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District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Portmann, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner

In: Public Choice, 2012, vol. 151, no. 3-4, p. 585-610

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    Title
    • District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes
    Author
    • Portmann, Marco. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    • Stadelmann, David. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    • Eichenberger, Reiner. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland
    Document Type
    • Postprint
    Language
    • English
    Published in
    • Public Choice, 2012, vol. 151, no. 3-4, p. 585-610. Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com
    Other Version
    OAI-PMH Identifier
    • oai:doc.rero.ch:311840
    Summary
    Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament's voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives' incentives to adhere to citizens' revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences