfactual reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences (such as in the BEBE case) proved to have a beneficial function of prolonging the discussion and motivating further reflection and self-inquiry (Chapter 10). Interestingly, after upward counterfactual reasoning a shift in the focus of the editorial conversation can be observed, the topic of the conversation can be altered, and new possible worlds of interpretation can be introduced. On a linguistic level this is witnessed by the shift of verbal tense from past to present or even future, indicating that journalists experience 'St. Augustine's present of past things' when they prolong their discussion on the basis of past errors. The juxtaposition of past and present experiences actualizes the past and highlights past experiences for similar future situations. Additionally, we can say that the function of irrealis, including counterfactuals in a strict or broad sense, is highly beneficial in the newsroom, since it helps journalists elaborate new solutions and strategies, by widening the number of possible choices, in line with Von Foerster's ethical imperative to "Act always so as to increase the number of choices", which the father of the second-order cybernetics proposed in his 1992 essay (Von Foerster 1992). The pragmatics of irrealis in

evaluative editorial conferences must be examined within the higher purpose of the activity type at hand, namely evaluating past items to produce better future items that fulfil the institutional mission of the newsroom. The juxtaposition of a past counterfactual world and of an actualized past that becomes present, requires the sort of double-perception or double-experience described by St. Augustine and by the English linguist Lyons (1997) (see Chapter 10). Therefore, in evaluative editorial conferences where a past item is negatively evaluated, the use of upward counterfactual reasoning and of irrealis more generally is productive and may function as a trigger for avoiding previous mistakes and finding news solutions. It is interesting that upward counterfactual reasoning in editorial conferences is (almost) always of deontic nature (what should have been done), since it refers to editorial norms that have not been respected and that have therefore caused a negatively judged outcome.

Upward counterfactual reasoning is specifically highly beneficial when the causes of regret can be identified and when changes in future similar editorial situations can be made (see Section 11.3), since it leads one to then "learn from one's mistakes" and to carry out the counterfactual situation that would have led to a better outcome that has not been carried out in the past. In upward counterfactual reasoning the agent acts *in order to*, and pursues involvement goals.

Upward counterfactual reasoning may also be detrimental (see Section 11.4), however, in cases where the causes of the regret cannot be identified and/or changed. Evidence of this detrimental function of regret can be observed in the TEMPO case, wherein the victims of the reported event regret that 'the accident to the girl could have been avoided if the driver had gone slower'. In this case it is evident that regret has a detrimental function, since the accident cannot be deleted and it is more difficult to imagine an analogous similar situation. However, the entire news item is based on the fictive possibility of remedying what has happened (the accident) by simulating similar future conditions wherein the counterfactual alternative (going slower) can be carried out. In this case the journalists have explicitly demonstrated their awareness of the detrimental function of this kind of upward counterfactual reasoning and have decided to convey to the audience the idea of 'no-more-possible', in order to produce a higher emotive impact.

Downward counterfactual reasoning. On the other hand, downward counterfactual reasoning identifies the consideration of worse alternatives and stems from the avoidance of bad or suboptimal experiences. If regret is clearly correlated with upward counterfactual reasoning, relief can be said to be bound to downward counterfactual reasoning. Indeed, if regret is elicited by invalidated positive anticipatory reasoning and invalidated positve expectations, relief is often elicited by invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning and by invalidated negative expectations. When one individual imagines a foregone worse alternative and thinks about 'what might have been', he experiences relief. In the newsroom downward counterfactual reasoning was found in two distinct places of reflection, namely in retrospective verbal protocols and evaluative editorial conferences within which journalists positively evaluated a previous editorial choice.

First, downward counterfactual reasoning in evaluative editorial conferences is used to support a positive evaluation of a past item or an editorial habit, which thereby confirms the positive aspect of the judgement. In this kind of editorial conference it may be found in the concluding phase of the argumentative discussion and its use tends to close it. Instead of referring to a new possible world in which a news item may be changed and improved, downward counterfactual reasoning induces journalists to deal with the realities of a given news item that should not be improved, but rather eventually re-proposed in a similar manner. We can say that downward counterfactual reasoning can be used when a given *status quo* is threatened: it can be used to defend a *status quo* that is questioned. Indeed, journalists are induced to think to the alternatives of a given *status quo* if it is questioned: the present is thus better of the invoked change. Downward counterfactual reasoning serves an important function, since journalists repeat themselves the reasons of a given choice, and this hinders that habit becomes the only reason. It has the function of organizational learning, since it is a way of dis-authomatize normal decisions.

