Palestinian Public PERCEPTIONS
REPORT IX - April 2006

Funded by

Riccardo BOCCO
Matthias BRUNNER
Isabelle DANEELS
Luigi DE MARTINO
Jalal AI HUSSEINI
Frédéric LAPEYRE

Institut universitaire graduate institute d' études du développement of development studies

Funded by
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward and Acknowledgments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives and methodology</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Security, mobility and security sector reform</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Politics, media and peace process</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Changes in the socio-economic situation</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Changes in the labor market</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Health</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Children</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Needs and priorities</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8: Assistance in General</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9: Refugees and UNRWA</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Executive Summary</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIJ</td>
<td>Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGP</td>
<td>Employment Generation Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATEH</td>
<td>(Arabic acronym for) Palestine Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>The Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSRC</td>
<td>Gaza Strip refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>(Arabic acronym for) Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUED</td>
<td>(French acronym for) Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Jerusalem Media and Communications Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIFTAH</td>
<td>Palestinian Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, PNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli Shekel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPT</td>
<td>Occupied and Autonomous Palestinian Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECDAR</td>
<td>Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRCS</td>
<td>Palestine Red Crescent Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Special Coordinator’s Office in Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>The West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBRC</td>
<td>West Bank refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This study is the ninth report carried out by the Palestine Research Unit of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) of the University of Geneva since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, on the impact of local and international aid on the living conditions of the civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt). The period under scrutiny in this report covers the six months prior to late July 2005.

These reports have been supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), who has been funding the reports since the inception of this project, and has been joined by several UN Agencies (UNDP, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, OCHA) to co-fund the reports. The ninth report has also received a specific contribution by the “Program on Security Sector Governance and Reform in the Middle East” of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

The aim of these reports and studies is to provide the various UN agencies, international and local organizations, and the Palestinian Authority with timely and reliable information relevant to their work with the purpose of helping them better understand the views and concerns of the Palestinian public on issues pertaining to assistance, impact, and needs.

During the preparation of the questionnaire, the team discussed the content of the questions with different stakeholders. The scope of the questionnaire remained as the previous ones with some additional questions and modifications emanating from the deliberations and discussions with the stakeholders.

The questionnaire upon which this report was based, (see Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the Arabic version) was drafted by the team members and reviewed by a number of stakeholders who pointed out the issues that they felt pertinent in drawing up an objective assessment of the living conditions and needs of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

We are particularly indebted to a number of people whose contributions and assistance were extremely important. Special thanks are due to Mr. Fritz Froehlich (deputy director of the SDC, Gaza and West Bank Office); Mr. Sufyian Mushasha (UNDP, Jerusalem); Ms. Rohini Kohli (Program Officer, UNDP, Jerusalem); Mr Lionel Brisson (Director of Operations and Chief of the Gaza Field Office, UNRWA); Mr. Sam Rose (Gaza Field Office, UNRWA), Dr. Elena Mancusi (Program Officer, UNRWA, Jerusalem), Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot (Head of the World Food Program, Jerusalem), Mr. Rudi Luchmann (Program officer, UNICEF, Jerusalem), Mr. David Shearer (Director of OCHA, Jerusalem), Dr. Ambrogio Manenti (Director of WHO, Jerusalem), Mr. Yousef Muheisen (Program officer, WHO, Jerusalem), and Mr Arnold Luethold (Program director, DCAF, Geneva).

The IUED subcontracted the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for conducting the survey in late July 2005. More than 60 fieldworkers interviewed 1,498 people under the supervision of PCBS senior staff. We are particularly grateful to PCBS’s Palestinian fieldworkers, coders, and data-entry personnel, whose dedication and work under difficult and sometimes stressful conditions, made this study possible.
The team work was conducted between Ramallah, Jerusalem, Amman, Brussels, and Geneva. Special thanks are due to Aude Bertholet, student at the Graduate Institute of International Studies as well as to the students of the Political Science Department at the University of Geneva who helped a lot on data checking: Delphine Morard, Chantal Gassmann, Amanda Gavilanes, Chrystel Pion and Marcela Lima.

The unusual delays for the production of this report are due, on the one hand, to the weighting of the data collected, as explained in the methodology chapter. On the other hand, at the beginning of the data analysis process, a team member – Mr. Jamil Rabah – has suffered from a serious health problem. This has obliged the team to recruit new colleagues for helping in the analysis and chapter writing. We are indebted to Mrs Rania al-Haddad and Cheikh Sadibou Sakho (PhD student at IUED), as well as to Ms Nadia Boulifa and Céline Calvé (Datadoxa, Geneva) for their precious help.

Along with this report, the team has also produced a set of “Briefing Notes” related to each chapter and released in late November 2005. The briefing notes are available on the IUED web site, at: [http://www.unige.ch/iued](http://www.unige.ch/iued)

We are also grateful to Mr. William O’Reilly in Geneva for his work in editing the entire manuscript. Special thanks are also due to Mr. Jack Rabah who worked in Ramallah on the layout.

Finally, the data for this study were collected by the PCBS, but the data cleaning, weighting and interpretation of the results are the sole responsibility of the authors of this report.

Riccardo BOCCO
on behalf of the team

Geneva, January 2006
Executive Summary

Main Trends: Security, mobility and security sector reform

The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a significant decrease in the degree of military violence in the oPt and, consequently, by the decline in the numbers of Palestinian casualties, which reached their lowest levels, in terms of those killed or injured, since the outbreak of the Intifada.

Despite the decrease in the number of casualties, Israeli occupation nevertheless emerged as the main threat to the Palestinians’ security throughout the oPt, and more especially in the West Bank. Jerusalemites felt comparatively more threatened by the existence (and expansion) of the settlements and overall regional security problems, while socio-economic problems and internecine fighting among different armed factions (various security forces of the Palestinian Authority, armed militias affiliated to political factions, etc.) had a more acute impact in Gaza.

The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree reflected in the findings of our survey. In July 2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, place of work and relatives, was seriously affected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months earlier. This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was particularly felt in the Jerusalem and Gaza regions.

The construction of the Separation Wall continued in the central and southern regions of the West Bank. Our survey finds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall have diminished significantly since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings of 2004. It may also be explained by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the Palestinians as a means of coping with the existence of the Wall. This was however less the case in Jerusalem than in the West Bank.

While Israeli occupation impacts on Palestinian perceptions of security and imposes severe constraints on the Palestinian authorities, it does not explain the limited trust the Palestinian population has in the security sector. It appears rather that the governance of these institutions and their legitimacy are questioned.

Domestically, the Palestinian Authority and the official security organisations are confronted with a major legitimacy deficit. Unless confidence in the official institutions is restored, popular support for substitute organisations, such as private militias and parallel court systems, is likely to grow. This could further undermine the already weak confidence in the public system. It could also widen the gap between residents in Jerusalem and residents in the West Bank and Gaza and eventually be detrimental to Palestinian unity and the nation-building process. From a Palestinian perspective, improving security sector governance should therefore be a matter of high national interest.

The strong and widespread popular demand for an in-depth reform of the whole security sector indicates dissatisfaction with the present situation. But it is also expresses broad-based willingness to strengthen official institutions and improve their performance, which provides a foundation of political capital upon which the political leadership can build.

The challenge for the Palestinian Authority will be to build a nationally owned and led vision of how the security sector should be reformed and to map and implement a government-wide strategy for security sector reform that can deliver tangible results to Palestinian citizens, such as a substantial reduction in corruption and nepotism and enhanced respect for human rights.
While the Palestinian Authority can count on overwhelming support in the population for disarming and disbanding the militias, it will unlikely be able to achieve this objective unless it succeeds in strengthening its own legitimacy. Representative institutions and a well-governed security sector would help the Palestinian Authority gather the support needed to take on riskier tasks.

Main Trends: Politics, media and peace process

- The majority of respondents (76%) supported the Legislative Council elections, carried out in January 2006. Results show that the strongest support for the elections was in the Gaza Strip. It is in Jerusalem where one can also find a strong opposition to the elections totalling (29%). When looking at such results it is important to highlight the special situation of Jerusalem that reflected on the respondents’ perceptions.
- Despite the general support for the PLC elections, in July 2005 29% of respondents was undecided about their selection of a candidate, whereas 21% mentioned that they would not participate in the elections. Hence, basically six months before the elections the position of 50% of the electorate was still unclear.
- In July 2005 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fateh whereas only 12% said they would choose Hamas in the January 2006 PLC elections.
- When choosing a candidate respondents attached a great importance to moral values as 45% affirmed that honesty and integrity is the first most important reason for their choice followed by qualification and experience of the candidate (29%) as the second and third most important reason for selection. The emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PNA are indications that the PLC elections have probably to be interpreted as a protest vote against a PNA seen as incapable to bring positive change.
- In July 2005, the Palestinian president enjoyed high levels of support among the Palestinian public despite the general pessimism concerning the Palestinian Authority. Results indicated that the first biggest issue of concern regarding the PA is once more nepotism/ clientelism whereas the PA’s inability to maintain public order is the second biggest issue of concern.
- Despite the fact that certain reforming measures were introduced following the appointment of Abbas as President, the majority of the Palestinians showed in July little confidence in the PA’s reforming efforts. 49% of the respondents believe that the reform is only cosmetic while 25% didn’t hear of such reform.
- When asked about the main measure of the PA reform, more than 50% of respondents think that some of PA employees should be forced to early retirement and 38% of them think that some of the PA employees should be laid off.

Freedom of Expression and Media

- Despite the little trust the Palestinians seem to have in the PA, the vast majority of Palestinians (65%) affirm that they can freely express their opinions and views without any fear from the Palestinian Authority.
- When looking at Palestinians’ trust in media, Al-Jazeera TV is the single most trusted first (43%) and second (25%) source of information, showing an increase of 16% in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the Palestinian public in the last six month. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, Palestinian radio with 9% of preferences follow Al-Jazeera as the as the first most trusted sources of information. At the same time, analysis shows that 52% of respondents think that the Palestinian media’s coverage to Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% think it is very bad.

Peace Process

- The vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result
indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004. However, the level of support varies according to three independent variables, namely, “refugee status”, “area of residence” and “geographic area”.

- In principle, the respondents seem to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of respondents are willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% are willing to relinquish the refugee right of return. This represents a striking change from the previous survey.

Main Trends: Changes in the socio-economic situation

- In July 2005, the overall poverty rate was 68% and the depth of poverty was very severe, as 35% of the population were in a situation of extreme poverty.
- There was an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the months preceding the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, as extreme poverty in the oPt increased from 26% to 35% between November 2004 and July 2005.
- The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in the West Bank have both especially affected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas. The poverty rate increased from 56% to 69% in villages between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% as compared to 23% in November 2004.
- One striking result to appear is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps have deteriorated sharply in the past year. Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But in July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank was higher outside refugee camps than within them, affecting 72% of respondents outside refugee camps as compared to 66% inside. Nevertheless, extreme poverty remains higher in the refugee camps, measuring 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty rate was about the same outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty had become higher amongst people outside camps, where it increased dramatically from 33% to 49% between November 2004 and July 2005.
- In respect to subjective poverty, the results indicate that 79% of respondents stressed that their household income was slightly less or much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 61% in November 2004.
- In July 2005, 10% of those surveyed stressed that, in the last month, their household food consumption was much less than needed, and 19% reported that it was less than needed.
- As many as 45% of the poorest stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than needed, with 18% of the poorest stressing they were suffering from severe food deprivation.
- Overall, only 32% of respondents maintained that they could cope financially for as long as it takes, whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition.
- Five consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest. The results show a significant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings, from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.
- The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps led to an increase, from 46% to 51%, of the percentage of respondents who reported that they were not paying their bills, while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on credit increased, between November 2004 and July 2005, from 49% to 63%.
- Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has avoided up till now, any major social fragmentation and has secured social cohesion, as two-thirds of respondents consider the financial situation of their household to be similar to that of other members of their community.
Main Trends: Changes in the labor market

- The results show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while one-third of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter were underemployed.
- The rate of full-time employment slightly increased between November 2004 and July 2005, but this trend did not lead to a decrease in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 33%.
- The unemployment rate was especially high in refugee camps, where, in July 2005, it reached 44% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in November 2004.
- Outside refugee camps, unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip as compared to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004.
- In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners have never been unemployed during the second Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed (i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, the results show that the very long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than two years) represent as many as 32% of the respondents.
- Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55% as compared to about 22% in the age group of 25-49 years.
- The level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as only 20% of the poorly educated workers are employed full-time, while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 70% of workers with a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed.
- Only 29% of respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability they may lose it is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather likely.
- The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also more likely to be trapped in bad segments of the labour market and to lose their current job. Only 9% of the poorest declared they had very secure jobs compared to 39% of the non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was very likely as compared to 4% of the latter.
- Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty as 71% of the non-poor were employed full-time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked only few hours a day.
- Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a significant proportion of the poor are, in fact, currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their livelihood. Indeed, 37% of those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor in July 2005.
- The percentage of respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%.
- Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land, as 60% of the respondents stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land as compared to 39% in November 2004.

Main Trends: Health

- Health is considered to be the second most important household need, but is only the fourth most important unmet household need, which might suggest that this need is already quite well catered for. Health is considered to be the third most important community need.
- In the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked if they themselves or members of their household had been in need of 10 different types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey. The most frequently needed type of medical care during this period was emergency hospital care (8%),
followed by ambulatory care for a sick child (6%).

- Respondents were asked whether or not the various types of medical care that they needed in the six months prior to the survey were delivered within an acceptable time or whether it was not received at all. The results indicate that concerning the 10 types of medical care that were under study, invariably over 80% of the respondents received the required medical care according to acceptable standards. The only exception concerns emergency hospital care as only 75% of the respondents stated that they received such care within two hours of seeking it.

- Concerning the providers of various types of medical care, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of most types of health services, with the exception of ambulance services and family planning.

- Palestinian governmental health insurance and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers of assistance through covering Palestinians' medical expenses. The lowest percentage of Palestinians covering their medical bills from their own resources can be found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip.

**Main Trends: Children**

- The need of children to attend school regularly is by far the priority for the majority of the respondents, followed by the need for safe opportunities to play and the need of children to receive psychological support. Still concerning the latter and in comparison with Palestinian Public Perceptions report VIII, the importance of the more immediate need for children to eat better than before the Intifada seems to have increased at the expense of the more long-term – but not less required – need for children to receive psychological support.

- The new Palestinian curriculum is seen as the main impediment to children's education, followed by the financial limitations of the household. Deeper analysis across various subgroups of Palestinian society revealed that the perception that the present curriculum is the main impediment to children's education is most explicit among respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents, refugees, the extremely poor and the low educated.

- A majority of Palestinians are dissatisfied with the new Palestinian curriculum. This dissatisfaction is most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.

- A majority of 64% of Palestinians are satisfied with the quality of education in the oPt. The level of satisfaction is highest in the West Bank, in villages, and among the low educated.

- Only 35% of the respondents believe that schools in the oPt prepare children sufficiently for higher education, and a mere 22% are of the opinion that schools prepare children sufficiently for entering the labor market.

- Children in the oPt continue to shows signs of stress since the beginning of the Intifada. Of a predetermined list, 62% detected anxiety among their children, 48% bad school results, 38% aggressive behavior, 28% a lack of interest in cultural or social or sports activities, 27% nightmares, 21% bedwetting, and 17% a lack of interest in socializing.

- A majority of 73% of parents believe that they are fully able to meet the children's needs for care and protection. This is less the case for parents in the Gaza Strip, those in households living in hardship, and those with low levels of education.

- A majority of 84% of respondents believe that there is violence against children in the oPt. This perception is least prevalent in the Gaza Strip, among hardship cases, and the low educated. As for the main source of violence against children in the past year, a majority of 62% of respondents blame the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while 11% point the finger at the lack of internal security in the oPt.

- Concerning the most important sources that Palestinians rely on to obtain information about the health
and well-being of the children, the five most important sources in order of importance are: (1) local TV stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) satellite channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. Not many of the respondents seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions of their children on posters or pamphlets, or health clinics or even on social or health workers.

- The results of the poll conducted for this report indicate that adolescents (14-19 yrs) in the oPt spend their free time in order of importance as follows: 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during their free time, 57% play in the neighbourhood, 34% follow up with their hobbies and interests, 25% participate in sports activities, 21% attend remedial classes, 16% go to clubs, 11% attend political or cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk around in the streets.

Main Trends: Needs and priorities

Evaluation of the Palestinian household needs
- 53% of Palestinians households were in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, an increase of 7% since Nov. 2004.
- 57% of refugees are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of non-refugees reported such a need.
- 76% of Palestinians living in hardship are in need of a lot of assistance.
- 55% of respondents from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip are in need a lot assistance.
- The neediest areas are refugee camps (61% of camp dwellers are in need of a lot of assistance), while half of the population of cities and villages are also in need of a lot of assistance.
- In comparison with the previous survey, the need for a lot of assistance has grown, particularly outside refugee camps for both the West Bank (an increase of 9%) and the Gaza Strip (an increase of 5%), while the need remains fairly stable in the refugee camps.

The most important household need
- Food remains, in July 2005, the major need of Palestinian households, followed by the need for health, education and employment.
- Interestingly, the needs for housing and re-housing has emerged as a significant need for households in the past six months.
- The most important need for West Bankers is health, while, for Gaza Strip inhabitants, it is employment.
- In terms of the respondents’ status, refugees consider housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health and food (both 17%); as the major need for households. Non-refugees consider food and health (both 21%) as their top priority.
- Employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet needs of households. It leads as the most important unmet need for Gaza Strip respondents, while West Bankers consider financial assistance as their most important unmet need.

Most important community need
- A significantly high percentage of Palestinians interviewed (44%) think that the most needed assistance is in the field of employment. The need for housing has sharply increased (by 12%), as well as the need for education in the community, followed by health needs, cited by 13% of respondents.

Most important infrastructures needed
- Water supply networks are considered as the most important infrastructural facility needed, cited by 52% of respondents.
- The majority of respondents consider the fixed phone line as the most important communication facility.
Availability of services

- In general, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network (97%) and to a water network (91%). 57% of households benefit from a connection to a sewage disposal network, while 64% are connected to a solid-waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication services, more than half of the population is connected to a fixed phone network (58%), while 75% are connected to a mobile phone network. 95% have a TV set and 75% have access to satellite TV.

Main Trends: Assistance in general

In general

- The level of assistance delivered has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In July 2005, 38% of respondents received assistance in the six-month period prior to the July 2005 poll.
- The decrease in assistance received is particularly acute for the West Bank (a decline of 8% since November 2004) and the level of assistance is the lowest outside the West Bank camps. On the other hand, levels of assistance remain high in the Gaza Strip (56%), especially in the refugee camps (72%).
- During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has focused on the poorest segment of the population. The level of assistance delivered to non-refugees has decreased.
- About one-third of the respondents have received food assistance (31%), followed by financial aid (8%), while 4% have benefited from employment assistance.
- There is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined: 300 NIS in July 2005 as against 400 NIS in November 2004.
- The main providers of food assistance remain UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed by the PA (10%) and, thirdly, international organisations (3%).
- In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the level of satisfaction has improved in July 2005.

Employment

- Roughly 150,000 households received employment assistance in July 2005.
- Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12%, while the percentage of respondents whose households have benefited from such assistance has decreased by 19%.
- Since November 2004, for both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in short-term jobs. In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the respondents as the most important provider of personal employment assistance. UNRWA remains an important source, cited by a quarter of the interviewees. In general, a majority of beneficiaries of employment assistance (66%) evaluated it positively.

The issue of food and its delivery

- The proportion of Palestinians whose food consumption was not sufficient is quite high, as 19% of respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10% consumed much less food than needed.
- West Bankers consumed 19% less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. In the Gaza Strip, it is clear that households cannot afford to meet their basic needs in food. It appears that households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly more difficulty in being able to afford their food needs.
- In July 2005, 78% of respondents cited basic commodities as their most-needed food items. Meat and poultry stand together as the second most important food item.
- Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July 2005 than they did in November 2004, the majority of the respondents (86%) reporting that they rely on their own income for food.
In July 2005, 50% of respondents stated that they have reduced the quantity of food in the past six months, while almost half of the respondents have bought less-preferred food in the same period of time.

33% of respondents have received food assistance in the past six months. UNRWA was cited by 25% of respondents as their main provider of food aid. 45% of interviewees have received food assistance twice in the six-month period up to July 2005.

**Main Trends: Refugees and UNRWA**

One of the main results is that in July 2005, refugees were significantly poorer than non-refugees, changing the trend towards uniformity of poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored in previous reports. As an example, refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non-refugees by 8%.

More refugees confirmed that their income had decreased over the past six months (23% as against 18% of non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income had remained the same (72% as against 76% of non-refugees).

From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps are still the poorest areas in the oPt. However, the degradation of living conditions that affected the oPt has mainly affected cities and villages.

Refugees (and more especially those residing in the camps) are still the main targets of socio-economic assistance in general (60% of them receiving some kind of assistance in July 2005, as against only 21% of non-refugees). Despite this fact, the main identified reason for the degradation of the refugees’ poverty status is the decrease in assistance received by them. With the exception of food assistance, all other types within this category of assistance have decreased in importance for refugees and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. However, given the refugees’ heavier dependence on institutional assistance, this trend may have affected them comparatively more.

In the case of employment assistance, the survey shows that although more refugees benefited from UNRWA’s job projects during this period, UNRWA’s efforts to increase job opportunities could not counteract alone the overall employment crisis that hit the oPt during the first half of 2005.

Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees’ (and non-refugees’) most important unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of financial assistance (27%, and previously the refugees’ most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%).

Overall, one can see a significant decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising such traditional assistance items as health, education, financial assistance and food as unmet needs. This may be directly and/or indirectly due to improvements in access to basic services that has resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure policy and the reduction of the number of military clashes in the oPt.

This may also partly be due to the fact that UNRWA has enhanced the provision of basic services (education, health, relief and social services, and income generation) for registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) on regular and emergency bases.
Objectives and Methodology
Matthias Brunner, Benjamin Firmenich

Introduction

The main objective of the PPP studies is to provide government officials, aid professionals, donors and civil society representatives with tools for monitoring the situation and the assistance in Palestine. It relies on polls that measure Palestinians’ perceptions about the situation and its evolution, the assistance received, its impact and their satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals and organizations involved in assistance in Palestine.

In this part of the report, the objectives of the study as well as its methodology will be described. Since for the 9th report we worked with a new partner for data collection, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and that some results may seem very different from the previous polls, the discussion of our methodology will be much more detailed in the present release than in the previous ones.

In fact, in the second section on the methodology of the project, we will first describe the problem: the apparent differences between poll no9 and the previous ones. In the two following parts of the section, we will suggest an explanation for these differences and discuss the general principles of over-sampling some population groups and weighting of the data.

I. Objectives of the Study

Since January 2001, nine polls on the perceptions of Palestinians have been conducted\(^1\). The fact that most questions remained the same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of monitoring information. Whenever possible and meaningful, the analysis in each chapter will refer to this evolution. For the purpose of our analysis, we standardized the results of eight of these nine polls to allow precise monitoring of the evolution of answers over time\(^2\).

The results of this standardization can be found on [http://www.iuedpolls.org](http://www.iuedpolls.org). In this location, the interested reader can find all the relevant information, from question wording to distribution frequencies as well as bivariate analysis with our list of independent variables. For this reason, no table of frequencies is included with this report.

Because of data standardization, it is not possible to use question numbers to designate the variables used for the analysis. In the present report, the variables are referred to in the format o### where ###

\(^1\) Representative polls of the Palestinian population living in the oPT were conducted in January, June and November 2001, in April and November 2002, July 2003, March and October 2004 and July 2005.

\(^2\) In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army’s reoccupation of the Autonomous Palestinian Territories. However, due to the difficult conditions, the data were collected by phone on a sample that is not totally random (see Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this poll - covering only the West Bank - were not standardized with the other polls.
is the number of the variable. To find the name of the variable that is related to a particular question, the interested reader can use the correspondence table that is presented in Annex II just before the questionnaire.

The questionnaire for the study (see Annex I and II) was elaborated in order to offer data on Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that correspond to the nine parts of the report.

In the outline below, we present these nine chapters and give the list of relevant variables for each of them.

Chapter 1: Security, mobility, and security sector reform

The general situation in terms of mobility and security conditions is presented in the first chapter.

Variables: o031, o113, o114, o115, o116, o118, o140, o164, o195.

Chapter 2: Politics, media and peace process

The last chapter of the report addresses issues related to politics and government such as the faction or leader Palestinians feel closest to, support for the PA and its executive as well as issues pertaining to the media.

Variables: o133, o134, o136, o176, o256, o257, o258, o259, o260, o261, o262, o306, o307, o308, o309, o310, o311, o312, o313, o314, o315, o316, o324, o331.

Chapter 3: Changes in socio-economic conditions

A portrait of the socio-economic conditions is given in the third chapter of the report. It helps the reader in assessing change in the evolution of the perceptions on poverty and of Palestinians’ strategies for sustaining the hardship and coping with the situation.

Variables: poverty3, o040, o057, o095, o108, o109, o131, o156, o162, o163, o177, o194, o248, o283, o327.

Chapter 4: Changes in the labor market

The labor market and the employment status (including the place of work, occupation and the effects of the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.

Variables: o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o017, o019, o063, o100, o157, o196, o197, o198, o199, o200, o201, o202, o204, o205, o206, o207, o208, o243, o244, o245, o246, o279, o280, o281, o282.

Chapter 5: Health

Additional questions relate to Health. They concern assistance received, priorities, access to basic
services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of chapter 5

Variables: \textbf{educ, o056, o091, o126, o168, o169, o186, o187, o188, o190, o247, o287, o288, o289, o294, o295, o296, o297, o298, o300, o301, o302, o303.}

\section*{Chapter 6: Children}

Other questions in chapter 6 concern \textit{Children}. The effect of the Intifada on children, parents’ responses, psychological support, children’s work and women’s contribution to the household’s income are investigated in this part.

Variables: \textbf{o061, o086, o105, o187, o192, o193, o219, o220, o221, o222, o223, o224, o225, o226, o227, o228, o229, o230, o231, o232, o233, o234, o253, o285, o286, o290, o291, o292, o293.}

\section*{Chapter 7: Needs and priorities}

Chapter 7 covers the perceptions of the Palestinians on the \textit{needs} of their families and neighborhood as well as their views on the main priorities of assistance.

Variables: \textbf{o038, o079, o080, o180, o250, o251.}

\section*{Chapter 8: Assistance in general}

An overview of the \textit{assistance delivered} according to type, value, source and satisfaction is presented in chapter 8. In the present report, the chapter on assistance also includes the discussion on “food” which was usually discussed in a separate chapter.

Variables: \textbf{o024, o025, o026, o035, o036, o037, o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o123, o131, o166, o173, o181, o252.}

\section*{Chapter 9: Refugees and UNRWA}

An assessment of \textit{UNRWA’s} strategies during the past months, the type of assistance provided by the UN Agency (in particular food aid, employment generation and financial assistance), the patterns of aid distribution and its effectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its beneficiaries are the content of chapter 9.

Variables: \textbf{o002, o263, o264, o265.}

The sampling and data collection was done by PCBS in the same way as for the previous polls (Bocco, Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah 2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Al Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah 2003; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Al Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah 2005). There was an over-sampling of refugee certain zones in Jerusalem (see section 2).
A representative sample of 1,796 Palestinians aged 18 and over was interviewed face-to-face in July 2005 in the Palestinian Territory: Gaza, Jerusalem and the West Bank.

II. Methodology

1 The Problem: Striking Differences in the Results of Poll no 9

Until poll no 8, there were, of course, differences in the responses from one poll to the next but they made always much sense in the general context and compared to other literature. For poll no 9, we found very large differences which hinted on a brutal decrease in the Palestinian’s living conditions that were not found by others and did seem to contradict our knowledge of the situation.

It appears that there are important changes in the data between the results of poll no 9 and the preceding ones. For example the proportion of hardship cases has evolved from poll no 8 to poll no 9 from 22% to 32% of the population. Figure 1 below shows the evolution of poverty since poll no 5. If we were to interpret this data in a straightforward way, we could say that we reached in poll no 9 the worst situation ever since November 2002. Such a result seems to seriously contradict the results of other polls and our historical and contextual analysis of the situation.

Another striking result is depicted in figure 2: There was an 11% increase in unemployment in eight months from poll no 8 to no 9. Also, this increase seems too large to be realistic.

Figure 1 Evolution of poverty, uncorrected data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardship cases</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below poverty line</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above poverty line</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Evolution of unemployment, uncorrected data
A detailed comparison between PCBS and JMCC samples on gender and age did not show relevant differences. But when it comes to the education structure, as shown in figure 3, the samples differ significantly:

- The proportion of lower education levels, especially the illiterate and those who attended elementary school only, is much higher in the PCBS poll than in the previous ones.
- While higher educational levels are slightly more represented in the JMCC polls, the striking difference relates to those people who have attended “some college” only but did not finish: 23% of the JMCC sample no 7 were in this case, 26% in JMCC sample no 8 and only 8% in the PCBS sample!

According to United Nations Development Programme (2005), the adult literacy rate of the occupied Palestinian territories equals 90%. For this reason, it seems that the results of PCBS are closer to reality. In fact, these differences hint on a sample selection problems for JMCC: The lower educated Palestinians are less likely to be selected while those who have not finished college tend to be over-represented.

**Figure 3 Evolution of education level, uncorrected data**

2. **A Possible Explanation: Questionnaire Response Rate**

Both PCBS and JMCC use a similar three-step methodology for selecting the sample for the poll:

1. They randomly select geographical areas. Each area has a probability to be selected that is proportional to its population size.
2. They randomly select households within these areas.
3. They randomly select the individual to be interviewed from these households.

More precisely, PCBS uses a sampling frame consisting of 150 Enumeration Areas (EA) from the Population, Housing and Establishment Census 1997. Enumerations areas are of relatively equal size in terms of number of households. These EAs are then stratified regarding two levels: stratification by Governorate and area of residence: urban, rural and refugee camp.
A stratified sample of 12 households in each EA is then selected randomly. Finally, the interviewee is randomly selected within the household using the Kish technique\(^1\). According to our knowledge, JMCC uses the PCBS sampling frame and a very comparable procedure. There should not be too large differences in the original samples of both institutes.

We believe the difference arises during the fieldwork and that it is related to the response rate to the questionnaire: Apparently, the interviewers of the public polling institute, PCBS, attain higher levels of people accepting to be interviewed than those of the privately owned JMCC. The explanation for this could be related to a better acceptance of a government institute, greater care for the replacement of the refusals (find an interviewee in the same household or same block instead of the same neighbourhood for example) or simply more effort in trying to convince the sample members.

It seems logical that an illiterate person will be less likely to answer a survey questionnaire. On the other hand, a person who has attended some college but did not finish will be more likely to answer. More generally, educational level and answer probability are certainly highly correlated.

### 3 Weighting and Sampling: The General Principles

In the majority of the samples for the Palestinian Public Perceptions Polls, some population groups were voluntarily over-represented. For example, we knew that on a sample of 1’200-1’500 respondents, only roughly 50-80 people would live in West Bank refugee camps. As we needed to investigate this population group thoroughly, we over-sampled it by 200 individuals. As an analysis of all respondents would yield a false population composition, we used only ex ante weighting so that, for example, the 250 West Bank refugee camp dwellers count only as 50. In other words, if we want to be representative of the total Palestinian Population, the WBRC dwellers’ number should be multiplied by 0.2 (50/250).

To better understand weighting, let us consider that we want to study a reference population of 10,000 people who are distributed in three pre-selected sub-groups (group A= 2’500 people, B= 1’000 and C=6’500). If we simply draw a random sample of 1’200 interviewees from the total population of 10’000, we may end up having only 120 individuals from group B, which may not be very convenient for precise analysis of this group.

How to proceed if we don’t want to interview more than 1,200 people and still want to be representative of the three groups and of the total population? The answer to this question is outlined in figure 4 below: We could draw a random sample of 400 people from each of the three strata and weight the final results each time we want to be representative of the total population.

---

\(^1\) The Kish technique is intended for randomly selecting one individual inside the household. Using the total number of people in the household and the total number of women, the researcher can easily select the person to be interviewed. It should be noted that JMCC and PCBS use slightly different procedures and tables.
In this example, each time we want to infer the whole sample’s results to the general population, the 400 people from the first group will be weighted to count only as 250. They will be multiplied by a weighting factor of 0.625. The second group will be multiplied by a weighting factor of 0.25 (400/100). The third group, clearly under-represented in the sample, will be multiplied by 1.625 (650/400).

In poll no 9, it was decided to over-sample Jerusalem and, to a lesser extent, the West Bank. Table 1 below gives the population and sample proportions of the three regions as well as their weighting factor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sample Population</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>59.30%</td>
<td>0.876897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>0.827068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>27.40%</td>
<td>1.350364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The published results for the general population will though always be weighted according to these figures. Each time the results will be presented for the three regions separately, the weighting will be removed.

4 The Solution: Weighting for Education

To correct for the selection bias in polls no 1-8, we could use post hoc weighting. We could “apply” the educational structure of poll no 9 to the eight previous polls. In this way, the results of poll no 9 will be easier to analyze in a monitoring or evolution perspective.

A new variable has been designed in order to weight the polls No1 to 8 according to the educational
level. It has been named ed_wgt and its detailed description can be found on the IUED Palestine website [http://www.iuedpolls.org/PPP/doc/var/ed_wgt.htm](http://www.iuedpolls.org/PPP/doc/var/ed_wgt.htm).

