Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France

Mario Turchetti*
Université de Genève

The author analyzes the two historiographic concepts of concord and tolerance as revealed in theological and political debates in France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In particular, an examination of legislative texts from 1560 up to 1685 reveals a kind of alternation between two attitudes of the government: a measure of relative toleration of Protestant worship would be followed periodically by a measure of concord or religious reunification under Roman Catholic supervision (the revocation of the Edict of Nantes is the most important). In spite of their similarity, concord and tolerance possessed different historiographic meanings and led to political programs that were quite different from each other and sometimes even opposed. In the work of historiographic explanation it is essential that historians distinguish clearly different types of concord and tolerance.

This article gives a general analysis of French sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history in the light of two chief historiographical concepts: concord and tolerance. My aim will be to show how much this history is affected by the alternation of the two notions. First, however, it is necessary to offer some explanation of the exact meaning and usage of the terms "concord" and "tolerance."

Let us begin by the older: concord. Of course, the foundation and the maintenance of unity has been the goal of all social, political, economic, legal, and religious institutions. Concord has always been sought by all forms of government, and was even worshipped as a goddess in ancient Greece as well as in the Roman Republic and Empire. Several temples were dedicated to Concord.

Christianity naturally brought new dimensions to the concept: religious and moral, particular to the new Christian world-view. Saint Paul distilled his "good news" by maintaining doctrinal and religious concord. "I exhort you," he says to the Ephesians, "to conserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is one body and one Spirit even as ye are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism. One God and Father of all. . . ." (Eph. 4:3–6).

We know that Christianity in medieval times simply reinforced the bond of religious concord, extending it to all aspects of communal life, in its construction of the monolithic Republica Christiana. In the Kingdom of

*This essay was first presented in a seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London on January 16, 1989.
France, as everywhere else, the safeguarding of religious unity was, from the very beginning, one of the chief duties of all kings, who at their consecration swore solemnly to "keep the peace of the Church" and to exterminate all those whom the Church considered as heretics.

It was thus up to the "most Christian" king to safeguard religious as well as political and national concord. The three types of concord were brought together in the famous and ancient motto: "One faith, one realm [one law], one King," of which Chancellor Michel de L'Hôpital reminded the Estates General in 1560. In the sixteenth century the necessity for religious concord was felt not only by Roman Catholics but by Protestants as well. The latter considered seriously an agreement between all confessions adhering to the principles of the Reformation. Just how seriously concord was being considered is shown by the different doctrinal statements drawn up in 1530 (The Tetrapolitan Confession: Memmingen, Lindau, Strassburg, Constance), then in 1536 (Wittenberg Concord, the First Helvetic Confession), 1549 (Consensus Tigvinus), 1577 (The Formula of Concord), 1581 (Harmony of Confessions), etc.

Attempts at concord between Protestants continued into the seventeenth century and were the basis of very interesting doctrinal exchanges between Calvinists and Zwinglians, Calvinists and Lutherans, Strict Calvinists and Anglicans, and others. So much for the concord restricted to the different Protestant confessions.

But there were those who wanted a wider ranging concord, between Catholics and Protestants, concord in the strict sense of the word. Its advocates wished for the traditional Church to be reformed from within and the "lost brethren" reunited within that Church at the expense of certain doctrinal and above all disciplinary concessions. It was with that aim in view that the more conciliatory churchmen, Catholic and Protestant alike, organized the famous interconfessional colloquies such as those of Leipzig (1534, 1539), Haguenau (1540), Worms (1541), Ratisbonne (1541, 1546), Augsburg (1548), Worms (1557) and others.

The urgent desire for concord was also felt later, in the seventeenth century. In France, which enjoyed a large measure of religious tolerance because of the Edict of Nantes, methods were constantly being devised for the conversion or reconversion of Calvinists. Examples are the famous Traité qui contient la méthode la plus facile et la plus assurée pour convertir ceux qui se sont séparé de l'Eglise, 1651 (Privilège, 2 juin 1646) of Cardinal Richelieu; Méthode pour ramener les protestants à la vraie foi, 1670, of Louis Mainbourn; and the Exposition de la doctrine catholique, 1671, of Bossuet. On the Calvinist side, the examples include La réunion du christianisme, 1670, of Isaac d'Huissseau; Le protestant pacifique, 1684, of Aubert de Versé; and the Propositions et moyens pour parvenir à la réunion des deux religions en France, 1676, of Alexander Dyze. It is interesting to note that all the Protestant treatises advocating unity and reconciliation with the Catholics are always condemned by the Calvinist orthodoxy.

