

REVIEW ARTICLE

FROM STATE COLLAPSE TO DUTY-FREE SHOP: SOMALIA'S PATH TO MODERNITY

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Human Development Report Somalia 2001, by Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhaus, and Roland Marchal. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2001. 222 pp. ISBN 9966-9738-0-X.

Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism, by Ken Menkhaus. Adelphi Paper No. 364. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2004. 92 pp. ISBN 0-19-851670-3.

Somalia – The Untold Story. The war through the eyes of Somali women, edited by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra, London: Pluto Press Publishing, 2004. 272 pp. £ 15.99 paperback. ISBN 0-7453-2208-5.

A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, by I. M. Lewis. Oxford: James Currey, 2002. 4th edn. 368 pp. £ 14.95 paperback. ISBN 0-8214-1495-X.

Somalia: Economy without state, by Peter D. Little. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; Oxford: James Currey, 2003. 224 pp. £ 12.95 paperback. ISBN 0-253-21648-6.

FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR AND SIYAD BARRE'S DEFEAT IN 1991, popular discourse on the trajectory of Somalia and its people has gradually become mired in stereotypes. As fighting and statelessness continued after the United Nations' (UNOSOM) intervention (1993–95), Western narratives of the Somali 'crisis' became increasingly one-dimensional. International organizations, development agencies, political analysts, and journalists alike perceived Somali politics and warfare through a spectrum oscillating between cultural essentialism, social anomaly, and

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perplexity.¹ These interpretations gave birth to a discourse that portrayed Somalia in stereotypical terms of anarchy, 'warlordism', and 'tribalism'.² According to this cliché, the civil war and state collapse transformed Somali politics into senseless infighting between clan factions, everyday life consisted of marauding militia intoxicated by *khat*, and the absence of a central government threatened regional stability and the effectiveness of the international community. If such descriptions fitted the peak of human suffering when hundreds of thousands died in warfare and famine at the beginning of the 1990s, they became increasingly estranged from reality over the course of the following decade. Beyond the massive eruption of violence, what stuck most in the mind of the outside world about Somalia was the image of total state collapse. Since 1991 all discourse on Somalia has ultimately centred on the absence of a functioning central government to explain whatever, usually negative, developments occur within Somali territory.

Retrospectively, state collapse deprived Somalis not only of a central government but also, in the eyes of some observers, of recognition as members of a responsible society in a universe of nation-states. Against the background of a triumphant ideology of liberal democracy, the demise of the Somali state seemed fundamentally to question Somalia's fitness for modernity at the end of the outgoing century. While other African states at least pretended to embrace the liberal principles promoted by foreign donors, *inter alia*, multi-party democracy, good governance, and free market policies, Somalia embarked on a different path altogether. Rather than exploring this new Somali path intellectually as a legitimate object of analysis, most observers understood developments in Somalia as an aberration. Instead of challenging conventional ideas of statehood, kinship, and violence on the basis of the Somali experience, the latter was mostly subjected to ethnocentric assumptions along the lines of what Mahmood Mamdani calls 'history by analogy'.³ Consequently, Somalia's process of political disintegration was explored through a rhetoric that reduced Somalis to a deficient polity and 'failed state'. The fact that observers have described more than a dozen years of Somali politics negatively, i.e. by what does not exist (a state apparatus) rather than by what does exist (a variety of fragmented authorities), indicates the ideological power of state-centred concepts.

1. Catherine Besteman, 'Representing violence and "othering" Somalia,' *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (1996), pp. 120–33.

2. The film *Black Hawk Down* (2001), a distorted account of the unsuccessful US manhunt of 'warlord' Mohammed Farah Aided in Mogadishu in October 1993, represents a typical account of the Somali civil war nurtured by such stereotypes.

3. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of colonialism* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1996).