We can say that downward counterfactual reasoning is beneficial since it often produces relief and it may foster learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future situations. Like upward counterfactual reasoning, after downward

counterfactual reasoning there is a frequent shift of verbal tense from past to present and future: the present tense actualizes the good choice and projects it into the future. Journalists' experiences of relief due to the positive evaluation of an editorial choice are produced by the avoidance of a worse alternative. This occurs for example in the PEDO case (section 11.7), when the journalist who published a newspaper article about the sexual abuse of minors anticipates that the victimes could have been identified (by quoting names), and realizes that he might have caused a damage to the minors, identifying them, he feels retrospective fear and guilt (including a negative IAR; that is, the belief "possible/likely enabling of victims' identification" together with the opposite goal "not enabling victims' identification"), and experiences subsequent retrospective relief (the invalidation of that negative IAR: "thank goodness we did not enabled victims' identification!").

Following the path forged by Castelfranchi and Miceli, I have supported the conception that invalidated negative anticipatory reasoning and invalidated expectation and the consequent relief (derived by downward counterfactual reasoning), "may foster *learning about how to prevent negative outcomes in similar future circumstances*" (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 109). For instance, in the newsroom, downward counterfactual reasoning and the consequent experienced relief, may have the function of consolidating editorial practices that have proved to avoid negative impact or negative repercussions on the audience. In Section 11.5 I have analysed cases that demonstrate downward counterfactual reasoning's ability to confirm a discussed editorial practice and to stop the discussion, therefore reinforcing the concluding phase.

Another place of reflection where I have observed a noticeable prominence of downward counterfactual reasoning is in retrospective interviews. There, journalists are asked to give reasons and to explain what they have done during the composition of their news items. During this reflection, downward counterfactuals mostly have the function of justifying journalists' choices in terms of audience anticipation. Indeed, in this type of interview journalists use downward counterfactual reasoning to support the goodness of their editorial choices in view of the audience uptake. This enables journalists to keep a

critical distance from the editorial choices they have made. It is a peculiar rhetorical strategy of this type of place of reflection, in which the journalist persuades himself of the goodness of his own editorial choices, providing explicit reasons of the disreagrded or omitted editorial choices that would have led to an unacceptable outcome. It is a kind of self-empathy where the journalist re-assumes his own practical standpoint and justifies it. The noticeable prominence of downward counterfactual reasoning in retrospective interviews, *i.e.* guided interviews, is congruent with the literature on downward counterfactuals that highlights that they are generated spontaneously only very rarely (Roese 1997). Moreover, it is wise to say that the high frequence of downward counterfactual reasoning in retrospective protocols may be interpreted at the first glance as a signal of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1947): however, this is not the case, since journalists have previously reasoned –both at an individual as well as at a collective level– on the editorial strategy to carry out and this has led them to make a certain reasoned choice.

A central issue in argumentation theory concerns the legitimacy of simulative data in counterfactual reasoning. Can a simulative datum be considered a licit datum, an actual piece of evidence? The analysis of counterfactual reasoning under an argumentative perspective can shed light on this issue. Indeed, by observing the inferential configuration of counterfactual reasoning analysed following the AMT, and more specifically the contextual premises, the necessary presence of two data emerges. On the one hand, there is a factual datum, realized in the action that has been carried out. On the other hand, there is a simulative datum, namely a retrospective prediction about the convenience of an alternative that has not been chosen. However, this simultative datum is focused on an alternative possibility that has not been carried out, but that was *possible* at the moment of the choice. What is simulated is a discarded or omitted choice that is *a posteriori* considered better or worse, but that was present and *possible* in the *hic et nunc* of the decisional moment. Thus, it is a piece of evidence in some way, since it is not a factual datum but it has been a factual datum in the past in some way. Subsequently, we can conclude that not all simulative data can be considered licit, but only those that are based on a choice that was possible and plausible during the decision-making process. The

possibility is thus the generative nucleus in which the intention takes shape and the action originates.

12.1.7 The influence of the cultural context on journalists' premises

One concern of my dissertation was to understand the function of cultural premises in journalists' topical choices in newsmaking processes and products, namely in a context in which acting on culturally shared valued is fundamental.

