

suppress heretical opinions in books and pamphlets and to enlist the help of governments in doing so. This attempt failed as the spread of heterodox opinions from place to place and from country to country via the printed word proved unstoppable. Moreover, secular governments used the religious schism as an opportunity to either subordinate the clergy or push them aside altogether in order to exercise control over the printing press. In his treatment of England, the author focuses on the collapse of the Licensing Act at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. According to Tortarolo, this was the result not of a principled rejection of censorship by Parliament, but rather of a lack of consensus about how to carry on the traditional system of preventive censorship.

The author alludes to the growing importance of the market in printed books in undermining censorship. This deserved wider and deeper attention, particularly in relation to the partial emergence in England in this period of something like a civil society in which a partial separation between religion and the state occurred, while the market likewise assumed greater autonomy and a discourse on individual human rights emerged. Indeed, it is striking how in the throes of these developments contemporaries argued in principle for self-regulation of speech by autonomous individuals or the notion of judgment by public opinion in deciding what should or should not be published or read.

Having dealt with England in one chapter, the author devotes two more to the case of authors and censors in France, a state in which the government continued to exercise control over both religion and the market and there was no breakthrough of civil society until 1789. There were authors like Montesquieu, Helvétius, and Condorcet who bridled under the censorship and looked to the freedom of England as their example. But Tortarolo shows that in the face of the development of the Enlightenment, many authors and censors were complicit in the circulation of ideas—even subversive ideas—as well as the maintenance of preventive censorship. It was always possible for authors to publish abroad or clandestinely, but the official system offered authors and printers the advantages of both legal and commercial protection. Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de Malesherbes, who virtually controlled the French system of licensing in the mid-eighteenth century, himself spoke of censorship in France as one of participatory liberty that permitted everything to be discussed except matters which directly threatened the monarchy, religion, public order, and the honor of individuals. Malesherbes's close associate François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais insisted on the state's need to regulate the operation of the market, including the market in books, in the name of the general interest. It is important to note that the state of the market in books and ideas in France and England is an important clue to the state of the market overall in these countries in the early modern period.

The author concludes his work by tracing the breakdown of the entente between the French regime and its

intellectuals on the eve of the Revolution. He then carries us through a short overview of the rules of censorship in central and southern Europe in the eighteenth century. There the system of censorship evolved toward the French model, which above all involved the elimination of clerical influence and the substitution of censorship by the state.

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DAVID WETZEL. *A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870–1871*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2012. Pp. xvi, 310. Paper \$26.95, e-book \$16.95.

While David Wetzel's *Duel of Giants* (2001) reexamined the origins of the Franco-Prussian War, his sequel, *A Duel of Nations*, analyzes the diplomacy and politics of the war. This includes attempts by the French to make other powers intervene on their side, Otto von Bismarck's attempts to foreclose outside interference while defending German security interests, and attempts to reestablish peace. Drawing from state archives and published documents in France, Germany, Italy, and Austria, as well as contemporary autobiographies and recent studies on various aspects of the subject, Wetzel's new study combines perceptive analysis of mentalities, insightful interpretations of the main actors' statecraft, and a profound understanding of how the European international system operated in the age of Bismarck.

Wetzel's narrative is structured chronologically in eight chapters. The first introduces the main actors on the German side: Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck, King William I, and General Helmuth von Moltke. Here Wetzel ably reads and interprets the mind and character of key actors. In the following chapters he introduces actors of the French republican government before analyzing Bismarck's attempts to conclude peace with a French provisional republican government handicapped by a legitimacy deficit, a lack of authority, and increasing internal dissensions. The French first had to decide whether they would accept the consequences of the folly of Emperor Napoleon III or deny any responsibility and insist on a return to the status quo. The republican government initially chose the latter course. Both Napoleon, unwilling to contemplate surrender after the debacle at Sedan, and the Empress Eugenie also refused to contemplate territorial concessions at this stage. As Wetzel argues, the failure to come to terms with sudden defeat prolonged a struggle that Bismarck was ready to end had he received sufficient guarantees for south German security. The continued unwillingness of the French to accept defeat after the fall of Metz played into the hands of Moltke, who was bent to continue the war until France was crushed and had lost its great power status. This Bismarck tried to prevent, as such a destabilization of the European balance of power would almost certainly have triggered foreign intervention.