As shown in table 2 below, after being weighted by ed_wgt, the proportions for the education variable o056 of the eight precedent polls have almost the same proportions as measured by PCBS for poll no 9. “Almost” because ed_wgt also contains the older variable called weight which weights results according to region, that is why the results for the education level variable slightly differ in each precedent poll.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the poll</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Until elementary |       |
| N                 | 120   |
| %                 | 9.5%  |
| N                 | 213   |
| %                 | 16.9% |
| N                 | 335   |
| %                 | 26.5% |
| N                 | 351   |
| %                 | 27.8% |
| N                 | 149   |
| %                 | 11.8% |

| Until preparatory |       |
| N                 | 151   |
| %                 | 9.6%  |
| N                 | 262   |
| %                 | 16.6% |
| N                 | 420   |
| %                 | 26.6% |
| N                 | 440   |
| %                 | 27.8% |
| N                 | 187   |
| %                 | 11.8% |

| Until secondary  |       |
| N                 | 130   |
| %                 | 9.5%  |
| N                 | 226   |
| %                 | 16.6% |
| N                 | 362   |
| %                 | 26.7% |
| N                 | 380   |
| %                 | 27.9% |
| N                 | 161   |
| %                 | 11.8% |

| Some college     |       |
| N                 | 139   |
| %                 | 9.3%  |
| N                 | 200   |
| %                 | 16.7% |
| N                 | 396   |
| %                 | 26.6% |
| N                 | 320   |
| %                 | 26.6% |
| N                 | 416   |
| %                 | 27.9% |
| N                 | 474   |
| %                 | 26.6% |

| College and above|       |
| N                 | 170   |
| %                 | 9.5%  |
| N                 | 298   |
| %                 | 16.7% |
| N                 | 397   |
| %                 | 26.6% |
| N                 | 487   |
| %                 | 26.6% |
| N                 | 176   |
| %                 | 11.8% |

When this weighting is applied, and as can be seen in figures 5 and 6, more than half of the previously observed differences on hardship cases and unemployed people disappear.

![Figure 5 Evolution of poverty, corrected data](http://www.iuedpolls.org/PPP/analysis/polls19c/o056_poll.htm)
III. A Word of Conclusion

Of course, the authors of the PPP reports would certainly all have preferred not to encounter artefactual differences in their last poll because of a change in the Polling Institution: This situation has implied increased work for each of them individually, especially in the monitoring of the situation. But on another side, we acquired an essential knowledge about the process of polling, especially in developing countries. The sample should always be checked for the least educated, especially the illiterate: Do they have a similar probability than the rest of the population of being selected in the sample?

In fact, such a problem could cast a doubt on the methodology of polling in general or for assessing the situation in Palestine at least. Those who don’t trust polls might argue that it is one more example of the weak methodology of this technique. To those critiques, we would like to remind that this bias has had almost no influence on the huge majority of the results highlighted in the previous polls: These results point on differences among different social, economical or geographical groups which are not affected by the “under-selection” of the least educated in the sample. The bias only impacts on the overall level of some variables such as poverty or unemployment that are strongly influenced by education.

For the remainder of the analysis presented in the following chapters, we will always use weighted data that is corrected for polls no1 to no 8. Poll no 9 will not be weighted to correct the education bias.
Chapter 1: Mobility, Security and Security Sector Reform

Jalal Al Husseini, Luigi De Martino

Riccardo Bocco, Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold

1.1 Introduction

The present chapter is a more developed version of a previous report produced in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). ¹

The first part of this chapter will deal with security and mobility issues in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) within the context of the second Intifada while, in the second part, we will deal with the questions related to security sector governance and reform.

In this study, ‘security sector’ is the public sector that comprises all security forces and the relevant civilian bodies needed to oversee them, including the judiciary. ‘Security sector governance,’ in a very general sense, refers to how this sector is run. It looks at people, institutions, processes and practices that affect the functioning of the security sector and its capability to deliver security in the broadest possible sense to the population. A successful security sector would effectively provide security for the greatest number of people at affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner. How well this is done in practice, however, is a matter of perception.

Thus, understanding how the public views the security sector and its activities is important for good governance. That is why public perception studies of security sector governance are an important tool not only for assessing the quality of governance, but also for evaluating the direction of future reforms. By giving the public a voice in the discussion of their own future security, public perception studies are a step towards greater inclusiveness in the management and oversight of security issues. They are also a means for establishing public accountability of the security sector and involving civil society in its governance. This in itself is an important element of any sector reform agenda, given that the security sector, more than any other public sector, has a tendency to resist public input and oversight.

While many governments in the Middle East would be reluctant to authorise similar studies, the Palestinian Authority deserves credit for having made this research possible.

1.2 Intifada–Related Security Issues

The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a significant decrease in the degree of military violence in the oPt. Consequently, the number of Palestinians killed or injured declined to its lowest level since the outbreak of the Intifada.

¹ The report can be accessed on the IUED and DCAF web sites (www.iued.ch/palestine or www.dcaf.org)
1.2.1 Higher feelings of security - or More Palestinians feel secure

The number of Palestinians feeling secure increased significantly from November 2004 until July 2005. While 82% felt insecure at the beginning of this period, this number declined to 47% by the end, a reflection of the abatement of military action. For the first time since the beginning of our surveys, the number of respondents feeling secure outnumbered those feeling insecure.

Generally speaking, the feeling of security in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is a matter of gender (60% of the women say that they feel secure), refugee status (58% of non-refugees feeling secure compared with
Despite decreasing casualty figures, a majority of Palestinians still perceive Israeli occupation as the main threat to their security. Shortly before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 60% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 44% in Gaza, compared to 51% in East Jerusalem, said Israeli occupation was the single most important reason for them to feel insecure. What is new is that, in comparison with November 2004, the percentage of hardship cases stating that they felt secure has increased by 18% (an increase of 15% for those below the poverty line and 18% for those above the poverty line), bringing back the general configuration to what it was in February 2004.

**1.2.2 Reasons for remaining insecurity**

Despite decreasing casualty figures, a majority of Palestinians still perceive Israeli occupation as the main threat to their security. Shortly before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 60% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 44% in Gaza, compared to 51% in East Jerusalem, said Israeli occupation was the single most important reason for them to feel insecure.
In all regions, lack of socio-economic improvement was listed as the second most important reason for the feeling of insecurity. And 11% of Jerusalem respondents mentioned the existence settlements as a reason for insecurity. Respondents from the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps perceive their security more directly threatened by armed groups than by settlements (6% and 10% respectively). In the Gaza refugee camps this tendency is increasing since, in November 2004, 6% of respondents had mentioned the existence of armed groups as a source of insecurity.

1.2.3 Mobility status of the Palestinians

In response to the Palestinian leadership’s decision to stop the Intifada, Israel has declared its willingness to improve Palestinians’ everyday life by easing the internal closure policy it has imposed on them since September 2001.

In Gaza, despite repeated blockings of the Erez Crossing and difficulties in reaching Palestinian enclaves surrounded by Israeli settlements, movement in and out of the Gaza Strip improved steadily during the period under scrutiny. For instance, the number of Palestinian workers and merchants being allowed to enter Israel increased, from less than 1,600 in March to over 5,000 in late April.

Likewise, the number of closure barriers in the West Bank decreased from 680 in November 2004 to 605 in April 2005, i.e., a net decline of 75 closure barriers within five months, mainly in the governorates of Bethlehem, Hebron and Jenin. In other stranded locations such as Nablus and Qalqilya, passage through checkpoints was facilitated and medical facilities were installed at these locations. The map, next page, of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) highlights the easing of Israel’s closure policy since November 2004.

The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree confirmed by the findings of the survey. In July 2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, place of work and relatives, to be seriously affected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months earlier. The percentage who admitted having experienced problems related to mobility restrictions decreased by 6%, from 88% to 81%, during this period of time, as shown in Figure 1.6 below:

![Figure 1.6: Mobility problems faced by oPt Palestinians, November 2004 and July 2005 (o031)](image)

This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was felt particularly in the Jerusalem and Gaza regions, where the percentage of people asserting that they had experienced no particular mobility problems increased by 9% (9% to 18%) in the former, and 8% (20% to 28%) in the latter. Improvement was less significant in the West Bank (+5%, from 8% to 13%). The south of the West Bank, where the closure system has not been significantly eased and where the Wall is supposed to be set up in the following months, was the least advantaged with regard to mobility, with only 5% of the inhabitants of this region not having suffered any problems, versus 14% and 18% in the middle and north of the West Bank respectively.
Improved mobility had positive socio-economic repercussions. Only 40%, compared to 59% before, said they had experienced various levels of difficulties in reaching their workplace. While work-related mobility improved in all regions, workers from the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps benefited most from the easing of the Israeli closure policy, as illustrated in the figure 1.7.
In the West Bank, the percentage of inhabitants of the southern areas finding it difficult or very difficult to reach their place of work was comparatively higher (62%) than in the central (44%) and northern areas (37%).

1.2.4 The Wall and its impact on mobility

Both the security steps taken in preparation for the disengagement process in the Gaza Strip and the construction of the Separation Wall have had a negative impact on Palestinian socio-economic conditions. The percentage of the respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%.

The construction of the Separation Wall, which was initiated in June 2002, continued in the central and southern regions of the West Bank. About one-third of the 670-kilometre Wall has been completed. The Wall’s current route will end up including 10.1% of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (about 143 acres), in the area lying between the Wall and the Green Zone.

According to our sample, the central area of the West Bank is currently the area with the highest percentage of Palestinians living within, or in concentrations around, the Wall: 32% compared to 6% and 0% in the south and north of the West Bank respectively. Not surprisingly, West Bankers in this central area felt more affected in their mobility status by the Wall, as is shown in figure 1.8, above.
Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land: in July 2005, 60% of respondents stressed that it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land as compared to 39% in November 2004. The Separation Wall creates more difficulties for business in the agricultural sector, not only because it separates farmers from their land but also because it increases the price for material and transportation - as was stressed by 61% of the respondents in the Jerusalem area and 22% of those in the West Bank outside refugee-camp areas.

However, this survey finds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall have diminished significantly since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it, following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings of 2004. It may also be explained by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the Palestinians as a means of coping with the existence of the Wall. This was, however, less the case in Jerusalem than in the West Bank. As seen in figure 1.6, the percentage of Jerusalemites who have been forced to move, or who have had problems meeting relatives or accessing basic services because of the Wall has increased.

Figure 1.9: Selected socio-economic impacts of the Wall in the West Bank and Jerusalem, Nov. 2004- July 2005

1.3 Security Sector Governance

While the first part of this study examined changes in perceptions of security and insecurity, this second section looks more specifically at perceptions related to the governance of the security sector. The security sector is the public sector that comprises all security forces and the relevant civilian bodies needed to oversee them, including the judiciary. ‘Security sector governance,’ in a very general sense, refers to how this sector is run. It looks at people, institutions, processes and practices that affect the functioning of the security sector and its capability to deliver security, in the broadest possible sense, to the population. A successful security sector would effectively provide security for the greatest number of people at affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner. How well this is done in practice, however, is a matter of perception.
Table 1: An overview of the Palestinian Security Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Official PA security agencies</th>
<th>Non-official PA security agencies</th>
<th>Non-statutory forces</th>
<th>Security Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Police</td>
<td>Special Security (currently being dissolved)</td>
<td>Martyr Izzal Din al-Qassem Brigades (armed wing of Hamas)</td>
<td>1000-1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive Security (Internal Intelligence)</td>
<td>Special Forces (currently being dissolved)</td>
<td>Al Quds Brigades (armed wing of Islamic Jihad)</td>
<td>Several hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Defence (Emergency and Rescue)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Aqsa Brigades (Fatah affiliated militias and armed groups)</td>
<td>500-700 (full-time); 2000 (part-time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Police (PA Proto-Navy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Intelligence (including Military Police)</td>
<td>Military Liaison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. 400 MI, c. 2000 MP</td>
<td>General Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Liaison</td>
<td>c. 400 MI, c. 2000 MP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judiciary

| Official judiciary | Civil: Magistrate Courts, District Courts and High Court; Military Courts; State Security Courts |
| Non-official judiciary | Sharia Courts, Clan-based law institutions |

Civilian control and oversight

Executive Control

| President |
| Prime Minister |
| Ministry of Interior and National Security |
| National Security Council |

Parliamentary oversight

| Palestinian Legislative Council |
| Interior Committee |
| Committee for Oversight of Human Rights and Public Freedoms |
| Budget and Financial Affairs Committee |
| Legal Committee |

---

2 The security sector usually includes the armed forces, all branches of the police, intelligence services, and judicial and penal institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight, e.g., the executive and parliament. For a detailed description of the Palestinian Security Sector see Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Passia: Jerusalem 2004.
1.3.1 Palestinians place high trust in non-statutory forces

The survey results show that after the Civil Defense, non-statutory armed groups such as the Al-Aqsa and Al-Qassem Brigades are the most trusted among the Palestinian security organisations in the occupied Palestinian territories.

**Figure 1.10: Trust in security sector organizations overall (ο319 a-g) - July 05**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>My trust is high</th>
<th>I trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Brigades</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qassem Brigades</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Intelligence</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Security</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Police</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organisations controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), such as Preventive Security, General Intelligence, National Security and the Civil Police scored significantly lower trust levels. General Intelligence and Preventive Security are the least trusted of all organisations, with, respectively, 22 and 23 percent of respondents having no trust in them at all.

**Figure 1.11: Trust in armed groups (ο319f-g) by place of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Gaza Strip RC</th>
<th>Gaza Strip non camps</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>West Bank RC</th>
<th>West Bank non camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Brigades</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qassem Brigades</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trust in security organisations seems to be related to both the socio-economic and educational level of respondents: the higher the income or education, the lower the trust. The only exception to this is the Civil Defense, where no correlation could be found between the educational level of respondents and the trust placed in this organisation. It could be that the apolitical nature of its mission (emergency and rescue services, including fire departments) has prevented the Civil Defense from getting involved in political disputes and resulted in higher trust and acceptance. Trust levels also vary with the area of residence. City dwellers have generally lower levels of trust than residents of villages. Compared to city dwellers, residents of refugee camps place higher trust in the Civil Defense and lower trust in the General Security. Otherwise, their ratings are similar.
In Gaza, non-statutory armed groups obtain very similar trust levels from residents inside and outside the refugee camps, whereas, in the West Bank, they are more trusted by people living outside the refugee camps. Trust in the Al-Qassem brigades is particularly strong in the Gaza Strip.

1.3.2 High trust in Sharia courts and customary law institutions

Organisations responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law, such as the courts, the correctional system and bodies tasked with the oversight of human rights are important for a functioning security sector. When asked about their trust in several institutions of the judiciary, respondents said they had most trust in the Sharia courts.

**Figure 1.12:** Overall trust in Judiciary System (e321a-e) - July 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Trust Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian clan-based customary law</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA Correctional system</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia Courts</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Security Courts and Military Courts</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official court system</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50% said they placed very high trust in Sharia courts and another 39% said they had some trust. Palestinian clan-based customary law institutions ranked second. The comparatively lower rating of the official PA institutions is hardly surprising. The official judiciary has often been described as the weakest link in the governance structure of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian legal system is influenced by legislation of various origins (British, Ottoman, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli) and, institutionally, is characterised by a proliferation of judicial organisations with overlapping mandates. It also struggles with serious shortages of funds and trained personnel. Unlike the official judiciary, Sharia courts and customary law institutions offer easy access and are present in all regions. They also may appeal to people not only for the values they represent, but also because they deal mostly with civil cases.

Three factors appear to influence respondents’ trust in the judiciary: revenue, area of residence and level of education. Respondents above the poverty line show lower levels of trust than those below the poverty line and those considered as hardship cases.³ City dwellers seem to have generally lower levels of trust than residents of villages or refugee camps. Trust also seems to be inversely dependent on the level of education, except for the Sharia courts where trust levels are not significantly affected by level of education.

**Figure 1.13:** Trust in Sharia law by region of residence - July 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>My trust is high</th>
<th>I trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Place of residence is a key factor for explaining trust in Sharia courts: 55% of respondents in Gaza and the West Bank reported a high trust in the Sharia courts, compared to only 20% in East Jerusalem, where the comparatively lower trust level can be explained by better access to regular (Israeli) courts.

³ With a revenue of 50% percent of those classified as below the poverty line.
The availability or non-availability of satisfactory alternatives may also explain the considerable variations in trust levels in the clan-based customary law institutions. Only 6% of respondents in Jerusalem said they placed high trust in clan-based judicial institutions, compared to 42% in the Gaza refugee camps and 39% in the West Bank regions outside the camps, where Sharia courts and customary law institutions are easily accessible and deal predominantly with civil-law cases.

**Figure 1.14: Trust in customary law by place of residence - July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>My trust is high</th>
<th>I trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them to a certain extent</th>
<th>I do not trust them at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip Refugee Camp</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip outside camps</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Refugee Camp</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank outside camps</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.3 Strong and widespread support for security sector reform

A strong message in support of change appears in the answers to questions related to security sector reform.4

The changes in the security sector undertaken by the PA during the period under scrutiny are considered in general to be a first step in the right direction (62% of support). Respondents in the Gaza Strip are those showing the highest level of support.

When asked to rate the importance of eleven concrete security sector reform measures, a sweeping majority of respondents (76% to 94%) considered all proposed measures as either very important or rather important.

**Figure 1.15: Support to changes in security leadership (o325) - July 2005**

**Figure 1.16: Reform of security sector organizations (o320a-k) - July 2005**

4 Security sector reform (SSR) refers to a systemic transformation of the security sector so that the various institutions can play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens.
1.3.4 Fighting corruption and nepotism seen as the top priority

84% consider it very important and another 13% as rather important to fight corruption and nepotism. Such a result is consistent with the fact that, despite the changes within internal Palestinian politics following the death of Arafat and measures introduced to increase the accountability and transparency of PA institutions, the majority of respondents (70%) think that corruption definitely exists in the PA.\(^5\) 78% of respondents consider the legal prosecution of security personnel responsible for human rights violations very important. Gaza residents and respondents living in refugee camps are those most supportive of this measure. Establishing an ombudsman to investigate citizens’ complaints and improving the training of police and security forces are also judged to be important; 75 and 73% of respondents, respectively, consider such measures as very important. Finally, 70% consider it very important to have independent institutions visit all places of detention. Such a result is in line with the low trust that Palestinians appear to have in the correctional system (only 29% of respondents reporting a high trust in the PA correctional system). Such strong and widespread support for in-depth reform suggests that the security sector has largely failed to meet the Palestinian people’s expectations and finds itself in a major crisis of confidence and legitimacy.

1.3.5 Strong support for dissolution of armed groups

Considering the high level of trust placed in non-statutory armed groups, such as the Al-Aqsa or the Al-Qassem brigades, it should be noted that a majority of respondents are in favour of dissolving them. 48% of all respondents consider the dissolution of armed groups a very important measure. It may be surprising that support for dissolving armed groups is highest in the refugee camps. In the camps of Gaza, 69% approve this measure as very important. The combination of high trust in armed groups and the strong support for their dissolution in an area that has a reputation for having served as a recruitment pool for armed groups raises a number of questions that deserve further analysis. It could be that the camp population has suffered disproportionately because of the presence of armed groups and sees in their disbandment an opportunity for increasing security. Among residents of refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, 10% listed the existence of armed groups as one of the main reasons for their insecurity. It could also possibly indicate a willingness of members of armed groups to join the statutory forces, if they were offered the opportunity to do so. In recent months, many have sharply criticised the Palestinian Authority for its partisan management of the security forces and have demanded that recruitment and selection be done on a non-factional basis.

**Figure 1.17: Dissolving armed groups by place of residence - July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Rather important</th>
<th>Rather unimportant</th>
<th>Very unimportant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip Refugee Camp</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip outside camps</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Refugee Camp</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank outside camps</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.6 Strong demand for accountability and increased oversight

The support for particular security sector reform measures varies according to place of residence. As mentioned above, Gaza residents and respondents living in refugee camps, for example, attach a higher importance to the legal prosecution of security officials responsible for human rights violations. A majority of respondents in all areas wanted the Palestinian Legislative Council to increase oversight of the security apparatus. Support for this measure was particularly high in the refugee camps of the West Bank, where 66% rated it as very important.

\(^5\) FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005. See also AMAN, Opinion Poll on Corruption in the Palestinian Society, December 2004
Respondents also perceive a strong need to improve the rule of law. Measures aimed at strengthening the legal framework and improving the functioning of the judiciary were usually seen as very important, with peaks of 79% in support of the unification of the Palestinian legal code and 74% for improving the training of judges and prosecutors.

The abolition of the state security and military courts is the most controversial of the proposed remedies. Interestingly, “only” 39% of interviewees strongly support this measure, despite the fact that a mere 19% of the respondents claimed to have high trust in these courts. Respondents living in the Gaza Strip outside the refugee camps are the least inclined to support the abolition of state security courts, while residents of East Jerusalem and of the West Bank refugee camps expressed the strongest support. Most in favor of such an abolition were interviewees above the poverty line.
A majority of Palestinians believe that salaries for judges and prosecutors should be increased, (as a means of fighting corruption in the judiciary). 57% in Jerusalem, and even 64% of refugees living in camps in the West Bank, attach high importance to this measure. In Gaza however, one in four respondents considered the measure as very unimportant.

**Figure 1.21: Improving salaries of justice sector (o322h) by region of residence - July 2005**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents in West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip who consider the measure very important, rather important, rather unimportant, and very unimportant.]

### 1.4 Conclusions

The period November 2004-July 2005 was marked by the decision of the new Palestinian leadership (led by President Mahmoud Abbas) to put an end to the Intifada. This decision was followed by a significant decrease in the degree of military violence in the oPt and, consequently, by the decline in the numbers of Palestinian casualties, which reached their lowest levels, in terms of those killed or injured, since the outbreak of the Intifada. Despite the decrease in the number of casualties, Israeli occupation nevertheless emerged as the main threat to the Palestinians' security throughout the oPt, and more especially in the West Bank. Jerusalemites felt comparatively more threatened by the existence (and expansion) of the settlements and overall regional security problems, while socio-economic problems and internecine fighting among different armed factions (various security forces of the Palestinian Authority, armed militias affiliated to political factions, etc.) had a more acute impact in Gaza.

The easing of mobility restrictions in the oPt is to some degree reflected in the findings of our survey. In July 2005, a majority of Palestinians still considered that their mobility status, including access to public services, place of work and relatives, was seriously affected by mobility problems, but to a lesser extent than eight months earlier. This improvement in the mobility status of the Palestinians was particularly felt in the Jerusalem and Gaza regions.

The construction of the Separation Wall, which was initiated in June 2002, continued in the central and southern regions of the West Bank. Our survey finds that, in general, the negative socio-economic impacts of the Wall have diminished significantly since 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings of 2004. It may also be explained by household and collective socio-economic strategies adopted by the Palestinians as a means of coping with the existence of the Wall. This was however less the case in Jerusalem than in the West Bank.

While Israeli occupation impacts on Palestinian perceptions of security and imposes severe constraints on the Palestinian authorities, it does not explain the limited trust the Palestinian population has in the security sector. It appears rather that the governance of these institutions and their legitimacy are questioned.

Domestically, the Palestinian Authority and the official security organisations are confronted with a major legitimacy deficit. Unless confidence in the official institutions is restored, popular support for substitute organisations, such as private militias and parallel court systems, is likely to grow. This could further undermine the already weak confidence in the public system. It could also widen the gap between residents in Jerusalem...
and residents in the West Bank and Gaza and eventually be detrimental to Palestinian unity and the nationbuilding process. From a Palestinian perspective, improving security sector governance should therefore be a matter of high national interest.

The strong and widespread popular demand for an in-depth reform of the whole security sector indicates dissatisfaction with the present situation. But it also expresses broad-based willingness to strengthen official institutions and improve their performance, which provides a foundation of political capital upon which the political leadership can build.

The challenge for the Palestinian Authority will be to build a nationally owned and led vision of how the security sector should be reformed and to map and implement a government-wide strategy for security sector reform that can deliver tangible results to Palestinian citizens, such as a substantial reduction in corruption and nepotism and enhanced respect for human rights.

While the Palestinian Authority can count on overwhelming support in the population for disarming and disbanding the militias, it will unlikely be able to achieve this objective unless it succeeds in strengthening its own legitimacy. Representative institutions and a well-governed security sector would help the Palestinian Authority gather the support needed to take on riskier tasks.

The challenges of Palestinian security sector governance illustrate the overlapping problems of development and security and highlight the need for integrated development and security policies. In the Palestinian context, international development assistance and humanitarian aid should increasingly be judged on its capacity to respond to the challenges posed by poor security sector governance. A failure to address this fundamental problem risks reducing the impact of aid and fuelling frustrations that, in the long run, may be difficult to control.
Politics, Media, & Peace Process
Politics, Government, Media and the Peace Process
Rania Al-Haddad, Sheik Fadisakho & Luigi De Martino

2.1 Main Trends

The survey covered the period from November 2004 to July 2005, one that was rich in significant developments on the Palestinian political scene. These included the death of President Arafat, the presidential elections and the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as president, the local council elections and the political rivalry among the Palestinian factions and, finally, the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

- The majority of respondents (76%) supported the Legislative Council (PLC) elections, carried out in January 2006. Results show that the strongest support for the elections was in the Gaza Strip. It is in Jerusalem where there was strong opposition to the elections (29% of respondents). When looking at such results it is important to keep in mind that the special situation of Jerusalem impacted on respondents’ perceptions.

- Despite the general support for the PLC elections, in July 2005 29% of respondents were undecided about their selection of a candidate, while 21% mentioned that they would not participate at all. Hence, six months before the elections, the position of 50% of the electorate was still basically unclear.

- In July 2005, 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fatah whereas only 12% said they would choose Hamas in the January 2006 PLC elections.

- When choosing a candidate, respondents attached great importance to moral values, with 45% affirming that honesty and integrity is the first most important reason for their choice, followed by the qualifications and experience of a candidate (29%) as the second and third most important reason for selection. The emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PA are indications that the PLC elections probably have to be interpreted as a protest vote against a PA seen as incapable of bringing about positive change.

- In July 2005, the Palestinian president enjoyed high levels of support among the Palestinian public despite the general pessimism concerning the Palestinian Authority. Results indicated that the foremost issue of concern regarding the PA was once more nepotism/clientelism while the PA’s inability to maintain public order was the second-largest issue of concern.

- Despite the fact that certain reform measures were introduced following the appointment of Abbas as President, in July the majority of the Palestinians showed little confidence in the PA’s reforming efforts: 49% of the respondents believed that the reform was only cosmetic while 25% had not heard of such reform.

- When asked about the main measure PA reform should involve, more than 50% of respondents thought that some PA employees should be forced to early retirement and 38% of them thought that some PA employees should be laid off.

- Despite the little trust the Palestinians seem to have in the PA, the vast majority of Palestinians (65%) affirmed that they could freely express their opinions and views without any fear from the Palestinian Authority.

- When looking at Palestinians’ trust in media, Al-Jazeera TV was the single most trusted first (43%) and second (25%) source of information, showing an increase of 16% in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the Palestinian public in the last six months. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, Palestinian radio with 9% of preferences followed Al-Jazeera as the as the first most-trusted sources of information. At the same time, analysis shows that 52% of respondents thought that the Palestinian
media's coverage of Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% thought it to be very bad.

- The vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004. However, the level of support varies according three independent variables, namely, “refugee status”, “area of residence” and “geographic area”.

- In principle, the respondents seemed to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of respondents were willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% were willing to relinquish the refugee right of return. This represent a striking change from the previous survey.

### 2.2 Introduction

The chapter will focus on five main issues: (1) the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, (2) the reform of Palestinian Authority, (3) perceptions about corruption (4) freedom of expression and media, and (5) perceptions about the peace process.

### 2.3 Elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council

In the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, Israel and the PA agreed upon the setting-up of an elected council in the Palestinian autonomous territories. The first Palestinian Legislative Council was elected on January 20, 1996 and consisted of 88 seats. Elections for a new Palestinian Legislative Council were scheduled for 17 July 2005 by Acting Palestinian Authority President Rawhi Fattuh in January 2005. However, following the Palestinian presidential elections, the newly elected president, Mahmoud Abbas, had postponed the elections after major changes to the Elections Law were enacted by the PLC which required more time for the Palestinian Central Elections Committee to process and prepare. Among those changes was the expansion of the number of the parliament’s seats from 88 to 132.

The elections have been carried out January 25, 2006 and have seen the victory of the list “Change and Reform,” led by the Hamas movement. Our survey (conducted in July 2005, seven months prior to the elections) will not go into a comparison between pre-election period attitudes and the results of the ballot.

The following section will focus on analysing Palestinian support for elections, people’s criteria for selecting a candidate, the Palestinian factions and the PLC elections and the reasons for selecting a candidate.

#### 2.3.1 Support for Legislative Council elections

The majority of respondents (76%) supported the Legislative Council elections, scheduled for January 2006.\(^1\)

![Figure 2.1: Support for Legislative Council elections](image)

Despite this general support for the elections, an examination of results reveals variations according to the independent variables: region of residence, area of residence, gender, place of residence and area.

In general, men show more strong support for the elections (40%) than women (31%). However, those who simply support them are more likely to be women (48%). One could explain this result by the considerably low participation of women in the political decision-making process.

---

\(^1\) Result confirmed by following surveys: The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.133, February 2005; Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, May 2005; The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.137, June 2005
Results show that the strongest support for the elections was in the Gaza Strip. The eagerness of the Gazans to have elections to define the political landscape in the post-withdrawal era could be explained by: the internal situation in the Gaza Strip especially after Mahmoud Abbas was elected President and was able to reach an agreement with the Palestinian factions to declare truce with the Israel, the changes in the structure of the Palestinian security apparatus, the successful second stage of local councils’ elections and the Israeli disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip. In Jerusalem, results show, as indicated in the adjacent graph, a different pattern of support for the elections. Although one can find a high percentage of respondents who only support the elections (47%), it is in Jerusalem where one can also find a strong overall opposition to the elections totalling 29%, of whom 11% strongly oppose.

It is important to highlight the special situation of Jerusalem, one that reflected on the respondents’ perceptions. Jerusalem continues to be administered by the Israeli government and its final status has not yet been defined.

When looking at the region of residence one can see that while in the Gaza strip the strongest support for the elections comes from regions outside refugee camps (48% of respondents stating a strong support), in the West Bank the answers are similar in both camps and non-camp regions. Interestingly, both in the regions outside the camps in the Gaza strip and in Jerusalem one can find the highest percentage of respondents who strongly oppose the elections (12% and 11% respectively). One could explain the strong support for the elections outside the camps in the Gaza Strip by a general feeling of optimism and hope that the elections will be a step forward towards improving the general situation in the territories. The high level of opposition in refugee camps in Gaza (27%) could be related to the general feeling of disappointment among the refugees with the performance of the Palestinian institutions.

### 2.3.2 Selection of a candidate

Despite the general support for the PLC elections, many respondents (29%) seem undecided about their selection of a candidate, as shown in the adjacent table.

The explanation for this may be that the unpredictable changes on the Palestinian political scene were making it difficult to ensure with certainty that the elections would actually take place as scheduled in January 2006 (having already been postponed once before by President Abbas in July 2005). The Israeli opposition to the participation of Hamas in the elections probably added a factor of uncertainty to the process. However, support for a faction or a party seems to be an important factor when voting for a candidate (28%). Support for a party seems to be stronger among men (31%) and in cities (29% preferring a candidate from a party/faction) and persons below the poverty line.
Figure 2.4: Selection of PLC candidate according to region of residence

If, in total, 21% of the respondents were saying that they would not participate to the elections, this percentage jumps to 48% in the case of Jerusalemites. The factors mentioned above (special status of Jerusalem, Israeli opposition to Hamas participation especially strong in Jerusalem, overall uncertainty of the process) could help explain this lack of enthusiasm about participation. Respondents living in refugee camps (34%) are the most undecided about the selection of a candidate, an attitude which could be related to the fact that 20% of respondents residing in camps indicated that they opposed the elections.

Interestingly, results show that the level of poverty of the respondents has also an influence on their selection of candidates. Respondents who live in abject poverty (33%) are the most undecided voters, whereas respondents who live above the poverty line prefer to vote for a candidate from a faction (27%) or an independent candidate (19%). 31% of respondents who live below the poverty line prefer to vote for a candidate from a faction or party.

2.3.3 Palestinian factions and the Legislative Council elections

Following the presidential elections in January 2005, the Palestinian factions have become increasingly more active on the Palestinian political scene. Both phases of the local council elections, in January and May 2005, were marked by fierce factional competition that was mainly between Fatah and Hamas.

When respondents were asked about the faction they would vote for, their responses indicated a preference for secular groups (37%) rather than Islamic (22%), as explained in the graph below. The analysis also confirmed the high percentage of respondents who would not participate in the elections (24%).

Despite the rising popularity of Hamas, especially in the Gaza Strip, Fatah remained the most popular party. In July 2005, 24% of respondents indicated they would vote for Fatah, whereas only 12% said they would choose Hamas in the January PLC elections.

In the seven months between the poll and the elections, the preferences of the Palestinian public have changed, giving Hamas a support that few had expected. Considering that Fatah, embodied in the PLO, is the traditional representative of the Palestinian people and was considered the only party able to deliver on the needs of the Palestinian public and to reach a peace agreement with Israel, the victory of Hamas has to be linked to the incapacity of the PA to seriously develop a process of reform. In the next section (2.4) we will look at this question in more detail.

---

2 The question was: “In case the PLC elections were held in the near future, to which candidate of the various factions would you give your vote?”

3 (37%) rather than Islamic (22%), as explained in the graph below. The analysis also confirmed the high percentage of respondents who would not participate in the elections (24%).

5 ‘44% Fatah, 21% Hamas’, PCPO, Poll No.133, February 2005; ‘38% Fatah, 26% Hamas’, PCPO, Poll 143, October 2005.

6 Results of Poll 8 have indicated more trust in Fatah than in Hamas.
Looking at the July 2005 results from a geographical perspective, data confirmed the previously mentioned preference for Fatah across the three regions. As for Hamas, it was evidently more popular in the Gaza Strip (21%) than in the West Bank (8%); this is not surprising, considering that Hamas was ‘born’ in Gaza and that it is there where its influence is the strongest. Nevertheless, results show that a higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip would vote for Fatah (28%).

**Figure 2.6: Selecting a candidate from a faction according to region of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Islamic</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Nationalist</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.3.4 Reasons leading to the selection of a PLC candidate**

In each electoral process, many reasons help to determine voters’ political choice. Respondents were asked to specify the three most important reasons determining their choice of a candidate in the coming PLC elections. Results shown in the graph below indicate that respondents attached a great importance to moral values when choosing a candidate, as 45% affirm that honesty and integrity is the first most important reason for choosing a candidate. Faction affiliation comes only in second position as first most important reason whereas qualifications and experience of the candidate (29%) are the second and third most important reason. In addition, the educational background\(^7\) of a candidate would influence the selection.

