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Abstract

The paper starts with an assessment of the internal spatial organisation of the eight host cities of the European Football Championships 2008 into a complex patchwork of tightly enclosed and monitored fan zones (also called ‘public viewing events’). Fan zones, such is the paper’s basic assumption, constitute a previously tested and exemplified solution to the problem of how to deal with security and branding in the event city. The paper examines the mediating mechanisms through which the ‘fan zones exemplar’ was transferred from the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany to Euro 2008 in Austria/Switzerland. Based on rich empirical insights, the exemplar is studied in its various forms and stages: as a written bid requirement for Euro 2008, as a lesson drawn from exchanges and collaboration at earlier mega events and as the object of a wide range of conferences, exercises and external assessments. On this basis, the paper also brings to the fore a number of more fundamental insights into the public–private coalitions of authority and into the patterns of learning and lesson-drawing in contemporary security governance.

Fanmeile, die—The top word for 2006 reflects the spirit of the World Cup (WM) held in Germany in the summer of 2006. The term “Fanmeile” (fan mile) refers to the various locations where thousands of football fans from Germany and all over the world gathered to celebrate the games (German Language Society, 2006).

The German Language Society’s decision to declare fanmeile the top word of 2006 hardly came as a surprise. Earlier that year, the anglicism, together with its less felicitous twin term ‘public viewing event’, had taken the German media world by storm, summing up the phenomenon also known as the ‘German World Cup Summer 2006’.

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‘Fanmeile’, or ‘fan zone’, stands for the separation, fencing and surveillance of extended parts of German city centres during the World Cup. Although public viewing was not completely novel at the time, the 2006 World Cup marked a step change in the major restructuring of event cities into spatially extended fan zones (Schulke, 2006). Thus the innovative aspect of public viewing at the World Cup came from its extent. In Berlin alone, fences 5.3 kilometres long and 2.2 metres high were erected, demarcating an impressively large fan ribbon. In the enclosed perimeter, massive video screens allowed hundreds of thousands of fans to join together to watch and celebrate football games in urban public space. Closely monitored by CCTV cameras, private security agents and police forces, this pre-defined fan zone allowed the canalisation of social life during the World Cup, but also raised important security concerns relating mainly to terrorism and hooliganism (Schäuble, 2006).

As shown elsewhere in more detail (Klauser, 2011), the tightly enclosed fan zones addressed not only the need to regulate public life during the event, but also served temporarily to reconfigure urban space in the interest of visibility and branding for FIFA’s commercial partners. FIFA was in full control of the brands and billboards displayed in the official fan zones, thus exemplifying the intimate relationship between the opportunities and the vulnerabilities associated with urban space at sport mega events. Following a combined security and branding rationale, fan zones provide a secured space for the collection and integration of individual spectators into commercialised spheres of emotions and analogous rituals, moving beyond the traditional stadium in restructuring and appropriating urban public space more generally.

Two years after the 2006 FIFA World Cup, fan zones were again to be found at the European Football Championships 2008 in Austria and Switzerland (hereafter ‘Euro 2008’).¹ The Swiss national security strategy for Euro 2008 reiterates the zones’ security rationale and also hints at the succinct exemplification of fan zones as best practices for crowd regulation in event cities.

The public viewing events which took place on an as yet unprecedented scale at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany were of outstanding importance for the safety and security of the overall championship. … Public viewing events should therefore also be perceived as a preventive security element at large-scale international sporting and related events and implemented as such. … Experiences of both the 2006 FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro 2004 in Portugal have been incorporated into the present National Security Strategy for Euro 2008 in terms of ‘best practice’ (Public Authorities Security Sector Co-ordination UEFA EURO 2008, 2007, p. 17).

The Exemplified Event City

The aim of this paper follows directly from the content of this quote. My ambition is to investigate in empirical detail the transfer of fan zones as best practices from the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany to Euro 2008 in Switzerland and Austria. This analysis complements two previous papers, which have explored the zones’ ‘interpretative flexibility’ for business and security purposes (Klauser, 2011) and the surveillance and control implications of fan zones (Klauser, 2008). What I am suggesting here is not to focus on the meaning and implications of fan zones at Euro 2008, but to unpack the mediating mechanisms, moments and places through which fan zones were
transferred from one event to the other. My focus lies on the relation between events, rather than on the events themselves.

This emphasis derives strong inspiration from literatures on ‘policy transfer’ and, more specifically, on ‘policy mobilities’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2010). In recent years, a growing body of theoretical and empirical research has provided a wealth of insight with respect to the actors, patterns and effects of learning and lesson-drawing in public policy both from a general perspective (Rose, 1991; Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Peck and Theodore, 2001) and from a specific security/surveillance viewpoint (Bennett, 1991; Jones and Newburn, 2007). However, the questions of how security policies circulate between different mega events and how event cities act as laboratories for the elaboration of novel security exemplars have been widely ignored so far.