If Western narratives of Somali society had gradually turned towards reductionism, it was not due to stereotypical thinking alone. Little in-depth research has been carried out within Somali territory since the beginning of the war. With few exceptions, physical insecurity and problems of accessibility have deterred researchers from conducting longer periods of field research in the country. In addition, the war prevented, or rather delayed, the emergence of a young generation of Somali scholars who could have produced alternative interpretations of the Somali state and nation.⁴ Without novel and field-based empirical material, the dominant paradigms and fissions within Somali studies continued to prevail unquestioned.⁵ Fortunately, however, over the past few years a number of scholars have questioned the truisms mentioned above and have greatly improved our understanding of Somalia. While representing an eclectic ensemble, the books under review enlighten the ongoing Somali transition from multi-disciplinary and complementary perspectives.

Maybe surprisingly, the *Human Development Report Somalia 2001* represents a contribution that needs to be reckoned with. Although a product of the United Nations system, the report privileges analysis over political correctness. Three reasons account for this. First, in the absence of a Somali governmental counterpart, the publisher, UNDP, was much less bound by diplomatic precautions.⁶ Second, the report was written by long-time Somali pundits Mark Bradbury (co-ordinating author), Ken Menkhaus, and Roland Marchal who contribute their distinct interpretation of Somali 'human development'. Third, despite the questionable usefulness of some of its statistics and an overall structure amenable to repetition, the report represents a comprehensive compilation of quantitative and qualitative data on a wide range of topics from food security to remittance services and from livestock production to governance. Somalia's calculated 'human development index' has slightly improved compared with 1998,⁷ yet key indicators such as life expectancy, adult literacy, and GDP per capita place the country at the bottom of global rankings. The authors emphasize the need to disaggregate overall figures in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Accordingly, across all sectors analyzed by the report, richer households fare better than poor ones, males better than females, urban areas

4. Among the exceptions are contributions in Ali Jimale Ahmed (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia* (Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ, 1995) and Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli (eds), *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia* (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1996).

5. For a summary overview of contrasting explanations see Martin Doornbos and John Markakis, 'Society and state in crisis: what went wrong in Somalia?', *Review of African Political Economy* 21 (1994), pp. 82–8.

6. An exception is the report's euphemistic referral to Ethiopia as 'foreign support' or 'a regional government' when talking about its intrusion in the Bay and Bakool regions in 1999 and subsequent military co-operation with the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA).

7. UNDP, *National Human Development Report Somalia 1998* (New York, 1998).

better than rural ones, Somaliland better than central and southern Somalia, and individuals belonging to the dominant clan system better than occupational castes and minority groups. Whether or not Somalia faces a crisis of development, many of its indicators lag behind even the world's poorest countries. In the long run, deteriorating terms of trade in pastoral products and a decline of herder's bargaining power are especially worrying.

In addition to assembling facts and figures, the *Human Development Report* compellingly interprets contemporary Somalia by placing recent events in the context of long-term trends. Consequently, state collapse is cast as a 'long and uneven process' (p. 140) rather than an isolated, sudden episode. The erosion of social services, the consolidation of an informal economy, and the rising importance of kinship identity and kin relations all preceded the civil war. The very fact that many pre-war development indicators do not differ substantially from those of today illustrates this process and highlights the resilience of Somali society. Economically, the authors recount a simultaneous process of radical privatization and differentiation. State collapse and warfare were most effective at achieving what structural adjustment had failed to bring about: the total privatization of all public services from water to electricity, and schooling to security. This unplanned liberalization increased socio-economic inequalities; yet it also provided the foundation for Somalia's booming finance and telecommunication sectors. Highly dependent on remittances from its worldwide diaspora, Somalia gradually evolved into an *entrepôt* economy and a labour reserve for the global market. While firmly integrated into global markets,⁸ Somalia experienced an involuntary political localization and empowerment of local constituencies. The *Human Development Report* concludes with a spirited plea for addressing issues of distributive justice in future peace processes, of which land ownership is the most pressing.