(**RQ 6**) *Do journalists rely on highly culture-specific shared premises?*

In general, cultural premises play a crucial role in every context. In the newsroom culturally shared premises are used by journalists to be more effective. Indeed, the more journalists make topical choices coherent with the audience's value system, the more their arguments will be effective, which in turn will increase the possibility of capturing the audience's attention and promoting public understanding. A clear example can be found in the TEMPO case and is represented by an argument used by the journalist in the editorial conference (argument 1.1b in Figure in Section 9) and by the interviewed person, *i.e.* the father of the victim (Figure). This argument is based on the inconveniences caused by expenses due to physical and psychological problems caused by the accident and it is particularly effective in the Swiss German environment, within which economic prosperity is an important and acknowledged value.

12.1.8 Journalists' anticipatory inferences and news framing

(**RQ 7**) *Does the observation of journalists' anticipatory reasoning about audience uptake offer elements of explanation for the news frames adopted for journalists? Specifically, can we trace the news frames underlying the text of news products, the explicit arguments observable in the products, and stylistic choices to episodes of anticipatory argumentative reasoning?*

Journalists' anticipatory inferences regarding audience uptake operate as a point of departure for framing the news in a particular way. A particular framing may be an attempt to convey a critical view of a reported event, but at the same time it may present a risk of unfair framing. In this regard, a distinction can be made between manipulation that occurs when we convey untruth information and manipulation that occurs when we omit the truth (that in turn may be directed to lead the other not to know or to reach a false conclusion). In this dissertation, I claim that journalists' anticipatory inferences concerning audience uptake, considered as a subtype of interpretations of how the audience will react to their news, naturally represent the point of departure for a certain framing of the news by interpreting reality in a manner that refers to the reported events in a -non neutral- view. This may lead the audience to either make false inferences or omit the truth, and therefore to an unfair framing.

I have carried out an argumentative analysis of the whole intertextual chain consisting of editorial conferences, informal conferences, retrospective interviews, intermediate versions of news products, as well as final news products. This analysis shed light on the coherence between journalists' argumentative interactions in editorial conferences and the editorial strategies they actually used in news items. I have verified the implementation of the editorial strategies discussed in editorial conferences in the news items and I have confirmed these strategies in the analysis of retrospective interviews, which casts further light on previous data. Indeed, in retrospective interviews journalists are asked to make the reasons for their editorial choices, such as modifications and additions, explicit. In all of case studies that I analysed there was a perfect coherence between the journalists' collective and/or individual argumentation in editorial conferences and the final news items' argumentation.

12.1.9 Journalists' strategic maneuvering on the basis of anticipated audience (emotive) uptake

(**RQ 8**) *Do journalists struggle between impressing the audience/ capturing its attention and conveying an objective view of the event they are reporting?*

To answer this question, I must first specify that capturing audience attention

can be considered as a sort of effectiveness pursued by the journalist, whereas conveying a balanced and critical view can be considered as pursuit of a commitment to reasonableness on the part of the journalist. With this framing, it becomes clear that these two journalistic tendencies constitute a peculiar form of strategic maneuvering. Indeed, these two tendencies can be seen as an attempt to show events in a correct (reasonable) manner, while at the same time still directed at satisfying the audience's emotive demand. I have observed a continuous struggle in the journalist's mind between the will to convey facts in an objective/ balanced way and to frame the news in such a way that is coherent with their anticipatory reasoning concerning audience uptake. The anticipation of audience emotive uptake can be used by journalists to strategically maneuverer. Arguers attempt to keep an equilibrium between reasonableness and effectiveness in every move of an argumentative discussion when they pursue a strategic maneuvering. For journalists, this means that they face a continuous struggle between the editorial commitment to criticality, which involves providing a fair and balanced view of events, and satisfying audience demand, which involves predicting and accounting for their possible/probable/desirable audience emotive uptake. When journalists favour their goal of being effective (capturing the audience attention) instead of their goal of being reasonable and conveying a critical and balanced view of the event, there is the risk of employing manipulatory tendencies. This is particularly true in cases where the journalist's goal of capturing audience attention becomes absolutely prominent and a unique framing of the news event(s) is presented, as was partially the situation in the TEMPO case (Chapter 9).