**Figure 2.7: The three most important reasons for selecting a candidate**

\(^7\) An-Najah National University, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No.12, May 2005
Despite limited variations according to region of residence, area of residence, place of residence, level of poverty and area, the order of the three most important reasons for selecting a candidate remains unchanged: first and foremost comes the issue of honesty/integrity.

When selecting a candidate, honesty/integrity is more important for respondents living in West Bank refugee camps (56%) than respondents living outside the camps (44%). In the Gaza Strip honesty/integrity is also the most important reason for a candidate's selection, with little difference outside camps (50%) and in refugee camps (45%). The candidate's educational background continues to be the third most important reason after qualifications/experience, however it is more important for refugee-camp residents in both the West Bank refugee camps (32%) and Gaza refugee camps (19%). This could be explained by the fact that education is traditionally valued, particularly by the refugee population in the oPt. Nevertheless, 17% of Gazans living outside camps indicate that the candidate's struggle history is the third most important reason for their selection of a candidate.

The emphasis given to the question of honesty and integrity as the main factor for choosing a candidate combined with the scepticism about the reform of the PA are indications that the PLC elections have probably to be interpreted as a protest vote against a PA seen as incapable to bring positive change.

2.4 The manner by which Mahmoud Abbas is leading the PA

Although the analysis of the results on the issue of PA reform showed that, generally, the Palestinian public has little faith in these reforms, the Palestinian president enjoyed high levels of support among the Palestinian public.\(^8\) Nevertheless, results show that city dwellers (52%) are less satisfied than refugee-camp dwellers (62%) and villagers (64%) regarding the way Abbas is leading the PA. Moreover, it is in the cities where one can find the highest proportion of respondents who disagree and strongly disagree (30% in total) with Abbas’ leadership. One could relate this dissatisfaction to the large numbers of respondents living in cities who believe in the existence of corruption in the PA: 51% of them think that PA reform is only cosmetic. Refugees are less supportive than non-refugees. Refugees represent the highest proportion (30%) of respondents who disagree with the manner by which Abbas is leading the PA (disagree 21%, strongly disagree 9%) compared to 23% of non-refugee respondents (disagree 14%, strongly disagree 6%). It appears that the Palestinian refugees are more frustrated than non-refugees with the progress of the peace process, and that they have had higher levels of expectations and are thus more demanding of the new president.

2.4.1 Perceptions about the reform of the PA

This section examines the Palestinians’ perceptions about PA reform. It will focus on three issues: their biggest concern about the PA, opinions about reforms in the PA and the main measure that should be taken when reforming the PA.

2.4.1.1 Biggest concerns about the PA

Respondents were asked to express their first and second issue of concern regarding the PA. Their responses are summarised in the following graph:

Consistent with the general result explained above regarding the concern about corruption, the analysis indicates that the first issue of concern in regard to the PA is once more nepotism/clientelism,\(^9\) followed by the PA’s inability

---

\(^8\) 72.1% support, to varying degrees, the PNA president Mr. Mahmoud Abbas – PCPO, Poll No.144, 9 November 2005
\(^9\) Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.16, June 2005
to maintain public order as the second-largest issue of concern. The occasional periods of chaos resulting at times from factional conflicts and the clear inability of the PA security forces to control it may explain why the PA’s inability to maintain public order is a major Palestinian public concern.

**Figure 2.9: The two most important issues of concern regarding the PA**

- Inability to deal with non-authorised weapons: 11%
- Lack of human right: 12%
- Lack of transparency: 7%
- Lack of democracy: 11%
- Inability to maintain public order: 13%
- Inability to deal with internal security problems: 11%
- Inefficiency and mismanagement: 10%
- Nepotism/clientelism: 28%
- Lack of financial means: 16%

**The first** | **The second**
---|---

If there are no differences between the three regions regarding nepotism/clientelism, the most important area of concern, there are considerable differences in the three regions regarding the second most important concern with the PA. In the West Bank, 16% say that their second most important concern about the PA is its inability to maintain public order. Incidents of competition between the Palestinian factions which developed, at times, into violent confrontations and the PA’s inability to control these factions and impose order on the Palestinian streets could explain this result. Jerusalemites and the Gazans alike seem to have different concerns. For 17% of Jerusalemites who responded, their second most important concern is the lack of transparency/accountability in the PA. This is not a surprising result as previous analysis indicated that 35% of Jerusalemites believed that there was widespread corruption and 44% of them believed there is significant corruption in the PA. In the West Bank, 16% say that their second most important concern about the PA is its inability to maintain public order as the second-largest issue of concern. The occasional periods of chaos resulting at times from factional conflicts and the clear inability of the PA security forces to control it may explain why the PA’s inability to maintain public order is a major Palestinian public concern.

When results are analysed according to gender, it is evident that for both men (27%) and women (28%) nepotism/clientelism is the primary concern about the PA. Yet for 13% of men, the lack of transparency in the PA is their second biggest concern, while women (15%) seem to be more concerned about the lack of human rights, citing this as their second most important concern.

### 2.4.2 Palestinians’ opinions about reform in the PA

Despite the fact that certain reform measures were introduced following the appointment of Abbas as president, the majority of the Palestinians polled in July showed little confidence in the PA’s reforming efforts. 49% of respondents believe that the reform is only cosmetic while 25% had not heard of any such reform. This continuously pessimistic perception of PA reform measures could be explained by the numerous corruption scandals involving PA officials (the last of which directly involved Prime Minister Ahmad Qureia).

Pessimism is constant within all age categories, whereas there is a correlation between the level of education of correspondents and their perception that reform is cosmetic. More respondents with a high educational level (55%) than respondents with a medium educational level (50%) and low educational level (43%) believe...
2.4.3 Reform of the PA: main measures

As explained in the previous sections, Palestinians have generally little faith in the reforms of the Palestinian Authority, and the recent reform measures undertaken by the PA have done little to change this. When asked about what should be the main measure of the PA reform, more than 50% of respondents think that some PA employees should be forced to early retirement and 38% of them think that some of the PA employees should be laid off. This is not a surprising result considering that 73% of respondents believe that PA employees are corrupt or significantly corrupt. In addition, the majority of respondents also believe that the most disturbing form of corruption is the appointment of relatives and friends.

Forced early retirement and firing of employees are, across the board, the most-welcomed measures across all independent variables, despite the fact that the PA is the largest provider of employment in the oPt. The level of support for these measures tended to increase with the level of education; when looking at poverty levels, the strongest support for laying-off PA officials is to be found among those above the poverty level (61%). In terms of geographic variables, early retirement as a reform measure received widespread support also among villagers (60%) and among respondents living in refugee camps in the Gaza strip. Jerusalemites seemed to be more severe in their preferences for reform, as 57% of them believe that some PA employees should be laid off, compared to 40% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip.

![Figure 2.12: Main measure of PA reform](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of Reform</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Refugee Camp</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lay off employees</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For early retirement</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain as is</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Looking at the geographic independent variables, respondents residing in refugee camps were the most distrustful of PA reforms. 57% of them believe reform is only cosmetic whereas village residents represent the highest percentage of respondents believing that the reform is real (30%).
2.5 Perceptions about corruption

The issue of corruption in the Palestinian Authority had been repeatedly discussed and highlighted, locally and internationally, over the last years. However, following the death of Arafat, the issue of corruption in PA institutions and the urgent need for reform has come under the spotlight internally as well as externally. We will look at Palestinian perceptions of corruption, its existence and its extent, in particular the disturbing forms of corruption in four sectors: the PA, the private sector, civil society institutions and international organisations working in the oPt.

2.5.1 Existence and stretch of corruption

As shown in the table below, in July 2005 the Palestinian public considered that corruption existed in all sectors but especially within the PA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNA P%</th>
<th>Private Sector P%</th>
<th>Civil society institutions P%</th>
<th>International organisations in oPt P%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely yes</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably yes</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably no</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely no</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are considerable variations regarding the perception of the extent of corruption in the four sectors, as shown in the graph. Yet, despite the changes in internal Palestinian politics following the death of Arafat and the measures introduced to increase the accountability and transparency of PA institutions, the majority of respondents (68%) think that corruption definitely exists in the PA.\(^{10}\)

The graph illustrates that a total of 80% of respondents believe that there is a widespread and a significant level of corruption in the PA.

A similarly high percentage of respondents believe in the existence of significant and widespread corruption in the private sector (63%) and in civil society institutions (61%). One can also note that a high percentage of respondents (46%) believe that there is little corruption in the international organisations working in the oPt.

In order to clarify this perception of corruption in the different sectors, respondents were asked if they agreed that employees of these four sectors were corrupt. The perception that the PA is corrupt is based their perception of PA employees. The graph illustrates that a large percentage of respondents believe that a great or a significant

\(^{10}\) FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005. See also AMAN, Opinion Poll on corruption in the Palestinian society, December 2004
proportion of PA employees are corrupt, while only 27% believe a small or a minuscule proportion of PA employees are corrupt. Private sector employees are considered less corrupt with a total of 33% of respondents believing that a great or significant proportion of employees in the private sector are corrupt. Respondents seem to be divided regarding the extent of corruption among employees of the civil society institutions. A total of 51% believe a great or significant proportion of the employees are corrupt whereas 48% think only a small or tiny proportion are corrupt.

Respondents seem to believe that employees of international organisations in the oPt are the least corrupt: only 21% believe a large or significant proportion of employees of international organisations are corrupt whereas 58% classify the question as non-applicable.

Despite the Palestinian public perception of the existence of corruption in all the four sectors, there are variations according to the following independent variables: region of residence, gender, place of residence, regional situation, and level of poverty. In the next paragraphs we shall look at some of the results.

2.5.1.1 Corruption within the PA

Regardless of the respondents’ level of education, a large proportion of them believe that there is widespread corruption in the PA. However, the more people are educated, the more they believe that the PA is generally corrupt (50%). Similarly, 40% of respondents with low educational levels and 39% of respondents with medium educational levels think that there is a widespread corruption in the PA.

Data show that the perception of the existence of corruption in the PA is strong across the three regions¹¹ (over 60% in all regions). Nevertheless, more Gazans (73%) than West Bankers (68%) and Jerusalemites (56%) believe that there is definitely corruption in the PA. Such results are confirmed by looking at views on the extent of corruption within the PA: data indicate that Gazans (48%) have a stronger perception of widespread corruption in the PA compared to West Bankers (37%) and Jerusalemites (35%). By contrast, a higher percentage of Jerusalemites (43%) believe that there is significant corruption in the PA than West Bankers (41%) and Gazans (34%).

One could relate this result to major corruptions scandals in the PA institutions in the Gaza Strip in recent months as well as the stronger frustration among Gazans with the PA performance. There are few variations between results inside and outside the refugee camps in West Bank and Gaza. Finally, more men (72%) than woman (64%) believe that corruption definitely exists in the PNA. At the same time, more women (28%) than men (23%) believe that corruption probably exists in the PNA.

2.5.1.2 Corruption within the private sector

In each area of residence, a high percentage of respondents believe that corruption probably exists in the private sector. Nevertheless, in the West Bank, more respondents living in refugee camps (60%) than respondents living outside the camps (48%) believe in the probable existence of corruption in the private sector, whereas in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, 46% of respondents definitely believe in the existence of corruption in the private sector while only 35% of them consider that it probably exists.

---

¹¹ FAFO Report, December 2004: 82% believe in the existence of corruption in the governmental sector’
2.5.1.3 Corruption among civil society institutions

Jerusalemites are those who are strong in affirming that corruption definitely exists among civil society institutions (41%), while 38% of Gazans believe it exists at that level. In the West Bank, more respondents living in refugee camps consider that corruption in civil society exists than those living outside camps.

In terms of gender, more men (41%) than women (34%) believe that corruption definitely exists in civil society institutions, whereas nearly as many men (41%) as women (40%) believe that corruption probably exists.

2.5.1.4 Corruption among international organisations in the oPt

If 30% of those living in refugee camps as well as in regions outside camps in the West Bank affirm that corruption probably exists in international organisations active in the oPt, it is in the areas of the Gaza Strip outside the refugee camps where confidence in the international organisations is high: 42% of respondents assert that corruption definitely doesn't exist in international organisations in the oPt.

2.5.2 Palestinian Experience of corruption

Although the previous analysis indicates that Palestinians perceive the existence of corruption in all sectors and especially in the PA, such perceptions may be exaggerated especially when examining people's real experience with corruption. Indeed, the majority of respondents (41%) know about corruption because “everybody says so,” i.e., everybody says there is corruption in Palestine. Moreover, 34% of them have heard about corruption from media (local media, Arab or international media, Israeli media). Only 10% of respondents admitted that they were confronted with corruption from personal experience. These results may seem contradictory (a perception of widespread corruption but little personal experience of corruption) but may partly be clarified when seeing that by contrast, 95% of respondents never heard of anyone who gave a bribe to a Palestinian official. Indeed it is nepotism and clientelism that Palestinians consider to be the main worrisome form of corruption.

Figure 2.17: Where did you hear about corruption?

2.5.3 The worrying forms of corruption

When asked to identify the most worrying form of corruption in the four sectors, the appointment of family and friends stands out, followed by bribery.

The analysis of the data according to the independents variables, region of residence, area of residence, place of residence, regional situation and educational level, confirms this result to a large extent.

Nepotism is still the most worrying form of corruption (42%) in the PA, a result consistent with previous results on PA corruption.

---

12 AMAN, Opinion Poll on corruption in the Palestinian society, December 2004
13 Ibid – Poll 8 has also showed that bribery was a major form of corruption.
they cannot express their opinions because of fear from PA. An almost equal percentage of women (27%) than men (22%) say that they express their views only with a certain level of fear from PA. An almost equal percentage of men (10%) and women (12%) say that they cannot express their opinions freely because of fear from PA.

When looking at answers from a gender perspective, a slightly lower percentage of women (61%) than men (69%) say they can express their opinions freely without fear from PA. Equally, a slightly higher percentage of women (27%) than men (22%) say that they express their views only with a certain level of fear from the PA. An almost equal percentage of men (10%) and women (12%) say that they cannot express their opinions freely because of fear from the PA.

Results indicate that respondents living in the West Bank camps (58%) seem to feel slightly less free to express their opinions and views. It is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can find the highest percentage of respondents (40%) who say that they only express their opinions with a certain level of fear from PA. By contrast, it is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can find the lowest percentage (2%) of respondents who say that they cannot express their opinions because of fear from PA.

When looking at answers from a gender perspective, a slightly lower percentage of women (61%) than men (69%) say they can express their opinions freely without fear from PA. Equally, a slightly higher percentage of women (27%) than men (22%) say that they express their views only with a certain level of fear from PA. An almost equal percentage of men (10%) and women (12%) say that they cannot express their opinions freely because of fear from PA.

Results indicate that respondents living in the West Bank camps (58%) seem to feel slightly less free to express their opinions and views. It is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can find the highest percentage of respondents (40%) who say that they only express their opinions with a certain level of fear from PA. By contrast, it is also in West Bank refugee camps that one can find the lowest percentage (2%) of respondents who say that they cannot express their opinions because of fear from PA.
2.6.2 Media

Respondents were asked to identify their first and second most important sources of information. As explained in the graph below, 43% of respondents trust Al-Jazeera TV as the first most-trusted source and 25% as the second most-trusted source. Although the results of Poll 8 in November 2004 have indicated the same outcome, a comparison reveals an increase of 16% in the popularity of Al-Jazeera among the Palestinian public in the last six months. Palestinian TV and Al-Quds newspaper with 10% of preferences, and Palestinian radio with 9% of preferences, trail Al-Jazeera as the the first most trusted sources of information.

The two religiously oriented channels, the Lebanon-based channel Al-Manar (16%) and the Dubai-based Al-Arabiyyah (15%), come in second and third place after Al-Jazeera as the second most trusted sources of information. 14 Al-Manar increased by 2% and Al Arabya remains stable, cited by 4% of respondents. 15

Figure 2.21: The two most important sources of information

However, in the last six months, Palestinian public trust in Palestinian sources of information (Palestinian TV, Palestinian radio and the Palestinian newspapers) seems to have dropped. The graph above shows that 31% of the Palestinian public trust Palestinian sources of information. One could explain the increased trust in Al-Jazeera TV by the special focus and attention it dedicates to the Palestinian Territories, with the the speed and breadth of its live coverage, having correspondents in most major towns and cities. Al-Manar’s audience is mainly people with particular religious affiliations. Despite being a new TV channel, the rapid growth in popularity of Al-Arabiyyah could be explained by its focus on delivering content that is relevant to Arabs around the world. Finally, the relatively low score of the Palestinian media is not surprising: analysis shows that 52% of respondents think that the Palestinian media’s coverage of Palestinian needs and views could be improved and 24% think it is very bad.

When looking at the above results concerning trust in the main two sources of information, one can see that trust in external sources such as Al-Jazeera is the strongest regardless the respondents’ level of education. At the same time, education is correlated with trust in Palestinian electronic media, the higher-educated respondents depending less on Palestinian radio and TV than medium- and lower-educated respondents. 16

---

14 Poll 8, November 2004: Al-Jazeera is the most trusted source of information with 27%
15 Poll 8, November 2004: Al-Manar is the most trusted source of information with 11%
16 Poll 8, November 2004: Al-Arabiyyah is the most trusted source of information with 4%
17 Poll 8, November 2004: 39% of Palestinian public trust the Palestinian sources of information
18 Al-Arabiyyah TV channel was established in March 2003 and is based in Dubai Media City
19 Whereas only 6% of respondents of high educational level trust Palestinian TV, the percentage is higher among respondents of medium (10%) and low (16%) educational level. Similarly, people with higher education depend less on the Palestinian radio as a main source of information than people with medium and low educational level.
the level of trust in the Arabic satellite channels, particularly Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyyah, we note that there are no major differences between the economic level of respondents and their trust in these channels. In the case of local electronic media, there is also a correlation between trust in sources of information and the level of poverty of the correspondents. Palestinians who are economically disadvantaged tend to place more trust in Palestinian radio and TV than those who are economically better off. Whereas only 7% of respondents who are above the poverty line trust Palestinian TV, this percentage increases to 11% and 14% among respondents below the poverty line and hardship cases.

If we analyse the results according to the region of residence we can see that, unlike Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip (who primarily trust Al-Jazeera TV),20 the Jerusalemites’ most trusted source of information is Al-Quds newspaper (28%), while for them Al-Jazeera is the second most-trusted source of information. This is not a surprising result considering the fact that Jerusalem is the birthplace of Al-Quds newspaper. Moreover, it is the oldest Palestinian newspaper and traditionally considered as a trusted source of information. Trust in Al-Quds newspaper depends also on level of education21 and revenue; a higher percentage of respondents who are above the poverty line (13%) trust Al-Quds compared to only 8% of respondents below the poverty line and 6% of respondents living in hardship.

2.6.2.1 Quality of Palestinian media

When asked their opinion about the Palestinian media, the majority of respondents (52%) say the coverage of the Palestinian media of the needs and views of the Palestinian people could be improved. Moreover, an equal percentage of respondents (24%) say that the Palestinian media does a good job or that it is very bad. Cross-tabulation with various independent variables confirm this general result.

First of all the opinion about the Palestinian media is related the educational level of respondents. The more educated respondents are, the less they think that the Palestinian media does a good job covering Palestinian needs and views. Whereas 34% of respondents of low and 23% of medium educational level say that the Palestinian media does a good job, only 15% of respondents of high educational level think so. Similarly, 31% of respondents with high educational levels believe that the Palestinian media’s coverage of the Palestinian views and needs is very bad, compared to 23% and 19% of respondents of medium and low level of education.

Analysing results according to the region of residence reveals that Jerusalemites, as illustrated in the adjacent graph, have the strongest opinions about the Palestinian media. Only 13% of Jerusalemites think that the Palestinian media does a good job in covering the Palestinian views and needs and 33% of them think the coverage is very bad.

20 Al-Manar TV is the second most trusted source of information, after Al-Jazeera, in both the West Bank (18%) and Gaza Strip (15%)
21 Persons with a higher educational level trust Al-Quds newspaper (11%) more than persons with medium and low educational level. As for the second most important source of information, respondents with medium (18%) and low educational level trust Al-Manar (18%), whereas respondents with higher educational level prefer Al-Arabiyyah (16%)
However, there is little difference between the three regions regarding the opinion that the Palestinian media could become better. One explanation for this is that the Jerusalemite might feel alienated by the Palestinian media (especially Palestinian radio and TV) which, for political reasons, has limited access to Jerusalem and thus focuses more on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 2.24: Opinion about Palestinian media according to gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Its coverage of the Palestinian views and needs is very bad</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its coverage of the Pal. needs and views could become better</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does a good job expressing the views and needs of the people</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.25: Opinion about Palestinian Media according to poverty level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Level</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above poverty line</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below poverty line</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardship cases</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of gender, although a similar percentage of male and women consider that Palestinian media could improve in quality, results indicate that a considerably higher percentage of female respondents (29%) think that the Palestinian media does a good job in covering the Palestinian needs and views. By contrast, male respondents are more critical of the Palestinian media and a high percentage of them think that its coverage is either very bad or it could be improved.

Finally, there is a relationship between the economic situation of respondents and their opinion about the Palestinian media. The better-off respondents are the more critical of the Palestinian media. While 30% of respondents who are classified as hardship cases think the Palestinian media does a good job, only 16% of respondents above the poverty line think so. Similarly, more respondents above poverty level believe that the Palestinian media coverage is very bad than respondents below the poverty line and hardship cases.

2.7 Perceptions about the peace process

In the aftermath of Oslo process, the support for peace with Israel was very strong among the Palestinians. However, this support gradually decreased since then as a result of the various and numerous obstacles and the continuous interruptions of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 to the period considered by our survey (in July 2005), there has been little, if any, progress in peace process. The Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continued, settlement continued to expand in the West Bank and Jerusalem, with Israel confirming its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israel continued building a Separation Wall into the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the violence in the territories continued to escalate and the number of Palestinian casualties continued to rise. Nevertheless, the Israeli unilateral withdrawal plan could be considered the main single important event in 2005 in the oPt.

In this section, we continue to examine Palestinian perceptions towards peace with Israel in the period preceding the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza. We will examine the Palestinian support for a peace agreement with Israel, the support for the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, the concessions the Palestinians are willing to make for the sake of a viable state and the acceptance of an interim international force.

2.7.1 Palestinians’ overall support of the peace process

The overall analysis indicates that the vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004.22 Despite the

---

22 Poll 8, November 2004 (55% supported a peace agreement with Israel, 45% opposed it)
numerous interruptions to Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, one could assume that the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza might have increased the Palestinian feeling of optimism regarding the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with Israel. Despite this high level of support for a peace agreement with Israel, the level of support varies according to three independent variables, namely, refugee status, area of residence, and geographic area.

First of all, refugee respondents (69%) are slightly less supportive than non-refugees (74%) of a peace settlement with Israel. This is not a surprising result considering the fact that most problematic issues that would determine a final peace settlement with Israel are indeed refugee issues such as refugee compensation and the refugee right of return.

When looking at the area of residence, results show that villagers (78%) support a peace settlement with Israel more than city-dwellers (71%) and refugee camp residents (65%).23 One could explain this by understanding that villages, particularly in the West Bank, have been suffering greatly from Israeli incursions, the destruction of their livelihood and means of living and the confiscation of their land, especially after Israel started building the Separation Wall. Thus one would expect them to be more enthusiastic about reaching a peace agreement with Israel. These results tend to be confirmed when we look at the data according to geographic area: northern West Bankers (75%), southern West Bankers (72%) and Gazans (73%) are more supportive of a peace settlement with Israel than middle West Bankers (63%), i.e., those who are currently mostly affected by the Separation Wall.

2.7.2 Gaza Disengagement Plan

In 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank. In October 2004, the Knesset approved the unilateral disengagement plan which was scheduled for mid-August 2005. Despite some reservations about the plan, the withdrawal was welcomed nationally and internationally.

When respondents were asked about their support for the disengagement plan, the data revealed that the majority of the Palestinian public (78%) supported the Israeli disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip, as shown in the table below. Only a mere 15% of respondents opposed or strongly opposed the disengagement plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for the disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know enough to decide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t hear of it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Similar result in Poll 8, November 2004 (71% of villagers supported a peace agreement with Israel and 29% opposed it)
Support for the disengagement plan was generally strong across the three regions, but, clearly, the highest percentage of respondents supporting it was in the Gaza Strip (totalling 83%). One could argue that it is in the Gaza Strip where the Israeli disengagement plan has been widely interpreted, especially within political circles, as a victory of the resistance over the Israeli occupation. At the same time, analysis reveals that there is less support in the Gaza Strip refugee camps (80%) than outside the camps for the disengagement plan, which confirms the levels of support according to refugee status explained above. It is also inside refugee camps in the Gaza Strip than one could find the strongest opposition for the withdrawal plan (15%).

Interestingly there is a correlation between poverty level and the level of support for the Israeli disengagement plan. There is a much stronger support for the withdrawal among respondents who come from households in hardship (54%) than among respondents who are below the poverty line (44%) and those who are above the poverty line (42%). This result clearly indicates the hope for a better economic future following the Israeli withdrawal.

### 2.7.3 Concessions for a viable Palestinian state

It is clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is strong among the Palestinian population even though the time the survey was carried was a period of hardly any significant progress in the peace negotiations with Israel, but rather a period marked by major developments in Palestinian internal politics and by continuous obstacles for any Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement.

In principle, the respondents seem to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of respondents are willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% are willing to relinquish the refugee right of return (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“What should the PA relinquish for a viable State?”</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part of Jerusalem</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10% of the land of the West Bank</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee right of return</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian control over borders</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should relinquish anything if this will lead to ending occupation</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When these results are compared with results from the previous survey in November 2004 (see graph below), the sharp change in the attitude of Palestinians is striking.

Although the period when the survey was carried could be characterised as a period of relative stability, one could explain this clear change in attitude by saying that the last five years of Al-Aqsa Intifada has considerably eroded Palestinian patience and/or hope in achieving any political gains through violent resistance. Indeed, most Palestinians believe that the Intifada made the situation worse for them.

### Figure 2.29: Concessions for a viable state

- Anything to end occupation: 4% Nov-04, 15% Jul-05
- Palestinian control over borders: 2% Nov-04, 7% Jul-05
- Refugee right of return: 3% Nov-04, 31% Jul-05
- 5-10% of the land of the WB: 3% Nov-04, 37% Jul-05
- Part of Jerusalem: 1% Nov-04, 11% Jul-05

---

24 Results confirmed by FAFO, Gaza Poll, September 2005
25 The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO), Poll No.16, June 2005
26 In Poll 8, November 2004, the majority of respondents (86%) said that the PNA should not relinquish anything of the Palestinian rights
27 Poll 8, November 2004, (84%) of respondents said that the general situation has worsened because of the Intifada
Most interestingly, the refugee status of the respondents does not seem to influence their willingness to hand over concessions. Indeed, 31% of refugee respondents are willing to relinquish their right of return for the sake of a viable Palestinian state. Equally, a high proportion of them are willing to relinquish parts of the West Bank and Jerusalem. The striking difference between the two groups is that 22% of refugees (as compared with 8% of non-refugees) mention anything to end occupation as a concession in exchange of a viable Palestinian state.28 One could argue that the state of desperation these results indicate could be explained by the assumption that the Palestinian refugees have suffered most from the conflict especially in the last five years. Similarly, the global tendency observed in the table is confirmed according to the region of residence. In the graph below, it is striking to see that a high percentage of West Bankers (39%)29 would agree to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 53% of Jerusalemites30 would agree to relinquish part of Jerusalem.

2.7.4 The 1967 borders

Although Palestinians seem to be willing to give major concessions for the sake of a viable Palestinian state, they are stricter regarding border issues. When respondents were asked if the Palestinian leadership could relinquish some of the Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, 81% of respondents refused such a concession.

2.7.5 Acceptance of an interim international force

Despite the various and continuous demands of the Palestinians in the last years to have an interim international force to monitor the situation in the oPt and Israeli violations, results of the survey show that 36% of Palestinians would not accept the presence of such a force. Nevertheless, 39% would accept the presence of such an interim international force only under certain conditions.

In all the three regions of the oPt support for an interim international force is limited: 29% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip would accept such a measure without reservation, contrary to Jerusalem where one can find the highest proportion of respondents who would not accept such an international force (48%).

---

28 Poll 8, November 2004, results were 3%, 3%, 1% and 8% respectively
29 In Poll 8, only 3% agreed to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank
30 In Poll 8, only (2%) of Jerusalemites agreed to relinquish part of Jerusalem
One could assume that because the major Intifada activities and confrontations with the Israeli forces mainly take place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the residents in these two regions believe that they need international protection and, thus, they are generally more supportive of the idea.

The opposition to the presence of an interim international force as well as the acceptance of an interim international force under certain conditions could be explained by the doubts Palestinians have regarding the utility of such a force. When respondents were asked about their expectations regarding outcomes of an interim international force, the majority of respondents (41%) believed that an it could not achieve anything. Nevertheless, 31% believe that such a force could achieve “an end to the violence on both sides.” Again, 20% of respondents think that such a force would guarantee their personal security.
3 Socio-economic Situation
Chapter 3: Changes in the socio-economic situation

Frédéric Lapeyre

3.1 Main trends

- In July 2005, the overall poverty rate was 68% and the depth of poverty was very severe, as 35% of the population were in a situation of extreme poverty.

- There was an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the months preceding the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, as extreme poverty in the oPt increased from 26% to 35% between November 2004 and July 2005.

- The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in the West Bank have both especially affected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas. The poverty rate increased from 56% to 69% in villages between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% as compared to 23% in November 2004.

- One striking result to appear is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps have deteriorated sharply in the past year. Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But in July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank was higher outside refugee camps than within them, affecting, 72% of respondents outside refugee camps as compared to 66% inside. Nevertheless, extreme poverty remains higher in the refugee camps, measuring 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty rate was about the same outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty had become higher amongst people outside camps, where it increased dramatically from 33% to 49% between November 2004 and July 2005.

- In respect to subjective poverty, the results indicate that 79% of respondents stressed that their household income was slightly less or much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 61% in November 2004.

- In July 2005, 10% of those surveyed stressed that, in the last month, their household food consumption was much less than needed, and 19% reported that it was less than needed.

- As many as 45% of the poorest stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than needed, with 18% of the poorest stressing they were suffering from severe food deprivation.

- Overall, only 32% of respondents maintained that they could cope financially for as long as it takes, whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition.

- Five consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest. The results show a significant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings, from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.

- The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps led to an increase, from 46% to 51%, of the percentage of respondents who reported that they were not paying their bills, while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on credit increased, between November 2004 and July 2005, from 49% to 63%.

- Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has avoided up till now, any major social fragmentation and has secured social cohesion, as two-thirds of respondents consider the financial situation of their household to be similar to that of other members of their community.
3.2 Objective poverty

On the eve of the disengagement process from the Gaza Strip, poverty in the oPt was widespread. In July 2005, the overall poverty rate was 68%. Figure 1 shows not only a situation of mass poverty but also that the depth of poverty was very severe, with 35% of the population being in a situation of extreme poverty. Since the Israeli-imposed restrictions on mobility - through internal and external closure - are the main cause of the present economic and humanitarian crisis in the oPt, it is clear that any improvement of the material situation will depend greatly on Israeli policies towards removing its mobility - restriction measures.

![Fig 3.1: Poverty level and depth, July 2005](chart)

From a dynamic perspective, all the results show an overall deterioration in living conditions in the oPt in the months preceding the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Overall, extreme poverty increased from 26% to 35% between November 2004 and July 2005. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2005) has evidence of the same trend, pointing out that 41% of respondents from the Gaza Strip reported that the overall well-being of their household was worse in July 2005 when compared to the situation a month before - the rate being 36% for the West Bank (PCBS, August 2005).

![Fig 3.2: Evolution of poverty, 2002-2005](chart)

The deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip has especially affected poor villagers and farmers in rural areas. Their ability to reach essential services, to travel, to work and market their goods was under considerable strain. Meanwhile, the Separation Wall in the West Bank has had a very negative impact on the living conditions of farmers close to it. This explains, to a great extent, why the poverty rate in the villages increased from 56% to 69% between November 2004 and July 2005, while extreme poverty reached 32% as compared to 23% in November 2004. Poverty also increased in the cities from 57% to 65%, and this trend was associated with a sharp increase in extreme poverty, which increased from 24% to 34% between November 2004 and July 2005. However, it is still in the refugee camps that the level of poverty is the highest, as it reached a level of 72% in July 2005.

![Fig 3.3: Evolution of poverty according to area of residence, 2004-2005](chart)

Poverty rates differ significantly from one region of residence to another, and a more detailed poverty analysis shows that individuals living in the Gaza Strip are more likely to be poor (77%) than those living in the West Bank (72%). Moreover, the depth of poverty is also much more severe in the Gaza Strip, where the rate of extreme...
poverty is 47% while in the West Bank it is 32%. Extreme poverty is much less important in Jerusalem as it was measured at 5% in July 2005 but the rate of poverty reached 19%, very likely a consequence of both the mobility restrictions in the West Bank and the continued building of the wall around East Jerusalem, which has a great negative impact on the living and working conditions of Palestinians from Jerusalem. The results show a severe deterioration in the situation in the West Bank between November 2004 and July 2005, where the poverty rate increased from 60% to 72%, including an increase in the percentage of extremely poor from 25% to 32%. In the Gaza Strip, the overall poverty rate remains about the same but the depth of poverty increased sharply as the rate of extremely poor increased from 36% to 47%.