Previously, in sixteenth-century France, interconfessional colloquies between Protestants and Catholics had not been held, except for the famous Colloquy of Poissy of 1561. Its prime purpose was concord; each party tried to convert the other to its own faith; the Catholics wanted to reconstitute Roman Catholic unity while the Calvinists wanted to convert the entire kingdom. In between those two extremes there were the mediators or Moyenneurs (the term used by Calvin). The Moyenneurs of the Poissy colloquy period were in fact spiritual heirs of Erasmus of Rotterdam and of Georg Witzel. They were fairly numerous: the humanist Georg Cassander, the lawyer Francis Bauduin, the theologian Claude d'Espence, the bishop of Valence Jean Montluc, and a few others. Their intention was to encourage a reform within the Gallican Church on the model of the Church of Saint Augustine's time. This reform would permit the Church to recover the Calvinists at the expense of some concessions. The historical importance of this program is that it coincided with the program put forward by the Royal Government: the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medicis, the Chancellor de L'Hôpital, and the Cardinal of Lorraine. Official documents of the time mention the object of the Colloquy of Poissy as being that of "recovering," "leading back," "conquering," "conquering and leading back" in all friendliness to the traditional Church "the brothers who have strayed." This was the notion of concord in the minds of the organizers of the Poissy meeting.1

Their project was hindered, however, by the Calvinists' demand to be tolerated; in other words they wanted permission for their congregations to practice their own form of worship. To tolerate another religion along with Roman Catholicism meant in effect to break the Concord; to destroy, albeit by legal means, the religious unity of the kingdom. The turn of events of the Colloquy of Poissy constitutes an excellent example of a conflict between concord and tolerance at a particular moment of French history.2

And yet, when one reflects on the very notions of concord and tolerance, notions which appear synonymous, the idea of there being a conflict between them is not self-evident. This is why I intend now to analyze more closely the ambiguous notion of tolerance, which indeed is not always antithetical to that of concord.

Before going further, I should specify that there are at least two meanings of the term "tolerance," which are relevant to this field of enquiry: one legal, the other, more common, psychological. Generally we mean by tolerance an attitude of indulgence, the readiness to admit that others may act and think in a manner different from ours. Saint Paul

mentions tolerance in the very passage that I cited as an example of concord: “I therefore the prisoner of the Lord, Beseech you that ye walk worthy of the vocation wherewith ye are called. With all lowliness and meekness, with long suffering, forbearing one another in love. Endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (Eph. 4:1–3).

In the historical reality of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe this attitude was the foundation stone of all ideas to do with moderation in the treatment of heretics. It was the attitude of all those who rejected corporal and above all capital punishment for so called “simple” heretics, i.e. those who professed a false doctrine without being seditionous. Among people who shared that attitude we might mention Erasmus, then later on in the sixteenth century Sebastian Castellio, and finally towards the end of the seventeenth century Pierre Bayle. This was also the attitude of the Moyenneurs, the moderati homines of the Colloquy of Poissy.

Understood in the "psychological" sense, tolerance can be seen as the starting point of concord. However, if we take the term "tolerance" in its strictly legal sense, it obviously enters into conflict with the concept of "concord." In fact, in legal terminology, tolerance is the permission or recognition of something which is forbidden. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century legal documents we often read that "tolerance [or toleration] does not mean approval." A government may tolerate something, e.g. an opinion, without approving it. This is a constant factor of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century historiography that has been underestimated hitherto. Historians by and large have not sufficiently stressed that in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France Calvinist worship, even after the Edict of Nantes, never finally acquired an official, legally recognized status. Tolerance, which was extended towards it, was always limited temporally and spatially: it was to be confined to certain regions of the kingdom for a limited time. Those in any case were the conditions imposed by the Parliament of Paris on 6 March 1562, when the Edict of 17 January of that year became law. This first Edict of toleration, so-called, was registered with the clause that this concession is "due to the pressing urgency of circumstances, obeying the Royal will; but without approbation of the new religion; everything is to be temporary until such time as another royal order is issued." This formula, with some variants, was to accompany nearly all future editions of pacification edicts.

In fact, who in 1562 really wanted nontemporary, i.e. genuine, tolerance? One may be tempted to reply: the Huguenots. And indeed historians, over the centuries, have allowed this assumption to gain ground, as it bears some marks of truth.

Yet, when examined, the assumption that Huguenots sought to be genuinely tolerated, turns out to be wrong. This error falsifies substantially to this day most histories of the Wars of Religion. The two concepts of tolerance tend to be conflated and, more generally, no distinction is made between tolerance and concord.