12.1.10 Journalists as argumentative intermediaries

(**RQ 9**) *Do journalists act as knowledge mediators between their available sources (corporate press releases, interviews to experts or to people involved in a reported event ...) and the audience, framing the whole news taking into consideration the audience*

uptake? Do journalists favour a critical attitude of the audience towards the sources that they report? And how is this related to the anticipation of the audience uptake?

Journalists consider their available sources, such as press releases in economic-financial journalism (Rocci and Luciani 2016) and interviews with experts and involved persons in TV programs (TEMPO case and JUGE case), as the starting points of their news pieces. However, journalists reformulate and select pieces of press releases and interviews, so that the passage from source to product is not a mere transfer of information, but an individually reframed piece of knowledge. I have provided evidence of the fact that audience uptake anticipation strongly influences journalists' source reformulation. Indeed, journalists' anticipations of audience uptake lead them to reformulate the source and/or insert a selected piece of it in line with their goals of capturing audience attention and promoting public understanding.

In general, I have shown that journalists aim at pursuing criticality, which is a prerequisite of the fidelity to reality. The journalist perceives the world with his emotive and cognitive states, which help him develop a critical attitude and anticipate audience uptake. This anticipation operates as a resource to actively reconfigure certain editorial choices. Objectivity does not originate from the absence of involvement, but from the presence of criticality. Journalists do favour an audience critical attitude towards the sources they report: this is clear in the JUGE case, where a journalist does not want to raise a wrong expectation on the audience by inserting a quotation after a certain framing (see section 7.2) and in the TEMPO case, where journalists do not want to convey a wrong idea of the reported event by selecting to emotional pieces of some interviews (see Chapter 9, in particular 9.4). We can say that the adoption of a critical attitude on behalf of the audience is a type of uptake on behalf of the receiver.

Therefore, journalists open a space for critical discussion in a resource-limited context constrained by time and space, thus enabling the audience to build an autonomous opinion on a given issue, news item, or social phenomenon.

12.2 Further results emerged from the research

This dissertation has brought to light the importance of anticipation and counterfactual reasoning as two key mental processes in journalists' minds. Doing so has provided a number of theoretical and contextual contributions not previously recognized or formulated. In the next sub-sections I illustrate the contextual (Section 12.2.1) as well as the theoretical (12.2.2) implications emerging from my research.

12.2.1 Counterfactual reasoning as a persuasive means in both editorial conferences and news pieces

The main finding for the context of journalism emerging from the research is the role played by counterfactual reasoning and irrealis in news pieces. As I have shown in the TEMPO case, counterfactual reasoning seems to be a fundamental strategy used by journalists not only in the persuasive rhetoric of their editorial conferences, but also in news items. This special role of counterfactual reasoning in news products is due to the fact that journalists use it to raise strong emotions in the audience. Upward counterfactual reasoning in particular may be used to raise regret in the audience in the case of bad news, therefore leading the audience to empathize with the victims of the news. Regret has a high emotive impact on the audience and producing a high emotive impact on the audience is one of the journalist's main goals, since it enables them capture audience attention and therefore promote public understanding.

12.2.2 Theoretical implications of the findings

12.2.2.1 The relationship between counterfactual reasoning and extrinsic loci

Using counterfactual reasoning, people imagine hypothetical situations and alternative realities. Hypothetical situations, a subtype of virtual situations, are strictly bound with extrinsic *loci*. One of the main theoretical results of this dissertation is the evidence that counterfactual reasoning mostly relies on extrinsic loci, since this type of reasoning involves relationships in which a different disregarded alternative could have produced a better or worse outcome. In regard to the inferential configuration of upward and downward counterfactual reasoning, I have shown that they are both based on a complex locus from final cause and alternatives that realizes the comparison, based on something that could have 'made a difference' in terms of producing a more desirable or a worse situation. The data in counterfactual reasoning consist in a factual datum (a choice that has been enacted) and in a simulative datum (concerning the possibile choice that has either been discarded or omitted, but that was present at the time of the choice). In the case of upward counterfactual reasoning the final conclusion coincides with a negative evaluative standpoint that may lead to regret, whereas in the case of downward counterfactual reasoning the final conclusion consists of a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead to experience relief.

In AMT terms, upward counterfactual reasoning can be represented by a complex Y-structure;



Figure 75. Generic Y-structure of upward counterfactual reasoning.