Until recently, poverty was higher in the camps than outside, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, the collapse of the oPt economy since the beginning of the second Intifada has led to a sharp deterioration in the living conditions of the population outside camps. They were less protected from the economic crisis than those living inside the camps, who were much more able to rely on safety-net mechanisms implemented by international and national institutions. In July 2005, the overall level of poverty in the West Bank was higher outside refugee camps than inside - 72% outside refugee camps as compared to 66% inside refugee camps. Nevertheless, the depth of poverty has remained less severe outside refugee camps as extreme poverty was still higher in the refugee camps, where it measured 36% as compared to 31% outside. In the Gaza Strip, the poverty rate was about the same both outside and inside refugee camps, but extreme poverty was higher amongst people outside camps, where it reached 49%, as compared to 42% for those inside camps. One striking result is that the living conditions of Palestinians outside refugee camps has deteriorated sharply in the past months and especially in the Gaza Strip, where the rate of extreme poverty increased dramatically to include half the population.

The decline in household total income is mainly due to the problem of lack of access to employment and decent jobs, a situation which has a very negative impact on income generation. The results indicate that, in the oPt, job loss and working-hour loss were considered to be the main cause of income decline by 69% of the respondents from the West Bank and, respectively, 64% and 59% of the respondents from Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the poorest are much more vulnerable to job loss, as 34% of them stated that it was the main cause of
income decline compared to 22% of the non-poor.

The analysis of household income composition shows that only 23% of the extremely poor have access to salaries from long-term jobs, crucial to secure livelihoods, whereas two-thirds of the non-poor have access to such source of income. Financial help from the PA or international/local organisations is an important source of income for the poorest, as more than one-quarter of them included it in their household income composition. This financial help seems well-targeted towards the poorest - as it is a source of income for only 10% of the non-poor - and the refugee camps. Indeed, 26% of respondents from the West Bank refugee camps stressed it as a source of their household income as compared to 7% outside refugee camps, while in the Gaza Strip such was the case for 39% inside refugee camps as compared to 33% outside refugee camps.

When examining poverty risk, it is important to stress that education seems to protect individuals against poverty. 71% of those who had only completed their education to elementary school level were poor and 44% extremely poor - the rate of extreme poverty reaching 50% for the illiterate group. But only 30% of those who had completed their education to college level and above were poor, and only 13% were extremely poor.
Family size is also an important variable in explaining poverty, as extremely poor families are composed of an average of 4.19 children of less than 18-years-old, while non-poor families average 2.33 children each. From a geographical perspective, it is in the Gaza Strip refugee camps that the family size is higher, with an average of 4.4 children.

### 3.3 Subjective poverty

In the previous section, the measure of poverty was based on income, where the PCBS poverty line was used to distinguish between the poor and non-poor. In the current section, the poverty analysis is based on a subjective measure of poverty, where the objective is to obtain the views of the Palestinian people themselves about the magnitude of material deprivation. To that end, a subjective financial-satisfaction poverty line has been elaborated. Respondents were asked to estimate the average amount of money they need to meet the basic needs of their household. Once the respondents estimated what they need to meet these household basic needs, they were asked how close their household income is to what is needed.
income was to this amount. Giving a voice to the population about their living conditions leads to a better understanding of the impact of the ongoing economic and political crisis on household welfare.

79% of respondents were of the opinion, in July 2005, that their household income was slightly less or much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs, compared with 61% in November 2004.

In the West Bank, the situation was more dramatic for those outside the camps, as the number of households with an income much less than needed to meet their basic needs was measured at 49% as compared to 42% in the refugee camps. In the Gaza Strip, the situation has also deteriorated sharply outside refugee camps, where the rate of those responding that their household income was slightly less than what was needed to meet their basic needs increased from 14% to 35%, whereas the rate stressing their household income was much less than needed remained the same. Surprisingly, the number of respondents from the Gaza Strip refugee camps stressing that their household income was much less than what was needed to meet their basic needs decreased from 61% to 29% between November 2004 and July 2005. The situation deteriorated sharply in Jerusalem, where the rate of subjective poverty increased from 43% to 75% between November 2004 and July 2005.

Fig 3.14: The extent to which the household income is close to what is needed according to place of residence, November 2004-July 2005

The Israeli military strategy toward the oPt over the last five years has deeply compromised Palestinian households’ access to basic needs by restricting income-generating activities. In July 2005, 10% of the population stressed that, in the last month, their household food consumption was much less than needed, and 19% reported that it was less than needed.

Fig 3.15: Household food consumption adequacy over the past month

Food deprivation - defined as a household’s food consumption being much less or less than needed - was especially high in the Gaza Strip where it affected 34% of those outside camps and 31% inside camps. In the oPt as a whole, about 12% of the inhabitants from the refugee camps and 10% of those outside refugee camps declared that their household’s food consumption was much less than needed. As many as 45% of the poorest stated that their household food consumption was much less or less than needed, with 18% of the poorest stressing they were suffering severe food deprivation.
3.4 Coping strategies

There is no doubt that Palestinians in the oPt have suffered a severe decline in their well-being since the beginning of the second Intifada. Overall, only 32% of the respondents were of the opinion that they could cope financially for as long as it takes, whereas 45% stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious condition. In the refugee camps, the situation seems to have improved, as the percentage of those who reported that they were in serious conditions decreased from 19% to 3% in the West Bank refugee camps and from 32% to 13% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps between November 2004 and July 2005. Amongst the extremely poor, the humanitarian crisis seems less severe, as those who stressed that they were in serious condition decreased from 39% to 21%, but the amelioration of the situation is limited, since those who stressed that they can barely manage increased from 39% to 47% between November 2004 and July 2005.
People in the oPt are not entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance mechanisms. Coping strategies play a crucial role in managing these hardships and securing livelihoods. The first coping strategies used by households at the beginning of the second Intifada were to reduce their expenditures and to draw on their savings. However, some of the main initial coping strategies tend now to be exhausted for growing numbers of the population who must rely heavily on other strategies, such as not paying bills or buying on credit, thus reducing even more the quantity of food bought, or being forced to buy food of inferior quality.

These five consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest and have pushed them to reduce their expenditure (both in terms of quantity and quality) as far as possible. Indeed, the results show a significant decrease in the percentage of the poorest who were relying on past savings, a decline from 72% in July 2003 to 36% in July 2005.

The deterioration of the economic situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps is very apparent through an analysis of the evolution of two main coping strategies: not paying bills or buying on credit. Indeed, the results show that the percentage of respondents who stressed that they were not paying their bills increased from 46% to 51% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps while the percentage of those who stressed that they were buying on credit increased from 41% to 44%.
credit increased from 49% to 63% between November 2004 and July 2005.

**Fig 3.22: Buying on credit according to place of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Nov. 2004</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WBNC</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBRC</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSNC</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSRC</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 3.23: Not paying the bills according to place of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Nov. 2004</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WBNC</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBRC</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSNC</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSRC</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reducing food consumption is one of the most common coping strategies in a situation of material deprivation. Within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, it is outside refugee camps that the reduction of the quantity of food consumed was most severe as, respectively, 49% and 57% of respondents stressed it as compared to 34% and 51% of those in refugee camps in these locations. Moreover, two-thirds of the extremely poor had to reduce the quantity of food consumption of their household to endure the hardship. The results also show that the extremely poor had to change their consumption patterns and buy less-preferred food to cope with this hardship, as a coping strategy.

**Fig 3.24: Reducing the quantity of food according to place of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Nov. 2004</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WBNC</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBRC</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS non-camp</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSRC</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Social cohesion

Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, Palestinian society has, up till now, escaped any major social fragmentation and has maintained a social cohesion which may explain households’ coping capacities to sustain themselves under such hardship. Solidarity networks amongst family and friends are still functioning and widespread, even if some coping strategies have now become exhausted or have begun to show signs of exhaustion. In this way, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been able to absorb such levels of poverty and unemployment that could have led to the tearing of social ties and the breaking-up of the social fabric.

To evaluate the level of social cohesion, interviewees were asked how they would evaluate their financial situation in comparison to that of others in their community. Overall, two-thirds of respondents stated that they consider the financial situation of their household to be similar to that of others in their community. This means that the socio-economic crisis, initiated by the second Intifada, was not associated with any major trend towards income differentiation that could have led to social fragmentation. However, the situation seems to have deteriorated outside refugee camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where the rate of those feeling that the financial situation of their household has worsened as compared to the rest of their community increased, respectively, from 28% to 31% and from 22% to 26% between November 2004 and July 2005.
Palestinian society has until now displayed great social cohesion, with 71% of the poor and 53% of the extremely poor still believing that the financial situation of their household to be about the same of the rest of the people in their community. The results indicate that the percentage of respondents feeling that their household financial situation has worsened compared to others decreased amongst the poorest from 59% to 45%, whereas it increased amongst the poor - excluding the poorest group - from 14% to 24% between November 2004 and July 2005.
Changes in the Labour Market
Chapter 4: Changes in the labour market

By Frédéric Lapeyre

4.1 Main trends

- The results show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while one-third of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter were underemployed.

- The rate of full-time employment slightly increased between November 2004 and July 2005, but this trend did not lead to a decrease in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 33%.

- The unemployment rate was especially high in refugee camps, where, in July 2005, it reached 44% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in November 2004.

- Outside refugee camps, unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip as compared to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004.

- In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners have never been unemployed during the second Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed (i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, the results show that the very long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than two years) represent as many as 32% of the respondents.

- Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55% as compared to about 22% in the age group of 25-49 years.

- The level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as only 20% of the poorly educated workers are employed full-time, while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 70% of workers with a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed.

- Only 29% of respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability they may lose it is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather likely.

- The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also more likely to be trapped in bad segments of the labour market and to lose their current job. Only 9% of the poorest declared they had very secure jobs compared to 39% of the non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was very likely as compared to 4% of the latter.

- Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty as 71% of the non-poor were employed full-time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked only few hours a day.

- Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a significant proportion of the poor are, in fact, currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their livelihood. Indeed, 37% of those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor in July 2005.

- The percentage of respondents stressing it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%.

- Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land, as 60% of the respondents stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land as compared to 39% in November 2004.
4.2 Employment situation

Palestinian workers from the oPt must face a situation of mass unemployment and underemployment resulting from the paralysis of the Palestinian economy by Israeli military forces. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Palestinian workers have faced two major problems: firstly, the crisis of the domestic Palestinian labour market, marked by depressed labour demand and falling wages in the private sector, and, secondly, the loss of access to work in Israel and the Israeli settlements, marked by the long-term substitution of Palestinian workers by foreign workers.

The results in Figure 4.1 show that, in July 2005, only 40% of the labour force was employed full-time, while one-third of the labour force was unemployed and about one-quarter underemployed. The rate of full-time employment increased slightly between November 2004 and July 2005, but this trend did not lead to a decrease in unemployment which, on the contrary, increased sharply from 27% to 33%. Indeed, it is the rate of those working part-time - which, in the main, is involuntarily part-time - and those working a few hours per day which decreased. This is a very worrying result taking into account that unemployment is one of the main reasons of economic vulnerability and poverty.

Fig 4.1: Employment Situation of the labour force, November 2002-July 2005

The unemployment rate was especially high in the refugee camps in July 2005, where it reached 44% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip as compared to 30% in both cases in November 2004. Outside refugee camps, unemployment also increased sharply as it reached 34% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip as compared to, respectively, 28% and 26% in November 2004, Figure 4.2.

Fig 4.2: Employment situation of the labour force according to place of residence, July 2005
The employment situation in villages was unique, as it is the only area where full-time employment decreased from 37% to 31% between November 2004 and July 2005, while unemployment increased from 31% to 34%. Elsewhere, the results indicate that full-time employment increased from 39% to 46% in the cities and from 29% to 37% in the refugee camps during this period. However, in both cases, unemployment also increased sharply from 23% to 31% in the cities and from 31% to 41% in the refugee camps. (Figure 4.3, below)

**Fig 4.3: Employment situation of the labour force according to area of residence, November 2004-July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Full time</th>
<th>Part time</th>
<th>Few hours a day</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City November 2004</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City July 2005</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camp November 2004</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camp July 2005</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village November 2004</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village July 2005</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deterioration of the situation in villages is largely due, on the one hand, to the situation of rural areas in the Gaza Strip before the disengagement process and, on the other hand, to the situation of the areas crossed by the Separation Wall. Indeed, the percentage of the respondents who stressed it was almost impossible or very difficult to cultivate land in the Gaza Strip between November 2004 and July 2005 increased from 27% to 41%. Farmers from the Jerusalem region had also to face growing problems in cultivating land as 60% of the respondents stressed, in July 2005, that it was almost impossible or very difficult, as compared to 39% in November 2004. The Separation Wall is a major concern for business in the agricultural sector not only because it separate farmers from their land but also because it increases the price of materials and transportation - as was stressed by 61% of the respondents in the Jerusalem area and 22% of those in the West Bank outside refugee camps – and makes business difficult. (Figure 4.4, below)

**Fig 4.4: Possibility to cultivate land in the last 6 months according to region of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Almost impossible/very difficult</th>
<th>Difficult</th>
<th>Not difficult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Nov. 2004</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Jul. 2005</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Nov. 2004</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Jul. 2005</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip Nov. 2004</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip Jul. 2005</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the question of workers’ accessibility to their workplaces, mobility restrictions are still a problem but they are much less severe in the oPt than before. Overall, 40% of the respondents declared that it was more or less difficult to go to work as compared to 61% in November 2004. The evolution has improved everywhere but especially in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, where the percentage of respondents stating that it was not difficult increased, respectively, from 34% to 64% and from 42% to 69%. It is in the West Bank that the problem of access to the workplace remains the most severe, as only 53% of the respondents declared it was not difficult. (Figure 4.5, next page)
deprivation, because income-generating activities by the main breadwinner have been the main source of income
while this rate was 34% inside refugee camps. (Figure 4.3, adjacent)

Fig 4.3 Unemployment and job precariousness

In the oPt, only 33% of main household breadwinners have never been unemployed during the second Intifada, whereas 49% were long-term unemployed (i.e., unemployed for more than a year). Moreover, the results show that the very long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than two years) represent as many as 32% of respondents. (Figure 4.6, adjacent)

It is in the West Bank that unemployment hit the main breadwinners hardest, as 75% of respondents outside refugee camps and 84% of those inside refugee camps declared that the main breadwinner of their household was unemployed at one time during the second Intifada. The results show also that as many as 53% of the main breadwinners outside refugee camps and 65% of those inside refugee camps were unemployed for more than one year. The situation is less dramatic in the Gaza Strip and in Jerusalem where, respectively, 48% and 57% of the main breadwinners have never been unemployed during the whole period of the second Intifada. However, there is a large segment of the active population in the Gaza Strip which is trapped in long-term unemployment, as 36% of the main breadwinners outside refugee camps were unemployed for more than two years, while this rate was 34% inside refugee camps. (Figure 4.7, below)

Fig 4.6: Unemployment duration of the main breadwinner

Mass and persistent unemployment amongst family breadwinners has had dramatic consequences on material deprivation, because income-generating activities by the main breadwinner had been the main source of income for most households. The results indicate that 67% of the extremely poor had experienced unemployment for
more than one year and 50% experienced it for more than two years, as compared to only 12% amongst the non-poor. (Figure 4.8, below)

**Fig 4.8 : Unemployment duration of the main breadwinner according to poverty level, July 2005**

Unemployment is especially severe for less-educated and young workers. The results indicate that the unemployment rate in the age group of 18-24 years is 55%, as compared to about 22% in the age group of 25-49 years. Moreover, when the younger workers have a job, they are less likely to have a full-time job than workers in the other age groups: only 25% of them held a full-time job compared to 46% in the age group of 25-34 years and 49% in the age group of 35-49 years. The level of full-time employment is also low for workers of 50 years of age or more, as only 27% of them are employed full-time, whereas 52% are unemployed. (Figure 4.9, below) The level of education is also a key variable in explaining workers’ vulnerability in the labour market, as only 20% of the poorly educated workers are employed full-time while 56% are unemployed. In contrast, 70% of workers with a high level of education are employed full-time and only 15% are unemployed. (Figure 4.10, below)

**Fig 4.9: Employment situation of the labour force according to age group, July 2005**

**Fig 4.10: Employment situation of the labour force by level of education, July 2005**

Access to employment is a major policy issue considering the mass unemployment and underemployment in the oPt. But an effective labour market policy should take also into account the great level of job precariousness in the oPt. The results indicate that a large number of workers are trapped in unstable jobs leading to great insecurity in household sources of income. Only 29% of the respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability of losing it is very unlikely, while 12% stated it was very likely and 34% that it was rather likely. (Figure 4.11, next page)
It is in the Gaza Strip where there are the larger proportion of secure jobs, as 46% of respondents from the refugee camps and 34% of those outside refugee camps reported that the risk of losing their job was very unlikely, as compared to only 24% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 29% inside camps. In Jerusalem, the results also reveal a strong feeling of job insecurity amongst workers, as only 27% of them declared that they thought that the risk of losing their job was very unlikely. It is in the West Bank refugee camps that job precariousness is the most severe, as 29% of the respondents declared that the risk of losing their job was very high. (Figure 4.12, below)

The poorest are more likely to be unemployed, but also to be trapped in bad segments of the labour market and to lose their current job. Only 9% of the poorest declared to have very secure jobs compared to 39% of the non-poor, while 20% of the former declared that the risk of losing their job was very likely, as compared to 4% of the latter. Other results show that this widespread feeling of job precariousness amongst the poorest is very real, as, in the past six months, 19% of them had, in fact, lost their job. Fighting poverty should then also include pro-active employment policies to avoid such a negative process that pushes individuals from a zone of job precariousness to a zone of exclusion from the labour market and the associated consequence of having to live in poverty. (Figure 4.13, below & Figure 4.14, next page)
4.4 Employment structure

The employment structure in the oPt is characterised by the predominance of employees, who are the largest group of workers, representing 35% of the total, but also by the large and growing number of self-employed, who are now the second-largest group represented in July 2005, totalling 23% of workers, as compared to 12% in November 2004. This new structure of employment in the oPt is the result of both the paralysis of the Palestinian economy and mass poverty, which has led people to develop various income-generating activities to cope with hardship. (Figure 4.15, below)

One can find a higher proportion of employees in the Gaza Strip, both outside refugee camps (41%) and inside refugee camps (46%), as compared to 30% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 39% inside refugee camps. Gaza Strip refugee camps are also characterised by a large proportion of skilled workers (22% of respondents), while the proportion of unskilled workers in the West Bank outside refugee camps is very high (23%) as compared to the other place. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, self-employment is higher outside refugee camps than inside them because of more income-generating opportunities. (Figure 4.16, below)

The severe socio-economic crisis and the related extensive involvement of domestic and international organisations deployed to avoid a major humanitarian crisis have all considerably changed the employment
structure in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada. The private sector has paid a very high price for the current situation - infrastructure destruction, internal and external closures, mobility restrictions, etc. - and its share in employment has dropped sharply since 2000. However, a positive trend has emerged since February 2004, as the proportion of workers employed by the private sector increased from 24% to 38%. It is in Jerusalem and in the West Bank where the proportion of workers employed by the private sector is the highest.

The other very specific feature of the oPt employment structure is the astonishingly high share (7%) of local and international NGOs as well as international agencies in employment. International agencies and, primarily, UNRWA, are key job opportunity providers in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where as many as 11% of respondents declared they were employed by an international agency.

Finally, the Palestinian Authority plays a crucial role in employment by securing jobs and income for a large group of workers and their families. In the Gaza Strip, 29% of respondents were employed by the PA while the figure was about 20% in the West Bank. Donors are aware of this situation and financially support the PA to fight poverty through securing employment in the public sector and delivering basic services. (Figure 4.17 & Figure 4.18, below)

**Fig 4.17: Type of employer, July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer Type</th>
<th>July 2003</th>
<th>February 2004</th>
<th>November 2004</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International agency</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural petty trade</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture petty trade</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other self-employed</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 4.18: Type of employer according to place of residence, July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>WBNC</th>
<th>WBRC</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>GSNRC</th>
<th>GSRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International agency</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.5 Poverty risks**

The strength of the links between employment situation and other dimensions of economic and social life (family, health, income or living conditions) suggests that people in situations of unemployment or not having a decent job are at great risk of becoming poor. Indeed, full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty, as 71% of the non-poor were employed full-time, while 57% of the extremely poor were unemployed and 27% worked only few hours a day.
Although employment is a key factor in escaping poverty, a significant proportion of the poor are, in fact, currently working, and the results indicate a dramatic level of working poor who cannot secure their livelihood. Indeed, 46% of those working a few hours a day were extremely poor. More surprisingly, in July 2005, 37% of those working full-time were poor and 9% were extremely poor. (Figure 4.19, below)

The risk of poverty is more or less dependent on the type of employer. The results show that the Palestinian Authority, international agencies and local and international NGOs guarantee many of their employees a better level of income and job security and, as such, protect them from poverty. The poverty rates among workers employed by these organisations are much lower than average. On the other hand, employment in the private sector and self-employment are associated with high levels of poverty and extreme poverty. For example, 73% of the workers in the private sector, 77% of those involved in petty trade in manufacturing and 88% of those in agricultural petty trade were poor, compared with 37% of the workers employed by the government, 44% of those employed by international agencies and 31% of those employed by international NGOs.

Employment in the public sector is associated with a lower extreme-poverty risk, as only 7% of Palestinian Authority employees were extremely poor as compared to 42% of the workers of the private sector. The results show that extreme-poverty risk is highest for the workers involved in agricultural petty trade activities where 62% of the respondents belonging to this group were extremely poor. Figure 21 shows the same results from another perspective, and displays the very specific employment structure according to the level of poverty. (Figure 4.20, below)
To conclude, it is important to stress that the place (or most recent place) of work has a great impact on poverty risk. The exclusion of Palestinian workers from both the Israeli and the settlements’ labour market is a major challenge, as it had been an important source of income for Palestinian households. (Figure 4.21, above) The results show that the rate of poverty among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (67%) or in Israel (79%) is much higher than the overall oPt average. Those workers who lost their job or have had great difficulty in reaching their workplace as a consequence of mobility restrictions are the big losers of these changes in the labour market. As there is very little hope of returning to pre-September 2000 employment levels inside Israel and the settlements, this exclusion has placed great pressure on the oPt labour market to create new jobs. (Figure 4.22, below)
Chapter 5: HEALTH
Isabelle Daneels

5.1 Introduction

Part 5 of the study is focusing on issues related to health. Specific attention will be given to the need of various types of health care in the past six months, the providers of these various types of health care, and their prompt or delayed delivery. Furthermore, and as has traditionally been the case in previous reports, the issue of health coverage and its providers will be tackled.

5.2 Health in general

Before going into depth into issues related to health, it is important to briefly evaluate the importance of the need of health both for the household and for the community.

When the interviewees were asked about the two most important needs of their household, the results in figure 5.1, below, indicate that health (19%) comes second as the first most important need after employment (20%). When the first and second most important needs are analyzed together, health (39%) holds the second place after food (42%).

Figure 5.1: The two most important needs of your household (o079)

When taking into consideration only the unmet needs of the household, the importance of health is ranked in fourth place (11%), which suggests that the need of health is already quite well catered for as there are more important unmet needs such as employment (29%), financial assistance (25%), and food (14%), see Fig. 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most important need of your household? (o180)

---

1 For the first time, several questions have been added in the questionnaire that aimed to evaluate the various types of health care in terms of several variables, such as waiting time, availability of drugs, distance, health staff attitude, consultancy time, and hours of work of the health center. The results of those questions can be found and analyzed at the following websites: [www.unige.ch/iued/palestine or dartmonitor.org](http://www.unige.ch/iued/palestine or dartmonitor.org). They are, however, too copious and detailed to fall in the scope of this chapter.

2 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the report.

3 This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the report.
When the question to interviewees concerned the two most important needs of their community, health (13%) is ranked in third place as the first most important community need. When the first and second most important needs of the community are analyzed together, health (28%) is ranked in third place after employment (62%) and education (35%) as illustrated in Fig. 5.3.

![Figure 5.3: The two most important needs of the community](image)

Respondents were also asked to rank the 5 main expense types of the household in order of importance. One type of household expense concerns health. The results are summarized in table 5.1, below. It is clear that food (80%) is by far the first main expense type of the household, while health (4%) comes in a very distant fourth place. In the second main expense type of the household, health (20%) comes in third place after education (30%) and household items (23%). Concerning the third main expense type of the household, health takes the lead as a household expense with 25%. In the fourth and fifth main expense types of the household, the importance of health diminishes again to fourth place with respectively 16% and 10%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance ranking of main expenses (1 to 5) in percent</th>
<th>1st expense</th>
<th>2nd expense</th>
<th>3rd expense</th>
<th>4th expense</th>
<th>5th expense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household items</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining family business</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying house, car, or business</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 The need for various types of health assistance in the past six months

In an attempt to monitor the need for medical care among Palestinians, interviewees were asked from a predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their household members had been in need of in the past six months. In general, and as overviewed in figure 5.4, below, 8% of the respondents were in need of emergency hospital care, while 6% were in need of ambulatory care for a sick child. In the six months prior to the survey conducted for this report, respectively 4% of the respondents needed an ambulance, hospitalization for delivery care, and follow-up for chronic diseases (such as diabetes, hypertension, or asthma). Furthermore, 3% of the respondents specified that they themselves or any of the household members had needed vaccinations. Lastly, respectively 2% of the respondents stated that there had been a need for specialized care for non-acute problems and antenatal care, while respectively 1% of the respondents explained that in the six months prior to the survey there had been a need in their household for mental health care and family planning.
In order to be able to get a better idea about the delivery of medical care, those respondents who had specified that they themselves or any of their household members had been in need of any of the types of medical care in the predetermined list, were asked to specify whether or not they had received the needed medical care within an acceptable time or whether they had perhaps not at all received the type of medical care that they had been seeking. Logically, different types of medical care have different acceptable time-frames during which it is acceptable to receive such types of medical care. The various types of medical care that are included in the predetermined list can be organized according to the following time-frames: (1) delivery of care within 1 hour, (2) delivery of medical care within two hours, (3) delivery of care within one day, and (4) delivery of care within one week.4

Starting with the delivery of medical care within one hour, of the 4% of respondents who explained that either they themselves or their household members had needed an ambulance in the six months prior to the survey, 80% were delivered with such a service within one hour of requesting it. As illustrated in figure 5.5, below, 13% had to wait longer than one hour before the ambulance arrived, while 7% who needed such a service were not provided with it at all.

When in need of emergency hospital care and hospitalization for delivery care, it is acceptable to expect the delivery of such types of medical care within two hours after seeking it. Concerning emergency hospital care, 75% of the respondents who had been in need of such care received it within two hours, 18% after two hours, and 6% did not receive such care even if they sought it. As for hospitalization for delivery care, 82% of those in need of it received it within two hours, 18% after two hours, while all of the respondents who sought such care receive it. The results are overviewed in figure 5.6, below.

---

4 It is worth noting that the results on the delivery of various types of medical care will not be disaggregated according to different variables as the number of respondents concerned is too small to be able to draw any reliable conclusions.
The delivery of ambulatory care for a sick child and the delivery of mental health care can be expected to be received within one day of requesting such care. As portrayed in figure 5.7, below, 87% of the respondents who needed ambulatory care for a sick child in the household received such care within one day, 11% received it after one day, while 3% did not receive such care for their child, even if they sought to receive such care. All of the 4 respondents who specified that or any of their household members needed mental health care in the six months prior to the survey conducted for this report, received it within one day of seeking it.

Figure 5.7: Delivery of ambulatory care for a sick child and delivery of mental health care, in general

Lastly, when seeking specialized care for non-acute problems, follow-up for chronic diseases, vaccination, antenatal care, or assistance in family planning, it is normal practice to expect the delivery of such types of medical care within one week of seeking it. As detailed in table 5.2, below, the large majority of respondents seeking any of those five types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey have received it within one week.

Table 5.2: Delivery of various types of health care, in general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Sought &amp; received within 1 week</th>
<th>Sought &amp; received after 1 week</th>
<th>Sought, but not received</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized care for non-acute problems</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up for chronic disease</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccination</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenatal care</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family planning</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 The service providers of various types of health assistance

The respondents who had specified that they had been in need of any of the types of medical care from the predetermined list in the six months prior to survey were also asked which institution provided them with the health service (see Figure 5.8, next page).

In general, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of most types of health services, with the exception of ambulance services and family planning. The Red Crescent’s main contribution to the provision of health services is clearly in the field of ambulance services (55%). In the areas where UNRWA seems to provide a considerable amount of the medical services, such as the ambulatory care for a sick child, follow-up for chronic diseases, vaccination, and antenatal care, the results reveal a tendency that UNRWA provides these services to a larger extent in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, and among refugees. Still, these tendencies have to be considered with care as the number of cases on which the analysis of service providers is performed is too small to be conclusive.

---

Again, the results on the service providers of health assistance will not be disaggregated according to different variables as the number of respondents concerned is too small to be able to draw any reliable conclusions.
5.5 Health financing

Traditionally and as health financing is an important element that can help facilitate access to health care, interviewees were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in covering their medical expenses. As indicated in figure 5.9, below, 22% of the respondents cover their medical expenses from their own sources. When the respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main providers are the government health insurance (47%) and UNRWA (10%). An additional 14% of the respondents replied that they rely on a combination of UNRWA and the PA to cover their medical expenses. Respectively 2% of the respondents cover their medical bills through private health insurance and charitable organizations.

Sources of health coverage vary considerably according to the region and area of residence of the respondents and according to their refugee status. The results in figure 5.10, below, indicate very clearly that a far lower percentage of respondents of refugee origin (12%) and those residing in the Gaza Strip (3%) and in refugee camps (6%) than non-refugees (30%) and those living in the West Bank (37%) and in cities (24%) or villages (28%) cover their medical expenses from their own pocket. Not unexpectedly, assistance in covering medical expenses by UNRWA or by a combination of UNRWA and the PA is most pronounced in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, and among refugees. Lastly, the percentage of respondents covered by Palestinian government health insurance is the lowest in refugee camps (29%) and among refugees (30%).

6 It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in Jerusalem are excluded. Jerusalemites are entitled to Israeli government health coverage and as such their inclusion into the analysis would provide inaccurate results about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.

7 It is worth noting that UNRWA does not offer its own health insurance scheme, although the Agency (partially) covers hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.
When examining the sources of health coverage according to the variable of poverty, a rather unbalanced picture appears. As overviewed in figure 5.11, below, UNRWA and the PA mainly assist respondents with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line. However, 61% of the relatively better-off respondents receive assistance in covering their medical expenses from charitable organizations compared to only 39% of the respondents below the poverty line. Similarly, a mere 32% of the respondents with an income above the poverty line are covered by private health insurance, while this is the case for 68% of those with a living standard below the poverty line. Lastly, 76% of the respondents with a monthly household income below the poverty line compared to 24% of those above the poverty line cover their medical bills from their own pocket.

Finally, when examining the sources of health coverage exclusively among respondents living in hardship, the Palestinian government health insurance is by far the main provider, followed by UNRWA. One fifth of the respondent hardship cases cover their medical expenses from their own sources. The results are detailed in figure 5.12, adjacent.
5.6 Conclusion

The main findings concerning health can be summarized as follows:

- Health is considered to be the second most important household need, but is only the fourth most important unmet household need, which might suggest that this need is already quite well catered for. Health is considered to be the third most important community need.

- In the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked if they themselves or members of their household had been in need of 10 different types of medical care in the six months prior to the survey. The most frequently needed type of medical care during this period was emergency hospital care (8%), followed by ambulatory care for a sick child (6%).

- Respondents were asked whether or not the various types of medical care that they needed in the six months prior to the survey were delivered within an acceptable time or whether it was not received at all. The results indicate that concerning the 10 types of medical care that were under study, invariably over 80% of the respondents received the required medical care according to acceptable standards. The only exception concerns emergency hospital care as only 75% of the respondents stated that they received such care within two hours of seeking it.

- Concerning the providers of various types of medical care, the Ministry of Health is the main provider of most types of health services, with the exception of ambulance services and family planning.

- Palestinian governmental health insurance and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers of assistance through covering Palestinians' medical expenses. The lowest percentage of Palestinians covering their medical bills from their own resources can be found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip.
Chapter 6: CHILDREN
Isabelle Daneels

This part of the study focuses on issues related to children in the oPt, particularly in the context of the impact of the second Intifada. First of all, the most important needs of children will be examined, followed by a closer look at several aspects of children's lives, such as education, their psychological well-being and their free time.

6.1 Children and their needs

In order to be able to formulate relevant policies towards children, it is imperative to have accurate information about the actual needs of children. To this end, parents in the survey conducted for this report were asked to specify from a predetermined list the two most important needs of the children in the household. As such, the analysis, below, will study both the results of the two most important needs of children together and will also consider the first most important need separately.

In general, when the two most important needs of children in the household are examined together, attending school regularly (66%) is by far the most frequently cited need, followed by the need for safe opportunities to play (43%) and the need for psychological support for children (31%). Interestingly, and in comparison with Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII,¹ the “immediate” need for children to eat better than before the Intifada (27%) seems to have gained considerable importance at the expense of a possibly more long-term need for children to be able to receive psychological support (31%). Lastly, the need for children to eat more than before the Intifada has remained quite stable when compared to the results in Palestinian Public Perceptions Report VIII. This rather stable percentage of the need for children to eat more than before the Intifada in combination with the sharp increase in the importance attached by parents to the need for their children to eat better than before the Intifada might suggest that the concern surrounding the food intake of children is not so much related to the lack of food (quantity), but is rather concentrated on the quality of the food intake.

When one looks at the first and second most important need of children separately, the results in figure 6.1, below, clearly illustrate that the need for children to attend school regularly is by far more frequently mentioned as a first need (54%) than as a second need (12%). The opposite is true for the need for children to have safe opportunities to play, to have psychological support available, to get unrestricted access to medical services and to eat better than before the Intifada. They are all more frequently mentioned by parents as a second most important need than as a first most important need.

Figure 6.1: The two most important needs of the children in the household in general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>First Most Important Need</th>
<th>Second Most Important Need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attend school regularly</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe opportunities to play</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get psychological support</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted access to medical services</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat more than before the Intifada</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat better than before the Intifada</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When analysing the two most important needs of children together according to the region in which the parents of those children reside, it is apparent that the need for children to attend school regularly and the need for children to have unrestricted access to medical services are important to a higher percentage of parents in the

West Bank (respectively 70% and 27%) than they are to parents in the Gaza Strip (respectively 60% and 19%) and Jerusalem (respectively 63% and 22%). The importance of the needs for children to have access to psychological support (34%) and to have safe opportunities to play (57%) are more marked in Jerusalem than in the West Bank (respectively 30% and 37%) and the Gaza Strip (respectively 32% and 48%). Finally, the results in figure 6.2, below, also clearly indicate that the need for children to eat better than before the Intifada is far more pressing in the Gaza Strip (34%) than it is in the West Bank (25%) and Jerusalem (10%).