Within the context of these literatures, it is desirable to emphasise the relationship between the terms ‘exemplar’ and ‘lesson’. Indicating phenomena differing in degree, not in kind, both terms stem from a similar concern. According to Richard Rose, ‘lesson’ can be defined as an action-oriented, instructive conclusion (hence implying an initial assumption that the same will be done elsewhere) that is drawn from observation or experience (Rose, 1991, p. 7). Mapping onto this, ‘exemplar’ is here understood as an institutionalised lesson, charged with considerable normative weight and thus acquiring coercive authority as a reference to be replicated elsewhere.

Both lessons and exemplars result from relationships and processes that are mediated by specific actors, mechanisms, techniques, intentions, domains of expertise, etc. Exemplars are distinguished from lessons, however, in that they undergo a further institutionalised process of normalisation and increased formalisation, as well as ‘materialisation’ in the form of associated objects and documentation.

In recent years, perhaps the most important advancement for our understanding of exemplars and lessons has come from a gradual shift in research approach. Having previously focused almost exclusively on the origins and destinations of exemplified policies, researchers now tend towards a study of the complex procedures and relationships shaping and underpinning ‘policies in motion’. Interventions by Larner and Le Heron (2002), Peck and Theodore (2010) and McCann (2011) have repeatedly emphasised the need for research that adds empirical depth and theoretical nuance to our understanding of the process of ‘policy circulation’ itself, thus drawing attention to the ‘microspaces of persuasion’ (McCann, 2011)—meeting rooms, conferences, site visits, etc.—through which policy mobilities are channelled and enacted.

This changing focus resonates with the longstanding conceptual and empirical interest of other literatures, and most notably actor network theory, in the connections and mediations of social relationships. Considering policy mobilities in terms of mediation also emphasises the multiple transformations, translations and distortions that occur to ‘mobile policies’ as they circulate. Anchored in this line of thinking, my task will be to investigate the chain of mediations through which the fan zone exemplar was transferred to, and reassembled in, Switzerland and Austria. The paper thus sets out to follow the exemplar in its various stages, from the initial bids to host the event to its realisation in the event cities. To paraphrase Latour (1987), I will be aiming to understand the ‘exemplar in action’.
Stages and Mediating Mechanisms in the Transfer of Fan Zones

In reality, the stages and mechanisms linking Euro 2008 to the 2006 FIFA World Cup cannot be clearly distinguished, either empirically or conceptually. The reproduction of best practices involves not a mechanical succession of steps and procedures, but an iterative patch of meandering and temporally overlapping paths. Nevertheless, to give structure to the analysis, this paper will be divided into six main sections, corresponding to six key stages/mechanisms in mediating the fan zone exemplar’s re-assimilation. I will show how each stage/mechanism has contributed to re-assembling the exemplar in its various entities and to re-instituting the complex system of interactions underpinning the setting up, development and reproduction of the exemplar. The six key stages to be distinguished are shown in Table 1.

Although this framework does not seek to provide anything more than a tentative sketch of some of the mediating mechanisms in the reproduction of fan zones, it nonetheless also aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental insights. Two key issues stand out: first, the complex and multiple public–private coalitions of authority; and, secondly, the interactions of scale in contemporary security governance. The basic problematic explored here is thus above all concerned with a combined issue of authority and scale. The paper looks at the relationships between the host cities/nations of mega events and the transnationally operating public and private actors, who temporarily ‘parachute in’ to specific localities and events with exemplified plans and designs.

The six key stages also lay the foundation for a critical examination of some of the problems arising from transnationally established security exemplars, in that they restrict the autonomy of local decision-makers and reduce the possibility of real democratic debate in mega event host cities.

Methodology

The paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating to the securitisation of Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland. This research project relied on the extensive study of official reports (minutes of local executive and parliament sittings, executive responses to interpellations in parliament and official documents from police sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from various local, national and international media articles. For practical and personal reasons, drawing upon longstanding research on issues of security, risk and surveillance in various Swiss cities, emphasis was placed on the securitisation of Euro 2008 in

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Switzerland (thus considering Austria to a lesser degree).

The project also involved 10 in-depth interviews with diverse stakeholders in the securitisation of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city of Geneva. These stakeholders included the co-ordinator of stadium security, security personnel at Geneva International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice in Geneva [chancellerie], the city’s security co-ordinator and police ground personnel.

Based on long-term research collaborations with police forces in Geneva, interviewees were chosen in function of their various roles and responsibilities, in order to generate a broad view of the stakes and implications of Euro 2008 securitisation. Interviews were based on a list of seven research themes, which was submitted to each interviewee before the meeting. This list was divided into three main parts: first, security threats and the organisational structure of security governance at Euro 2008; secondly, security preparations for Euro 2008, with a particular focus on the role of previously gained insights from other mega events; and, thirdly, the anticipated security legacies of Euro 2008. In its focus on the transfer and reproduction of fan zones at Euro 2008, the analysis that follows draws mainly on the second part of the interviews.