In this inferential configuration (Figure), reasoning from final cause and alternatives is applied, carrying out the comparison process between two alternatives x and y; the endoxon is constituted by the two alternatives X and Y (a belief of common knowledge) and by a convenient goal. Then, the data are composed by the choice that has been enacted (factual datum- En1) and a retrospective prediction about the possibility of choosing the disregarded or omitted alternative (simulative datum-En 2). The conjunction of endoxa and data gives rise to a first conclusion, which in terms of anticipatory reasoning is an invalidation of positive expectation: "Among two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C we have chosen the one that does not realize the goal G, disregarding the alternative that would have realized it". The invalidation of the positive expectation is the result of the merging of the knowledge that there were two alternatives and that there was a goal (endoxa) plus the actual evidence that *x* has been chosen that has not led to realizing the desired goal. There is thus an incongruity between the goal G in the endoxon and the factual choice in the first datum, namely the choice of an alternative that has not led to

realizing G). This is the feature that mostly distinguishes upward from downward counterfactual reasoning.

This conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y instead of X", and conjoined with it allows one to infer the final conclusion "we have chosen the worse alternative disregarding the better one", namely that *y* was preferable to *x*". In terms of anticipatory reasoning, the invalidation of positive expectation (GOAL that p but CHOICE that has not led to realizing p) plus the inferential force given by the maxim gives rise to the negative evaluative standpoint that may lead the agent to experience regret.

In AMT terms, downward counterfactual reasoning can be represented through a complex Y-structure. The reasoning that is applied is a complex reasoning from final cause and alternative, in a similar but specular way to upward counterfactual reasoning, as it is shown in Figure ;



Figure 76. Generic Y-structure of downward counterfactual reasoning.

The endoxa are constituted by a belief of common knowledge about two possible alternatives that can be chosen in a course of action C (En1) and by an avoidance goal of "not G" (En2). The data consist of a belief of evidential nature about the choice that has been made "we have chosen Y that has led to realize not G" (factual datum) and of a retrospective prediction about the undesirable results produced by the disregarded or omitted alternative X. The conjunction of endoxa and data gives rise to a first conclusion, which in terms of anticipatory reasoning is an invalidation of negative expectation: "Among the two alternatives we have chosen the alternative Y that has led to realize the goal not G, disregarding the alternative X that would have not led to realize it". By observing the endoxa, the data, and their conjunction, we can see the congruity between the goal not G in the second endoxon and the factual choice Y that has led to realize not G, differently from the upward counterfactual reasoning. This first conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim "if between two alternatives X,Y, in a course of action C, one (Y) realizes the goal not G of C, whereas the other (X) does not realize it, it is preferable ceteris paribus to choose Y rather than X", and conjoined with it allows inferring the final conclusion "we have chosen the better alternative disregarding the worse one". The final conclusion, which is the result of the conjunction of an invalidation of negative expectation plus the inferential force given by the maxim results in a positive evaluative standpoint that may lead the agent to experience relief. In the case of downward counterfactual reasoning the agent acts *in order not to* and pursues avoidance goals, he attempts to avoid negative or sub-optimal results.

Investigating counterfactual reasoning via AMT disproves the view that the contrast-effect mechanism mainly produces or fosters negative emotions, and that, on the contrary, causal inferences mainly have beneficial effects (Roese 1997: 141). Through an analysis of counterfactual reasoning via AMT, I have shown that this is not the case and that the discriminating feature is the comparison of the chosen alternative and the one that could have produced a better or worse result, resulting from the reasoning from final cause and alternatives. The comparison of 'what could have made a difference' (a better alternative that has not been chosen) with the actual worse state of affairs causes negative emotions that may nevertheless illuminate future planning (upward counterfactual reasoning),

whereas the comparison of 'what could have made a difference' (a worse alternative that has been avoided) with the actual better state of affairs causes positive emotions that may eventually produce self-enhancement and confirmation of one's conviction. Therefore, contrast effects and causal inferences can be said to be strictly interdependent mechanisms in counterfactual reasoning, and not independent mechanisms as has been claimed in previous literature on the psychology of counterfactuals.

