000029033 001__ 29033
000029033 005__ 20150420164350.0
000029033 0248_ $$aoai:doc.rero.ch:20120427135959-UQ$$particle$$ppostprint$$pcdu33$$prero_explore$$phesge$$zreport$$zthesis$$zbook$$zjournal$$zcdu16$$zhegge$$zpreprint$$zcdu1$$zdissertation$$zthesis_urn$$zcdu34
000029033 041__ $$aeng
000029033 080__ $$a33
000029033 100__ $$aAltman, Eitan$$uINRIA, Sophia-Antipolis
000029033 245__ $$9eng$$aApproximating nash-equilibria in nonzero-sum games
000029033 269__ $$c2000
000029033 520__ $$9eng$$aThis paper deals with the approximation of Nash equilibria in m-player games. We present conditions under which an approximating sequence of games admits near-equilibria that approximate near-equilibria in the limit game. We apply the results to two classes of games: (i) a duopoly game approximated by a sequence of matrix games, and (ii) a stochastic game played under the S-adapted information structure approximated by games played over a sampled event tree. Numerical illustrations show the usefulness of this approximation theory
000029033 695__ $$9eng$$aequilibrium (economics) ; duopolies ; game theory ; stochastic systems
000029033 700__ $$aHaurie, Alain$$uUniversité de Genève
000029033 700__ $$aMoresino, Francesco$$uHaute école de gestion de Genève
000029033 700__ $$aPourtallier, Odile$$uINRIA, Sophia-Antipolis
000029033 773__ $$g2000/2/2/3/155-172$$tInternational game theory review
000029033 8564_ $$fMoresino_2000_approximating.pdf$$qapplication/pdf$$s293738$$uhttp://doc.rero.ch/record/29033/files/Moresino_2000_approximating.pdf$$yorder:1$$zTexte intégral
000029033 918__ $$aHaute école de gestion de Genève$$bCampus de Battelle, Bâtiment F, 7 route de Drize, 1227 Carouge$$cCentre de recherche appliqué en gestion (CRAG)
000029033 919__ $$aHaute école de gestion de Genève$$bGenève$$ddoc.support@rero.ch
000029033 980__ $$aPOSTPRINT$$bHEGGE$$fART_JOURNAL
000029033 990__ $$a20120427135959-UQ