The Requested Exemplar

As a precondition of their bid for Euro 2008, the Austrian and Swiss governments and football associations provided a series of guarantees relating to a wide range of issues. These included provision of event security, the protection of UEFA’s commercial rights, promotional activities, granting visas and work permits, and the free importation of goods listed in UEFA’s Schedule of Conditions (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand UEFA EURO 2008, 2008, pp. 100–105). The requested pre-bidding guarantees resulted in a collection of six statements, signed by the relevant public authorities. The statement regarding the protection of UEFA’s commercial rights in Switzerland, for example, reads as follows

The relevant authorities of the government of Switzerland, Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, hereby confirms that the necessary measures will be taken to protect UEFA’s commercial rights, in accordance with Chapter 4.2. of the Schedule of Conditions (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand UEFA EURO 2008, 2008, p. 101).

Pre-bidding guarantees had an impact on the staging and securitisation of Euro 2008 by fixing a series of organisational standards underlying the event. The organisation of fan zones was not specified in these guarantees, but its guiding principles (security and exclusive commercial rights) had already been established. Thus the first action of UEFA involved establishing a series of mediating principles—i.e. an overall coercive framework of legally binding assurances. No local characteristics or particular conditions of transferability for these principles were taken into account; instead, the same general level of ‘convergence through penetration’ (Bennett, 1991) applied to any potential host of the event. Thus the replication of fan zones started from a very general, abstract and distant level.

In addition to the requested government guarantees, UEFA also provided detailed documentation regarding the event specificities and requirements (named ‘Schedule of Conditions’) to potential bidders for the event. Whilst the ‘Schedule of Conditions’ for Euro 2008 can be approached only indirectly through the study of parliament protocols and minutes of executive meetings, UEFA’s schedule of conditions for Euro
2012 can be found on the official UEFA webpage. In this document, UEFA’s intention to establish fan zones, together with its implied commercial rationale, is stated unmistakably.

UEFA currently intends to establish a fan zone in certain Host Cities and/or, potentially, in other cities in the Host Country (each a ‘Fan Zone’). The concept of a Fan Zone is to create an area that is accessible to the general public in which UEFA’s Commercial Partners can stage a variety of UEFA EURO 2012-related activities, entertainment and displays. The Fan Zone(s) will provide certain Commercial Partners with an additional opportunity to leverage off their commercial involvement in UEFA EURO 2012 (UEFA, n.d., p. 45).

Fan zones are here portrayed as a requested exemplar, standing from the beginning of the bidding process for the partitioning of the host cities into specific areas of control and branding for the organising body’s commercial partners. Given its privileged position as the event organiser, UEFA at this stage appears to assume almost complete authority of the staging of fan zones in the host cities. With this in mind, it is worth highlighting the somewhat unusual circumstances of policy mobilities in the context of sport mega events. It rests with the organiser (in this case UEFA) to impose a pre-established set of conditions onto potential event cities. Unlike with other, more consensual, forms of urban policy mobilities, the hosting of mega events implies a series of requirements which push towards the reproduction of previously tested exemplars. Thus from the very decision to bid for the event, the organisation of fan zones was part of an ‘institutional agenda’ (Cobb and Elder, 1975) set externally by UEFA.

Yet the apparent absence of any local or national autonomy in the staging of fan zones is a fact worth pondering. In Austria and Switzerland, pre-bidding UEFA requirements raised considerable legal debate in terms of liability and legality (Hilty et al., 2006; Arpagaus, 2008). Most importantly, UEFA’s efforts to enhance exclusive branding in the event cities directly opposed the claims of ownership of previously established local businesses.

UEFA 2008 did not only take place in the football stadia, but also occupied large public areas in the host cities. Regarding the rights of sponsors and brands, and copyright matters, this leads to inevitable conflicts of interest with those who were already occupying these areas or wanted to profit from the ‘football’ product. With the signing of guarantees, especially those protecting UEFA’s commercial rights and those of its sponsors, we were hardly aware of the potential consequences. The legal situation is still unclear and the subject is totally controversial and media-bound (Overall Project Co-ordination Swiss Authorities, 2008, p. 6).

The quote bears testimony to the conflicts of interest between UEFA and those previously occupying the areas that became defined as fan zones. As shall be shown in the following, controversies in the host cities of Euro 2008 were suspended temporarily with the Host City Charter, a legally binding agreement between the event cities and UEFA. In some other Swiss cities, however, plans to stage fan zones had to be cancelled following public votes; this was the case in Winterthur, where 56 per cent of the population voted against the city’s intention to stage fan zones during the event.