When examining the first most important need of children separately, the results again indicate that the importance of children attending school regularly is highest in the West Bank (60%), while the importance attached to children eating better than before the Intifada is the highest in the Gaza Strip (11%). It is in Jerusalem that the perceived importance for children to have safe opportunities to play (22%) and to have access to psychological support (15%) is most prevalent.

**Figure 6.2: The two most important needs of the children in the household according to region of residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attend school regularly</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe opportunities to play</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get psychological support</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted access to medical services</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat more than before the Intifada</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat better than before the Intifada</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether one examines the two most important needs of children in the household according to area together, or whether one looks at the first most important need of children according to this variable separately, similar trends appear. As is apparent in figure 6.3 below, the need for children to have safe opportunities to play and to be able to receive psychological support are more of a concern to parents in refugee camps than to parents in cities and villages. Conversely, the need for children to attend school regularly, to have unrestricted access to medical services and to eat more than before the Intifada are less of a concern to households in refugee camps than to those in cities and villages.

Interestingly, and although not illustrated in the figure below, the varying levels of importance attached to the range of listed needs of children according to area correspond very well with the analysis of this question according to refugee status. As was the case for respondents residing in refugee camps, refugee respondents generally gave more importance than their non-refugee counterparts to children having safe opportunities to play and being able to receive psychological support. On the contrary, a higher percentage of non-refugees than refugees gave high importance to children being able to attend school regularly, to children having unrestricted access to medical services and to children eating more than before the Intifada.
Finally, a statistically significant relationship could also be established between the issue of the two most important needs of children in the household and the poverty level of the respondents, especially when one contrasts the responses of respondents with a monthly household income above the poverty line with those of respondents who live in hardship. Moreover, the trends apparent when comparing the opinions of the extremely poor and the relatively better-off on the importance of the needs of children totally match the comparison in opinions on this issue between respondents with a low level of education and those who possess high levels of education.

In any case, in regard to the two most important needs of children according to poverty level, respondents with a living standard above the poverty line systematically attach greater importance than those facing hardship to children having safe opportunities to play, being able to receive psychological support and having unrestricted access to medical services. On the contrary, and as illustrated in figure 6.4 below, the relatively better-off respondents are consistently less concerned than the extremely poor respondents about the need for their children to attend school regularly, and the need for their children both to eat better and more than before the Intifada.

Figure 6.4: The two most important needs of the children in the household according to poverty level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st most important need (n=1342)</th>
<th>2nd most important need (n=1305)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attend school regularly</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe opportunities to play</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get psychological support</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted access to medical services</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat more than before the Intifada</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat better than before the Intifada</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hardship cases

Figure 6.4: The two most important needs of the children in the household according to poverty level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st most important need (n=1342)</th>
<th>2nd most important need (n=1305)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attend school regularly</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe opportunities to play</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get psychological support</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted access to medical services</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat more than before the Intifada</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat better than before the Intifada</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below poverty line

Figure 6.4: The two most important needs of the children in the household according to poverty level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st most important need (n=1342)</th>
<th>2nd most important need (n=1305)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attend school regularly</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe opportunities to play</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get psychological support</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted access to medical services</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat more than before the Intifada</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat better than before the Intifada</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above poverty line
It is possible to tentatively conclude from the results on the two most important needs of children in the household that the extremely poor, those with low levels of education, non-refugees, non-camp residents and respondents residing in the Gaza Strip have a tendency to be more concerned about the immediate and daily needs of their children as they are more often unable to provide for those needs, while their counterparts have the luxury to be more concerned about more long-term - yet no less necessary - needs of their children, such as being able to receive psychological support.

6.2 Children and education

From the above analysis on the most important needs of children, the importance of education to Palestinians in the oPt has become patently clear, as the need for children to attend school consistently scored highest in importance across all sub-groups under study. In the current section, several aspects concerning children and their education will be discussed. However, before entering the analysis on this topic, it is important to first outline the actual educational attainment of the respondents in the poll that was conducted for this report.

As illustrated in figure 6.5 below, 10% of respondents said that they are illiterate, 16% stated that they only went to elementary school and 26% specified that they only went to preparatory school. Slightly fewer than 30% of respondents finished secondary school, while 7% attained some level of college education and 12% went to college or above. For the purposes of analysis in this study, the various levels of education were categorised into three categories: poor education (illiterate and elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary), and high education (some college, and college and above). When the various levels of educational attainment are grouped in such a manner, one can see that 26% of the total sample of interviewees are poorly educated, 55% are moderately educated and 19% are highly educated.

Although not illustrated in the figure below, there is a clear, statistically significant, relation between the educational attainment of respondents and their level of poverty. More specifically, whereas 15% of the respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line only enjoyed low levels of education, this is the case for 25% of the respondents with a household income below the poverty line, and 38% of those living in hardship. In contrast, whereas a mere 9% of the hardship cases and 13% of those below the poverty line are highly educated, this is the case for 34% of the respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line. These results point out the pivotal role that education can play in improving people's economic circumstances.

When respondents were asked what, in their opinion, the main impediment to children's education is, 40% replied that it was the present curriculum, 22% specified that it was the financial limitations on the household, while 19% said that it was the lack of qualified teachers. An additional 10% of respondents mainly blamed the lack of access to better facilities as an impediment to children's education, while 7% saw the quality of education as the main impediment.

As seen in figure 6.6 below, opinions on the main impediment to children's education vary considerably depending on the region and area of residence of the respondents and their refugee status. Indeed, systematically, a larger percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents and respondents of refugee origin consider the present curriculum to be the main impediment to children's education. Conversely, and again consistently, a
larger percentage of respondents outside the Gaza Strip, outside refugee camps and non-refugees blame, in the main, the financial limitations on the household as an impediment to children’s education.²

Figure 6.6: The main impediment to children’s education in general and according to region of residence, area of residence and refugee status

Opinions on the main impediment to children’s education also vary according to poverty level and educational level; a larger percentage of the extremely poor and poorly educated respondents than those who are, financially, relatively better-off and those with higher levels of education consider either the present curriculum or the household’s financial limitations to be the main impediment to children’s education. In addition, the very poor and badly educated believe that either the lack of qualified teachers or the lack of access to better facilities constitute the main impediment to children’s education. These results are detailed in figure 6.7, below.

Figure 6.7: The main impediment to children’s education according to poverty level and educational level

From the above analysis on the main impediments to children's education, it became clear that the new Palestinian curriculum that has been gradually introduced in the first 10 grades of basic schooling is seen by many as a problem. This reluctance to accept the curriculum is also obvious from the results in figure 6.8, below, as, in general, a majority (53%) of respondents are dissatisfied with the new Palestinian curriculum, while only 40% are satisfied with it and 7% do not know enough about it to be able to state an opinion. Consistent with the results on the main impediment to children’s education, those least satisfied with the new curriculum can be found in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.

² It may be argued that refugees and camp residents are less concerned than their counterparts about the financial limitations as an impediment to children’s education because they have the possibility of access to free educational services offered by UNRWA.
The belief that schools are unable to prepare children for higher education is expressed by 38% of the respondents. As illustrated in figure 6.10 below, 27% of respondents believe that schools do not sufficiently prepare children for higher education. The belief that schools are unable to prepare children for higher education is more prevalent among respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line (33%) than among respondents in households that fall below the poverty line (23%) or those living in hardship (26%).
While 42% of parents with children in government schools and 41% of parents with children in UNRWA schools in the oPt believe that the school their children attend does not sufficiently prepare their children to enter the labor market, this is the case for 37% of parents with children in private schools in the oPt.

Concerning the ability of schools in the oPt to prepare children for entry into the labour market, the picture appears more negative. As seen in figure 6.11, a mere 22% of the respondents believe that schools prepare children sufficiently for entry into the labour market, while 36% feel schools are only able to do so to a certain extent. The remaining 42% of respondents believe that schools do not sufficiently prepare children for entry into the labour market. While not detailed in the figure below, the results indicated that the conviction that schools are unable to prepare children sufficiently for labour-market entry is highest in the Gaza Strip (52%), in cities (45%) and among refugees (44%).

6.3 Children and their psychological well-being

In the section on the needs of children in the oPt, the analysis showed that a rather large percentage of respondents indicated that their children were in need of psychological support. In order to be able to create a more concrete picture of the reasons behind the importance attached by respondents to the need for children to be able to receive psychological support, respondent parents were asked to specify from a list of stress signs whether or not their children had displayed such signs since the beginning of the Intifada. As can be seen in figure 6.12, below, 62% of parents detected anxiety among their children, 48% reported bad school results and 38% noticed aggressive behaviour, while 28% said that their children no longer had an interest in cultural, social or sports activities. Furthermore, 27% of parents reported that their children had suffered from nightmares since the beginning of the Intifada, 21% related that their children wet their beds and 17% said that their children have no interest in socialising.

It is worth noting that when results on the main signs of stress in children were cross-tabulated according to the various independent variables at hand, no consistent trends across all the signs of stress could be detected in any of the sub-groups under examination. Still, it is perhaps worth mentioning that signs of stress among children since the beginning of the Intifada, such as anxiety, bad school results,
bedwetting and nightmares are consistently more prevalent among children who are members of extremely poor households.

Perhaps surprisingly, given the many manifestations of psychological distress among Palestinian children, a majority of 73% of parents still feel that they are fully able to meet the children's needs for care and protection. Still, this needs to be be qualified, as deeper analysis shows that parents in the Gaza Strip (68%) and parents in extremely poor households (64%) are less able to fully meet their children's needs. The results in figure 6.13, below, further show that a considerably higher percentage of parents who enjoy high levels of education (79%) are able to fully meet their children's needs for care and protection than parents with medium (71%) or low levels of education (73%).

Figure 6.13: Ability of parents to fully meet the children's needs for care and protection, in general and according to region of residence, poverty level and educational level

The main challenge to children's psychological well-being and the ability of parents to meet their children's needs seems to be related to the often violent atmosphere in which Palestinian children in the oPt grow up. When parents were asked whether they believe that there is violence against their children, the large majority of 84% replied that they do believe this is the case. As detailed in figure 6.14 below, the smallest percentage of parents feeling that there is violence against children can be found in the Gaza Strip (80%), among hardship cases (81%), and among the poorly educated (78%).

Figure 6.14: Violence against children in the oPt, in general and according to region of residence, poverty level and educational level

Given the high percentage of respondents feeling that there is violence against children in the oPt, it is very valuable to try and gauge the main source of violence against children in the year before the survey for this report was conducted. As is apparent in figure 6.15 below, a majority of 62% of the respondents consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be the main source of violence against the children, while, respectively, 11% of parents pointed the finger at the lack of internal security and 11% at children's friends and peers. About 10%
of the respondents locate the source of violence within the household, with 6% blaming the parents and 4% referring to other relatives. The remaining 6% of the sample believe teachers are the main source of violence against children.

When the data on the sources of violence against children are analysed according to the region of residence of the respondents and their poverty level, one notices that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is least specified as the main source of violence by Jerusalemites (52%) and respondents that are relatively better-off (55%). Respondents in the Gaza Strip most frequently blame both the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (65%) and the lack of internal security (13%) as the main sources of violence against children, while they least often blame teachers (4%) and friends or peers (8%).

Figure 6.15: The main source of violence against children in the past year, in general and according to region of residence and poverty level

![Figure 6.15: The main source of violence against children in the past year, in general and according to region of residence and poverty level](image)

Taking into consideration the large number of children who need psychological support in the oPt and the high level of perceived violence against children, it is important to find out which sources Palestinians rely upon to gather information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining to the well-being of children. Indeed, an answer to this question might help those who have valuable information on these subjects to channel this information through the most effective available channels.

Respondents were asked to specify the two most important sources that they rely upon to obtain information about the health and well-being of children. The detailed results are illustrated in figure 6.16 below. In general, it is clear that the five most relied upon channels of information on the subject in order of importance are: (1) local TV stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) satellite TV channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. Not many of the respondents seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions of their children on posters or pamphlets, health clinics or even on social or health workers.

Figure 6.16: The two most important sources of information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining to the well-being of children, in general

![Figure 6.16: The two most important sources of information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining to the well-being of children, in general](image)

When looking at the first most important source used to get information about the health and psychological well-being of children in more detail, local TV stations and friends or relatives are least relied upon in Jerusalem, among the relatively better-off and respondents with high levels of education. Conversely, respondents in
Jerusalem, the relatively better-off and the highly educated rely most frequently on local daily newspapers and on information received from social or health workers. Lastly, the lowest percentage of respondents who get information about the health and psychological well-being of their children from satellite channels can be found in the Gaza Strip, among the extremely poor and the poorly educated.

Figure 6.17: The first most important source of information about the health and psychological conditions pertaining to the well-being of children according to region of residence, poverty level and educational level

Figure 6.18: Free time of adolescents (aged 14-19), in general

6.4 Adolescents and their free time

This last section deals with the issue of how adolescents between the ages of 14 to 19 years old spend their free time. As laid out in figure 6.18 below, 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during their free time, 57% play in the neighbourhood, 33% pursue their hobbies and interests, 25% participate in sports activities, 21% attend remedial classes, 15% go to clubs, 11% attend political or cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk around in the streets.

When cross-tabulating the eight activities of adolescents between the ages of 14 to 19 under study with the independent variables at hand, some trends appear, but they are not consistent over all the activities. Still, the results show, for example, that a larger percentage of adolescents in extremely poor households than those in other Palestinian households hang out with friends in their free time, walk around the streets or attend remedial classes. Conversely, fewer of the extremely poor adolescents than their peers in households that are relatively better off go to clubs or participate in sports activities. Similarly, when analysing the results according to educational level, the lowest percentage of adolescents going to clubs, participating in sports activities, hanging out with friends, pursuing activities related to their hobbies or attending political and cultural seminars can be found in the households of respondents with low levels of education. These more in-depth results can be viewed on either of two websites: http://www.iued.unige.ch/palestine/ or http://www.dartmonitor.org.
6.5 Conclusion

When examining specific issues related to children, a number of interesting findings are worth remembering and are summarised bullets below:

- The need of children to attend school regularly is by far the top priority for the majority of the respondents, followed by the need for safe opportunities to play and the need of children to have the opportunity of receiving psychological support. Nevertheless, concerning this last need and in comparison with Palestinian Public Perceptions report VIII, the importance of the more immediate need for children to eat better than before the Intifada seems to have increased at the expense of the more long-term - but no less required - need for children to be able to receive psychological support.

- The new Palestinian curriculum is seen as the main impediment to children's education, followed by the financial limitations of the household. Deeper analysis across various sub-groups of Palestinian society revealed that the perception that the present curriculum is the main impediment to children's education is most explicit among respondents in the Gaza Strip, camp residents, refugees, the extremely poor and the badly educated.

- While a majority of Palestinians are dissatisfied with the new Palestinian curriculum, this dissatisfaction is most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees.

- A majority of 64% of Palestinians are satisfied with the quality of education in the oPt. The level of satisfaction is highest in the West Bank, in villages and among the poorly educated.

- Only 35% of the respondents believe that schools in the oPt prepare children sufficiently for higher education, and a mere 22% are of the opinion that schools prepare children sufficiently for entering the labour market.

- Children in the oPt have continued to show signs of stress since the beginning of the Intifada. Of a predetermined list, 62% of respondents detected anxiety among their children, 48% specifying bad school results, 38% aggressive behaviour, 28% a lack of interest in cultural or social or sports activities, 27% nightmares, 21% bedwetting and 17% a lack of interest in socialising.

- A majority of 73% of parents believe that they are fully able to meet their children's needs for care and protection. This is less the case for parents in the Gaza Strip, those in households living in hardship and those with low levels of education.

- A majority of 84% of respondents believe that there is violence against children in the oPt. This perception is least prevalent in the Gaza Strip, among hardship cases and the poorly educated. As for the main source of violence against children in the past year, a majority of 62% of respondents blame the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while 11% point the finger at the lack of internal security in the oPt.

- The five most important sources that Palestinians rely on to obtain information about the health and well-being of the children are, in order of importance: (1) local TV stations, (2) friends and relatives, (3) satellite channels, (4) local radio stations, and (5) local daily newspapers. Not many of the respondents seem to rely for information about the health and psychological conditions of their children on posters or pamphlets, or health clinics or even on social or health workers.

- The results of the poll conducted for this report indicate that adolescents (14-19 yrs) in the oPt spend their free time as follows, in order of importance: 73% of the adolescents hang out with friends during their free time, 57% play in the neighbourhood, 34% follow up with their hobbies and interests, 25% participate in sports activities, 21% attend remedial classes, 16% go to clubs, 11% attend political or cultural meetings, 10% work, while 10% walk around in the streets.
Needs & Priorities
Chapter 7: NEEDS AND PRIORITIES
Matthias Brunner – Nadia Boulifa – Céline Calvé

Introduction

This chapter is an overview of the needs of the Palestinian people at both the household and the community level. It will also focus on population needs in regard to infrastructure and the facilities available to Palestinians.

Main findings:

1. Evaluation of the Palestinian household needs
   - 53% of Palestinians households were in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, an increase of 7% since Nov. 2004.
   - 57% of refugees are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of non-refugees reported such a need.
   - 76% of Palestinians living in hardship are in need of a lot of assistance.
   - 55% of respondents from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip are in need of a lot assistance.
   - The neediest areas are refugee camps (61% of camp dwellers are in need of a lot of assistance), while half of the population of cities and villages are also in need of a lot of assistance.
   - In comparison with the previous survey, the need for a lot of assistance has grown, particularly outside refugee camps for both the West Bank (an increase of 9%) and the Gaza Strip (an increase of 5%), while the need remains fairly stable in the refugee camps.

2. The most important household need
   - Food remains, in July 2005, the major need of Palestinian households, followed by the need for health care, education and employment.
   - Interestingly, the needs for housing and re-housing has emerged as a significant need for households in the past six months.
   - The most important need for West Bankers is health care, while, for Gaza Strip inhabitants, it is employment.
   - In terms of the respondents’ status, refugees consider housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health care and food (both 17%); as the major need for households. Non-refugees consider food and health care (both 21%) as their top priority.
   - Employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet needs of households. It leads as the most important unmet need for Gaza Strip respondents, while West Bankers consider financial assistance as their most important unmet need.

3. Most important community need
   - A significantly high percentage of Palestinians interviewed (44%) think that the most needed assistance is in the field of employment. The need for housing has sharply increased (by 12%), as well as the need for education in the community, followed by health care needs, cited by 13% of respondents.

4. Most important infrastructures needed
   - Water supply networks are considered as the most important infrastructural facility needed, cited by 52% of respondents.
   - The majority of respondents consider that the fixed phone line is the most important communication facility.

5. Availability of services
   - In general, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network (97%) and to a water network (91%). 57% of households benefit from a connection to a sewage disposal network, while 64% are connected to a solid-waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication services, more than half of the population is connected to a fixed phone network (58%), while 75% are connected to a mobile phone network. 95% have a TV set and 75% have access to satellite TV.
7.1 The need for assistance

Before examining in detail the most important needs of the households, interviewees were asked to evaluate whether or not their household was in need of more assistance.

Figure 7.1: Assistance needed or not enough, July 2005.

As clearly indicated in the figure above, 53% of Palestinians households were in need of much more assistance in July 2005. This percentage has increased by 7% in the past six months. Obviously, this evolution is not due to the decrease in the level of assistance delivered, as the majority of Palestinians (51%) state that the assistance did not change much in the past six months. Also, only 1% of people interviewed answered that they have received enough assistance, while 17% said they do not need assistance at all. If we consider that the overall level of assistance in 2004-2005 was quite significant in the oPt, the fact that households’ needs are not completely fulfilled is of great concern.

More concretely, through an analysis of the main explanatory variable, it is possible to draw a profile of the neediest Palestinian households. When examining refugee status, we find a high level of refugee respondents who are in need of assistance: 57% of them are in need of a lot of assistance, while 48% of the non-refugees reported such a need.

Figure 7.2: Assistance needed or not enough according to the level of poverty, November 2004-July 2005.

1 The question regarding the changes in assistance to the household budget was: “During the past 6 months did the importance of assistance increase or decrease in your household budget?” 51% stated that the assistance did not change much, 28% that six months ago assistance was less important and 21% that it had increased.
As observed in the figure above, Palestinians living in hardship comprise the neediest households, with 76% claiming to be in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005, while 35% of households above the poverty line do not need assistance. Since November 2004, the need for a lot of assistance has decreased amongst the hardship cases by 12%, but it increased for those living below the poverty line (10%) as well as for those above the poverty line (5%). Lastly the results also indicate that 31% of households above the poverty line are in need of a little assistance, which seems logical if we consider that the majority of Palestinian households have been affected by the second Intifada.

**Figure 7.3: Assistance needed according to region of residence, July 2005.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance Needed</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes a lot - July 2005</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes a lot - November 2004</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes a little - July 2005</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes a little - November 2004</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure - July 2005</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure - November 2004</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive enough - July 2005</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive enough - November 2004</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not need assistance - July 2005</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not need assistance - November 2004</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a geographical perspective, if we consider the region of residence of the respondents, the results are similar for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 55% of respondents need a lot of assistance both in West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 24% answered that they needed a little assistance. Also, it is noticeable in the figure above that 35% of Palestinians in Jerusalem need a little assistance. These trends clearly indicate a worsening of the humanitarian situation in the oPt, on the eve of the fifth year of the second Intifada and despite the massive mobilisation of the international community in the humanitarian field.

Those results are not surprising with regard to the overall poverty situation in the oPt. They confirm the growing dependency of the Palestinian population on assistance. Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, there is no doubt that the Palestinians households have suffered a deep decline in their well-being. Obviously, on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, all the results of the current poll show a worsening in living conditions in the oPt. This deterioration explains, to a large extent, the high percentage of respondents who are in need of assistance. In comparison with the previous poll, the need for a lot of assistance has increased in the West Bank by 8%. Also, the percentage for the Gaza Strip remains fairly stable, with a slight increase of 3% since November 2004.

To conclude the mapping of the population in need, the independent variables - area of residence and place of residence - provide more accurate details about the geographical distribution of the neediest Palestinians within the oPt.

Through an examination of the results according to area of residence, it becomes apparent that, as in November 2004, the neediest areas are the refugees camps, where 61% of the camp dwellers are in need of a lot of assistance. When monitoring the results obtained for the cities and the villages, the structure of the needs has clearly changed since November 2004: half the population of cities and villages is in need of a lot of assistance. These results show an increase by 6% in the cities and 10% in the villages in the number of Palestinians who need a lot of assistance. In parallel, the percentage of respondents who declared that they received enough assistance has decreased for each area in the past six months.

---

2 The exact rates are 55.3% for the West Bank and 54.70% for the Gaza Strip.
In looking at the need for Palestinian households, we can first examine the two most important needs together, and then analyse in detail what is the most important need. Respondents were asked to state the two most important needs, and then analyse in detail what is the most important need.

In addition, the results by place of residence indicate that the neediest Palestinians are more concentrated in the West Bank and specifically in the refugee camps: 64% of refugee camps inhabitants are in need of a lot of assistance, while only 5% consider that they don't need any assistance. As the Gaza Strip has faced a worsening humanitarian crisis since the beginning of the second Intifada, 63% and 18% of refugee camps inhabitants are respectively in need of a lot of assistance and a little assistance. Lastly, the breakdown by place of residence confirms the results mentioned previously: the need for a lot of assistance has increased outside refugee camps in both the West Bank (9%) and the Gaza Strip (5%), while the need remains fairly similar in the refugee camps. (Figure 7.5, above)

### 7.2 Households needs

Respondents were asked to state the two most important needs for their household. Through their answers, we can first examine the two most important needs together, and then analyse in detail what is the most important need for Palestinian households.

In looking at the first and second most important need, we can come to a balanced view of what is considered by Palestinians as the most important need for their households. (Figure 7.6, next page)
The distribution of household priorities for assistance was more balanced in July 2005 in comparison with our previous survey. The need for food was measured at 19% in July 2005, and 10% of the population stressed that, in the past six months, their household’s food consumption was much less than needed. Also, the need for employment is still one of the main concerns for 19% of the Palestinian population, as half of the household breadwinners were long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than a year) in July 2005.

However the context of the poll carried out in July 2005 explains, to a certain extent, the considerable increase in the need for housing from 3% of respondents in November 2004 to 17% in July 2005. Damage to and destruction of property and infrastructure resulting from Israeli military operations have been a primary...
humanitarian concern. Since 2000, over 24,000 Palestinians living in Gaza have been made homeless by Israeli house demolitions.\(^3\) In the first 9 months of 2004, Rafah in southern Gaza, was badly affected (demolitions were running at an average of 77 per month).\(^4\) But the Israeli army has recently ended this strategy and no house demolitions were recorded during the first six months of 2005.

In the meantime, over 12,000 houses have been either demolished or damaged in the West Bank since 2000.\(^5\) Destruction is particularly visible in the West Bank, where since 2002, hectares of land have been cleared for the Separation Wall construction in the East Jerusalem.\(^6\) The proposed extension of the Wall from East Jerusalem to form a circle around the settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim would have similar effects. 2004 saw a near tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished in East Jerusalem; at least 152 buildings (most of them residential) were demolished, a sharp increase over previous years (66 in 2003, 36 in 2002, 32 in 2001 and 9 in 2000).\(^7\) These demolitions might explain, to a certain extent, the increase in the need for housing.

On the other hand, as mentioned in the chapter on refugees, this attitude toward housing may be directly or indirectly due to the improvements in access to services that have resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure policy imposed by Israeli authorities in the oPt.\(^8\)

This analysis is illustrated in the following figure, where 29% of Jerusalemites cite housing and re-housing as their first most important need in the households.

### Figure 7.8: Household assistance: 1st most important need according to the region of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assistance</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and re-housing</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Needs vary according to region of residence. For West Bank respondents, the most important need is health care (23%), whereas it is employment for the inhabitants of Gaza respondents. The need for employment is not surprising in the Gaza Strip, considering the high level of unemployment in this region (38% of the respondents), a situation that may be explained by the collapse of the Palestinian economy as a consequence of the Israeli military strategy.

---

\(^5\) Idem.
\(^6\) OCHA, West Bank Barrier reports, [http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt).
\(^7\) According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 52 buildings (including a seven-storey building and eight petrol stations) have been demolished in East Jerusalem in the first six months of 2005. EU Report on East Jerusalem, [Jerusalem and Ramallah Heads of EU Mission](http://www.icadh.org), November 2005. Israeli Committee against House Demolitions [www.icadh.org](http://www.icadh.org).
\(^8\) See the chapter in this report on refugees.
When we analyse the results according to the area of residence, most city inhabitants consider that the most needed assistance for their households is in housing and re-housing (22%) ahead of food (20%) and employment (18%). In the meanwhile, the most needed assistance for Palestinian from refugee camps is food (20%) and employment (19%). Again, this makes sense as the unemployment rate is higher in the camps (see chapter 2 of this report). (Figure 7.9, above)

Lastly, the village-dwellers consider health care as their most important need (27%), understandable considering that they are likely to face difficulties gaining access to health services. The health sector has responded to closure and fragmentation by increasing the number of small clinics and mobile clinics. This has resulted in a decline in the quality of service because clinics can provide only primary health care and are not able to handle emergency cases.  


For refugees, housing (21%), ahead of employment (20%), health care and food (both 17%), is considered as the major need for household, while non-refugees consider food and health care (both 21%) as their top priorities.

When examining the first most important need according to the level of poverty, for the hardship cases as well as for those living below the poverty line, the most needed assistance remains employment and food, while for those living above the poverty line, the most needed assistance is health care (for 25% of the respondents) and then housing (for 21%). (Figure 7.10, above)
These household priorities seem logical. People living above the poverty line need much less food assistance than hardship cases. As such, their needs are much more oriented towards health care or housing.

Lastly, when considering the first most important need separately, the importance placed on health care and education (22%), as well on housing (20%) is highest among respondents with a high level of education. On the other hand, the importance assigned to households’ needs for food (24%) and employment (20%) reach substantial rates for the least-educated respondents.

### 7.3 Household unmet needs

**Figure 7.13: Most important unmet needs, November 2004-July 2005.**
In line with the previous report, employment remains, in July 2005, the most important unmet need of households for 29% of respondents, a decrease of 3% in comparison with the results of the poll in November 2004. Financial assistance is considered by 25% of respondents as their highest unmet need, while the importance of housing and health care needs has increased since November 2004.

**Figure 7.14: Most important unmet needs according to region of residence**

- **Employment**: 34% (West Bank), 26% (Jerusalem), 21% (Gaza Strip)
- **Food**: 16% (West Bank), 17% (Jerusalem), 9% (Gaza Strip)
- **Health care**: 11% (West Bank), 16% (Jerusalem), 11% (Gaza Strip)
- **Financial assistance**: 29% (West Bank), 19% (Jerusalem), 23% (Gaza Strip)
- **Housing and re-housing**: 18% (West Bank), 14% (Jerusalem), 7% (Gaza Strip)
- **Education**: 11% (West Bank), 9% (Jerusalem), 9% (Gaza Strip)

**Figure 7.15: Most important unmet needs according to the level of poverty**

- **Employment**: 36% (Hardship cases), 28% (Jerusalem), 20% (Gaza Strip)
- **Food**: 12% (Hardship cases), 15% (Jerusalem), 15% (Gaza Strip)
- **Health care**: 8% (Hardship cases), 11% (Jerusalem), 16% (Gaza Strip)
- **Financial assistance**: 29% (Hardship cases), 27% (Jerusalem), 19% (Gaza Strip)
- **Housing and re-housing**: 9% (Hardship cases), 9% (Jerusalem), 17% (Gaza Strip)
- **Education**: 7% (Hardship cases), 9% (Jerusalem), 14% (Gaza Strip)

While employment (34%) was the most important unmet need for Gaza strip respondents, financial assistance (29%) came first for West Bank respondents. (Figure 7.14, above) Also, Employment was the most unmet concern to hardship cases (36%), and for refugee households (29%) than for non-refugees (28%). (Figure 7.15, above)

### 7.4 Community needs

The analysis of the most important needs for the community will use two perspectives: the first one will examine the results obtained by adding the two most important needs of the community and then we will focus on the results for the first most unmet need.

---

10 Regarding the decrease in the level of employment assistance received from November 2004 to July 2005, we could have expected a corresponding increase in the need for employment. Employment remains the most important unmet need but to a lesser extent due to the significant increase in other needs such as education and housing.
When looking at the two most important community needs together, the importance of employment is critical and remained the most important in the past six months.

Furthermore, the need for education has dramatically increased from 10% to 35%, in the past six months, while the need for food and financial assistance have decreased, by 21% and 9% respectively, since November 2004.

When looking at the two most important community needs together, we can observe (as in the analyses of household needs) that the need for housing has sharply increased by 12% since November 2004, along with the need for education in the community, followed in third position by the need for health care cited by 13% of the respondents, an increase of 6% in the past six months.

Also noteworthy is the decrease in the importance of employment, food and financial assistance as community needs in the past six months. These results follow the general trend seen in the perception of assistance needs for both household and community.

When considering the foremost needs separately, a significant number of interviewees (44%) mention employment as their most important need where assistance is required. Six months ago, employment was already the central priority for 59% of respondents. (Figure 7.18, below)
If we consider the most important assistance need of the community according to area of residence, the result cited above is confirmed: employment is the most important need for communities in cities (39%), refugee camps (48%) and villages (49%). Nevertheless, it is still much higher in the camps and villages. The need for housing and re-housing seems to be quite important for communities, especially in the cities (17%), while in the villages only 6% of the people mentioned this need. (Figure 7.20, below)
While only 20% of people in Jerusalem mentioned employment as the most important assistance need for their community, it was most important in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (46% in both regions). If we consider that since the beginning of the Intifada, more Palestinian have lost their job or source of income in these two regions compared to Jerusalem, this result make sense. On the contrary, people living in Jerusalem are more concerned with housing needs (30%) than employment.

**Figure 7.21: Most important needs of the community according to level of poverty**

Employment is the most important need for assistance for the hardship cases (49%) and people living below the poverty line (46%). For those living above the poverty line, employment is still the first priority, but they also give importance to the housing needs. It is clear that the higher living conditions are, the less people see employment as the top priority.

### 7.5 Most important infrastructure needed

**Figure 7.22: Most important infrastructure assistance needed, November 2004-July 2005.**

As was the case in the previous survey, water supply is considered as the most important infrastructural facility need for 52% of the population, an increase of 8% since November 2004. When looking at the results of the previous poll, the importance of solid waste disposal services has decreased by 9%.
When examining the breakdown by region of residence, it is apparent that a higher percentage of respondents from Jerusalem considered the most important infrastructural improvement needed was the water network. The need for sewage disposal network facilities is considered by 33% of West Bankers as their most important need.

When considering the more specific needs in the community for communication facilities, interviewees were asked to state the most important facility needed for the community from a predetermined list of facilities (fixed phone line, mobile phone network and permanent connection to the Internet).

According to the statement of the World Summit on the Information Society, “information technology and telecommunications play a significant role in the development of society and the increase in the level of education, knowledge and economy. They also improve the global standard of living and contribute to inter-society integration.”

Obviously, in the context of the second Intifada and the protracted conflict with Israel, communication facilities play a key role for the Palestinian population. Within the oPt, divided into isolated cantons by the erection of military checkpoints and the ongoing construction of the Separation Wall since 2003, the availability of communication services is clearly of crucial significance.

The figure below indicates the most important communication facilities perceived to be needed in the community in July 2005, in comparison with the answers provided six months earlier.

Even if a new and modern infrastructure for the telecommunications and information technology sector has been provided in the past two years, the trend outlined in our previous survey is confirmed by the current poll: 62% of respondents considered that the fixed phone line is the most needed communication facility, 17% were of the view that it was a permanent connection to the Internet (3% less than in the previous poll). 17% of Palestinians interviewed considered the mobile phone network (+4%) to be the most important communication

---

12 Idem, p.5.
facility needed.\textsuperscript{13} Lastly, only 4\% saw satellite as the most important communication facility needed.