Let me explain this crucial point of historical hermeneutics in some detail. Neither Calvin, "the founder," nor Beza, "his apostle," ever developed a coherent doctrine of tolerance. This is hardly surprising given that in the solid system of Calvin’s doctrine, concord plays as important a role, if not more so, as in the systems of his Roman Catholic adversaries. The entire force of Calvin’s message consisted in his insistence on the oneness and indivisibility of the Christian truth and faith.

In the words of a Huguenot pamphlet issued just before the Colloquy of Poissy, "We shall make them admit before this holy assembly that it is we and not they who follow the true Church." The necessity of political and religious unity was strongly felt by the Huguenots who learned not to stoop to any compromise "since Christ cannot coexist with Belial."

"Where there are several and diverse life styles, there also are contradictory wishes, leading to discords, seditions and finally to war."

This refusal of diversity means that one of the tasks of a Christian prince is to safeguard "one sole Christian confession, one pure and simple religion, one and only one faith, one and only one law, one and only one baptism, one and only one God and one and only one Christ, the Savior, the Advocate, the Mediator." This echo of the Pauline exhortation contains all the force and intrinsigence of the Huguenot doctrine, a doctrine which emphatically does not conceive of tolerance as any stable regime. This impressionist coherence persisted until the seventeenth century, the time of Pierre Jurieu, a representative of Calvinist orthodoxy and intolerant victim of the intolerance of others.

That being so, we are entitled to ask what sort of tolerance the Huguenots were demanding in 1562. They were demanding temporary tolerance, which would allow them to gain time, to put out more propaganda, to acquire sufficient strength to accomplish the conversion of the kingdom. This was the strategy publicly denounced by François Bauduin 40... comme Elie devant Aarab montra aux Prebrests Balaamites, que leur Dieu estoit faux... ainsi nous par le testemouogn de la Parole de Dieu, leur ferons censier devant ceste Sainte Assemble [de Poissy], que nous sursuiuo la vraie Eglise, et non point eux...", in Complainte Apologique des Eglesi es de France (1563) in Mem. Condé, 2:330; cf. my Bauduin e i Moyenneurs, 259.

"Où il y a diverses formes de vivre, là il y a diverses et contraires volontes, et de là discordes et seditiones, et enfin guerres. Response Christiane et defenseuse sur aucoys points calomnisses contenus en certaines lettres envoyees aux Baillis, Senechaux et Lieutenant du Roy, in Mem. Condé, i. 1382.

"Ibid.", "... une seule secte Christiane, une pure et simple Religion, une seule Foy, une seule Loy, un seul Baptisme, un seul Dieu et un seul Christ Sauvour, Advocate et Mediateur...”; cf. my Bauduin e i Moyenneurs, 259-60.
in 1562. And Calvin himself wrote to John Sturm on 25 March 1562: "If the freedom which has been granted to us by the Edict is maintained, the Papacy will fall by itself." No concord. No tolerance.

Who then wanted tolerance as a steady regime, given that the Huguenots did not? One man, or rather a circle of people around one man: Sebastian Castellio. In the *Conseil à la France désolée* (Oct. 1562, in which the author takes up the argument of the anonymous *Exhortation aux princes* published in the summer of 1561), Castellio is the lone voice proclaiming the true open-minded and definitive tolerance, which both the Catholics and the Protestants detested. "Let us admit two religions in France," he says.9

As a result of the publication of his *Conseil*, Castellio was once more attacked by Calvin and Beza, who had already accused him of tolerating heretics. Now to make matters worse he wanted to admit the validity of all religious beliefs, including Atheism and Servetism.

I have tried to throw a light on the historiographical confusion between two concepts of tolerance: that demanded by the Huguenots and that advocated by Castellio. This confusion has led to a fundamental misunderstanding of an important historical debate, an impassioned discussion, which is witnessed throughout the seventeenth century right up until the time of Pierre Bayle and Gédeon Fluet.

I would now like to draw the reader's attention to another historiographical misunderstanding. Those who study Castellio's thought usually consider Erasmus as its principal source. Indeed, I myself earlier admitted that Erasmus' doctrines on moderation in matters of punishment of heretics did influence Castellio. However, things become more complicated when we begin to analyze Castellio's concept of tolerance as official recognition of two or more religions. Historians who have studied Castellio and/or Erasmus so far—Wallace Ferguson, Roland Bainton, Jean Lecler, Hans Guggisberg,10 to cite only those in the twentieth century—maintain that Erasmus also influenced Castellio's concept of tolerance as recognition of several religions and not just his ideas on moderate conduct vis-à-vis heretics. This thesis (tolerance as legitimacy of two religions) becomes

---


10J. S. Castellion], *Conseil à la France désolée* . . ., ed. M. Valkhoff (Genève: Droz, 1967), 53.