The Prescribed Exemplar

Following UEFA’s decision to award Euro 2008 to Switzerland and Austria, the initial framework of pre-bidding guarantees and
requirements was further refined and operationalised and, by January 2007, a collection of detailed terms of conditions named the Host City Charter had been elaborated between UEFA and the eight host cities. As a comprehensive co-operation agreement, the Charter specified mutual rights and duties between the main event stakeholders, as well as the necessary infrastructure to be put in place. At this point, the staging of fan zones, as well as the branding rights of UEFA sponsors within these zones, were given legally binding recognition. Hence the ‘translation’ (Latour, 1999, p. 91) of fan zones from a requested to a legally prescribed exemplar

Each host city is responsible for planning, organising and putting into effect one or several supporter zones, situated in an appropriate and highly frequented zone of the city. … UEFA sponsors enjoy exclusive advertisement rights within these sites (UEFA Host City Charter Euro 2008; quoted in République et Canton de Genève, 2007; author’s translation).

Negotiations leading to the Host City Charter not only resulted in the legally binding confirmation, and hence reproduction, of fan zones, but also affected the exemplar itself. In contrast to the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, for example, Euro 2008 host cities were given the right to negotiate deals with up to four local sponsors for fan zones, complementing (but not competing with) the official UEFA sponsors (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 2007, p. 11). It is not possible to elucidate the exact reasons accounting for this difference, given that negotiations leading to the Charter were agreed to remain secret and hence a priori excluded from democratic scrutiny and public debate (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 2007, p. 50). I am content here to underscore the merits of the example for our understanding of the circulation of policy exemplars, as it indicates that mediating mechanisms not only allow the reproduction of best practice solutions, but also help to shape, reshape and transform the mobile exemplars themselves (McCann, 2011).

Whilst the Host City Charter imposed a legally binding system of reference, it offered no detailed guidance regarding the reproduction of the prescribed measures and norms. Therefore, in the case at hand, UEFA also provided detailed additional specifications for the handling of fan zones as a combined security/business exemplar

UEFA has produced a document named “Minimal Security Standards for Public Viewing Events” [Standards minimums de la sécurité des public viewings]. A substantial document of over 50 pages, it prescribes in detail everything that is authorised or not, and outlines all the precautions and obligations to which different stakeholders are bound. The same document has already been used in Germany, but has since been developed, given that every event adds something new (Security co-ordinator, Euro 2008 in Geneva; author’s translation).

The security co-ordinator’s account provides at least two significant insights into the procedures at work in the transnational transfer of the fan zone exemplar. The first key dimension of the emerging picture is that fan zones were not only imposed as an abstract norm or best practice model, but also implanted through the provision of detailed written documentation (guidelines and recommendations). This shows that the circulation of the exemplar is as much about abstract norms and stipulations as it is about concrete, very specific guidelines.

Secondly, the account also connects neatly with Richard Rose’s understanding of ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991; Bennett and
Howlett, 1992). The security co-ordinator quoted earlier portrays “Minimal Security Standards for Public Viewing Events” as a momentary stage in the learning process, integrating previous experiences and observations. However, his emphasis on UEFA as the main accumulator of knowledge and material must be somewhat nuanced. In light of recent replications of public viewing events in Swiss cities with explicit reference to Euro 2008 (examples include the establishment of fan zones to watch the Ice Hockey World Championships 2009 and the FIFA World Cup 2010), there is good reason to assume that local policy stakeholders have also drawn important lessons from Euro 2008.

The Discovered Exemplar

Despite the insights provided, my discussion so far explains only a limited aspect of the fan zone exemplar’s circulation, having only considered its requirement, prescription and written specification, which do not bring fan zones to life. In reality, there is a substantial difference between the ‘acting side’ and the ‘lived side’ of the exemplar.

In actual fact, the transfer of fan zones from Germany to Switzerland/Austria had begun long before the establishment of the Host City Charter. In order to gain a deeper understanding of this, we need to move beyond a view of fan zones as a legally and externally imposed best practice model and to look in more detail into the multiple channels and complex interactions in the exemplar’s circulation.

My interviews shed light on the various opportunities provided for Swiss security personnel to gain insight into, and become involved with, the securitisation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. This included ‘site visits’ and ‘guided tours’, as well as more formalised ‘exchange programmes’ and involvement in the after-action reports of the World Cup.

Project leaders in the police department had already gained important experiences from local security stakeholders at the Football World Cup 2006 in Germany. Impressions from visits of the games and of public viewing events in Stuttgart and Munich, as well as the results of co-ordinated evaluations from project leaders, strongly influenced our own project planning (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a, p. 1).

In different ways, to different degrees and on different levels, Swiss security stakeholders were already linked to the fan zone exemplar through its previous realisation. Having gained an initial awareness of fan zones as best practices, a first series of lessons regarding the exemplar’s functionalities were drawn and integrated into project planning for Euro 2008.