Menkhaus's Adelphi paper *Somalia: State collapse and the threat of terrorism* deepens the analysis of governance in Somalia from the viewpoint of a political scientist well versed in Somali affairs. Menkhaus's argument, viewed as a whole, is solid and provocative. He forcefully refutes the conventional wisdom on the Somali crisis and its standard set of explanations. Among outsiders' fallacies are the tenets that the absence of a government is synonymous with absence of governance, that armed conflict and criminality are inherently linked with state collapse, that peace in Somalia must be achieved through the re-establishment of a central government, and that Somalia harbours radical Islamists. Menkhaus carefully dissects state collapse, armed conflict, and lawlessness as distinct phenomena. *State collapse* demonstrates how regional authorities, *shari'a* courts, and municipalities

8. See Roland Marchal, Jamil A. Mubarak, Michel del Buono and D. L. Manzollilo, *Globalization and Its Impact on Somalia* (UNDP/UNDOS, Nairobi, 2000).

provide modest security in many parts of the country, despite their inherent shortcomings. As the genuine state of civil war and associated economy of plunder ended in 1992, the severity and nature of conflict in Somalia altered. Conflicts gradually became more localized, perpetrators of violence were increasingly held accountable, while warlords lost, and businessmen gained, influence. In parallel, the customary Somali law *xeer* regained importance and provided rudimentary collective security. Despite these improvements, lawlessness remains problematic, especially white-collar crime, of which the repeated import of counterfeit currency by Mogadishu businessmen is a telling example.

State collapse uses a political economy of war approach to explain how statelessness could endure for an extended period in Somalia. One reason lies with numerous powerful veto-holders capable of sabotaging newly built institutions, but not of rebuilding or maintaining them. In addition to opportunistic spoilers, specific interest groups have an interest in prolonging statelessness. Mogadishu's influential business class illustrates Somalia's dilemma between war and peace; while traders and entrepreneurs have been instrumental in improving security, they fear losing profits if an effective administration takes root. Menkhaus stresses that state-building and peace-building represent antagonistic projects in the Somali context.⁹ Against the background of the US-led 'war against terrorism', the second part of the book sheds light on radical Islamists in Somalia. Menkhaus reviews the debate on political Islam as a potential system of governance, terrorism practised by Somali Islamists, and the country's role within transnational terrorism. A review of *al-Ittihad's* administration in Luuq (1991–96) illustrates how Somali political Islamists struggled rather unsuccessfully against divisive kinship identities. This observation has recently been confirmed by Marchal, who concludes that 'new-born Islamists have not managed to transcend... clan loyalties'.¹⁰ Thereafter, *al-Ittihad* adopted a strategy of infiltrating existing political structures rather than creating new ones. *State collapse* concludes that local permutations impede generalizations about Islamists in Somalia. In addition, adherents of radical Islam fervently pursue local and national political agendas but are somewhat disengaged from international Islamists. Menkhaus's contribution provides an informed analysis of contested governance in Somalia and succeeds in separating fact from fiction in regard to post-September 11 US speculations on Somali Islamic fundamentalism. Criticism needs to be levelled at the terminology used, however; in a stateless

9. This point is fully developed in Ken Menkhaus, 'State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts', *Review of African Political Economy* 39 (2003), pp. 405–22.

10. Roland Marchal, 'Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war', in Alex de Waal (ed.), *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Hurst & Co., London, 2004), p. 131.

environment, distinctions between formal versus informal and lawful versus unlawful can be meaningless.

Whereas innovation is required to understand Somali politics, a research gap of striking proportions concerns gendered approaches to studying contemporary Somalia and, more generally, women-centred scholarship. This doubtless reflects the dominance of male authors on Somali affairs and the few Somali women who have benefited from higher education. In this context *Somalia – The Untold Story: The war through the eyes of Somali women* resembles a drop of water on a hot stone. Yet it is an important and most welcome drop. Unlike conventionally edited volumes, it creatively blends Somali female authorship with oral testimony, complemented with short background explanations by editors Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra. The book's most important contribution is its focus on daily practice by ordinary Somalis, a view often neglected by research with a more structural perspective. In so doing, the editors neither reduce Somali women to mere victims, nor do they oppose female peacefulness to male aggression. Rather, individual chapters and gripping testimony straightforwardly recount how Somali women experienced and adapted to the war at individual, household, economic, and political levels.