\textbf{Figure 7.25: The most important communication facility needed in the community according to region of residence.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.25.png}
\caption{The most important communication facility needed in the community according to region of residence.}
\end{figure}

From a geographical perspective, the figure above shows that the perception of the fixed phone line as the most important communication facilities was held by 69\% of residents of the Gaza Strip. This percentage has increased by 10\% over the past six months. In our last survey, a high percentage of the people of Jerusalem considered that the fixed telephone was their main priority, this percentage has decreased by 23\% in the current survey.

\textbf{Figure 7.26: The most important communication facility needed in the community according to area of residence}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.26.png}
\caption{The most important communication facility needed in the community according to area of residence.}
\end{figure}

As clearly indicated in the figure above, 65\% of refugee camp inhabitants, followed by 63\% of city dwellers were of the opinion that a fixed phone line network is the most important communication facility for their community. A permanent connection to the Internet is considered by 25\% of village inhabitants as the most important communication facility needed.

The Israeli occupation imposes obstacles to the development of Palestinian communication facilities by preventing the importation of equipment needed to develop communications networks, as well as preventing the connection of the oPt to international networks.\textsuperscript{14}

\section{7.6 Availability of services.}

One of the most problematic concerns encountered in the oPt is the poor state of basic physical infrastructures, resulting from decades of minimal investment as well as recurring destruction by the Israeli army. As a consequence, physical infrastructure in the Palestinian territory is underdeveloped.

In general, as observed below, the majority of the Palestinian population is connected to an electricity network (97\%) and to a water network (91\%). 57\% of households benefit from a connection to a sewage disposal network, while 64\% are connected to a solid waste disposal facility. When examining the availability of communication services, more than half the population is connected to a fixed phone network (58\%), while 75\% are connected to a mobile phone network. 95\% have a TV set and 75\% have a satellite TV.

\begin{itemize}
\item[13] JAWAL is the first Palestinian mobile phone company. The number of its subscribers rose from 80,000 to 120,000 in 2001 and has reached 265,000 (most of them use pre-paid cards). Since the outbreak of the Intifada, JAWAL has been unable to expand and develop its network as it had planned, due to Israeli measures. The Israeli government, which controls all Palestinian borders, has hindered JAWAL from operating at maximum efficiency, by banning entirely, or delaying for months, imports of technical equipment and other essential items. These measures came as a strong reaction by the Israeli government after JAWAL broke the Israeli monopoly of the Palestinian telecom markets and its capture of some 60\% of the local market. (PALTEL, Palestinian Telecommunications Company, \url{http://www.padico.com/paenet.htm}).
\end{itemize}
91% of respondents are connected to a water network. Even if this percentage is substantial, it does not provide information about the quantity, the quality (drinking water or not) of the water and especially about the conditions in which water is consumed (e.g. restrictions on consumption, etc.).

Indeed, as reported by UNCTAD, the oPt faces serious water-supply problems (shortages and deterioration in quality because of the depletion of the aquifers and the subsequent seepage of sea water).

The rate of connection is much lower in villages than in other areas: 74% of the village dwellers are connected to a water network compared to 97% in cities and 99% in refugee camps. The connection to water networks is somewhat less substantial in the West Bank, especially in the north, where 79% of households are connected, and outside the refugee camps, where 85% of households are connected.

In general, 37% of interviewees are connected to a well; a large percentage of households in the West Bank make use of a well (54%), as do 64% of camp-dwellers (64%) and 49% of non-refugees.

In general, 97% of people interviewed affirmed that they are connected to an electricity network. If we look at these results according to area of residence, they are more or less the same. Again, cities (99%) and camps (99%) are privileged compared to villages (94%). The same percentage of households in Jerusalem (99%) and the Gaza Strip (99%) are connected to an electricity network, while the percentage reaches 96% in the West Bank. According to UNCTAD, “lacking generative capacity of its own, the Palestinian Authority (PA) relies on Israel for obtaining electricity. As a consequence, 140 villages use small diesel generators.”

Sewage disposal is a major issue in the oPt. Only 57% of people interviewed said they were connected to a sewage disposal network a number that has decreased by 8% in the past six months. A higher percentage of refugees (69%) are connected to a sewage disposal network than non-refugees (47%). The problem seems to be even more acute in the villages, where 82% of respondents are not connected to such an infrastructure. In parallel, only 43% of West Bankers are connected, the situation in the north being the worst, as only 38% of the respondents are connected to a sewage disposal system. However, in the Gaza Strip, which is known for its difficult living conditions, 69% are connected to a sewage network.

As with sewage disposal networks, the provision of solid waste disposal services is quite precarious in the oPt, with 36% of the population not benefiting from any solid waste disposal service. The worst situation is in the villages, where only 52% of respondents are connected, and in the Gaza Strip, where only 56% are connected.

16 Idem.
Figure 7.31: Household connection to a sewage disposal network according to area of residence, place of residence, regional situation, refugee status and level of poverty.

City
- Refugee camps: 18%
- Villages: 77%

West Bank
- Jerusalem: 43%
- Gaza Strip: 69%

West Bank North
- West Bank Middle: 38%
- West Bank South: 74%

Gaza Strip
- Refugees: 69%
- Non-Refugees: 47%

Hardship cases
- Below poverty line: 56%
- Above poverty line: 66%

Figure 7.32: Household connection to solid waste disposal services according to area of residence and region of residence.

City: 68%
Refugee Camps: 69%
Villages: 52%

West Bank: 67%
Jerusalem: 76%
Gaza Strip: 56%

Figure 7.33: Household connection to a mobile phone network according to area of residence, region of residence and poverty level.

City: 78%
Villages: 67%
Camps: 76%

West Bank
- Jerusalem: 75%
- Gaza Strip: 75%

Hardship cases
- Below poverty line: 66%
- Above poverty line: 83%
Connections to mobile phone networks in Palestine have reached very high levels, regardless of the level of poverty. 75% of the population is connected to such a service, an increase of 20% since November 2004. Having a mobile phone in the Territories can be considered as a matter of security as it allows the population to stay connected to their relatives easily in a context of uncertainty.

Figure 7.34: Household connection to the Internet according to level of education, region of residence, area of residence and level of poverty.

15% of Palestinians interviewed had a permanent connection to the Internet. Such a service is most widely available in Jerusalem (34%) and in the cities (19%). It seems that respondents with a high level of education and those whose household is better-off represent the segment of society that most frequently enjoys the availability of a permanent connection to the Internet. According to UN sources, only 145,000 people were connected in 2003, which represents 3.8% of the whole Palestinian population, while the current figure of 15% represents 646'000 people.17

Figure 7.35: Household connection to satellite TV according to area of residence, region of residence, poverty level and level of education.

Overall, 75% of respondents are connected to satellite TV. This service is more widely available in Jerusalem (94%) than elsewhere. Again satellite TV is most generally available among the more highly educated elements of the population (84%) as well as better-off households.

17 [www.unstats.un.org](http://www.unstats.un.org)
7.7 Conclusion

- Half of the Palestinian population is in need of a lot of assistance in July 2005. This result confirms the growing dependency of the Palestinian population on assistance. Palestinians living in hardship are the households most in need, and the mapping of the population in need indicates that the need for a lot of assistance has increased by 8% in the West Bank, and dependence on assistance of respondents residing outside the camps has sharply increased as well.

This finding is of great concern considering that, in the same period, the general level of assistance delivered to the population has sharply decreased in the past six months (see chapter on assistance).

- In July 2005, employment remains the most frequently cited household need but to a lesser extent than reported in our previous survey. As was underlined in our previous report, employment is the most important unmet need, whilst financial assistance is the second most important unmet need.

- Changes occurred in the levels of priority in assistance needed by households. The distribution of household priorities is more evenly balanced amongst a range of needs in July 2005 in comparison with our previous survey.

- Housing and rehousing needs for households have sharply increased, particularly in the Jerusalem area, which can be explained, to some extent, by the demolitions and the damages caused to property in East Jerusalem as a consequence of the proposed extension of the Separation Wall to form a circle around the Ma’aleh Adumin settlement. 2004 saw a near-tripling of the number of Palestinian buildings demolished in East Jerusalem and its environs.
8 Assistance in General
Chapter 8: ASSISTANCE IN GENERAL
Matthias Brunner – Céline Calvé

Introduction

Despite changes in the political situation in the first half of 2005, the lack of real change in the humanitarian situation in the oPt in the last six months has led assistance providers to continue their work in strategic areas as food security, emergency infrastructure and employment. Budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority and the strengthening of local capacities remain, as well, two main concerns. Over the past two years, there has been a slight shift towards development assistance, although the humanitarian focus remains dominant. The most crucial challenge now is to build a stronger link between emergency assistance and the development of the oPt,

This chapter explores the different facets of assistance (types of assistance, source and value of assistance, etc.) delivered to the Palestinian people. The first section will examine aspects of assistance delivered (nature, value, origin and the level of satisfaction of respondents). The second part will focus on the two most significant types of assistance: employment and food.

Main findings

In general

- The level of assistance delivered has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In July 2005, 38% of respondents received assistance in the six-month period prior to the July 2005 poll.
- The decrease in assistance received is particularly acute for the West Bank (a decline of 8% since November 2004) and the level of assistance is the lowest outside the West Bank camps. On the other hand, levels of assistance remain high in the Gaza Strip (56%), especially in the refugee camps (72%).
- During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has focused on the poorest segment of the population. The level of assistance delivered to non-refugees has decreased.
- About one-third of the respondents have received food assistance (31%), followed by financial aid (8%), while 4% have benefited from employment assistance.
- There is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined: 300 NIS in July 2005 as against 400 NIS in November 2004.
- The main providers of food assistance remain UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed by the PA (10%) and, thirdly, international organisations (3%).
- In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the level of satisfaction has improved in July 2005.

Employment

- Roughly 150,000 households received employment assistance in July 2005.
- Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12%, while the percentage of respondents whose households have benefited from such assistance has decreased by 19%.
- Since November 2004, for both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in short-term jobs. In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the respondents as the most important provider of personal employment assistance. UNRWA remains an important source, cited by a quarter of the interviewees. In general, a majority of beneficiaries of employment assistance (66%) evaluated it positively.

The issue of food and its delivery

- The proportion of Palestinians whose food consumption was not sufficient is quite high, as 19% of respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10% consumed much less food than needed.
- West Bankers consumed 19% less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. In the Gaza Strip, it is clear that households cannot afford to meet their basic needs in food. It appears that households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly more difficulty in being able to afford their food needs.
- In July 2005, 78% of respondents cited basic commodities as their most-needed food items. Meat and poultry stand together as the second most important food item.
- Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July 2005 than they did in November 2004, the
In July 2005, 50% of respondents stated that they have reduced the quantity of food in the past six months, while almost half of the respondents have bought less-preferred food in the same period of time.

33% of respondents have received food assistance in the past six months. UNRWA was cited by 25% of respondents as their main provider of food aid. 45% of interviewees have received food assistance twice in the six-month period up to July 2005.

### 8.1 Assistance in general

In the first six months of 2005, the situation in the oPt has not really changed, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance has continued. In this section, we will concentrate on the actual distribution of assistance. We will examine its delivery, value, the nature of such assistance and the level of satisfaction with its provision.

#### 8.1.1 The assistance delivered

8.1.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001.

The Palestinians interviewed were asked whether or not they or a member of the household members received any type of assistance since the beginning of the Intifada and whether or not they or any of the household members received any type of assistance in the past six months.

In July 2005, 38% of respondents stated that their household had received assistance in the past six months. As indicated in the figure below, this proportion has decreased by 8% since November 2004. In addition, since the beginning of the second Intifada, 49% of Palestinians have received assistance, constituting a decrease of 5% since the November 2004 survey.¹

![Figure 8.1: Level of assistance received in the past six months (assistance such as food, medicine, job, money, education etc.) and evolution since the beginning of the second Intifada.](image)

8.1.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery.

If we consider the breakdown according to region of residence, the results shows that the highest percentage of respondents who reported receiving assistance in the past six months are those living in the Gaza Strip (56%), followed by the West Bank (33%) and Jerusalem (6%).

¹ The proportion of Palestinians who received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada indicates the general trend of assistance delivered to the population in the past 5 years. This proportion was 50% in Feb 2004; 55% in Nov 2004; and 49% in July 2005, indicating that, in spite of the decrease of 5%, roughly half of the Palestinian population have benefited from assistance since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
The percentage of households that have received assistance in the Gaza Strip has decreased by 5% in comparison with our previous survey, while the percentage of those in the West Bank has decreased by 8%. The substantial diminution of assistance received by those in Jerusalem is clearly due to the sampling procedure used by the polling institute (PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) contracted for the ninth poll.

**Figure 8.2: Received assistance in the past six months according to the region of residence.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank - Nov. 2004</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank - July 2005</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem - Nov. 2004</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem - July 2005</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip - Nov. 2004</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip - July 2005</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When examining results by place of residence, we can see that the percentage of households that have received assistance in the past six months is lower than the percentage of households that have received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada. The results also indicate that the assistance received in the past six months is in general more important inside the refugee camps in the West Bank (67%), but particularly in the Gaza Strip (69%). On the other hand, the level of assistance is lowest outside the West Bank camps (29%).

**Figure 8.3: Assistance received in the past six months and since the beginning of the second Intifada according to place of residence, July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Assistance in Past Six Months</th>
<th>Assistance Since Beginning of Intifada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank outside camps</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank refugee camps</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip outside camps</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip refugee camps</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the breakdown by area of residence, the level of assistance delivered in villages (35%) remains close to the level of November 2004. The assistance delivered in the cities (31%) has decreased by 14%, while it has increased slightly in the refugee camps by 2% (67%). The percentage of respondents living in refugee camps and who have received assistance in the past six months is the lowest since November 2001.

---

2 See section of report on methodologies.
8.1.1.3 Targeting the poor and the refugees

During the period under scrutiny, the provision of assistance has been concentrated on the poorest segment of the Palestinian population. Households living in hardship have received the most assistance (51%), followed by Palestinians below the poverty line (41%) and people above poverty line (19%). Again, when monitoring those results with the previous poll, it appears that the earlier general finding of a decrease in assistance delivered is confirmed, as the percentages of households that received assistance have decreased in the past six months, regardless of the level of poverty.

As, on average, refugees are poorer than non-refugee Palestinians, a higher percentage of refugees (59%) have received assistance in the past six months compared to 19% of non-refugees. These results confirm the overall trend observed since the outbreak of the second Intifada: Palestinian refugees receive more assistance than non-refugees. Since November 2004, it appears that the assistance provided to non-refugees has sharply declined by 17%.

Further data analysis of assistance delivered in the past six months to refugees and non-refugees according to their level of poverty reveals that non-refugees living in hardship are much less catered for than extremely poor refugees. 74% of refugee hardship cases have received assistance since November 2004, but only one-quarter of the extremely poor non-refugees have reported that their household has received such assistance. The figure below indicates that, in general, the level of assistance delivered to non-refugees decreased. More specifically, the percentage of non-refugee hardship cases who have received assistance has halved since the November 2004 survey. Also, a quite high percentage of the relatively better-off segments of the population have benefited
from assistance; as was already the case in November 2004, this was particularly true for refugees above the poverty line (38%). This finding is related to assistance in general (e.g. food, medicine, job, money, education, etc), and does not solely refer to emergency assistance. As a consequence, it suggests a widespread poverty amongst refugees.

Figure 8.7: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months according to refugee status and poverty level, November 2004–July 2005

When examining the percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance according to their place of residence, the analysis reveals that the delivery of assistance to refugees in camps has slightly increased. This result is not surprising, considering the earlier findings that the level of assistance has increased by 2% in refugee camps, but it is clear that a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees benefit from this increase. For the population residing outside the refugee camps, the gap in assistance delivery between the refugees and the non-refugees is much more pronounced in the Gaza Strip (47% versus 34% in November 2004) than in the West Bank (25% versus 9% in our last survey). The delivery of assistance to non-refugees has decreased considerably outside the refugees camps both in the Gaza Strip (-16%) and in the West Bank (-10%).

Figure 8.8: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months according to place of residence, November 2004–July 2005

8.1.2 Nature of the assistance delivered

After having analysed the distribution of assistance, its evolution since the beginning of the Intifada and since November 2004, this section deals with the nature of the assistance delivered.

8.1.2.1 Assistance delivered in general
Respondents were asked to state the most important type of assistance that they or their family received in the past six months. When adding the two main types of assistance received in July 2005, about one-third of respondents received food assistance (31%), ahead of financial aid (8%), while 4% have benefited from
employment assistance. These results remain the same when compared with those of the poll conducted in November 2004.

The adjacent graph presents the percentages of aid delivered by type of assistance. The results confirm the general trend of a decrease in assistance delivered in the past six months; the levels of food aid, financial aid as well as employment assistance have decreased, although employment assistance has gained importance since 2001.

Food assistance is currently benefiting roughly 1.2 million people in Palestinian households. Given the importance of such a means of aid, we need to look more closely at it in the third part of this analysis. Medical assistance is mentioned by 1% of respondents (the medical services are not cited at all as a type of assistance provided in villages and outside refugee camps). This percentage has decreased by almost 2% since November 2004. Coupons assistance is not used anymore. As a consequence, only the percentage of the total population who received financial and employment assistance will be analysed further.

### 8.1.2.2 Financial assistance received

8% of respondents have received financial assistance in the past six months, that is to say 300,000 Palestinians households within the oPt. Financial assistance is considered by 25% of the respondents as their most important unmet need.

When considering the breakdown by refugee status, the highest percentage of respondents receiving financial assistance are refugees (11% versus 6% of non-refugees). In addition, financial assistance was delivered to a higher percentage in the Gaza Strip (14%), in refugee camps (12%) and more particularly in the Gaza Strip refugee camps (15%). Lastly, 12% of hardship cases have received such assistance in the past six months.

#### Figure 8.10: Received financial assistance according to refugee status, region of residence, area of residence and poverty level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee status</th>
<th>11%</th>
<th>6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 See Part II: Employment assistance.
8.1.3 Value of assistance delivered

After analysing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is important to consider the median value of various assistance types and their evolution over time. We will examine in detail the value of each type of assistance provided to the Palestinian population during the period under scrutiny. It is worth remembering that the real value of assistance does not fall within the scope of this analysis; it concerns, rather, the perceived value of assistance received. At the time of the writing of this report, currency rates were as follows:

100 NIS (New Israeli Shekels) = US$ 21.20 (US Dollars) = EUR 17.7 (Euros) = CHF 27.55 (Swiss Francs).

As displayed in the figure below, the total value of received assistance has increased almost constantly since February 2002. Yet, there is a decrease in the median value for all the types of assistance combined (any type of assistance), standing at 300 NIS in July 2005 versus 400 NIS in November 2004. In regard to the median value of food assistance, it has increased by 50 NIS (US$ 10.6) since November 2004, while the median value of financial assistance has decreased by 155 NIS. The median value of employment assistance has increased sharply by 400 NIS (US$ 85) in comparison with our previous survey. Lastly, there are no significant results when considering the breakdown by geographical area or by poverty level.

8.1.4 Sources of assistance delivered

Palestinians identify assistance providers as those organisations that directly deliver the aid. In some cases, this could explain the fact that the international organisations are not cited as the main providers of assistance because they are more likely to target their beneficiaries through the PA ministries, or through local organisations. When looking at the figure below, the main provider remains UNRWA, cited by 26% of respondents, followed by the PA (10%) and - in third place - international organisations (3%). When comparing the results of the previous poll, the visibility of the international organisations has remained stable, while the visibility of Islamic organisations has decreased by 3% and NGOs by 6%. For UNRWA, the percentage of respondents who perceive it as a source of assistance received has increased by 6%, confirming that the agency is still the single most-cited source of assistance. For the PA, the percentage has decreased by 5% in comparison with November 2004, and it stands at the level of February 2004. The fact that the PA is cited as the main provider of different types of assistance received by 10% of respondents is positive in terms of state-building. We should finally mention the sharp decrease in the visibility of trade unions.
We could take the analysis one step further to provide a better picture of where and to which sub-groups of the Palestinian population the various providers have delivered their assistance. We will look at UNRWA, the PA, international organisations and Islamic organisations as they are, successively, the main providers of the assistance cited by the interviewees.

According to the July 2005 survey, the majority of UNRWA’s beneficiaries are refugees (94%) residing in the Gaza Strip (70%) and living in refugee camps (44%). As indicated in the figure below, 41% of UNRWA beneficiaries live in cities, while 15% of them are villagers. Interestingly, UNRWA beneficiaries are more often classified as hardship cases\(^5\) (49%) than as living below the poverty line (34%). On the contrary, the results of the November 2004 survey indicated that UNRWA beneficiaries were more often as below the poverty line than as extremely poor (Palestinian Public Perceptions, Report VIII, page 113).

Interestingly, we could have expected that the PA and/or municipalities’ beneficiaries would more likely reside in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, as was the case in the results of the November 2004 poll. In July 2005, 43% of PA beneficiaries can be found in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Also, 53% are non-refugees whereas such was the case for two-thirds of the beneficiaries in the previous survey. 48% of PNA beneficiaries

\(^5\) The notion of hardship cases used in this report is different from the notion of special hardship cases used by UNRWA. The latter is not restricted to income-related criteria, as it also restricts eligibility to specific categories of the refugee population (families headed by widows, for instance).
are refugees, a percentage which has sharply increased since November 2004. One can draw a parallel with the impoverishment of the refugees observed above (pages 6-7). The distribution of beneficiaries of PA aid according to area of residence remains the same in comparison with November 2004: 44% of PA beneficiaries reside in cities, 32% in villages and 24% in refugee camps. Finally, the largest percentage of the beneficiaries of PA assistance can be found, to a large extent, among the poorest segment of the population (48% are extremely poor) in comparison with November 2004.

Figure 8.14: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from PA/municipalities according to region of residence, area of residence, refugee status and poverty level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Refugee camps</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugees status</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Non Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty level</th>
<th>Hardship cases</th>
<th>Below poverty line</th>
<th>Above poverty line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the beneficiaries of international organisations’ assistance, and when comparing them with the two most important assistance providers, the international organisations have the largest percentage of beneficiaries who reside in Jerusalem (4%), and the largest proportion of their beneficiaries are living below the poverty line (57%). The areas of residence of such beneficiaries are mainly the cities (44%), ahead of villages (32%) and refugee camps (25%). Also, contrary to the results of the November 2004 survey, there are more non-refugees than refugees (62% versus 38%) among the international organisations’ beneficiaries.

Figure 8.15: Composition of beneficiaries of assistance received from international organisations according to region of residence, area of residence, refugee status and poverty level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of residence</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Refugee camps</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee Status</th>
<th>Refugee</th>
<th>Non-refugee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of poverty</th>
<th>Hardship cases</th>
<th>Below poverty line</th>
<th>Above poverty line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the composition of beneficiaries of assistance from Islamic organisations, they mainly reside in the Gaza Strip (51%) and in refugee camps (44%) rather than in cities (39%) or villages (17%). We can find more beneficiaries of Islamic organisations among refugees (58%) than non-refugees (43%). Lastly, as indicated below, 55% of Islamic organisations’ beneficiaries are living in hardship whereas, in November, this provider of assistance tended to target households with a monthly income below the poverty line as well as hardship cases.
8.1.5 Level of satisfaction with assistance

This section provides an evaluation of assistance by examining the respondents’ level of satisfaction with the aid that they have received.

Since the beginning of the second Intifada, the level of satisfaction with assistance in general has continuously increased. 10% of respondents are very satisfied (this percentage has increased by 7% since November 2004) with the assistance received and 55% are satisfied, while 23% are dissatisfied and 12% are very dissatisfied. In the past six months, the percentage of people satisfied with the assistance provided has increased by 10%. The level of dissatisfaction has decreased by 14% and the level of very dissatisfied people has increased slightly (by 3%). In comparison with the November 2004 results, the level of satisfaction has improved. Compared to February 2004, the evaluation of the assistance by its beneficiaries is slightly less favourable.

The general level of satisfaction varies according to the region of residence of the respondents. As indicated in the figure below, 34% of West Bankers are dissatisfied with the assistance delivered and 13% are very dissatisfied. The proportion of very dissatisfied respondents has increased by 5% since November 2004. A higher proportion of respondents from the Gaza Strip have expressed their satisfaction with regard to assistance received in the time-frame of the July 2005 survey. The proportion of dissatisfied respondents residing in the Gaza Strip has decreased by 24%, while the percentage of satisfied respondents has sharply increased (an increase of 12% of satisfied respondents and 11% of those who are very satisfied). The level of satisfaction with assistance delivered has decreased in Jerusalem from 80% to 64%, while the percentage of dissatisfaction has increased by 16%.
Figure 8.18: Level of satisfaction with assistance received according to place of residence, November 2004-July 2005

- West Bank - July 2005: 4% Very satisfied, 48% satisfied, 34% dissatisfied, 13% very dissatisfied
- West Bank - November 2004: 2% Very satisfied, 50% satisfied, 40% dissatisfied, 8% very dissatisfied
- Jerusalem - July 2005: 9% Very satisfied, 55% satisfied, 27% dissatisfied, 9% very dissatisfied
- Jerusalem - November 2004: 2% Very satisfied, 78% satisfied, 18% dissatisfied, 2% very dissatisfied
- Gaza Strip - July 2005: 14% Very satisfied, 61% satisfied, 14% dissatisfied, 12% very dissatisfied
- Gaza Strip - November 2004: 3% Very satisfied, 49% satisfied, 38% dissatisfied, 11% very dissatisfied

Looking at the level of satisfaction according to the place of residence, it appears that the level of satisfaction has decreased, particularly in the West Bank refugee camps where the proportion of respondents who judged it satisfactory has decreased by 14% in the past six months. The proportion of dissatisfied respondents has increased by 4% and the percentage of very dissatisfied respondents has increased by 3%.

Figure 8.19: Level of satisfaction with assistance received according to place of residence, November 2004-July 2005

- WB non camps - July 2005: 4% Very satisfied, 50% satisfied, 34% dissatisfied, 12% very dissatisfied
- WB non camps - Nov. 2004: 3% Very satisfied, 50% satisfied, 41% dissatisfied, 7% very dissatisfied
- WBRC - July 2005: 6% Very satisfied, 39% satisfied, 37% dissatisfied, 18% very dissatisfied
- WBRC - Nov. 2004: 5% Very satisfied, 53% satisfied, 33% dissatisfied, 15% very dissatisfied
- Jerusalem - July 2005: 9% Very satisfied, 55% satisfied, 27% dissatisfied, 9% very dissatisfied
- Jerusalem - Nov. 2004: 2% Very satisfied, 78% satisfied, 18% dissatisfied, 2% very dissatisfied
- GS non camps - July 2005: 15% Very satisfied, 61% satisfied, 13% dissatisfied, 11% very dissatisfied
- GS non camps - Nov. 2004: 4% Very satisfied, 53% satisfied, 35% dissatisfied, 8% very dissatisfied
- GSRC - July 2005: 12% Very satisfied, 59% satisfied, 17% dissatisfied, 13% very dissatisfied
- GSRC - Nov. 2004: 3% Very satisfied, 42% satisfied, 41% dissatisfied, 14% very dissatisfied

Respondents who were unsatisfied were asked to state the reason behind their negative evaluation. In general, 49% of the dissatisfied beneficiaries of assistance felt this way because the assistance provided was too infrequent. This proportion has increased by 3% in the past six months. 35% were discontented because of the small amount of assistance delivered and, lastly, 11% were dissatisfied because of the poor quality of the assistance received.
When compared with the results of the November 2004 survey, the July 2005 results reveal that concern about infrequency has sharply increased in the West Bank by 11%. For the Gaza Strip respondents, the main reason for their dissatisfaction is also, to a large extent, the frequency of assistance provided, according to 60% of the respondents. Interestingly, this percentage has decreased slightly by 5%, whereas the proportion of dissatisfied respondents because of the amount of assistance received has increased by 4%.

Indeed, the gap between the needs in term of assistance of West Bankers and the assistance that is actually disbursed in this region has increased considerably in the past six months. This gap certainly explains why, for respondents in the West Bank, the reason behind the discontent is by far the infrequency of assistance received, rather than the small amount of such assistance.

8.2 Employment assistance

As a consequence of the protracted economic crisis and the accompanying widespread unemployment that affects the Palestinian population, employment remains, in July 2005, the most important household unmet need for 29% of respondents. As a consequence, it is important to review in this section the types of employment assistance (long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds and resources for the self-employed) received both at the personal and the household level, as well as who provides this assistance and their effectiveness.
8.2.1 In general

Statistically significant differences can be established in the percentage of the total population (roughly 150,000 households) who received such assistance according to poverty level. 6% of extremely poor respondents have received employment assistance in the past six months compared with 4% of respondents living below the poverty line and 1% of the better off. Also, when mapping the distribution of employment assistance, it appears that such assistance is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the refugee camps.

Figure 8.22: Received employment assistance according to refugee status, region of residence, area of residence and poverty level.

Efforts to alleviate unemployment rates in the oPt have been apparent in our successive polls since the beginning of the second Intifada. According to the Consolidated Appeal Process 2005, donors’ contributions have concentrated on two major sectors: food security and the recovery of infrastructure employment. Nevertheless, the decrease in socio-economic assistance received by the population in the past six months is also noticeable in regard to employment assistance, as illustrated in figure 9. The responsibility for this overall decrease in employment assistance is not to be ascribed to UNRWA or UNDP, who allocate a considerable portion of their emergency funds to employment generation programmes.

Employment assistance received personally has decreased by 12% while the percentage of respondents whose households have benefited from such assistance decreased considerably, by 19%.

Figure 8.23: Employment assistance received personally and by the households in general.

---

6 See chapter on UNRWA and Refugees, 9.1.2: Causes of increased refugee poverty.
When one examines the regional impact of such a decrease on the Palestinian population, it appears that the highest decrease in the personal employment assistance occurred within the Gaza Strip (a decline of 17% when compared with November 2004), more particularly in the refugee camps (a loss of 21%), and among the extremely poor segment of the population (25% less). With regard to household employment assistance, in parallel with the results mentioned above, the highest decrease is obvious is the Gaza Strip (26% less), for the population of the refugee camps (27% less) and for the poorest part of the population (30% less).

### 8.2.2 Types of employment assistance

Specifically, in regard to personal employment assistance, 10% gained long-term employment, 29% obtained a short-term job, 48% benefited from unemployment funds and 13% received resources aimed to assist the self-employed. When monitoring with the results outlined in the previous poll, the proportion of respondents who received long-term job assistance and that of respondents who were allocated resources for the self-employed have slightly increased, by 2% and by 3% respectively. Meanwhile, the proportion of short-term jobs received has decreased by 5% and that of received unemployment funds remain stable.

**Figure 8.24: Distribution of answers of those who personally received employment assistance, November 2004–July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-term Job</th>
<th>Short-term Job</th>
<th>Unemployment Funds</th>
<th>Resources for Self-Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding household employment assistance, in the six-month period prior to July 2005, 13% benefited from long-term job provision, 27% obtained a short-term job, 42% received unemployment funds and 17% received resources for self-employment. In comparison with the November 2004 survey, the proportion of those whose household benefited from a long-term job has slightly increased by 1%, while the percentage of those who received resources for self-employment has increased by 7%. The proportion of households that have received unemployment funds has slightly increased by 2%. The proportion of those whose household obtained a short-term job has decreased considerably by 10%.

**Figure 8.25: Distribution of answers of those whose household received employment assistance, November 2004–July 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-term Job</th>
<th>Short-term Job</th>
<th>Unemployment Funds</th>
<th>Resources for Self-Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Long-term job
- Resources for the self-employed
- Short-term job
- Unemployment funds
In general, when examining the various types of employment assistance, it is clear that since November 2004, for both the respondents and their households, the highest decline occurred in short-term jobs.

When examining the various types of household employment assistance according to place of residence, the highest percentages of households that have received any kind of employment assistance are those in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, followed by West Bank refugee camp residents. Also, in general, the gap visible in November 2004 between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the allocation of job assistance has decreased. As in our previous survey, the lowest proportion of households receiving employment assistance are in Jerusalem. If we look in detail, the long-term job distribution is higher outside the Gaza Strip refugee camps. The short-term distribution is as important in the Gaza Strip camps as it is in the West Bank camps (3%). The unemployment fund distribution is higher in the refugee camps, in particular in the West Bank (10%) ahead of the Gaza Strip (9%). Lastly, the distribution of resources for the self-employed is more important outside the West Bank camps (4%).

**Figure 8.26: Types of employment assistance received by household according to the place of residence, July 2005.**

In general, a higher percentage of households living in hardship (14%) have received employment assistance in the six-month period prior to the survey, followed by households living below the poverty line (12%) and those living above (7%). The most marked difference between hardship household and poor households, on the one hand, and the relatively better off households, on the other hand, are the short-term jobs, the unemployment funds and the resources for the self-employed received. Higher percentages of the poorest households have received such types of job assistance. In the same period of time, households living above the poverty line have obtained more long-term jobs than other segments of the population. This trend is a real concern, as the poorest segments of the population benefit from precarious types of employment assistance, where incomes are low and intermittent, while in November 2004, twice as many households facing hardship than those with avv living standard above the poverty line had benefited from a long-term jobs.
8.2.3 Sources of employment assistance

In the survey conducted in July 2005, the PA is perceived by 58% of the interviewees as the most important provider of personal employment assistance. In comparison with our previous survey, this percentage has increased by 44%. UNRWA remains an important source, cited by one-quarter of Palestinians; only 2% fewer respondents mentioned the agency as the source of their personal employment assistance in July 2005. Also, the number of respondents that cited the municipalities as their providers of employment assistance has been halved since November 2004, while the percentage that mentioned NGOs has decreased by 9%. The increased visibility of international organisations as providers of personal employment assistance is confirmed by the July 2005 survey: 5% of the respondents obtained personal employment assistance from an international organisation, in contrast to the 2% of respondents in February 2004 (PPP Report VII).

