

lying cultural critique of capitalism and a collectivist prescription for America's current physical culture ills.

JOHN D. FAIR

University of Texas at Austin

CHARLES S. YOUNG. *Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 241. \$35.00.

The study of prisoner of war (POW) issues is often a tricky area of endeavor, and is always complex since it depends on many factors including individuals' thoughts, feelings, and memories, in addition to international norms of warfare as well as national priorities and interests. The study of the experiences of Korean War POWs is especially difficult due to the limited character of the conflict, its ideological implications, and its controversial conclusion, especially in the United States. Undaunted by these concerns, Charles S. Young has produced a work that analyzes the Korean War POW experience, and provides a balanced and nuanced look at the policies of the combatant nations and the overall influence of the POW issue on the war's settlement and on American official attitudes in the wake of the war.

Most POWs were captured during the war's early phase, characterized by the rapid advances of the North Korean, and later United Nations' (UN) forces, followed by the devastating Chinese intervention in November 1950, before settling into the more static phase from the spring of 1951 to the armistice of mid-1953. Prisoners held captive by the North Koreans suffered tremendously during the war's first year, enduring brutally cold weather, forced marches, limited rations and medical care, as well as incomprehensively violent treatment by their captors. These conditions improved greatly once the Chinese took responsibility for the POWs, although they were hardly ideal. Prisoners held by UN forces typically fared much better in terms of conditions and treatment, but there were certainly many instances of maltreatment of the communist captives.

Unlike previous and subsequent wars, the Korean War, in Young's estimation, was dominated by the issue of the postwar fate of the captives. Once the battle lines became essentially permanent and neither side proved willing or able to break the stalemate, both sides grasped for an issue that would symbolize an ideological victory since a definitive battlefield victory eluded them. In the Cold War context, it was of great national and international importance to be able to prove the ideological superiority of the two sides' respective social, political, and economic systems, and POWs of both sides were exploited to serve this end. The issue of prisoner repatriation became the dominant theme at this point and both the Chinese and Americans employed methods to encourage, cajole, and in some cases force POWs to refuse to return to their home countries. The greater the number of those refusing repatriation would, hopefully, prove to the rest of the world the na-

ture of the corrupt and oppressive regimes of their enemy and reflect the positive features of their own systems.

The communists subjected their captives to repeated indoctrination efforts, usually hours-long sessions of Marxist teachings requiring rote memorization by the POWs. Young makes quite clear that this indoctrination was essentially useless on the UN prisoners, as very few of the many thousands of UN POWs refused repatriation at the war's end. In the main UN-administered camp on Koje-do, Nationalist Chinese and South Korean agents controlled the camp's functions inside the walls and resorted to intimidation and often to violence to coerce many North Koreans into refusing repatriation. His assertion of U.S. compliance in this arrangement is worth noting, as well. Eventually, the peace negotiations at Panmunjom hinged on the repatriation issue, drawing out the talks for two years while both sides sought to maximize their respective positions at home and abroad. Two years of a grinding war that, in Young's opinion, was primarily the result of American truculence on the repatriation issue.

Young points out that, in addition to the exploitation they faced as pawns in the peace negotiations, American POWs faced a different type of exploitation upon returning home after the war. Reports of prisoners willingly participating in communist propaganda efforts through radio broadcasts, writing antiwar and anti-Wall Street letters, and the like were widely known in the U.S. In the charged domestic Cold War atmosphere, politicians and pundits took the returning POWs to task, questioning not only their patriotism, but also their toughness, their masculinity, and by association, the perceived effeminate culture arising in the United States that was rendering this generation of fighting men incapable of meeting the global communist threat. This led to calls for girding the national mindset for future conflicts, increasing the national defense budget, and for a new code of conduct to guide the behavior of future POWs to avoid an embarrassing repeat of the Korean experience. This McCarthy-era and McCarthyesque exploitation quickly subsided when family members and friends of POWs made their extreme displeasure known, and further prosecutions of POWs for their wartime "collaboration" faded out of military courtrooms and the national conscience, another forgotten aspect of the Forgotten War.

Young has provided an important and fresh new look at the national reaction to the Korean War POW issue. His thorough archival research has allowed him to provide a useful and pertinent context within which he sets out his logical and well-crafted arguments, and his work with former prisoners, especially through oral history interviews, has enabled him to use his considerable writing skills to keep the people consistently involved in the narrative. Young's extensive discussion of the "brainwashing" phenomenon emanating from the Korean POW story is especially insightful, as is his discussion of Hollywood's treatment of prisoners of war in the post-World War II and post-Korean War eras.