Whilst the legal framework underlying the exemplar’s transfer was laid down by UEFA, the first steps in its practical circulation relied principally on the mediating role of the German police, whose position was defined not only by their practical knowledge of the exemplar, but also by their authority and their co-ordinative role in the securitisation of the previous event. There are many examples from my interviews reflecting on the German police’s role as ‘connectors’ (Latour, 2005, p. 239) between the FIFA World Cup and Euro 2008.

When I went to Stuttgart, I was not in contact with my colleague from stadium security. I was with the police. I’ve visited external fan zones, the stadium and its PC, but not with my counterparts from stadium security. The police were receiving foreign delegations. I saw what I had to see (security co-ordinator, Geneva Football stadium; author’s translation).
We see thus that fan zones were not only prescribed legally, but also transferred practically. The circulation of the exemplar was not only about stipulations and guidelines, but also about connecting people. Fan zones were experienced, practised and evaluated by various security experts associated with different events; hence the development of fan zones from a prescribed to a discovered exemplar. In this process, information and guidance were not only provided through documentation in the form of requirements and guidelines, but also gained through formal and informal exchanges in newly established, or recently extended, ‘issue networks’ (Heclo, 1978).

These observations add an important layer of complexity to our understanding of the distribution of authority in the policy transfer of fan zones. By definition, the understanding of policy mobility as a social process entails carefully analysing the apparently banal practices of myriads of actors, as well as considering related questions of commensurability (McCann, 2011). In our case, the point is not to underplay the position of UEFA, but to acknowledge the role and responsibility of other stakeholders at different stages in the exemplar’s circulation. Whilst UEFA appeared most powerful in the pre-bidding stage of Euro 2008, a wide range of other actors, harbouring other interests and providing additional forms of expertise, have contributed to the practical reproduction of fan zones.

In this respect, the heightened level of communication between security personnel from different events is telling. Yet it must also be seen within the wider context. It is important to remember that similarities between the FIFA World Cup 2006 and Euro 2008 were particularly strong not only because of the geographical proximity of the two events, but also on account of the cultural similarities and common language of German, Swiss and Austrian security personnel. Case by case, interactions and relationships between security stakeholders at different mega events may vary significantly in terms of the actors involved and the interests and reasons for collaboration. A central challenge for future research on transnational exchanges in security matters at mega events will thus be to undertake comparative empirical investigations into the ways in which different cultural and linguistic contexts relate to, and interact with, each other. The present analysis could be complemented, for example, with a detailed study of the policy circuits and connective learning processes involved in the staging of fan zones at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa (Haferburg et al., 2009).

The Interlinked Exemplar

Exchanges between the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Euro 2008 gave rise to initial ties of collaboration, linking security professionals from different events. Step by step, numerous additional opportunities for the stakeholders to meet and interact arose, constituting a series of mediating moments in the reproduction of the exemplar. These included a wide range of workshops, conferences and other types of gatherings.

As privileged places and points in time to meet, interact and learn, workshops and conferences constituted a crucial mechanism in multiplying and calibrating the collaborations and interdependencies linking the numerous security players involved with Euro 2008. Amongst other things, these ‘key relational sites’ (McCann, 2011), or ‘globalising microspaces’ (Larner and Le Heron, 2002), also allowed the liaison of various pre-existing networks of expertise, connecting, for example, pre-existent police collaborations with pre-established partnerships between the event organiser and private security companies. Conferences and other gatherings also played a crucial role in
relationally interlinking the fan zone exemplar and helped to stabilise links between the actors, ideas and objects surrounding and underpinning the restaging of the exemplar. The following account portrays fan zones as an increasingly *interlinked* exemplar.

On Wednesday, public viewing organisers from 24 sites in Switzerland came together in the House of Sports in Ittigen. At the workshop, the organising committee for UEFA Euro 2008, in collaboration with the conference for cantonal justice and police directors, provided basic information on the organisation of public viewing events at Euro 2008. Themes included security, environmental protection and prevention of alcohol abuse and violence, as well as legal rights and licences. The workshop allowed event hosts to work out concrete security concepts for their cities. Security dispositifs and procedures were discussed. Support was also provided by PriSec-E08, a consortium of private security providers (Projekorganisation Öffentliche Hand UEFA EURO 2008, 2007).

The extract highlights the significance of the workshop for the organisers of fan zones in at least three ways. First, the workshop provided participants with specific practice-oriented information and norms (what can/should I do?). Secondly, the workshop played an important role in interlinking the participants and in institutionalising the routines and relationships underpinning the organisation of fan zones (which procedures can/should I follow, who can/should I contact?). Learning and lesson-drawing, in this context, are as much about specific information and norms as about processes and relationships. Thirdly, the quote underscores the significance of expert knowledge in the replication of the fan zone exemplar and, more particularly, the importance of advice and expertise provided by private security companies.