8.2.4 Level of satisfaction with employment assistance

In general, a majority of beneficiaries (66%) of employment assistance evaluated it positively in July 2005, while 34% of the respondents judged the assistance negatively. The figure below indicates that the level of satisfaction with the provided assistance has improved continuously since the beginning of the surveys on Palestinian Public Perceptions.
As for the reason behind the dissatisfaction, 32% of beneficiaries are dissatisfied because the employment period is very short, while 59% are dissatisfied because the number of opportunities are too few. In comparison with the November 2004 survey, there is an increase of 22% in those who are dissatisfied with employment assistance received because of the number of positions. At the same time, there is a decrease of 28% in the dissatisfaction with employment assistance because the period is very short. A parallel can be drawn between the most important unmet need of the Palestinian population, which is employment for 29% of the households, and the huge decrease in employment assistance provided in the oPt. The gap between those two indicators could explain the high level of dissatisfaction related to the paucity of employment assistance.

8.3 The issue of food and its delivery

As mentioned in the introduction, food security is one of the main concerns of the humanitarian organisations. The deterioration in the nutritional status of Palestinians began soon after the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000 and the consequent lack of access of the population to food and the disruption of markets. According to the World Food Program (WFP) in mid-2004, “food insecurity is a reality for 38% of the Palestinian population (i.e. approximately 1.3 million people), while a further 26% (586,000 people) are at risk of becoming food insecure.”

---

7 World Food Program (WFP), Emergency operation 10190.2: Support to the most vulnerable Palestinian population affected by the protracted conflict, July 2004-June 2005, Occupied Palestinian Territories, p.2.
8.3.1 Need for food

8.3.1.1 Household quantity of food consumption over the past months

Figure 8.31: Household quantity of food consumption over the past months

The respondents were asked whether or not their food consumption has matched their needs in the six-month period prior to the survey. As indicated in the figure above, the proportion of Palestinian whose consumption was not sufficient is quite high, as 19% of the respondents have consumed less food than needed and 10% consumed much less food than needed. For the greatest percentage of respondents (63%), food consumption was more or less according to household needs.

Figure 8.32: Household quantity of food consumption over the past months according to region of residence.

An analysis of consumption of food according to the independent variable, region of residence, provides relevant indicators for mapping the malnutrition crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories. In July 2005, food consumption was adequate for the needs for 77% of respondents residing in Jerusalem. In the West Bank, 19% consumed less food than needed and 10% much less food than needed. It is obvious that Palestinians households living in the Gaza Strip cannot afford to meet their basic needs in food. For 11% of them food consumption is much less than needed, and for 22% the consumption of food is less than needed.

Figure 8.33: Household quantity of food consumption over the past months according to place of residence
The results by place of residence are helpful in mapping the Palestinian households that have to cope with the lack of food. If we consider the answer much less than needed and less than needed together, one can see that households living outside refugee camps seem to face slightly greater difficulties in satisfying their food needs. Within the Gaza Strip, for 32% of the inhabitants of refugee camps and for 34% of households living outside camps, their food consumption is not sufficient. In the West Bank, the proportion of Palestinians who cannot afford their food consumption is approaching 29% outside the refugee camps and 28% in the refugee camps.

Figure 8.34: Household quantity of food consumption over the past months according to poverty level

The situation is dire for the poorest segment of the Palestinian population; for 18% of the extremely poor, consumption of food is much less than needed. For 28% of the respondents living in hardship, the consumption of food is less than needed.

8.3.1.2 Most needed food items

As mentioned in the chapter on needs, food is considered by 43% of the respondents as their most important need for their households. When examining the most needed food item for the household in general, dry food is the most important food commodity needed by the Palestinian household, ahead of fresh food.

Figure 8.35: First and second most needed food item, July 2005.

In July 2005, 78% of the respondents cited basic commodities such as wheat flour, sugar etc. as their first most-needed food item, ahead of baby food, cited by 11% of respondents. Basics commodities remained the most important items in the past six months, increasing by 9% since the November 2004 survey, while the need for baby food has decreased by 12%. As observed in the second pie-chart on the right, the basic commodities are followed by meat and poultry, two expensive sources of proteins, ahead of fruits and vegetables considered, respectively, by 33% and 32% of the respondents as their second most important food item needed.
8.3.2 Sources of food

Fewer Palestinian households rely on food assistance in July than they did in November 2004. The dependency towards food assistance has been halved in the past six months, as 7% of respondent households rely on relief assistance for food, whereas such was the case for 14% in November 2004. Reliance on family support (7%) has slightly decreased by 3% since November 2004. The majority of the respondents (86%) said that their household relies on their own income for food; this proportion has increased by 10% since November 2004.

When examining the sources of food according to the refugee status, it appears that more refugees than non-refugees rely on outside sources for their food. The refugees rely on UNRWA for food assistance through the regular food aid programme that provides food parcels to special hardship cases or the emergency food aid program focusing on the “new poor.” While 13% of refugee respondents rely on food assistance, the proportion among the non-refugees is 1%. These proportions have both sharply decreased since the November 2004 survey, strengthening the earlier trend of a considerable decrease in the dependency on outside sources for food.

The role of UNRWA also explained why more respondents from refugee camps rely on outside sources for food (19%) than city or village inhabitants (4%).

When looking at the results by region of residence and by place of residence, it appears that the dependence on outside sources for food is higher in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the refugee camps (23%), ahead of the West Bank camps (9%). Finally, the dependence on outside sources for food is unsurprisingly higher for the extremely poor segments of the Palestinian population (14%).

---

8 This group consists of people who have lost assets due to the emergency (farmers, home and land owners), farmers who have lost access to markets and workers who have lost jobs. UNRWA Emergency Appeal 2005, p.8.
8.3.3 Attitudes toward food assistance

Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Palestinians households that rely more and more on their own sources for food are resorting to increasingly negative coping mechanisms, drastically reducing the quality, variety and quantity of food intake.

8.3.3.1 The reduction of food consumption.

Figure 8.38: Attitudes toward food consumption: reducing the quantity of food

In July 2005, 50% of respondents confirmed that they had reduced their level of food in the past six months. As displayed in the chart above, a higher percentage of Gaza Strip residents (55%) have reduced their food consumption in the past six months, whereas half the West Bankers (49%) and 33% of Jerusalemites have reduced their consumption. Also, more respondents residing outside refugee camps have reduced their food consumption (50% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip). Lastly, 66% of the respondents living in hardship have reduced their food intake in the past six months.

8.3.3.2 Reduction of food purchase

Figure 8.39: Purchase of less-preferred food
The respondents were asked whether they, or their households, have bought less-preferred food in the past six months. About half of the respondents (48%) have done so in the past six months. In comparison with the November 2004 survey, a slight increase of 1% is noticeable in the proportion of respondents who answered positively.

When examining the statistically significant relationship that can be established with regard to the reduction in food consumption, a higher percentage of respondents residing in the Gaza Strip (51%) and respondents living in hardship (65%) have reduced their food purchase in the past six months.

### 8.4 Food assistance

#### 8.4.1 In general

As is apparent in the figure above, there has been a very slight decrease in the number of people reporting that they have received food assistance in the past six months. While the percentage was 34% in November 2004, the proportion decreased slightly to 33% in July 2005.

When looking at the main explanatory independent variables, the percentage of refugees among the respondents is much higher than non-refugees (57% versus 14%). Also, the results reveal that half of the respondents residing in the Gaza Strip have benefited from food assistance while such was the case for 26% of West Bankers and only 5% of Jerusalemites.

Further examination of the distribution of food assistance reveals that, while 63% of respondents living in refugee camps have received food (versus 26% of city inhabitants and 27% of village dwellers), a higher proportion of the Palestinian population living in refugee camps has received such assistance. It was the case for, respectively, 70% and 63% of the population living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip camps. When examining food distribution according to the level of poverty, the results indicates that 44% of the respondents living in hardship have received food aid, while 36% of those below poverty line and 18% of better-off Palestinians have received such aid.
8.4.2 Source of food assistance

Respondents were asked to mention the main providers of the food assistance they received. In July 2005, UNRWA was cited by 25% of respondents as their main provider of food aid. UNRWA was followed by the Palestinian Authority (19%), followed by the international organisations (15%) and Islamic organisations (13%).

Indeed, the World Food Program (WFP) distributes food items to 480,000 non refugee households through the different PA Ministries (mainly through the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture). International organisations involved in food assistance activities are also, to a large extent, working in close partnership with the PA. Such partnerships could explain the perception of the PA as one of the most important source of the food assistance, as the ministries are often the direct providers of food items to Palestinian households.

8.4.3 Frequency of food assistance

As illustrated in the adjacent figure, according to the respondents, 15% received food assistance three times during the six-month period before July 2005, 45% twice, while 30% have benefited from food aid only once.

8.5 Attitude towards food assistance

8.5.1 Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance

Figure 8.43: Targeting of food assistance in general and according to the region of residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 2005</th>
<th>November 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary in need</td>
<td>Needy but others also receive it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As illustrated in the figure above, 7% of respondents consider that food assistance targets the needy, while 43% feel that food aid is allocated to the Palestinian population without distinction. The majority of respondents (50%) feel that food assistance is delivered to the needy but that others segments of the population not in need have received it. The results of the July 2005 survey reveal that the targeting of food assistance is not judged as positively as it was in the November 2004, with a decrease of 19% in people feeling that food assistance is focusing on needy Palestinians.

If we consider the breakdown by region of residence, those earlier findings are, interestingly, confirmed among respondents residing in the West Bank. Only 5% of West Bankers believe that food assistance targets the needy; this percentage has decreased by 21% in the past six months. For 49% of West Bankers, food assistance is judged to be delivered without distinction. This percentage increased sharply in the past six months (an increase of 28%). Also, 54% of Gazans feel that food aid is distributed to the needy but also to people who do not need it.

8.5.2 Attitudes towards the organisation of food distribution

Attitudes toward the organisation of food are more positive in July 2005 than in November 2004. 40% of respondents believe that food aid is organised (an increase of 29%), while 35% feel that such assistance is somewhat organised (a decrease of 21%), and 26% of the respondents have a negative attitude toward the organisation of food distribution, a decrease of 7% from November 2004.

According to the figure above, one can find the most positive attitudes toward food distribution among refugees (47%), Gaza Strip residents (48%) and camp residents (57%). When considering the breakdown by place of residence, it appears that Jerusalemites have the most negative attitude, as 53% of them feel that such assistance is poorly organised.

8.5.3 Level of satisfaction with food assistance

In general, the level of satisfaction with food assistance is more positive than it was in the November 2004 survey. The results indicate that, in July 2005, 22% of respondents were very satisfied with the food assistance received, an increase of 21% over the last survey. Half the respondents were satisfied with the food assistance, while 13% were dissatisfied and 12% were very dissatisfied.
Looking at the breakdown by region of residence, the highest level of dissatisfaction appears in the West Bank, where 25% of respondents are dissatisfied and 12% are very dissatisfied. On the other hand, the level of satisfaction is far higher in the Gaza Strip. As observed in the chart above, the level of satisfaction of respondents residing in the Gaza Strip is higher as half of them are satisfied and 32% are very satisfied with the food assistance received. The level of satisfaction with food assistance is in general higher among the refugees, and the level of satisfaction is also high in refugee camps, ahead of city and villages.

8.6 Conclusion

The Palestinian perception of an overall decrease in the level of assistance delivered is the main finding of this chapter on assistance. Roughly 1.4 million Palestinians have benefited from assistance in the first half of 2005. The decrease is particularly acute in the West Bank, where the level of assistance has dropped by 8% between November 2004 and July 2005.

It is arguable that that the decrease in the amount of assistance provided to the West Bank is mainly due to the relative lull in violence, as well as to the guarded optimism related to the Palestinian election process of January 2005. On the other hand, the level of assistance remains high in the Gaza Strip because of the continued violence observed in the past six months. The need for additional humanitarian assistance has risen sharply as a consequence. In addition, one could argue that the assistance focused on the Gaza Strip in advance of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. For these reasons, more than half of the Gaza Strip residents received assistance whilst one-third of West Bankers benefited from such assistance. Also, the level of assistance is lowest outside West Bank camps.

When examining the delivery of assistance to the refugees, it appears that non-refugees living in hardship are much less catered for than extremely poor refugees. Also the delivery of assistance to non-refugees has considerably decreased outside the refugees camps in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. As a consequence, when looking at types of assistance received (financial assistance, employment assistance and food assistance) it was delivered to a higher percentage of refugees and to Gaza Strip residents, particularly to those who are living in camps.

Some interesting conclusions can be drawn through an analysis of where and to which segments of the Palestinian population the main providers of aid have delivered their assistance. In November 2004, the results indicated that the PA seemed to have a larger percentage of beneficiaries in the West Bank and amongst the non-refugee and the poorer segments of the population, while the majority of UNRWA beneficiaries were much more concentrated in the Gaza Strip, amongst refugees and people living below the poverty line. In July 2005, for both UNRWA and the PA, the largest numbers of beneficiaries could be found in the Gaza Strip, amongst refugees and hardship cases. Some interesting developments can be seen in the results of the July 2005 results, regarding the beneficiaries of aid from international and the Islamic organisations. Non-refugees are less likely to be targeted by international organisations than they were in the past. Also, coverage of the refugee camps by Islamic organisations has increased since November 2004. Lastly, there are more extremely poor beneficiaries benefiting from aid from the Islamic organisations.

These findings are confirmed by the evaluation of the level of satisfaction with the assistance received, as a higher proportion of respondents residing in the Gaza Strip have expressed their satisfaction in this respect. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with assistance received has increased in the West Bank, and the results reveal that concern about the infrequency of assistance is the reason behind a dissatisfaction that has increased sharply in this region, by 11%.
Refugees & UNRWA
Part nine of the report focuses on the socio-economic status of Palestinian refugees in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and the impact of international aid on their livelihoods.

Refugees constitute 44% of the survey’s population sample, i.e., 772 out of 1767 respondents. 33% of them live in the West Bank, where they make up less than one-third of this region’s population. 7% of them live in the Jerusalem area, where they constitute one-third of the area’s total population. The majority of the refugee sample, i.e., 60%, live in the Gaza Strip, where they represent nearly three-quarters of the total population.

Fig. 9.1: Percentage of refugees per region of residence

About half of the refugees live in cities (46% of the refugee sample), one-third in refugee camps (38%) and one-fifth in villages (16%). However, as shown in figure 9.2, refugee camps remain “refugee pockets”, with populations being mostly refugees.

Fig. 9.2: Percentages of refugees and non-refugees per place of residence

The chapter is divided into two sections:
- The first section tackles the socio-economic status of the refugees with respect to poverty, levels of income and employment.
- The second section analyses the assistance received by the refugees and their unmet needs. It also looks into the linkages between assistance, refugee status and UNRWA.

1 Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (around 97%) were registered with UNRWA.
2 This is in line with UNRWA’s figures. According to the agency, out of 1,614,201 Palestine refugees registered in the oPt (including Jerusalem), 41.9% are West Bankers (including Jerusalemites) and 58.1% are Gazans. (UNRWA, 30 June 2004).
The main explanatory (or independent) variables utilised in this part of the report are “refugee status” as well as “camp resident”, either as area of residence (vis-à-vis inhabitants of villages and cities or, more generally, non-camp inhabitants). Poverty status will also be used as an important dependent variable in the first section of the chapter. Other independent variables related to age, gender and education are excluded from this analysis, as they are dealt with in other parts of the report.

9.1 Socio-economic conditions of the refugees

9.1.1. Refugees and poverty: overview

The trend towards a uniformity in poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored in previous reports (see, for instance, Palestinian Public Perceptions VIII, subchapter 9.2.3) was significantly altered during the period under scrutiny. In July 2005, refugees were significantly poorer than non-refugees. As highlighted in figure 9.3, refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non-refugees by 8%, while the percentage of those above the poverty line amongst non-refugees was 4% higher than amongst refugees.

**Fig. 9.3: Poverty status according to refugee status in July 2005**

From a geographical perspective, it appears that while the refugee camps have remained the poorest areas in the oPt, the degradation of living conditions during the period of scrutiny has mainly affected cities and villages, as illustrated in figure 9.4.

**Fig. 9.4: Poverty status per area of residence**

More specifically, in the West Bank the percentage of hardship cases in refugee camps rose by 4% (32% to 36%) as against 7% outside refugee camps (24% to 31%). In Gaza, the percentage of hardship cases in refugee camps

---

3 Total below the poverty line refers to the percentage of hardship cases and that of the below the poverty line (between the HC and the poverty line).
rose by 2% (from 41% to 43%) compared with 16% outside refugee camps (33% to 49%).

The renewed poverty gap between refugees and non-refugees also appears when comparing the levels of family income between November 2004 and July 2005. Figure 9.5 shows that more refugees were earning low salaries of less than 2000 NIS per month (an increase of 4%), and fewer were earning higher salaries over 3499 NIS (a fall of 6%). Conversely, non-refugees saw their income status improve during the period under survey.

**Fig. 9.5: Family income per refugee status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Refugees (Nov 04)</th>
<th>Refugees (July 05)</th>
<th>Non-refugees (Nov 04)</th>
<th>Non-refugees (July 05)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income Status</td>
<td>Below 2000 NIS</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000-3499 NIS</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above 3500 NIS</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This change was clearly felt by our respondents. More refugees confirmed that their income had decreased over the past six months (23%, as against 18% of non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income had remained the same (72%, compared with 76% of non-refugees). Accordingly, refugees appeared less confident than non-refugees in their ability to keep up financially in the near future, with 49% of them admitting they were already barely managing and/or were in serious condition, compared with 44% of the latter.

More concretely, as shown in figure 9.6, the survey also found that more refugees had resorted to coping strategies in order to endure the hardship, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the non-refugees. In this context, the fact that fewer refugees had to resort to reducing their quantity of food may well indicate that this coping strategy was already exhausted.

**Fig. 9.6: Selected coping strategies per refugee status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ref /Not paying bills</th>
<th>Non-ref /Not paying bills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ref /Buying on credit</th>
<th>Non-ref /Buying on credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ref /changing place of residence</th>
<th>Non-ref /Changing place of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ref /More adults in job market</th>
<th>Non-ref /More adults in job market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ref /Reducing quantity of food</th>
<th>Non-ref /Reducing quantity of food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.1.2. Causes of increased refugee poverty

When analysing causes of poverty, one usually looks at unemployment figures, as well as damage inflicted to business or land. Our survey found that between November 2004 and July 2005, the unemployment rate for the overall oPt population has increased from 27% to 33%, while the percentage of people working, be it part time, a few hours a day or full time had decreased from 73% to 67%. In the oPt population’s eyes, refugees included, the three main reasons for decrease in income were reduction of working hours (36%), loss of job (29%) and damage of business/land (10%).
Whereas this worsening in the employment situation, with its rise in unemployment and loss of working hours, may account for the general increase in poverty levels within the oPt population at large, it cannot explain the variations between refugees and non-refugees in this respect. Indeed, refugee status as an independent variable was not found relevant in our analysis of employment status and reasons for decrease in income.

Amongst the main identified reasons for such a degradation of the refugees’ poverty status is the decrease in socio-economic assistance received by them (see section 9.2), including, employment assistance. As became clear in our previous survey, this type of assistance has come to play a structural role in the living conditions of the refugees (See Palestinian Public Perceptions VIII, sub-chapter 9.2.3). Figure 9.7 shows that household employment assistance has decreased for the total oPt population, but more particularly for the refugees.

Fig. 9.7: Main household job assistance schemes per refugee status

The responsibility for this overall decrease in employment assistance is not to be ascribed to UNRWA, the agency that has catered for the refugees' basic needs since 1950 (see below sub-section 9.2.2). Actually, the survey shows that, as in the previous period under scrutiny, UNRWA was the main provider of employment assistance projects for refugees, comprising mainly household short-term employment contracts.4 In contrast, other institutions (apart from the municipalities) had fewer refugees benefiting from their programmes, as shown in figure 9.8.

Fig. 9.8. Source of household employment assistance for refugees

---

4 For instance, between January and March 2005,, UNRWA offered 6,449 temporary employment contracts under direct hire, 1,111 in the West Bank and 5,338 in Gaza (see UNRWA, 2005: 8).
However, UNRWA's ongoing efforts to increase job opportunities could not alone counteract the employment crisis that hit the oPt during the first half of 2005. In addition, most job opportunities the agency (and other stakeholders) provided consisted of short-term, temporary jobs, unlikely to provide a lasting solution to the crisis. In this regard, while over two-thirds of those benefiting - or having benefited - from these projects, refugees and non-refugees alike, claimed to be satisfied with them, 59% of them found that the number of projects was too few, and 32% of them found the employment period too short.\(^5\)

### 9.2 Assistance and needs of the refugees

#### 9.2.1. Contents of assistance received and unmet needs

Employment assistance also decreased amongst refugees as an emergency (i.e., first and second) most important assistance item received), as is clearly indicated in figure 9.9. This figure also shows that, with the exception of food assistance\(^6\), all other types within this category of assistance have decreased in importance for refugees and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. However, given the refugees' heavier dependence on institutional assistance, this trend may have affected them comparatively more.

![Fig. 9.9: Most important assistance items received per refugee status](image)

The trends in refugee camps were somewhat in keeping with the overall refugee situation. In particular, the increase in food distribution was quite significant in the West Bank camps (from 59% to 70% during the period under survey) and the Gaza camps (from 52% to 63% during the same period). Employment assistance, as a most important assistance received, was an exception; whereas it decreased for refugees during the same period of time - as seen above - it increased slightly in the camps of the West Bank (from 6% in November 2004 to 9% in July 2005) and it remained stable in the camps of Gaza (8% for each period).

Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees’ (and non-refugees’) most important unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of financial assistance (27% and previously the refugees’ most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%). Three other points are worth noticing in relation to the refugees’ unmet needs as illustrated in figure 9.10: firstly, food (which became more significant as a most important assistance item during the period under survey) logically saw its significance as an unmet need decrease; second, housing services have emerged as a significant unmet need for the refugees, the percentage of them defining it as a most important unmet need increasing from 9% to 15% between November 2004 and July 2005; and lastly, there was a decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising such traditional assistance items as health and education as unmet needs. This may be directly and/or indirectly due to improvements in access to services that have resulted from the easing in the closure policy imposed by

---

\(^5\) The duration of employment may have been extended during the period under scrutiny, since the percentage of people criticising employment duration was much larger in November 2004: 59%. During the same period however, the percentage of people criticising the insufficient number of employment project increased from 37% to 59%.

\(^6\) Increased food assistance has benefited the camps only. In the West Bank and in Gaza, the percentage of refugee-camp beneficiaries increased by 11% (59% to 70% and 52% to 63%, respectively), while it decreased by 4% and 2% outside the refugee camps (from 26% to 22% and 45% to 43%, respectively).
the Israeli occupation authorities in the oPt and the reduction in the number of military clashes in the oPt (see chapter 1 of this report). The survey found that the refugees' mobility status had improved, as the percentage of refugees having encountered mobility problems dropped from 86% in November 2004 to 77% in July 2005.

Fig. 9.10: Most important unmet needs per refugee status

Compared to cities and villages, refugee camps are the areas of residence where percentages of people referring to employment, health and housing services as main unmet needs were the highest: 30%, 14% and 14% respectively. More precisely, employment and housing services as unmet needs were more prevalent in Gaza camps (35% and 15% respectively), than in West Bank camps (22% and 13% respectively). Conversely, health services were mentioned slightly more as unmet needs in the West Bank camps (13%) than in Gaza camps (12%).

Despite the shortcomings in terms of assistance provided, and maybe on account of the significant reduction of violence and of mobility restrictions in the oPt (see chapter 1 of this report), the degree of overall satisfaction amongst refugees vis-à-vis most important services received increased significantly from November 2004 to July 2005, as shown in figure 9.11.

Fig. 9.11: Satisfaction with various most important assistance items received per refugee status

9.2.2. Assistance, refugee status and UNRWA

Despite increased poverty levels and a decrease in vital assistance items received, such as employment assistance, refugees are still the main beneficiaries of socio-economic aid in general: 60% of them received some kind of assistance in July 2005, compared with 21% of non-refugees. As seen in figure 9.12, refugees are more targeted whatever the poverty level: hardship cases as well as those below and above the poverty line.
From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps remain the main targets of socio-economic assistance. In July 2005, the percentage of camp inhabitants receiving aid, 67%, had outmatched that of city and village beneficiaries combined (31% and 35%, respectively).

In the West Bank, 68% of camp inhabitants said that they received some kind of assistance, i.e., nearly three times as many as non-camp inhabitants (29%). In November 2004, the gap had been smaller (67% of camps as against 39% of non-camps). The same phenomenon occurred in Gaza: the difference camp/non-camp was higher in July 2005 (69% as against 50% respectively) than seven months earlier (72% and 56%)

The focus of socio-economic assistance on refugees may partly be due to UNRWA’s prevalence among refugee communities and, more particularly, the refugee camps. Since 1950, this agency has gradually taken the form of a “quasi-government”, providing registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) with basic services (education, health, relief and social services, and income generation) on regular and emergency bases. Such prevalence, on the rise during the period under survey, is underscored in figure 9.14.

UNRWA, clearly, primarily targeted the poorer places of residence, i.e., the Gaza camps. As shown in figure 9.15, over two-thirds of these residents confirmed receiving their most important services from UNRWA in July 2005, i.e., 18% more than in November 2004. UNRWA was also more active in Gaza outside the camps (increasing from
32% to 42%), while its involvement as provider of the most important assistance services remained stable in the West Bank, inside and outside the camps, and decreased in Jerusalem.\(^7\)

**Fig. 9.15: UNRWA as source of most important services per place of residence**

Comparing assistance and poverty levels between refugee and non-refugees leads us to the conclusion that, generally speaking, the impact of assistance cannot extend beyond cushioning the consequences of poverty. It is therefore no surprise that refugees still happen to feel more in need of socio-economic assistance than the average oPt population. Our survey found that 57% of them believed that a lot of assistance was still needed, in comparison with 48% of non-refugees.

**Fig. 9.16: Assistance according to needs per refugee status**

The same phenomenon also occurs at camp level: 5% of West Bank camp inhabitants and 15% of Gaza camp inhabitants stated that they could do without assistance, as against 18% and 17% of non-campus inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza respectively.

Whatever assistance programmes are planned for the oPt in the short or longer run, the refugees may well insist that UNRWA be the prime stakeholder in that process. A poll carried out by Fafo in Gaza in September 2005 indicated that over three-quarters of the population (78%) expressed confidence in UNRWA, whereas only one-quarter of them (24%) said they trusted the PA institutions (Fafo 2005; UNRWA 2005: 2).

### 9.3 Summary

The analysis on specific issues related to refugees and UNRWA have allowed us to come to a number of interesting findings:

Refugees constitute 44% of the survey’s population sample. 33% of them live in the West Bank, where they make

\(^7\) In comparison, the PA was also more active in Gaza in camps (18%, i.e., 9% more since November 2004) and outside camps (14%, one percent more than in November 2004) than in the West Bank outside the camps (9%, i.e., 9% less than in November 2004) and inside the camps (6%).
up less than one-third of this region's population. 7% of them live in the Jerusalem area, where they constitute one-third of the area's total population. The majority of the refugee sample, i.e. 60%, live in the Gaza, where they represent nearly three-quarters of the total population. Although only 38% of refugees live in camps (as against 46% in cities and 16% in villages), the camps are mostly inhabited by refugees, who comprise 91% in the West Bank and 96% in the Gaza Strip.

The trend towards uniformity of poverty status between refugees and non-refugees that had been underscored in previous reports was significantly altered during the period under scrutiny. In July 2005, refugees were significantly poorer than non-refugees. Refugees saw their percentage of hardship cases outmatch that of non-refugees by 8%, while the percentage of those above the poverty line amongst non-refugees was 4% higher than amongst refugees.

This change was clearly perceived by our respondents. More refugees confirmed that their income had decreased over the past six months (23% as against 18% of non-refugees), while fewer refugees stated that their income had remained the same (72% as against 76% of non-refugees). Accordingly, refugees appeared less confident in their ability to keep up financially during the coming period than non-refugees, with 49% of them admitting already barely managing and/or being in serious condition, compared with 44% of the latter.

From a geographical perspective, the refugee camps are still the poorest areas in the OPT. However, the degradation of living conditions that affected the OPT has mainly affected cities and villages.

Amongst the main identified reasons for such a degradation of the refugees' poverty status is the decrease in assistance received by them. With the exception of food assistance, all other types within this category of assistance have decreased in importance for refugees and non-refugees alike during the period under scrutiny. However, given the refugees' heavier dependence on institutional assistance, this trend may have affected them comparatively more.

This is more particularly so in the case of employment assistance. However, the responsibility for this decrease is not to be ascribed to UNRWA. Actually, the survey shows that more refugees benefited from UNRWA's job projects during the period under survey. But the agency's ongoing efforts to increase job opportunities could not counteract alone the overall employment crisis that hit the OPT during the first half of 2005.

Not surprisingly, employment assistance services have become the refugees' (and non-refugees') most important unmet need during the period under survey (29%), ahead of financial assistance (27%, and previously the refugees' most important unmet need), housing (15%), food (9%) and education (9%). Overall, one can see a significant decrease in the percentages of refugees characterising such traditional assistance items as health, education, financial assistance and food as unmet needs. This may be directly and/or indirectly due to improvements in access to basic services that has resulted from the easing in the Israeli closure policy and the reduction of the number of military clashes in the OPT.

Refugees (and more especially those residing in the camps) are still the main targets of socio-economic assistance in general, 60% of them receiving some kind of assistance in July 2005, as against only 21% of non-refugees. This may partly be due to UNRWA's predominance among the refugee communities. Since 1950, this agency has provided registered refugees (over 95% of our refugee sample) with basic services (education, health, relief and social services, and income generation) on regular and emergency bases. Such provision of services was enhanced during the period under scrutiny.

9.4 BIBLIOGRAPHY


المؤشرات الرئيسية: حركة التنقل والأمن

افظنات الفترة الوافقة ما بين شهدتين ثانيف 2004 وشهر تموز 2005 بقرار القيادة الفلسطينية الجديدة (enerimaة الرئيس محمود عباس) الذي ينص على وضع حد للاضطهاد الأقتصادي. وكانت تلك انطلاقاً معلماً في عدد الهجمات العسكرية الإسرائيلية في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة والذين تبنت عليه انخفاض في عدد الإصابات الفلسطينية التي وصلت إلى حداً آخر، سواء أكان تلك الإصابات من قتلى أو جرحى، منذ اتفاقية الانقسام.

على الرغم من انخفاض عدد الإصابات في الساحة الفلسطينية، إلا أن الاحتلال الإسرائيلي استمر في تهجين الحالة الأمنية للفلسطينيين في جميع أنحاء الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، وخاصة في الضفة الغربية، التي تتطلب نشاط أكبر تسييساً بسبب وجود (توسيع) المستعمرات الإسرائيلية والمشكل الأمنية الداخلية بشكل عام، بينما كانت المشاكل الإقتصادية والzialات الداخلية بين مختلف الأحزاب السياسية (القوى الأردنية المختلفة التابعة للسلطة الفلسطينية، القوات المسلحة الفلسطينية) لاحقةً لاتهام الأطراف في قطاع غزة.

إن تسهيلات حركة التنقل في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة كانت، إلى حد ما، مماثلة في نتائج هذه الدراسة، ففي شهر تموز 2005، اعتبرت إغلاقية الفلسطينيين أن طرح حركة التنقل لديهم، فيها الوصول إلى الخدمات العامة، أماكن العمل، وفترة الأدب، وما زالت تتأثر بالعوائق الحربية وكان بنسبتها أقل مما كانت عليه قبل ثلاثة أشهر، وقد لوحظت هذه التحسينات في ظروف حركة التنقل بشكل أكبر في مناطق القناد الشرقية وقطاع غزة.

استمر بناء الجدار العنصري في المناطق الموحدة والحدودية للساحة الغربية، ويكمل حكمة البنية، وجدت هذه الدراسة أن الاختيارات الإقتصادية- الاجتماعي للسائبة لبناء هذا الجدار قد ضعفت على نحو كبير منذ عام 2004، ويمكن تفسير هذا من خلال تغييرات مسار الحدود، وبدأت تظهر في تلك الفترة تنامي الخلافات، بناءً على القرار الذي اعتمدته الحكومة الإسرائيلية والعلياً المحكمة الدولية للإنهاء السار على عام 2004، ويعمل تفسير هذا أيضاً من خلال الاستراتيجيات الاقتصادية- الاجتماعية المترامية التي تشكلها الفلسطينية كوسيلة للتغلب مع وجود الجدار. حيث كانت استراتيجيات التأقلم لأسر القناد الشرقية أقل من الاستراتيجيات التي تلبني الأمنية في هذا الجدير بالذكر.

على الرغم من تأثير الاحتلال الإسرائيلي على الأطوار المناسبة لدى الشعب الفلسطيني وفرض الكثير من القبود على السلطة الفلسطينية، إلا أن هذا لابد أن يكون نشأة مركزية وجود النسخة المناسبة لدى الشعب الفلسطيني فيما يختص بالقطاع الأمني، حيث يظهر العديد من التساؤلات والشكوك حول نوعية حكم وشرعية هذه المسألة.

إن المسألة الفلسطينية ومؤسسات الأجزة الأمنية تواجهان اهتمامات شرعية، فيما بينها، لا تتم تسترجم مؤسسات الأجزة الأمنية لثقة الشعب، بما تهم، فإن غداً شرائط النضال الفلسطيني للمؤسسات الدينية، مثل النواة الخاصة ونظم الاحتلال، بيئة قانونية دينية. وهذا مقرر يعمل على إضفاء الالتزام المزعج للمنظمة الإعلان، ويعمل هذا أيضاً على توسيع المفاهيم بين الفلسطينيين المتمسكون في القناعات، وفي ضفة الغربية، وهو الذي يتأثر بالعوائق، وعمليات الإنشاء الإغلاقية.

لذلك فإن تحقيق حكم القطاع الأمني يجب أن يكون من أهم الأولويات والأهداف، وقد يكون من أهم الأولويات والأهداف، وقد يكون من أهم الأولويات والأهداف لدروت الجانب الفلسطيني.