12.2.2.2 The shift of verbal tense after counterfactual reasoning: a projection from past to future

I have provided evidence that counterfactual reasoning is correlated with the shift of verbal tense from past to present, demonstrating that some cases of counterfactual reasoning may foster the discussion, and thus proving productive. Counterfactual reasoning, be it upward or downward, provides a crucial function by allowing the agent to merge two distinct worlds, the world of the past in which a choice was made and the present moment in which he is reflecting about the value of the past choices in the *hic et nunc*. In counterfactual reasoning, the past experience is embedded within the present moment of enunciation. The past moment of reflection can be made present by the act of talking (i.e. *you raise an attitude of expectancy* as in the JUGE case. See Section 7.5). The shift from the past tense of counterfactual arguments to the present tense after them, confirms the tendency for counterfactuals to project the discussion towards future planning and further confirms the claim that counterfactual reasoning stimulates cognitive processes. In upward counterfactual reasoning, the shift of tense prolongs the discussion on the basis of past errors: the juxtaposition of past and present experiences supports the actualization of the past and the consideration of past experiences for future similar situations. In downward counterfactual reasoning, the shift to the present verbal tense actualizes the good choice and projects it into the future, fostering its maintenance.

12.2.2.3 Different types of audience uptake bound with illocution, locution or perlocution

In order to focus on the distinct types of journalists' anticipation of audience uptake, I have sketched a typology of audience uptake anticipation in terms of 'objects of anticipation' classified on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely the illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary, as it is shown in Figure . This classification holds not only for the context of journalism, but for every context that involves anticipation of audience uptake, of whatever kind.



Figure 77. Typology of audience uptake anticipation on the basis of their belonging to the three distinct levels of the linguistic act, namely illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary levels.

As shown in Figure , we can distinguish between *a)* anticipation of audience interpretation, which deals with either the locutionary or the illocutionary force, and *b)* anticipation of audience persuasion, which can aim at modifying audience attitude (acting either on the cognitive or on the emotive uptake of the audience or on both) or audience behaviour, therefore dealing with the perlocutionary force. The anticipation of audience persuasion acting on behaviour can be considered to be the most perlocutionary type of anticipation.

12.3 Open questions and further research paths

This dissertation illuminated the crucial role played by journalists' anticipatory inferences about audience uptake. However, further research should consider other dimensions that have emerged in my analysis. In this sub-section I will discuss the theoretical aspects as well as the aspects bound with the journalism context that should be further investigated.

At the theoretical level:

12.3.1 The importance of reconnecting inferential and interactional moves with particular attention on dialogue

The argumentative analysis I conducted deals with the study of reasoning in editorial conferences and other types of interactional data, relying on the path traced by Clayman and Reisner (1998) that focused only on interaction in editorial conferences. After completing the entire analysis, I realize that the restrited focus on either the study of reasoning or the study of interaction creates a methodological problem bound to the fact that every instance of reasoning occurs in (actual or imagined) interaction and in response to other agents' reasonings. A part of this problem is to trace back to the method applied to make the analytic reconstruction following P-D (see Chpater 4, section 4.2), which does not highlights many interactional aspects. In order to carry out an exhaustive analysis of reasoning, it would be necessary to come back on the study of interaction, in order to reconnect inferential and interactional moves. For further studies in this direction it would be necessary to take into consideration a model of interaction that considers the notion of speech act (Ginzburg & Sag 2000; Ginzburg 2012); such a framework would enable to shed light on the interaction-reasoning interface.

12.3.2 Counterfactual reasoning of past, present, future and eternally impossible scenarios

Counterfactual reasoning has proven to play a crucial role in newsroom activities. However, I have only focused on counterfactual reasoning concerned with the past, *i.e.* on

reasoning that was possible in the past but that was not carried out. To gain a complete insight into inferences based on counterfactual reasoning, I intend to study all types of *irrealis*, as I have classified in the following Figure :



Figure 78. Complete classification of irrealis that I intend to study in future work.

Specifically, I intend to devote particular attention to *a)* pure hypothesis in editorial interaction, in order to understand the role of this type of irrealis in enabling the acceptability of the standpoint put forth by the protagonist of a discussion, and *b)* eternally impossible hypothesis ("if my grandmother had wheels, she would be a wagon"), which often occur as a critical reaction to unacceptable hypothesis or proposals, namely to hypothesis or proposals that are perceived as irrelevant since they do not have a sufficient closeness with the receiver's frames of reference. Do eternally impossible hypothesis act as implicit counterarguments? Are they evaluative in nature? Finally, I intend to deepen the study of *c)* hypothesis that were possible in the past but that are

now no longer possible, *i.e. stricto sensu* counterfactuals, in order to gain further evidence of the role of arguments containing this type of reasoning in supporting pragmatic inferences. In particular, I intend to shed light on the inferential nature of simulative and factual *data* emerging in *loci from final cause and alternatives* of counterfactual reasoning.