Although not uncritical of the results of the war, Wetzel demonstrates convincingly that Bismarck's aim to annex Alsace and parts of Lorraine was not preconceived, but rather a result of his attention to south German security fears raised by the French declaration of war. By signaling his aim to secure Germany's southwestern border, Bismarck shaped the expectations and attitudes of the neutral powers, thus preventing those leaders who considered joining France at the beginning of the war from doing so. Bismarck's restraint and French military setbacks near Orleans and in Paris finally convinced Adolphe Thiers and Foreign Minister Jules Favre to accept the conditions held out by the German chancellor rather than continue a self-destructive war. Thus Bismarck prevailed in the internal struggle against Moltke, and brought the war to an end once the French government had accepted the annexations upon which he thought German security depended.

Wetzel argues that "the victory over France in 1871 and the resulting terms of the [Peace] Treaty . . . gave Germany more power than it needed" (p. 217), because the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine and German unification strengthened Europe's central power. This transferred the security dilemma to France. Had France been able to keep Metz and an important portion of French-speaking Lorraine, this gesture might have made military parity easier to achieve, and might have made it more difficult for French nationalists to maintain their antagonistic attitude toward the German Empire. However, the conquest of Metz and subsequent German victories had raised the price requested by the military leadership, for whom the return of Metz would have been an inexcusable betrayal by Bismarck, with a view both to the lives sacrificed to conquer the fortress, and to the fact that this was the territory through which prior French rulers had invaded German lands during the three preceding centuries.

Situating the Peace of Frankfurt in a larger historical context, Wetzel argues that it provided an example of Bismarck's extraordinary statecraft, for his argument for south German security was sufficiently convincing to make the annexation of Alsace and the larger part of Lorraine palatable to the diplomats of neutral powers. Indeed, the newly elected French assembly accepted the peace preliminaries immediately, by a huge majority. France paid its indemnity within two years of the war's end, retained its colonies as well as sovereignty over its military affairs, and incontestably remained a great power. French postwar desire for "revenge" was due more to the unwillingness to accept defeat than to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

While the book does not explicitly situate the great powers' behavior within the nineteenth-century Concert tradition of normative thinking and practices of mediation, emphasizing instead the role of individuals, it does make clear the probability of international mediation and integrates well the Black Sea Clauses Conference. Still, there are a few blind spots. The diplomacy culminating in the unification of the south German states with the North German Confederation

and the founding of the German Empire is practically absent from the book, yet undoubtedly was part of the diplomacy of the war. French and German diplomacy vis-à-vis neutral parties concerning the bombardment of Paris, which increased the probability of intervention, and the "humanitarian diplomacy" involving the Red Cross may also deserve more attention in a comprehensive study on the diplomacy of the Franco-Prussian War.

These minor reservations notwithstanding, the book is a major achievement. It fills an important gap in the literature, which has not seen such a lucid and well-composed case study on nineteenth-century war and diplomacy in many years. The bibliographical essay at the end adds to its value by orienting the serious researcher. Brilliantly written, well-edited, balanced, and empathetic in its interpretation of individuals and international relations, the book should figure on any reading list for advanced courses in nineteenth-century European or international history.

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ERIC G. E. ZUELOW, editor. *Touring beyond the Nation: A Transnational Approach to European Tourism History*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2011. Pp. xi, 250. \$119.95.

At first glance, a book devoted to exploring the transnationalism of tourism seems less than original. We already have many studies, to take just one example, of European elites partaking in the Grand Tours of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of travelers leaving home and crossing borders to explore "foreign lands." A transnational approach to tourism means more than the movement of people, however, implying a broader, multidirectional flow of information, organization, ideology, material items, and images across borders. "Tourism was bigger than a series of discrete national stories," Eric G. E. Zuelow argues in the introduction to this interesting edited collection; "it was hardly ever entirely the domain of specific state actors but was often the result of a larger current of developments." (p. 7)

Part one of the book explores the role of the transnational in the creation and evolution of tourist spaces. John K. Walton's essay, "Seaside Resorts and International Tourism," is a history of European seaside resorts as spaces of "international" encounter and "cultural mixing" (p. 20). Laurent Tissot explores the transnational circulation of the alpine model, specifically the Swiss Alps. Angela Schwarz examines the impact of international exhibitions and world's fairs on the development of mass tourism. Each of these interesting contributions is largely summative, relying primarily, and perhaps understandably, on secondary sources to draw broad conclusions about exchange across multiple countries and time periods. Stephen L. Harp's thoughtful case study of the role of other Europeans, especially Germans, on the expansion of the French nudist resort