12"Declarations interpretative sur aucun mots et articles contenus en l'Edict de 17 Janvier," in A. Fontenay, *Les edicts et ordonnances des rois de France*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1611) 270: "... et sans que par nostre ordonnance et la presente declaration, nous ayons entendu et n'entendrons approuver deux religions en nostre Royaume, ainsi une seule, qui est celle de nostre sainte Eglise, en laquelle nos predecessors Roys ont toujours vus...

Royal declaration of concord appeared forbidding the presence of Protestant assemblies in the city of Paris and even in the suburbs. This declaration was registered by the parliament on 14 April with the proviso that the concessions of tolerance were to be strictly temporary. On 21 April (1562), in its Reply to the Declaration of the Prince of Condé, the Parliament stressed that the edict of toleration was no more than a temporary expedience, and that there was no question of any innovations in matters of religion (in other words, it was an affirmation of concord). This burst of feverish activity (ignored by historians so far) shows to what extent preoccupation with concord made a desire for to wipe out the slightest measures of tolerance.

Let us now study the alternation through the major legislative events of the period. The Tolerance Edict of Amboise (19 March 1563, the end of the first war of Religion) was dampened by the Declarations of 14 December 1563 and 24 June 1564, which limited the number of places of worship and forbade all Protestant religious practice in royal residences.

The next instance of alternation is even more striking. The Tolerance Edict of Longjumeau (23 March 1568, end of the second war of Religion) was revoked and replaced on 28 September by the Edict of Saint-Maure-les-Fausset, which imposed the confession of one religion—Roman Catholic apostasy—on all the subjects of the realm. This edict of concord, in addition, considered itself as “perpetual and irrevocable.”

In 1570 the enforcement of the Edict of Saint-Germain (end of the third war of Religion) of 8 August was rendered less effective by the prohibition of Protestant schools on 4 October. It was finally rendered null and void on 28 August 1572 (four days after Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre) by a declaration which forbade temporarily all Protestant religious gatherings. Any tolerance still remaining was neutralized by the edict of 24 October 1572 against those “who blaspheme the name of the Virgin and the saints” (i.e. the Huguenots). In 1573 the edict of pacification of 2 July (fourth war of Religion) was counterbalanced by the edict of 10 September 1574 against blasphemers.

Between 1576 and 1580 a series of edicts and treaties (peace of Beaulieu, edict of Poitiers, treaty of Nérac, treaty of Fleix) stabilized and specified the status of tolerance. This series was followed inevitably by a further long series of treaties, declarations, and edicts between 1585 and 1588, the object of which was to reinstate concord in most drastic forms: abductions were to be made as soon as possible, all negotiation with heretics was forbidden. The Edict of Union of 1588 was sanctioned as basic and irrevocable law of the Realm.

The accession of Henry IV led to a lessening of severity. However, it is worth remembering that the alternation of concord and tolerance did not stop with the Edict of Nantes in 1598.

Elsewhere I have attempted to throw some light on the limits of the implications of tolerance contained in the Edict of Nantes, which the lawyer Pierre de Belloy (a close associate of Henry IV), its most authoritative commentator, defined as the Edict of Amnesty, Law of Union, Law of Concord. Henry IV himself felt strongly the need for concord which he tried to reinstate twice, in 1593 and 1607, with his project of holding a National Council.

It is worth noting that the Edict of Nantes was no less temporary than the other pacification edicts in spite of the appellation “perpetual and irrevocable,” which had also been applied by the Chancellor to the pretended reformé, de ne faire assemblies ne preches, pour quelque occasion que se soit... Fait à Paris le 28 jour d'Aoust 1572,” in Mémoires de l'État de France sous Charles IX, vol. 1 (Meudon, 1578), 322 ff. — cited by Isambert et al., ed., Recueil général des anciennes lois Françaises, vol. 14 (Paris, 1828), 257–49.


See Isambert, Recueil, 14:280–302 (Edict of Paris, May 1576); 14:330 (Edict of Poitiers, Sept. 1577); 14:330–41 (“Articles secrets,” Bergerac, 17 Sept. 1577); 14:377 (Nérac, 28 Feb. 1579); 14:485 (Fleix, 26 Nov. 1580).

Ibid., 14:495 (Paris, July 1585); 14:609 (Paris, 20 April 1587; “Déclaration pour la saine et vent de biens et revenus des protestans”); 14:629–630 (Blois, 18 Oct. 1588). “... que notre edict d’union et-attaché sous le contré-sel de notre chancelerie, soit de demeure à jamais loi fondamentale et irrevocable de ce Royaume.”