Among the common themes running through the nine chapters of *The Untold Story* are changing gender roles, women's dual relationships within the patrilineal kinship system, and their contribution to peacemaking. The combined impact of violence, displacement, material loss, and insecurity reversed the gender division of labour. In many instances, women became the family's main breadwinner. Women's increased economic power gave them a greater say in domestic affairs regarding marriage, divorce, and property ownership. Typically it did not translate into more political weight in the public sphere. Of particular interest are considerations on women's dual clan identity between their birth relatives and their husband's family through exogamous marriage. On the positive side, exogamous marriage offers women greater protection from abusive husbands, provides safe passage through territory belonging to other clans, and, more generally, positions women at the crossroads of the segmented kinship structure. Yet women's unique position between their husband's and their own patriline has also caused great personal distress and torn many families apart. In the words of the corresponding chapter's authors, 'being at the centre of multiple and potentially conflicting loyalties is precisely what put women at the "centre of suffering" during the post-1991 inter-clan wars' (pp. 161–2). Despite the patriarchal character of Somali politics, Somali women have time and again participated in endeavours to de-escalate conflict and reconcile with enemy groups. Based on first-hand experience as peace advocates and mediators, several of the contributors pay tribute to the different kinds of political, artistic, and in-kind contribution women

made to successive peace conferences held in Somaliland and northeast Kenya.

The Untold Story proposes a comprehensive examination of how the Somali civil war transformed gender relations and women's social status. The observation that Somali men have failed in their responsibility to serve as a defensive umbrella for women and children (p. 149) indicates newly arranged gender configurations. In the meantime, so the authors suggest, women's political room for manoeuvre continues to be determined by the sustained congruence between male decision-making and the patrilineal clan system. Among the volume's highlights is the piece by Rhoda M. Ibrahim on women's role in the pastoral economy and a short chapter on women, clan identity, and peacebuilding by Judith Gardner and Amina Mohamoud Warsame. Regrettably, the volume is rather thin in its review of the existing literature on Somali gender and women studies and has a tendency to frame social change by contrasting unhistorical 'traditions' with currently observed behaviour. Finally, the editors' uncritical enthusiasm for the Arta peace conference (2000) and their tribute to the late Starlin Arush, considered by some as 'Somalia's first war lady',¹¹ needs to be balanced with a more cautious judgment. All the same, the book's programmatic idea of presenting the war through the eyes of Somali women is laudable, instructive, and mostly successful.

A contribution that barely needs introduction to those familiar with Somali studies is I. M. Lewis's *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa*, now available in its fourth edition.¹² Although this latest version is advertised as 'revised, updated, and expanded', compared with its earlier editions, it is expanded more than anything else. Lewis elaborates in densely and candidly written chapters on the colonial partition of Somali territory, Sayyid Muhammed 'Abdille Hassan's military campaigns, colonial occupation and competition in the first half of the past century, rising Somali nationalism culminating in the 1960 independence, the first democratic government, and the advent of scientific socialism under Muhammad Siyad Barre. The ten ensuing chapters remain largely identical with those of earlier editions. The 11th and final chapter contains the author's appraisal of Somalia's turbulent experiences between 1991 and mid-2002. A mordant but lucid review of UNOSOM's disoriented manoeuvres, developments in Somaliland and Puntland, and of the transitional national government (2000–01) conclude the book.

A Modern History represents a seminal study of Somalia's political itinerary through the twentieth century. Lewis's scholarship encompasses 50

11. *The Economist*, 26 August 1999.

12. Originally published as *The Modern History of Somaliland: from nation to state* (1965) and subsequently as *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn* (1980 and 1988).

years of research and reflection on Somali society and has lastingly shaped our understanding of Somalia. Nonetheless and despite these achievements, *A Modern History* leaves the reader with an ambivalent impression. This results from a number of distinctive weaknesses that need mention. First, the book's publisher deserves blame for tolerating a superficial update and revision of this important text. Old-fashioned terminology such as 'Jibuti' or 'Galla', outdated demographic figures on the Somali and of Hargeysa's population, and obsolete administrative designations such as Harar and Bale provinces could all have been avoided. Second, Lewis's writing reflects a traditional sort of scholarship, which is questioned by contemporary social science. His restricted focus on official politics and his tendency to portray history as a sequence of events initiated by male leaders can overlook the history and sociology of everyday life. Thus economic, gender, and socio-cultural cleavages and differentiation within Somali society are often left unattended.