In Switzerland, the provision of new security technology for Euro 2008 appealed to the authority of each canton (Fürst, 2007). Workshops and conferences, from this perspective, must also be understood as mechanisms ensuring a high degree of internal co-operation—i.e. as factors pushing towards the standardisation of the different approaches of host cities to event security.

Whilst the quote gives an idea of the importance of workshops and conferences for the organisation of fan zones, it does not tell us how or when exactly the replication of the exemplar became a practical planning issue. Which urban areas should be chosen? How should the fences surrounding the events be erected? Where should the entrance gates be positioned? In order to investigate the micro negotiations and practical planning process of the zones, a more detailed empirical investigation would have been necessary, but in this case was beyond the immediate scope of my research.

**The Inhabited Exemplar**

For stakeholders in the securitisation of Euro 2008, the planning of fan zones raised an issue that has not yet been explored: the need to render the exemplar practically operational. The types of initiative set in motion to deal with this problem involved myriads of individual and collective training sessions and exercises, taking place on all levels across the hierarchy of involved actors. To develop this argument, I propose to look in some detail at the following press release with respect to the final exercise for the staging of fan zones in Geneva.

This morning, police forces in Geneva completed preparations for Euro 2008 with their last exercise. Preparations were finalised with
an exercise held in two public places, the fan zone Plainpalais and the fan village Bout-du-Monde. Police forces could use up to 50 role-players in order to train reactions to diverse threats. In the fan zone Plainpalais, which offers capacity for up to 45 000 people, security forces prepared for three scenarios: the removal of unruly fan groups, the removal of unruly individuals and the control of a specific risk zone. The second part of the exercise was carried out in the fan village Bout-du-Monde, where 30 000 spectators are expected and more than 3000 fans are likely to be accommodated. At this location, therefore, staff received training specific to the problematics of camping and accommodation zones. Local, national and international media also followed the exercises (Schweizerische Kriminalprävention, 2008; author’s translation).

There are at least two major points to note from this report. First, the place-relatedness of the exercise needs emphasising. Held in exactly those places where public viewing would be staged during Euro 2008, the exercise aimed to transpose the fan zone exemplar onto the level of urban morphology, allowing the ‘articulation’ (Latour, 1999, p. 142) of the exemplar in situ. Albeit temporarily and tentatively, the exemplar was made to ‘touch base’ in its spatial destination. At this stage, the designated urban environment in its materiality, sociality and functionality acted as the mediator in the shaping and ordering of the exemplar’s reassemblage. Practices developing from fan zones could be tested in, confronted with and adapted to the socio-spatial attributes of the exemplar’s site of implantation.

Furthermore, the exercise constituted not only an occasion for practical interaction, but also opened up a space of experimentation, thus allowing the rehearsal and adjustment of the planned ‘security dispositif’ (Foucault, 2009, p. 11). Problems could be observed and experienced in situ, vulnerabilities identified, technical and human capabilities tested and hence lessons drawn. In sum, the objective of the exercise was to render the exemplar practically ‘inhabitable’ in its chosen urban context. Thus, at this stage of the fan zones’ reproduction, different forms of practical expertise (from local police and rescue brigades to urban practitioners familiar with the chosen urban site) contributed in important ways to the operationalisation of the exemplar.

However, although the exercise was organised in places where fan zones would be staged and supporters would be accommodated during Euro 2008, the exact conditions of the real event could not be fully simulated (in terms of spectator density, crowd behaviour, etc.). Exercises were thus also staged on specific occasions resembling the actual event. Probably the most publicised exercise of this type was held during the European international football game between FC Zurich and FC Toulouse, approximately one year before Euro 2008. This particular exercise allowed police forces to conduct a major trial of unmanned aircraft for crowd control of fan flows to the stadium, a technique that was used in three of the four Swiss host cities for crowd management at Euro 2008 (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007b).

The second point standing out from the quote relates to the exercise’s temporality. In other words, how did the exercise relate to the future—i.e. the anticipated, real event? According to Ben Anderson, “exercises are bound up with two practices of invention; imagination and performance” (Anderson, 2010, p. 230). Both of these anticipatory practices are evident in the press release quoted earlier. On the one hand, ‘imagination’ is implied in the quote’s reference to ‘scenarios’. As Anderson (2010) shows, scenarios provide a means for naming and imagining the future and hence a formulaic
set-up for anticipatory action. On the other hand, the ‘performative’ aspect of the exercise is expressed by the quote’s reference to the theatrical performance by 50 role-players, involved in simulating the real event.

In sum, based on imagined scenarios and a spatially bound theatrical performance, the exercise offered a valuable opportunity for security stakeholders to relate to and hence prospectively to deal with the exemplar in its anticipated form and space. The exemplar was made manageable and governable as a set of imagined and pre-ordered entities.