P. de Belloy, Conferences des edicts de pacification des troubles esmeut au Royaume de France pour le faict de la Religion... (Paris, 1600), fol. 312 r. “Voici donc, François, nostre Loy d’Amnestie, nostre Loy d’oublissi, d’abolation, et generall suppression des injures... Voici le restauralement du regne de Dieu. Voici la restauration de son eglise Sainte Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine. Voici nostre Loy de Concorde, nostre Loy d’Union et Pacification.”


De Belloy, Conference, vol. 41, r. “De ceste espece est cesseour nostre Edict, qui en ce temps parmi nous est bon et juste, d’autant qu’il est necessaire, et pour la foy, parole et
previous edicts of concord (in 1568 and 1588). Moreover, it would be inexact to say, as some historians have been wont to do, that the Edict of Nantes "closed a particular period of history," since it did nothing to put a stop to the series of civil wars. The armed struggle continued right up until the Peace of Aixès (28 June 1629) with the campaigns of 1621 and 1622, and the siege of La Rochelle (August 1627–October 1629).

The later and ever more restrictive versions of the Edict of Nantes issued in the course of the seventeenth century show that its revocation was inevitable. The revocation was in any case implicit in the very terms of the edict, as in all other edicts of pacification. The regime of tolerance established in 1598 had always in view the reconstitution of religious concord, felt at all levels as being a necessary condition for reconciliation of the French nation.

Meanwhile, the Huguenot minority, disarmed, weakened and deceived by the statute of tolerance, which it believed wrongly was permanent and final (this was due to inadequate diffusion of information), this minority continued its struggle for recognition of its rights and for survival. Once armed conflict became an impossibility, the Huguenots concentrated on ideological and doctrinal conflict no less energetically and passionately.

Recent studies by Jacques Solé and François Laplanche show the complexity of these controversies, although, regretfully, both examine mainly the theological angle and persistently confuse tolerance and concord.27

Notions of concord and tolerance were to evolve in the course of the seventeenth century:

(a) It is not just concord which informs the ecclesiastical policies of seventeenth-century government and clergy, and which sometimes manifests itself in the repressive measures designed to "force the conscience," to reduce the number of the "so-called reformed" and to devise methods of easy conversion of heretics.

(b) There was also a major discussion taking place on the doctrinal grounds for a general concord, e.g. in the project put forward by Hugo Grotius and thwarted by the Calvinists André River, Jean de Laurens, and Samuel Desmaret. The irenic schemes put forward by Goerg Calixtus in Germany and John Dury in England were also influential.

(c) This type of discussion was also discernible among Protestants who drew up projects of concord between Calvinists and Zwinglians, authorité du Roi, doit estre en S.M. perpetuel et irrevocable: toutefois cette désignation et intention Royale, peut prendre changement, et receva une nouvelle face, quand les occasions et causes de la Loy par luy donnée cesseront et seront estées. 27 For detailed analysis of this question, see my "Concorde ou tolérance? de 1562 à 1598," Revue historique 274/2 (1985): 341–55.

Calvinists and Lutherans, Calvinists and Anglicans.

It is during these debates that different conceptions of history, different visions of the Early Church and different judgments on the Church Fathers took shape. These judgments are very different from those put forward in the early years of the Reformation (e.g. Saint Augustine, praised by Janssenius, is sharply criticized by Pierre Bayle for his views on tolerance and persecution of heretics).

In fact, in the seventeenth century, views on the doctrine of concord—whether they are motivated theologically, politically, or legally—go hand in hand with views on tolerance or rather tolerances. It is in the course of the last twenty years of the seventeenth century that the discussion reaches its summit. Whereas the intransigent Calvinist Pierre Jurieu imposes strict limits to any likelihood of concord between Protestants and refuses any principle of universal tolerance, the Calvinist philosopher Pierre Bayle advocates general tolerance and envisages concord between different confessions.28

One of the most remarkable positions in the seventeenth century is that of Gédéon Huet who, in his Apologie pour les vrais tolérans, explains the distinction between "false tolerance," "strict tolerance," "immoderate tolerance," and "true tolerance."29

So as not to prolong these general observations, at the risk of abstraction, I propose by way of conclusion to

(1) consider the period between 1560 and 1685 as one process, situated between the first measure of tolerance and the imposition of a forced concord;

(2) pay particular attention to problems concerning various concords and various tolerances, which can be examined more easily through the analysis of the alteration of legislative documents, and which are perhaps the most significant in the controversies of the period.

I hope thus to throw some light on an important chapter of the social, religious, and political history of France (and not only of France) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.30


29 I thank Dr. Irena Backus for translating the text of this article.