Third, a major bone of contention is Lewis's unrelenting insistence on the paramount significance of the Somali segmentary lineage system to explicate politics, organized violence, and statelessness. Lewis maintains that the ultimate rationality and historic continuity of Somali society and politics are to be found in 'the loyalty of the individual to his kin and clan' (p. 166) and 'the usual Somali segmentary style' (p. 281). By concluding that: 'part of the problem here, as must be obvious by now, is that conflict and war are normal conditions in Somali experience down the ages' (p. 308), he advances a simplistic and primordial causality between fragmented kinship structure and violence.¹³ Few will seriously deny the (revived) importance of kinship relations in all spheres of Somali life. Yet kinship affiliation *per se* does not predetermine individual or collective agency and identity. Lewis's unconditional statements partly explain the polemic reception of *A Modern History* by some Somali scholars. Ahmed I. Samatar harshly criticizes Lewis, among others, for underplaying colonial cruelties, relying on static epistemology, neglecting Africanist and recent Somali scholarly literature, partisanship for Somaliland, and for 'freezing Somalis into an exotic reality'.¹⁴ While one does not have to concur with these criticisms, it is deplorable that Lewis does not enter into discussion with those scholars and explanations contesting his own *oeuvre*. To do so would have only further consolidated his reputation as the doyen of Somali studies. However, this omission cannot hide the fact that *A Modern History*

13. Jon Abbink remarks that '... there is no direct link between the existence of clan identities and their violent and divisive instrumentalization': Jon Abbink, 'Dervishes, "moryaan" and freedom fighters: cycles of rebellion and the fragmentation of Somali society, 1900–2000', in Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn and Klaas van Walraven (eds), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and violence in African history* (Brill, Leiden, 2003), p. 335.

14. Ahmed I. Samatar, 'Review of I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*', *H-Africa* (2003), ><http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews><.

remains an authoritative contribution that itself has become a part of Somalia's intellectual history over the years.

Economics rather than politics stand at the centre of Peter D. Little's *Somalia: Economy without state*. The volume seeks to understand the development and characteristics of a 'second economy' within the stateless environment of Somalia. However, the book's title is misleading, as about three-quarters of the empirical material contained in *Economy without state* draws upon Little's long-standing field research on cross-border cattle trade between northeast Kenya's Garissa district and the adjoining Somali districts of Afmadow and Kismayo. Bearing in mind this proviso, the book essentially provides a detailed case study of the political ecology of herding before and during the civil war. Little's investigation of the changing fortunes of cattle-herders and traders involved in the Kenyan-Somali cross-border trade is quite a masterpiece. He diligently interweaves historical, ecological, social, and political events into a comprehensive account of the Lower Jubba region's pastoral economy. Biased policies and development interventions, competition over pastoral resources, and the destruction of rural-urban relations accentuated the fragmentation of the local Ogadeen and Harti clan lineages before the war. Towards the end of the 1980s, mafia-type warlords deliberately exploited these tensions to recruit followers for military aggression. The civil war and state disintegration decisively transformed the cross-border cattle trade, which today caters for the Kenyan domestic market rather than the pre-war overseas export via Kismayo town. Despite ongoing insecurity, a spectacular growth in Kenyan imports of Somali cattle ensued. Simultaneously the cattle trade became increasingly clan-based and benefited many rural middlemen rather than the urban export traders. The fact that Somali herders fared relatively better during recent droughts than their neighbours in Kenya and Ethiopia demonstrates that statehood is of little relevance for pastoral disaster mitigation. Little identifies accessibility of pasture and water, and mobility and marketability of livestock as the critical determinants of herders' response to drought, disease, and insecurity.

The in-depth study of pastoralism in the Lower Jubba region serves as a prelude to a survey of the remaining sectors of the Somali economy on the basis of secondary sources. Little lucidly elaborates on a number of economic trends that seem paradoxical to the casual observer. Among them is an astonishing monetary stability, despite the non-existence of a central treasury. High demand for the Somali shilling in the absence of a widely available alternative currency and confidence on the part of consumers and businessmen account for this exception. Another phenomenon, which went largely unnoticed, is the achievement of a 'greater Somalia' on the basis of trade, transport, and finance networks. While the Somali Republic had failed to reunite the Somali-inhabited territories politically, its collapse

promoted the economic integration of the Horn of Africa's Somali residents through the free flow of goods, services, and information. Finally, from pastoralists' experience, production and market costs remained high and food commodity prices increased steadily in the past decade. However, 'the destruction of the state only marginally impacted on them' (p. 169) as the Somali state had previously undermined pastoral mobility and thus welfare.