Some scholars may question Young's overall dismissal of other important issues prolonging the peace talks, as well as his claim that Korea "did lack military importance in the big picture" (p. 19), but this should not detract from the overall impact of this thoughtful and important work.

KELLY CRAGER
Texas Tech University

PHILLIP DEERY. *Red Apple: Communism and McCarthyism in Cold War New York*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 252. \$34.95.

Phillip Deery's *Red Apple: Communism and McCarthyism in Cold War New York* reminds us of the devastating impact that domestic anticommunism had on its victims at the height of the Cold War. His narrative recaps the events of the Cold War era when Americans witnessed the greatest attacks on their civil liberties. "McCarthyism," according to the author, "for at least a decade, disfigured the American political landscape" (p. 1). *Red Apple* makes an important contribution to the literature on domestic anticommunism by turning our attention to New York City. As Deery notes, New York City was the "epicenter" of American Communism (p. 3). By the 1950s the city became a major battleground between Communist and anticommunist forces. It was home to the largest number of Communist party members in the nation and many organizations affiliated with the party were headquartered in the city. In addition, some of the most noted anticommunist intellectuals from leftist anti-Stalinists to those on the Right made New York City their home. Several anticommunist organizations in a variety of fields including labor, academia, religion, civil rights, and business were located in the Big Apple. By the early 1950s thousands of Communists and anticommunists participated in Cold War struggles raising issues of academic freedom, freedom of opinion, and national security. These battles in the city reflected what was taking place throughout the entire country.

Deery's subjects include people involved in a wide range of fields, such as medicine, academia, literature, the arts, and law. Some but not all were members of the American Communist Party. Edward K. Barsky, a surgeon at Beth Israel; world-renowned author Howard Fast; New York University professors Lyman Bradley and Edwin Burgum; acclaimed Soviet Union composer Dmitry Shostakovich; and attorney O. John Rogge were hounded and persecuted by their governments and anticommunists, not for committing crimes but for the audacity of holding unpopular views or supporting unpopular causes. But Deery's work is more than a political history of domestic Cold War battles. He emphasizes the personal toll that anticommunist repression had on its victims. Some faced harsher consequences than others. Nevertheless, all paid a high price. Barsky, Fast, and Burgum, executive board members of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (JAFRC), were imprisoned for standing up for the civil liberties of their organization and not submitting its membership list to the

House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). But their persecution continued well after their prison sentence. The Board of Regents of the New York State Department of Education revoked Barsky's medical license. Despite Howard Fast's notoriety as an author, no publisher would publish his work. New York University dismissed Bradley and Burgum, not for inappropriate dealings with students or a failure to carry out their work as scholars and faculty members, but simply because of their effort to protect the civil liberties of others. Burgum's testimony before Joseph McCarthy's Subcommittee on Investigations and his public disgrace led to his wife's suicide.

Deery's scrutiny of Shostakovich demonstrates that the victims of Cold War repression also included citizens of the Soviet Union. Like the United States, the Soviet Union persecuted its citizens who did not acquiesce to the country's Cold War position. The focus on Shostakovich's ordeal demonstrates Deery's even-handed approach. Unlike the other victims in the book, Shostakovich did not openly oppose his government's effort to curtail his freedom. Nevertheless, starting in 1948 his symphonies were banned, he lost his professorships at the Leningrad and Moscow Conservatories, and he was even thrown out of the Composers Union.

But Deery's work is more than a discussion of the plight of six victims of anticommunist repression. As this book makes clear, the victims of Cold War repression were not just the people targeted by anticommunist crusaders. The people in this book symbolize how pervasive Cold War repression was. The JAFRC, a group that raised money to provide relief for the victims of the Spanish Civil War, was forced to fold, denying aid to many who were in hiding or who had fled Fascist Spain. Due to the political sparring at the 1949 Waldorf Conference, U.S. and Soviet citizens were denied a way to ease tensions among superpowers that had developed weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of the conference was to gather scientists, artists, and intellectuals together so they could find a "common action on the central question of peace as it affects our work, and our aspirations in the various fields of culture." The author tells us that the Communist Party was a central financial backer and organizer of the Waldorf Conference. Anti-Communists writers, intellectuals, artists and the press protested the conference, calling it a Communist front thus undermining it. The attacks on the JAFRC and the Waldorf Conference sent the message that no matter how important and noble the cause, if individuals and organizations were not willing to follow their government's dictates they could be punished severely. These incidents created an atmosphere of fear, curtailing democracy. Over the past decade, scholars have noted that despite constitutional violations and repression, the Cold War helped promote the social protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s. *Red Apple* points out that the destructive consequences of anti-