In the journalistic domain:

12.3.3 The influence of journalists' personal and interpersonal stories on argumentative dynamics

In this dissertation I have looked at the study of reasoning in newsroom activities, but I have omitted to consider the role played by personal and interpersonal stories. I believe that these aspects may strongly influence the argumentative discussion and that they should be considered in the study of argumentation in the newsroom. Further interviews should be conducted to find hidden conflicts, cooperative behaviours as well as friendship ties among journalists in the investigated editorial boards. Further, it would be wise to pay special attention to the interpersonal relationship between each journalist and the leading figures of the newsroom, *i.e.* the editor-in-chief and the chair of the editorial conferences. Indeed, these two figures play a directive role in the newsroom and this may have an influence on the other journalists' stance taking and choice of rhetorical strategy in editorial argumentative discussions.

12.3.4 The importance of considering the relationship between journalists' pessimist or optimistic orientation and upward/downward counterfactual reasoning

I have devoted special attention to counterfactual reasoning and to its two distinct simulation directions (upward and downward). In this regard, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2014) point out that if an agent has a pessimistic orientation, he will more frequently use

upward counterfactual reasoning, whereas if he has an optimist orientation, he will more frequently use downward counterfactual reasoning. They state:

> Optimists tend to use downward counterfactuals in response to negative life events. […] This 'strategy', as we know, is likely to accomplish a mood-repair function (e.g. Sanna et al. 2001). In fact, downward counterfactuals are associated with less negative affect and lower level of dissatisfaction than upward counterfactuals (McMullen et. al. 1995; Medvec et al. 1995; Roese 1994). Therefore, whereas a pessimist (as well as a neutral type) maintains the expectation as a reference point for evaluating the factual outcome, thus focusing on upward counterfactual thinking, an optimist is likely to disregard the original positive expectation and change the comparison standard, thus focusing on downward counterfactual thinking (2014: 115-116).

For this reason, journalists' pessimistic or optimistic tendencies should be assessed with special interviews and should be considered in the analysis of editorial argumentative interactions, so as not to confuse the usage of a certain type of counterfactual due to a personal tendency with the usage of a certain type of counterfactual for other reasons, such as improving editorial habits and/or improving the audience impact. Furthermore, journalists' pessimistic or optimistic tendency may have a strong influence on the choice of the topical potential, and should be taken into account. Indeed,

> a further important difference between optimists and pessimists in dealing with invalidated positive expectations is the 'value of proof' that is attached to invalidation. As we have already pointed out, dispositional pessimism is likely to favor a view of invalidation as a proof that the original positive expectation was unwarranted, inaccurate and unrealistic. For a pessimist the invalidation of one's positive expectations is, by default, always possible (as well as fearsome), whereas the confirmation of one's positive expectations is taken with some circumspection, perplexity, and uncertainty (isn't this just luck? Am I allowed to expect a similar success in similar circumstances?) (Castelfranchi and Miceli 2014: 116).

12.3.5 A typology of journalists' conflicts

A further open question arising from my research deals with journalists' intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts. I have shown that journalists always struggle between achieving the newsroom goals of capturing the attention of the audience and conveying a balanced/objective view of the event that they are reporting. This opens the path for future research questions. This struggle can be seen as a form of conflict that the journalist experiences daily. In future work, I intend to sketch a typology of conflicts experienced by journalists, since I believe in the generative power resulting from conflicts, since new solutions may arise from a conflictual discussion. To do so, I will first investigate intrapersonal conflicts, namely conflicts arising between the journalist's contradictory goals. Second, I will investigate conflicts arising from the discrepancy of the journalist's goals and the newsroom's goals, namely conflicts between the individuum and the institution. Third, I will examine the distinct types of interpersonal conflicts at stake in the newsroom and their roots. In so doing, I will devote particular attention to conflicts arising between journalists and leading figures of the newsroom, since this type of conflict may enable us to understand the role played by hierarchic roles in shaping argumentative discussions. Finally, I intend to examine the distinct possible ways of handling conflict in the newsroom that may generate new positive solutions.

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