**The Assessed Exemplar**

An important aspect in this report has not yet been explored: the exercise was not only performed for the benefit of the security professionals involved, but also played out in front of a wide range of media representatives and other spectators. Following a logic of comparison between different events, the circulation of the exemplar was constantly followed, assessed and commented upon by a range of people, in a range of ways.

At this point, I am mainly interested in the assessment and supervision of the exemplar’s reproduction by external experts. The following quote underlines the importance of external assessments as yet another mediating mechanism in the circulation of best practices between sport mega events.

We informed the Swiss project direction about any exercise we did. People were invited to assist, if they wanted. Various representatives were present … In this context, a whole series of reports were made by Prof. A. In collaboration with the project direction, A. wrote an evaluation report for each host city. Prof. A. is a true specialist in this domain and is regularly engaged by UEFA. I also think he’s had this mandate already in Germany [at the FIFA World Cup]. He attended some of our specific exercises, together with numerous other experts. On two occasions, there was also an exam, in quotation marks, of our dispositif (security co-ordinator, Euro 2008 in Geneva; author’s translation).

Importantly, external assessments were often destined not only for internal use, but also for public relations work. In many cases, results were made public by both the examinee and the examiner. Dissatisfaction implied public criticism (and ultimately sanctioning), whilst positive results often led to public praise.

An international experts’ commission visited Switzerland from 25 to 27 June 2007 to evaluate the Swiss national security strategy for UEFA EURO 2008. … “I am glad to note that Switzerland and Austria are on the right way towards the organization of a peaceful football festival which will bring people from different nations together” remarked Christoph Lipp, responsible for international security matters at large-scale sporting events within the German federal ministry of the interior (Public Authorities Project Organisation UEFA EURO 2008, 2007).

As a calculation of the distance between a given ensemble of norms and the actual behaviour, the examination, normalising judgement and reward coming from external authorities must be understood not only as an important means of control—a system of supervision and coercion—but also as a delegation of responsibility to external authorities. This reiterates the importance of expert knowledge in the exemplification processes of security governance at, and through, sport mega events. It appears that the power to define ‘good’ security governance depends largely on the expertise provided, and in many ways imposed, by...
‘nomadic policy entrepreneurs’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p. 172). As an arena for the stakeholders to meet, exercises provide an important mechanism in the ordering and shaping of the interactions and interdependencies between local, national and transnational players in mega event securitisation.

However, despite the implied relationship of power, this does not negate the role and importance of expertise and authority developing from the local level. I simply want to highlight the pressures, arising from transnationally established security players, which surround the organisation and staging of sport mega events and thus push towards increased imitation and policy convergence.

Conclusions

This paper has provided a set of empirically grounded insights into the transfer of fan zones, as best practices, from the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany to Euro 2008 in Switzerland/Austria. In the course of this study, fan zones have been portrayed as a previously applied and subsequently exemplified solution to the bipartite problem of crowd management and branding (regulation and commercialisation) in the event cities. In exploring this problematic, the fan zone exemplar has been studied in its various forms and stages: as a written pre-bid requirement, as a lesson drawn from exchanges and collaborations at earlier events and as the object of a wide range of workshops, conferences, exercises and assessments.

The six main stages distinguished here—the requested, prescribed, discovered, interlinked, inhabited and assessed exemplars—make up an exploratory framework for investigating the mediating role of particular channels and mechanisms in the making of the ‘exemplified event city’. With a view to the existing literatures on lesson-drawing and policy mobilities more generally, the present case study advances at least three key lessons to highlight. First, the paper shows that ‘policies in motion’ do not follow a mechanical succession of distinct processes and stages, but must be understood as an ensemble of meandering and overlapping paths and mechanisms. Whilst recent interventions by McCann (2011) and by Peck and Theodore (2010) have stressed the importance of investigating the micro spaces of persuasion shaping the very process of policy circulation itself, there are to date very few truly empirical studies that unpack the complex lines of movement and connective social tissues underpinning urban policy mobilities. This paper makes an important contribution to help fill this gap, illustrating the contingent mutual imbrications and continuous temporal overlaps between the studied (legal and practical) mechanisms mediating the policy circuits before Euro 2008.

Secondly, the paper reiterates that policy models themselves are transformed throughout the connective learning processes and through exchanges ‘on the move’. Examples given in this paper range from the specific solution for fan zones elaborated in the Host City Charter to the place-relatedness of practical exercises before the event, stressing the importance of the specific spatial particularities of each host city/nation. In general terms, this analysis also underscores the need to apprehend policies in motion as a combination of processes and projects bringing together various local, national and transnational actors whose positions are defined by interwoven, resonating and conflicting interests and concerns.