In a reflective conclusion, Little knits together the book's different threads by expounding the problems of Somalia's openly informal economy, the complexity of formal and informal politics and economy, and the intellectual challenges emanating from the Somali experience. In so doing, he provides provocative arguments, although he runs the risk of assuming rather than demonstrating some of his conclusions. This notably concerns causes of the state collapse and, inevitably, the role of the segmentary Somali clan system. In his exclusive reliance on exogenous causes of organized violence, Little follows the 'transformationalist' approach in the heated debate on the role of kinship in the Somali conflict.¹⁵ He provides ample empirical evidence to justify this proposition within the more limited case of the Kenyan-Somali cattle trade. However, the last chapters of his book advance a number of general conclusions for the whole of the country that are insufficiently substantiated. By the same token, the considerations on political institutions are rather cursory, and sub-national entities such as Somaliland and Puntland are hardly mentioned. Finally, *khat* as an important (if not the most important) daily commodity for many Somali men deserves more consideration in a book on the Somali economy.¹⁶

Recent scholarly work on Somalia thus deconstructs the cliché of an ungoverned society doomed to anarchy from different perspectives. The volumes under review exemplify the analytical necessity of approaching state collapse as a causally, temporally, and spatially differentiated process and not a dead end of collective political action. Over the past 15 years Somalis have radically decentralized politics, privatized public services, and internationalized their economy. Thus empirical examination rather than well-meant assumptions on the functions and meanings of state institutions is necessary when gauging the Somali situation. The impact of the civil war has been forceful and dramatic in all spheres of life; it reversed gender roles, created a global diaspora, gave birth to unique political institutions such as the *guurti* elders' council in Somaliland, established new

15. The distinction between the 'traditionalist' and 'transformationalist' approaches to Somali conflict is made in Abdi Ismail Samatar, 'Destruction of state and society in Somalia: beyond the tribal convention', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (1992), pp. 625–41.

16. See, for example, Isabelle Vouin-Bigot, 'Le khat en Somalie: réseaux et enjeux', *Politique Africaine* 60 (1995), pp. 135–41.

market channels, facilitated the spread of telecommunications, and - as Menkhaus accurately points out - transformed Somalia into the world's largest duty-free shop. To be sure, warfare and state collapse have been tremendously destructive for the physical and psychological welfare of individuals and groups. They have especially increased the vulnerability and misery of the weakest segments of society.

Nonetheless, warfare and state collapse have catalyzed Somalia's modernization, and the books reviewed furnish ample evidence of this. A specifically Somali modernity has emerged in which extremely effective globally operating money-transfer companies and free-market capitalism bursting with entrepreneurship co-exist with blood compensation based on time-consuming negotiations between family elders and *shari'a* courts drawing on written Koranic proscriptions. Somalis have effectively ditched their aid-dependent state and associated foreign patronage in favour of a more self-determined development. If development exists in today's poverty-struck Somalia, it is not due to official development assistance, but despite it.¹⁷ Outsiders' unrelenting insistence on Somalia's statelessness can no longer hide the fact that Somalis have brought into being a complex laboratory of fluid, localized, and contested political authorities. Step by step, the gap between accounts of, and realities in, Somalia is narrowing. This said, the research agenda on contemporary Somalia is far from exhausted. More work is needed to document and analyze the impacts of war on Somali society. Few studies empirically retrace the revitalization of kinship institutions and institution-building at local level. Despite consensus that the Somali people constitute a moral, cultural, and economic collective transcending colonially-imposed borders, developments in Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia, and northeast Kenya are routinely ignored. Finally, concepts suited to capturing the variegated emanations of governance and economics in Somalia require further thinking.

17. Mark Bradbury, 'Living with statelessness: the Somali road to development', *Conflict, Security and Development* 3 (2003), p. 22.