إن التحدي الكبير الذي تواجهه السلطة الفلسطينية يمر من خلال بناء قومية مزدهرة ووضع تصور ثقافي إعداد تركيب النظام الأمني، وتحقيق استراتيجيات حكومية موسعة للاستجابة، مما يقود إلى نتائج متمثلاً في استخدام الشعب الفلسطيني رؤيةганة من خلال احتفاظ ملحوظ في نسبة الفساد والمهتمية، وتعزيز احترام حقوق الإنسان.

إلا أن اعتماد شامل في الأسلوب الفلسطيني هو ما يتطلب تحديد السلاح من القبود، ولكن الأسلوب الثائرة، وحفرًا، حيث أن المؤسسات التمثيلية وقطاع الأمن الذي يتمثل بحيد تساعد بدورها السلطة الفلسطينية في كسب الدعم الذي تحتاج إليه لاتخاذ القرارات.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: السياسة، الإعلام والسلام

أمثلت أغلبية المستطعين (74%) انتخابات المجلس التشريعي التي انعقدت في شهر كانون الثاني 2006. حيث أشار النتائج إلى أن الدعم الأقوى لهذه الانتخابات كان متواجدًا في قطاع غزة. بينما تتواجد معارضة للانتخابات بشكل غربي في القدس الشرقية التي انعكس بدوره على انطباعات المستطعين بما يخص هذه الانتخابات.

على الرغم من الدعم العام لانتخابات المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني، كانت هناك نسبة (39%) من المستطعين غير مقررين حول اختيارهم. فيما، في حين أوضح (21%) من المستطعين عدم مشاركتهم في الانتخابات في شهر تموز 2005. كان موقع (50%) من الناخبين غير واضح قبل ستة أشهر من موعد الانتخابات.

في شهر تموز 2005 (34%) من المستطعين أنهم سيعلنون تصريحات نفاذ، بينما (31%) فقط أكدوا على اختيارهم لحماس في انتخابات المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني المعقودة في شهر كانون الثاني 2006.

أخذ المستطعين القليل الأغلبية بين الاعتراف عن اختيارهم المُرحلي. حيث أوضح (45%) منهم أن الصفق والنزاعة هما من أهم أسباب هذا الاختيار. بناءً على التحليك والنزاع بين الناخبين، فقد يعتبر ذلك مؤشرًا على انطباعات المستطعين في السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية تطور عناصرها عن تحقيق التغيير الإيجابي.

في شهر تموز 2005، تبين أن رئيس الشعب الفلسطيني يدعم أكبر عدد من الشعب الفلسطيني إلى الرغب من إحداث تغييرات بالسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية. وتشير النتائج إلى أن القضية الأولى والأكبر أهمية بما يترافق بالسلطة الفلسطينية، والتي تشكل 나라ً من الأغلبية العظمى من الفلسطينيين (46%) من خلال النتيجة. بينما ذكرت عدد قدرة السلطة الفلسطينية على تحمل النظام في المرتبة الثانية.

أظهرت أغلبية الفلسطينيين في شهر تموز قلة قليلة في جزء السلطة الفلسطينية بما يترافق بإعداد التحليك على الهم من تقديم معايير إعادة التحليك، دعم تعيين محمود عباس رئيسًا للسلطة. حيث بثت (49%) من المستطعين أن إعادة التحليك قد يذكر توجيه العدد المستطعين إلى أن بعض موظفي السلطة الفلسطينية يجب أن يجريوا على التحقيق المبكر، واعتقل (39%) منهم إلى أنه يجب تسجيل بعض موظفي السلطة من职ًا.

حرية التعبير والإعلام

على الرغم من قلة الشعب الفلسطيني القليلة في السلطة الفلسطينية، أظهرت الأغلبية العظمى من الفلسطينيين (46%) أنها تستطيع التعبير عن آرائها وفكارها بحرية دون التهم بالخوف من السلطة. عند النظر إلى كافة الفلسطينيين في الإعلام، تأتي قناة الجزيرة في المرتبة الأولى، حيث تأتي قناة الجزيرة (44%) في المرتبة الثانية من حيث المصدر المعلوماتانية بنسبة (34%)، وذلك تطور هذه الدراسة الواردة من الأغلبية (27%) في قناة الجزيرة للاستغلال الفلسطيني في الأشهر الأخيرة. يتأتي الأخلاقيات الفلسطيني وإحداث الأمم المتحدة نسبة (30%) من حيث الأقلية. بينما تأتي قناة الجزيرة بنسبة (35%) التي تأتي قناة الجزيرة كأكبر وأول مصدر للمعلومات أولاً للنهاية في نفس الوقت. تشير الدراسة إلى أن (35%) من المستطعين اعتقدوا أن نقطة الإعلام الفلسطيني لحالات الفلسطينيين والأفكار الشعبية لها يمكن تحسينها، بينما اعتقل (24%) منهم بأنها سبعة للغاية.

عملية السلام

دعت الأغلبية العظمى من الشعب الفلسطيني (77%) التسوية السلمية مع إسرائيل. وتشير هذه النتيجة إلى أن هناك زيادة بنسبة (21%) في مستويات الدعم منذ شهر تشرين ثاني 2004. مع ذلك، يعتبر مستوى الدعم للثالث متغير غير مستقرة. وحالة المنطقة الاقتصادية والمخاطر الجغرافية.

من ناحية، يبدو أن هناك استعداد واضح من جهة المستطعين لإجراء ندوات متوازنة. فقد سأول المستطعين عام إذا واجب على السلطة الفلسطينية التخلي عن القوة بعد من أجل دولة فلسطينية قابلة للتطبيق، أعرب (35%) من المستطعين عن استعدادهم للتخلي عن حقوقهمزة للاستثمار، ومن ثم (40%) منهم عن استعدادهم للتخلي عن حقوقهمزة للأجانب. وثمة النتائج متمة التغير المدهش منذ الدراسة السابقة.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: التغييرات في الظروف الاقتصادية - الاجتماعية

في شهر تموز 2005، كان معدل الفقر الكلي (28٪) وكان عمق خطر الفقر شديد للغاية، حيث كانت نسبة (35٪) من السكان تعيش في وضع الفقر المدقع.

- كان هناك تدهور كلي في ظروف المعيشة في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة في الأشهر السابقة لحالة الانقسام الإسرائيلي من قطاع غزة، حيث ازدادت نسبة الذين يعيشون في وضع مدقع في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، من (32٪) في الفترة الواقعة بين شهرين تجاوز تاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005.

- إن تدهور الوضع العام في قطاع غزة وبناء الجدار الفاصل في الضفة الغربية أثر كلاهما ويشكل كبير على القرويين الفقراء والمزارعين المتواجدين في المناطق الريفية. حيث ازداد معدل الفقر مع (35٪) في الفترة الفلسطينية في الفترة الواقعة بين شهرين تجاوز تاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005، بينما وصلت نسبة الذين يعيشون في وضع مدقع إلى (33٪) مقارنة مع نسبة (23٪) في شهر تموز تاني 2004.

- من المتفق للنظر في تدهور الظروف المعيشية للفلسطينيين العاملين خارج مخيمات اللاجئين بشكل كبير في السنة السابقة. حتى وقت قريب، كان الفقر في داخل المخيمات أعلى من خارجه في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة. ولكن في شهر تموز 2005، كان مستوى الفقر في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة عاليًا، حيث كان يؤثر على نسبة (27٪) من المستوطنين خارج مخيمات اللاجئين مقارنةً مع (33٪) في داخلهم. مع ذلك، تنك في حالة الفقر المدقع أعلى في داخل مخيمات اللاجئين بنسبة (36٪) مقارنةً مع (31٪) خارجها، أما في قطاع غزة، كان معدل الفقر تراجعت بنسبة في داخل مخيمات اللاجئين، حيث ازدادت نسبة عدد الأسر الذين يعيشون في وضع مدقع إلى (49٪) في الفترة الواقعة بين شهرين تجاوز تاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005.

- من ناحية حالات الفقر الشخصية، تشير النتائج إلى نسبة (78٪) من المستوطنين الذين أكدوا أن دخلهم الشهري أقل بقليل أو أقل بكثير من الدخل الذي يحتاجون إليه لتأمين حاجاتهم الأساسية مقارنةً مع (71٪) في شهر تموز تاني 2004.

- في دراسة شهر تموز 2005، أكدت نسبة (60٪) من المستوطنين أن استهلاك أسرهم للغذاء في الشهر السابق كان أقل بكثير من كمية الغذاء المحتاجة، وقد (49٪) منهم أن الاستهلاك كان أقل من كمية الغذاء التي يحتاجون إليها في ذلك الشهر.

- أفادت نسبة (45٪) من الأشخاص ذوي الحالات المستعصية أن استهلاك أسرهم للغذاء كان أقل بكثير أو أقل من كمية الغذاء المحتاجة، وشددت نسبة (88٪) منهم على أن أسرهم تعاني من حروق شديد من الطعام.

- وبشكل عام، صرح (43٪) فقط من المستوطنين أنهم يستطيعون تدبير أمورهم المالية طالما لم يرم الأمر، بينما أكد (45٪) منهم أنهم بالكاد يستطيعون تدبير أمورهم أو أن يوفروهم صعبة للغاية.

- بمثابة الأزمة الاقتصادية – الاجتماعية، التي دامت خمس سنوات متتالية، من إنهاء مدخرات الأسر القاسية المعدلة. حيث تشير النتائج إلى انخفاض كبير في نسبة الأسر القاسية المعدلة التي كانت تتعقد على مدار السنوات من نسبة (72٪) في شهر تموز 2003 إلى نسبة (36٪) في شهر تموز 2005.

- أدى تدهور الوضع الاقتصادي في قطاع غزة خارج مخيمات اللاجئين إلى ازدياد في نسبة المستوطنين الذين أروا بعد دفعهم الفوائد الخاصة بهم من نسبة (42٪) إلى (51٪). بينما ازدادت نسبة المستوطنين الذين أروا إلى شراء حاجاتهم بالدين. في الفترة الواقعة بين شهرين تجاوز تاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005، من نسبة (49٪) إلى (36٪).

- على الرغم من الأزمة الاقتصادية الإستثنائية، تنبه المجتمع الفلسطيني حتى الآن، أن أشكال استهلاك الاقتصادية كبيرة وآمن التماسك الاجتماعي فيها. فقد اعتبر كثيرون المستوطنين أن وضع الأسرة الماليا الخاص بهم نشأة وضع غير أخر في المجتمع.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: سوق العمل

- تشير نتائج دراسة شهر تموز 2005 إلى أنه تم توظيف (14%) من القوى العاملة بدوام كامل، وبينما كان ربع القوى العاملة تقريباً عاطلين عن العمل وتلقت هذه القوى غير موظف كلياً.

- ازداد معدل التوظيف بدوام كامل زيادة بسيطة في الفترة الواقعة بين شهر تشرين ثاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005. ولكن لم يقد هذا المبادئ إلى اقتصاد البطالة فحسب، بل على عكس ذلك، سيب في زيادة هائلة في نسبة البطالة حيث ارتفعت من (27%) إلى (33%).

- كان معدل البطالة عال جداً خاصة في مخيمات اللاجئين، حيث كانت نسبته في شهر تموز 2005، تجاوز (44%) في الضفة الغربية و(41%) في قطاع غزة، مقترنة مع نسبة شهري تشرين ثاني 2004 التي كانت (36%)(29%) على التوالي.

- ازدادت نسبة البطالة بشكل كبير خارج مخيمات اللاجئين، حيث وصلت نسبته إلى (34%) في الضفة الغربية (38%) في قطاع غزة.

- ف إن نسبة (32%) فقط من الم苄ل الأسر في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة لم يكن عاطلين عن العمل خلال الانتفاضة الثنائية. بينما كانت نسبة (49%) منهم عاطلون عن العمل لمدة طويلة (أكثر من سنة واحدة). إضافة إلى ذلك، تشير النتائج إلى أن نسبة العاطلين عن العمل لمدة طويلة جداً (أكثر من سنتين) تمثل (37%) من نسبة المستطعفين.

- تكمن هذه البطالة شديدة خاصة لدى ذوي الثقافة المتدنية والعمال الأصغر عمراً. حيث تشير النتائج إلى أن معدل البطالة في القطاعات العمومية ما بين 20-36 سنة (51%) مقترنة بـ (23%) في القطاعات العقارية ما بين 44-49 سنة.

- يعد مستوى التعليم في الشراف الفلسطيني المتفاجي المتغير في توضيح مشاكل العمل في سوق العمل، حيث أن نسبة (20%) فقط، من العمال ذوي الثقافة المتدنية يعملون بدوام كامل، بينما نسبة (51%) منهم عاطلون عن العمل. وعلى النقيض، إذن نسبة (26%) من العمال ذوي الثقافة العالية يعملون بدوام كامل بينما نسبة (63%) منهم عاطلون عن العمل.

- أشارت نسبة (26%) من المستطعفين أن وظائفهم الحالية مستقرة وامتدت قفدهم لهذه الوظيفة ضئيلة. بينما أفادت نسبة (12%) أنهم من المحتمل جداً فقدواها (12%) أنهم محتملون فقدانها محتملا.

- تكوانت احتمالية البطالة للأفراد ذوي الحالات المستعصية كبيرة. حيث تكون احتمالية حصر هذه الفئة في فئات سينة من سوق العمل كبيرة للغاية والتي بدورها تؤدي إلى فقدان وظائفهم الحالية. أن نسبة (9%) فقط من الفئة ذوي الحالات المستعصية أن لديهم وظائف امتدت من 1990(39%) من العمال، بينما أفاد (55%) من الفئة السابقة أن خطر فقدان الوظيفة بالنسبة إليهم كان محتملا جداً بالنسبة (4%) من الفئة اللاحقة.

- يعتبر العمل بدوام جزئي من أهم أساليب الهروب من خطر الفقر، حيث أشارت الدراسة أن نسبة (71%) من غير العاطلين بدوام كامل، بينما كان (57%) من الذين يعملون في فقر مدقع عاطلين عن العمل ونسبة (27%) منهم يعملون بضع ساعات في اليوم.

- بالرغم من اعتبار العمل من أهم أساليب الهروب من خطر الفقر، إلا أن نسبة كبيرة من الفقراء يعملون حالياً، وتشير النتائج أيضاً أن هناك تلك كبيرة من الفقراء الذين يعملون ومع ذلك لا يستطيعون تأميم رزقهم. وأشارت دراسة شهر تموز 2005 إلى وجود نسبة (37%) من الذين يعملون بدوام كامل كانوا يعانون من فقر مدقع.

- ازدادت نسبة المستطعفين الذين شددوا على أن زراعة الأراضي في قطاع غزة كانت صعبة جداً أو شبه مستحيلة من (72%) إلى (141%) في الفترة الواقعة بين شهر تشرين ثاني 2004 وشهر تموز 2005.

- اضطر المزارعون في القدس الشرقية أيضاً إلى مواجهة المشاكل المتزايدة المتعلقة بالزراعة للأراضي، حيث شدد (20%) من المستطعفين، في شهر تموز 2005، إلى كون زراعة الأراضي صعبة جداً أو شبه مستحيلة مقترنة بـ (3%) في شهر تشرين ثاني 2004.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: الصحة

تُعتبر الصحة من ثالث أكثر الاحتياجات المنزلية أهمية. ولكنها تعد من رابع أكثر الاحتياجات المنزلية أهمية غير الخفية والتي تشير إلى أن هذا الامتحان مهم على نحو جيد. وتُعتبر الصحة من ثالث أكثر الاحتياجات المجتمعية أهمية.

من داخل الدراسة التي حصلت في هذا التقرير كان هناك سؤال للمستطلعين ما إذا احتاج أحد منهم أو أحد أفراد أسرته إلى عشرة أنواع من العناية الطبية المختلفة في الأشهر السبعة السابقة للدراسة. وقد كانت الحاجة إلى عناية مستشفى الطوارئ (48%) في هذه الفترة هي الأكثر احتياجات من أنواع العناية الطبية، ليهي الحاجة إلى العناية المتجولة للطفل المريض (40%).

كان هناك سؤال آخر للمستطلعين يتعلق بترسيب العناية الطبية بأنواعها، في الأشهر السبعة السابقة للدراسة. لذلك كانوا بحاجة إليها خلال زمن مقبول أو عدم حصولهم عليها، وتُشير النتائج إلى أن (30%) من المستطلعين أفادوا أنهم تلقوا العناية الطبية اللازمة وفقاً لمعايير مقبولة. ولكن كانBug the only هو عناء مستشفى الطوارئ حيث أشار (27%) من المستطلعين أنهم تلقوا مثل هذه المساعدة في غضون ساعات من طلبيهم.

فيما يتعلق بمزودي العناية الطبية بأنواعها، تعتبر وزارة الصحة المزود الرئيسي لمعظم أنواع الخدمات الصحية، باستثناء خدمات

سيارة إسعاف وخطط العائلة.

يُعتبر التأمين الصحي الحكومي الفلسطيني، وإلى حد أقل الأونروا من المزودين الرئيسيين للمساعدات وذلك من خلال تغطية نفقات الفلسطينيين الطبية. تتواجد نسبة أقل من الفلسطينيين الذين يعطون نفقاتهم الطبية من خلال مصادرهم الخاصة بين اللاجئين، في مخيمات اللاجئين في فلسطين غزة.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: الأطفال

- تعتبر الحاجة إلى ذهاب الأطفال الفلسطينيين إلى مدارسهم بانتظام من أهم الأولويات بالنسبة إلى أغلبية المستوطنين، بل هي الحاجة إلى فرص لعب الأطفال الأمنة وحاجتهم إلى تلقى الدعم النفسي. بيئة متعلق بحالات الأطفال للدعم النفسي ومشاركتها مع نتائج الاعتقادات العامة الفلسطينية - التقرير العام، يلاحظ ازدياد أهمية حاجة الأطفال الفلسطينيين للتعليم بطريقة أفضل مما كانت عليه قبل الانتفاضة. ولكن كان ذلك على حساب حاجة الدعم النفسي للأطفال، التي تعد الآن الحاجة الأقل طلباً والتي سوف تتحول - على المدى البعيد - إلى الحاجة الأهم بالنسبة إلى الأطفال الفلسطينيين.

- ينظر إلى المنتج الفلسطيني الجديد على أنه الإعاقة الرئيسية التي تتفرج في وجه تعليم الأطفال، تليه القيود المالية لأسرة الفلسطينية، وتحليل أبعاد المجموعات الفرعية المحتفظة من المجتمع الفلسطيني، كشف ذلك عن أن الانطباعات التي تنزل من المنتج الجديد تعتبر الإعاقة الرئيسية التي تتعلق بالتعليم، إذ تكون مناطق غزّة، لدى المقيمين في المخيمات، للأطفال، الذي الحالات النفسية وندلدي الثقافة المدنية.

إن أغلبية الفلسطينيين يعبرون عن استيائهم من المنتج الفلسطيني الجديد. ويتكون هذا الاستياء واضحًا بصورة كبيرة في قطاع غزة، في مخيمات اللاجئين، بين اللاجئين.

- تعبر أغلبية الشعب الفلسطيني (74%) عن شعورها بالرضا إزاء نوعية التعليم في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، ويعتبر مستوى الرضا الأعلى في الضفة الغربية، في القرى وبين ذوي الثقافة المدنية.

- تتعدى نسبة (73%) فقط من المستوطنين أن المدارس في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة تجعل على تحضير الأطفال على نحو جيد للتعليم العالي. وتعلق نسبة (72%) منهم أن المدارس تحضر الأطفال على نحو جديد لدخول سوق العمل.

- يستمر الأطفال في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة في إظهار علامات التوتر منذ بداية الانتفاضة الثانية. من خلال قائمة محددة.

- كشفت نسبة (72%) من الأطفال، (48%) نتائج مدرسية سليمة، (37%) السلوك الداخلي، (38%) فئة الاهتمام في الزواج أو انتظامات الاجتماعية أو الرياضية، (27%) كوابيس. (27%) الشبب، (27%) البالغ، (27%) للشهداء، (27%) فئة الاهتمام في الاختلافات.

- إن أغلبية الآباء (73%) يعتقدون أنهم قادرون على شهرة حادات أطفالهم بما يتعلق بالرعاية والحماية. ويفترض هذا الاعتقاد لدى الآباء الذين يعيشون في قطاع غزة، لدى الأسر الفقيرة المعدومة ومنذ ذوي الثقافة المدنية.

- تتعدى أغلبية المستوطنين (89%) وجود ضد الأطفال في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة. ويتكون هذا الاختلاف أقل انتشاراً في قطاع غزة، لدى ذوي الحالات المستفвиصة ولذوي الثقافة المدنية. أما بالنسبة إلى المصدر الرئيسي للعنف ضد الأطفال في السنة الماضية، فتغلب أغلبية المستوطنين (27%) اللواء على النزاع الفلسطيني - الإسرائيلي، بينما وجهت نسبة (37%) منهم أسعه الاختلاف عن الأسر المدنية في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة.

- هناك مصدر مهماً يعتمد عليها الشعوب الفلسطينية للحصول على المعلومات فيما يتعلق بالصحة وسلامة الأطفال. من أهم المصادر المهمة عن حيث ترتيبها، بحسب أهمية، هي: (1) محطات الاتصال المحلية، (2) الصحف، (3) التعليم، (4) إدارات الإذاعة المحلية، (5) الصحف المحلية اليومية، لا يعتمد الكثير من المستوطنين على المعلومات والكليات أو على المعلومات والاجتماع في حصولهم على المعلومات بما يتعلق بالصحة والحالات النفسية للأطفال.

- تشير نتائج هذه الدراسة إلى أن المراهقين (من عمر 14 إلى 19 سنة) في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة يضيقون أوقات فراغهم، من حيث ترتيبهم بحسب أهمية، كما يلي: (73%) من المراهقين يقضون أوقات فراغهم في أوقات فراغهم، ومنهم، (78%) منهم يلعبون في الجوار، (74%) منهم يشتهر، وهم يمارسون رياضاتهم، (74%) منهم يشاركون في النشاطات الرياضية، (74%) منهم يذهبون إلى دور الثقافة، (74%) منهم يذهبون إلى النوادي، (74%) منهم يحضرون الأحداث السياسية أو الثقافية، (74%) منهم يشغفون (100%) منهم يتسلقون في الشوارع.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: الاحتياجات والأولويات

تقييم احتياجات الأسرة الفلسطينية

- 167% من الأسر الفلسطينيين كانوا يتأثرون بحاجة إلى الكثير من المساعدات في شهر تموز 2005، وهذه تعد زيادة بنسبة (78%) منذ شهر

- 47% من اللاجئين يتأثرون بحاجة إلى الكثير من المساعدات، بينما (84%) من غير اللاجئين أظهروا بحاجتهم لمساعدات.

- 59% من الفلسطينيين الذين يعيشون في حالات الفقر المدقع بحاجة إلى الكثير من المساعدات.

- 15% من المستقلين المتواجدين في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة بحاجة إلى الكثير من المساعدات.

- 21% من المقيمين في المخيمات بحاجة إلى المساعدات.

- بالشكل الكلي، بينما نصف سكان البلدان الأخرى هم بحاجة أيضاً إلى الكثير من المساعدات.

مقارنة مع الدراسة السابقة، فإن الحاجة إلى المساعدات أتت بالزيادة. خاصة خارج مخيمات اللاجئين في الضفة الغربية (زيادة بنسبة 9%) وقطاع غزة (زيادة بنسبة 5%); بينما تبقى الاحتياجات للمساعدات شبه مستقرة داخل مخيمات اللاجئين.

احتاجية الأسرة الأكثر أهمية

- ظل الغذاء الاحتياج الأساسي للأسرة الفلسطينية في شهر تموز 2005، بلغ الاحتياج إلى مساهمة في الجبهة الصحية، التعليم والوظيف.

- قبل تصريح اعتماداً، أصبحت احتياجات الإنسان وإعداد الأسرة الموحدة في القنوات الستة الأخيرة.

إن الاحتياج الأساسي بالنسبة إلى أهلية الضفة الغربية هو العبء الصحي الهائي: بينما بعد التوظيف الاحتياج الأساسي لاكالالي قطاع غزة.

بالنسبة إلى حالة المستقلين، كان الاحتياج الأساسي لاكالالي كما بلغ الإنسان (21%)، ومن ثم التوظيف (22%). بلغ العناية الصحية والغذاء (77%) لكلهما. أما بالنسبة إلى غير اللاجئين، يعتبر الحفاظ والعناية الصحية (21%) لكلهما من أهم الأولويات.

ظل التوظيف من الاحتياجات الأساسية غير الملبى في شهر تموز 2005، حيث بعد التوظيف من مهم الاحتياجات غير الملبية بالنسبة إلى أهلية قطاع غزة، بينما يعتبر أهلية الضفة الغربية المساعدات المالية من أهم الاحتياجات الأسرة غير الملبية.

احتاجية المجتمع الأكثر أهمية

- إن نسبة هالة من الفلسطينيين (44%) الذين اعتقدوا أن المساعدات الأكثر احتياجاً هي مساعدات التوظيف وحل مشكلات البطالة. يزايد احتياج الإنسان بشكل كبير يقدر بنسبة (22%)، كما هو الحال في احتياج التعليم في المجتمع. تلتها احتياجات العنابة الصحية.

- كما ذكر (31%) من المستقلين.

احتاجية البنية التحتية الأكثر أهمية

- تعتبر شكرة توزيع المياه من أهم موارد البنية التحتية الأكثر احتياجاً، كما ذكر (24%) من المستقلين.

- اعتبار أغلبية المستقلين أن خرج الهاتف الأرضي من أهم خدمات التواصل.

توفر الخدمات

- يمكن عام، أن غالبية الشعب الفلسطيني موصولون بشبكة الاتصالات (69%) وشبكة المياه (21%)، إن نسبة (75%) من الأسر الفلسطينية موصولون بشبكة الاتصالات، بينما (31%) منهم موصولون بشبكة الهواتف الثابتة، عمد أجمالي خدمات توفير الاتصالات، فإن أكثر من نصف سكان موصولون بشبكة الهواتف الأرضية (65%), بينما (55%) منهم موصولون بشبكة الاتصالات. يملك (95%) منهم أجهزة تلفاز (75%) منهم لديهم صحن لأقتصاد.
المؤشرات الرئيسية: المساعدات بشكل عام

المساعدات بشكل عام

- معدل المساعدات المزودة بنسبة (8%) من십시오 شهر تشرين الثاني. 2004. ففي شهر تموز 2005 (38%) من المستقلين تلقوا المساعدات.

- في فترة الأشهر السابقة لاستلام المساعدات شملت هذه المساعدات كبيرة خاصة في الضفة الغربية (انخفاض بنسبة 8% من شهر تشرين ثاني 2004) وقد كان أقل مستوي لهذه المساعدات متحركة خارج الخدمات التي تقدمها الخدمة المختلفة، فقد ظل مستوى المساعدات مرتفعاً في قطاع غزة (46%) خاصة في مبادرات اللاجئين (75%).

- في حالات الأزمة الخاصة لنقلي إمداد هذه المساعدات على مناطق ذات الحالات المعقدة من السكان، لذلك، فقد قُلّ

- تلقى حوالي ثلث المستقطبين المساعدات الغذائية (31%)، بلياً الدعم المالي (8%)، بينما استفاد (24%) منهم من مساعدات

التوظيف.

- إن هناك انخفاض واضح في متوسط قيمة جميع أنواع المساعدات مجمعة، حيث كانت متوسط القيمة تعادل 300 شكل في شهر


- بتوفير الأدوات المزودة الرئيسية للمستقلين قسم بهما السماء الوطنية الفلسطينية (50%) و

- الملاحظات الدولية (2%) في الدراسة الثالثة.


التوظيف


- قالت 15000 مساعدة توظيف على مستوى القرد بنسبة (24%). بينما كانت نسبة المستقلين الذين استفادوا منهم من مثل هذه

- هو نسبة تستقلين 2004، بالنسبة للمستقلين، حيث انخفض كبير في الوظائف النضالية للأمم، في الدراسة التي

- أجريت في شهر تموز 2005، (78%) من المستقلين أن السلطة الفلسطينية تعد الممول الأساسي لمساعدات التوظيف على

- مستوى الأفراد، أما بالنسبة للأونروا، فإنها ما زالت مصدر مهم، كما ذكر بعض المستقلين. بشكل عام، قيمت أغلبية المستقلين من مساعدات التوظيف، ونسبتهم (70%). هذه المساعدات بطريقة إيجابية.

قضايا الغذاء وتشغيل

- نسب المستقلين الذين لم يكن استهلاكم للغذاء كافياً كانت عالية، حيث استهلك (19%) من المستقلين كمية غذاء أقل

- من الكميات التي يحتاجون إليها بينما استهلك (20%) منهم كمية غذاء أقل بكثير من الكميات المحتملة.

- استهلنا أفعال الضفة الغربية كمية غذاء أقل بنسبة (14%) من كمية الغذاء الذي تحتاج إليها، بينما استهلكت كمية غذاء أقل بكثير بنسبة (30%) من الكميات المحتملة. أما في قطاع غزة، فإنه من الواضح معرفة أن الأسماك هناك لا تستخدم تحمل نقاط الغذاء، يظهر أن الأسماك التي تعيش خارج مياه اللاجئين تواجد صعودية في تحملها لنقاط الغذاء التي تحتاج إليها أكثر من الأسماك التي

- تعيش في داخلي.

- في شهر تموز 2005، كانت نسبة (8%) من المستقلين إلى بعض السلف الأساسية على أنها من أهم الأصناف الغذائية التي تحتاج

- إليها، حيث غيرت المحمولة مادتها معلاً أكثر الأصناف الغذائية أهمية.


- حيث أقرت الأغلبية العظمى من المستقلين (75%) أنها آمنة على منطقتها للأفراد، في شهر تموز 2005، (60%) من المستقلين آمنةً من كمية الأشهر السنة الماضية، بينما شارك نفس المستقلين

- توجهوا إلى استمتع الأصبات الغذائية الأخرى في الفترات الزمنية نفسها. استمت نسبة (20%) من المستقلين، والأسماك الغذائية في الأشهر السنة الماضية، حيث كانت الأسماك على ذكر (24%) من
المؤشرات الرئيسية: اللاجئين والأنوروا

من أهم النتائج دراسة شهر توزر 2000 هي معاداة اللاجئين، وهي تشكل ملمس من شدة الفضفاضية أكثر بكثير من بقية أبناء الشعب الفلسطيني غير اللاجئين، مما يعمل على تغيير التناقض في مستوى الفقر الذي كان متقاربا بين اللاجئين وغيرهم من الفلسطينيين، كما كانت الحال في الدراسات السابقة. فعلى سبيل المثال، إزدادت النفوذ بين نسبة حالات الفقر المدقع بين اللاجئين وغير اللاجئين بنسبة (48%).

كما أكد عدد أكبر من اللاجئين بأن دخولهم قد تناقص خلال الأشهر الستة الماضية (32%) من اللاجئين مقارنة بنسبة 78% من غير اللاجئين، فيما أفاد عدد أقل من اللاجئين بأن مستوى الدخل لديهم بقي ثابتا (72%) من اللاجئين و37% من غير اللاجئين.

من الناحية الجغرافية، نيات مخيمات اللاجئين في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة من المناطق الأقل قوة على الإطلاق. أما بالنسبة للتدور في الأوضاع المعيشية للشعب الفلسطيني، فقد كان تأثيره أكبر على سكان القرى والمدن في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة.

ما زال اللاجئون، وخاصة الذين يقطنون داخل مخيمات اللاجئين، يشكلون المستفيد الأول من المساعدات بشكل عام حيث تلقى (70%) منهم من المساعدات عند إجراء هذه الدراسة في توزر 2000 مقارنة بنسبة (21%) من غير اللاجئين. وبالرغم من هذا فإن السبب الرئيسي لهذه نسبة الفقر بين اللاجئين يعود إلى تناقص المساعدات المقدمة لهم، وثبت أن نسبة المساعدات الغذائية، فقد قللت أهمية جميع أنواع المساعدات الأخرى بالنسبة لللاجئين وغير اللاجئين بشكل متوازي خلال هذه الفترة. ومع ذلك، وسبب إمدادات اللاجئين بشكل أساسي على هذه المساعدات المقدمة من الموانع المختلفة فأن تناقص المساعدات أثر بشكل أكبر على اللاجئين.

أما بالنسبة للبطالة، ومع أن نسبة المستفيدين من مشروع الشفيلة التي تنفذه وكالة الغوث (الأوروا) قد أزدادت في فترة هذه الدراسة، إلا أن محاربلاً الأنوروا لزيادة فرص العمل لم تكن كافية وحدها للتصدى لأزمة البطالة التي تفاقمت في النصف الأول من العام 2005.

ولذا، ومن الطبيعي، أصبحت الحاجة إلى العمل لدى اللاجئين وغيرهم من الفلسطينيين أهم حاجة غير ملبأ في فترة الدراسة بنسبة (71%) من وليبيا، والمساعدات أوالبنسبة (17%)، والتعليم بنسبة (15%) وتعليماً، بل وتعليمناً، في السنوات السابقة، وأهم حاجة غير ملبأ بالنسبة لللاجئين من ثم الإسكان بنسبة (72%) وتعليماً، وتعليماً، وتعليماً.

وتجدر الإشارة أنه بشكل كلي، فقد كان هناك انخفاض ملحوظ على نسبة اللاجئين الذين يعتبرون المساعدات التقليدية مثل الصحة والتعليم والرعاية، والمساعدة في المساعدات الغذائية والمساعدات الأخرى بهذه النسبة، ويمكن اعتبار ذلك كنتيجة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة للتخفيف في سياسة الإغاثة الإسرائيلية وانخفاض عدد الإشكال خرج مساعدة في المناطق الفلسطينية المختلفة.

ويمكن أن نعزى ذلك أيضاً إلى التحسين في أساليب توزيع وتطبيق برامج المساعدات التعليمية والصحية والإجتماعية ومشاريع التشغيل من قبل وكالة الغوث (الأوروا) في الظروف العادية والحالات الطارئة لللاجئين المسجلين كما أفاد (45%) من اللاجئين المستغلين في هذه الدراسة.