Thirdly, the empirical insights provided here elucidate the very nature of the transferred exemplar itself. Policies in motion are often seen as somewhat abstract and more
or less institutionalised bodies of knowledge and ‘ways of doing things’, yet the present study shows that the transfer of fan zones from the FIFA World Cup 2006 to Euro 2008 relied on a wide range of practices and relationships, sites and moments. The transferred exemplar, in this reading, is not merely a type of knowledge, or an ensemble of more or less binding stipulations, but a dynamic assemblage of individuals, ideas and things (handbooks, guidelines, legal documents, plans, etc.) whose assimilation is reconstituted and re-enacted through multiple channels and in multiple sites. Some of these are identified and studied empirically in this paper, providing an exploratory portrait of the exemplification processes of security governance at, and through, sport mega events.

By way of conclusion, it is worth looking in more detail at two main issues arising from the largely unquestioned exemplification process in contemporary security governance. A first series of issues at stake is related to the changing role and importance of local expertise and authority in security governance. Whilst my investigation has placed emphasis on the multiple actors and forms of expertise involved in the practical reproduction of fan zones, it has also repeatedly underlined the privileged position of UEFA in the circulation of the fan zone exemplar.

The paper thus highlights the fact that sport mega events, as highly visible and prestigious projects, are firmly embedded within transnational circuits of imitation, marketing and exemplification, which increasingly characterise the production of urban, infrastructural and national security systems. In light of the analysis, it can be argued that, besides specific solutions and ad hoc collaborations for particular events, there is an increasingly important field of ‘exemplified solutions’ provided by actors moving from country to country and from event to event, thus creating ‘exemplified territories of security’. The resulting challenge for local stakeholders and authorities was expressed unmistakably by the government of the canton of Basel prior to Euro 2008

The JSSK [Commission for Justice, Security and Sport] can but conclude that the scope of action of local parliaments as regards Euro 2008 is considerably restricted. UEFA, other organisations, private companies, the confederation and the cantonal authorities have decided to stage an event of the biggest proportions, which will be financed partly by cantonal means. However, the fact that cantonal authorities are obliged to agree to provide financial support, when in reality they are not able to really influence essential elements, must be considered highly questionable (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 2007, p. 3; author’s translation).

Thus local authorities and stakeholders, having to implement and finance best practice solutions, are increasingly ‘caught’ within globalised networks of expertise, unable truly to challenge the reproduction of pre-defined security exemplars. Yet if the autonomy of local parliaments is limited, so is the scope of public debate: as mentioned before, negotiations leading to the Host City Charter were a priori excluded from democratic scrutiny. The confidential legal agreement between UEFA and the host cities not only temporarily suspended the claims of local businesses to spatial ownership, but also prevented the emergence of truly democratic forms of resistance, such as public votes, in the host cities of Euro 2008. The aforementioned example of Winterthur—a Swiss non-host city of Euro 2008, where 56 per cent of the population voted against the staging of fan zones—shows that democratic opposition did indeed develop where allowed.
A second series of issues at stake is more specifically related to the increasing role of private actors, expertise and interests in the exemplification processes of contemporary security governance. How do the increasing weight and scale of private authority in matters of public safety change ways of dealing with contemporary security issues? The example of Euro 2008 points towards at least three types of private interest to consider with respect to this question.

First, the reproduction of the fan zone exemplar in Switzerland and Austria was portrayed as a process that was—in a variety of more or less coercive ways—permanently ‘guided’ by UEFA. For Switzerland and Austria, to stage the European football championships meant also to reconfigure hierarchically the event cities into clearly circumscribed and demarcated perimeters for combined security and branding purposes.

Secondly, this investigation has repeatedly hinted at the importance of different types of technical expertise in the various stages of the exemplar’s reproduction. Conferences, workshops, technology fairs, etc. also constitute a privileged stage for technology companies aiming to take part in the coalitions of authority surrounding the circuits of exemplification and imitation in contemporary security governance. Indeed, companies providing personnel, advice and technology in security matters are playing an increasingly important part in shaping current trends and in establishing best practices in contemporary security governance.

Thirdly, from the economic perspective of host nations and cities more specifically, sport mega events are traditionally presented as promoting the tourist image of cities and nations, facilitating urban transformation, attracting financial investment and, consequently, encouraging economic development. Security issues, from this perspective, are often seen not only as endangering the athletes, local population and international visitors, but also as a threat to the carefully constructed marketing image of an enjoyable and colourful event.

For future research, it will be of critical importance to consider and investigate these and other types of economic interests lying behind the transnational recalibrations and circulation of best practices in contemporary security governance. By multiplying such studies, we may discover one of the major driving-forces underpinning the current developments in contemporary security governance.

Note

1. The European Football Championships are regarded as the third-largest recurrent sports event in the world (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a). At Euro 2008, during the 23 tournament days from 7 to 29 June 2008, millions of spectators and fans gathered together in the eight host cities of the tournament: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland, and Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria. In each host city, at least one fan zone was organised officially by UEFA. In addition, similar sites were set up by other operating companies in host cities as well as in other major Austrian and Swiss cities.

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References


