BORDERS, CIRCULATION AND SPORT
MEGA-EVENT SECURITY: THE EXAMPLE
OF EURO 2008 IN SWITZERLAND
AND AUSTRIA

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Abstract
The paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating to security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria (Euro 2008). The objective is to study the role and modalities of border and access control in the context of sport mega-event security on various national and urban scales. This investigation seeks to demonstrate that security and surveillance at sport mega-events are shaped, fundamentally, by efforts towards the increased flexibility, variability and mobility (in both space and time) of carefully orchestrated access, passage and border controls. At stake in this “mobile border assemblage” are a large variety of phenomena, places and scales: from classic border controls at the national boundaries to a wide range of inter- and intra-urban enclosures and passage points (Graham, 2010) aimed at monitoring, restricting, filtering and also managing and facilitating different forms and modalities of circulation (of people and objects). This paper explores the reasons, logics and characteristics of this phenomenon.

Following Michel Foucault’s conceptual distinction between (apparatuses of) “discipline” and “security” (Foucault, 2009), the paper also aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental insights into the spatialities of contemporary security and surveillance. Two key issues stand out: firstly, the complex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and reconciliation of the core requirements of mobility and surveillance in contemporary security governance, and secondly, the multi-scalar, public-private interests and forms of expertise associated with this phenomenon.

Key Words
Border, Circulation, Mobility, Security, Surveillance, Sport Mega-Events, Euro 2008

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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, security governance at sport mega-events has been undergoing profound change, notably in terms of costs, personnel and surveillance technologies, as well as the rising influence of transnational, public-private partnerships and perceived security threats (political violence, hooliganism and terrorism in particular) (Samatas 2007; Haggerty and Boyle 2009; Yu, Klauser and Chan 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). This paper explores a very specific take on this subject.

My broad aim is to study the role and modalities of border and access control in the context of sport mega-event security on different national and urban scales. More specifically, I seek to demonstrate that security and surveillance at sport mega-events are shaped, fundamentally, by efforts towards the increased flexibility, variability and mobility (in both space and time) of carefully orchestrated access, passage and border controls. This paper aims to investigate the reasons, logics, characteristics and socio-spatial implications of this phenomenon.

To do so, the paper draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year research project relating to security governance at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and Austria (Euro 2008). Facilitated by longstanding research collaboration, the project involved ten in-depth interviews with stakeholders in the policing of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city of Geneva. These included the security coordinator of the Euro 2008 stadium in Geneva, security personnel at Geneva International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice in Geneva, the city’s security coordinator and police ground personnel. Furthermore, the research relied on the extensive study of official documents (minutes of local executive and parliament sittings, executive responses to local, regional and national parliamentary interpellations, and official documents from police sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from local, national and international media articles.

2. APPROACH

The paper is divided into three main parts. Firstly, I discuss four main reasons for which issues of border control are of special importance for sport mega-event security and, in turn, for which the mega-event case study has special appeal for the purpose of addressing contemporary border developments. This will then lead on to parts two and three of the paper, which are concerned with the spatial and temporal flexibility and variability of border and access control at Euro 2008. My central thesis is that mega-event security relies on a wide range of efforts to create a temporally and spatially dynamic patchwork of access and passage control points aimed at monitoring, restricting and filtering as well as managing and facilitating different forms and modalities of circulation (of people and objects) across the host nation and host cities of the event. At stake in this “mobile border assemblage” are a large variety of phenomena, places and scales, from classic border controls to a multiplicity of intra-urban enclosures and passage points (Graham 2010).
This paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive overview of this topic, but proposes an exploratory analysis of select aspects of mobile borders in the context of Euro 2008, situated on two main scales: the host nations (1) and the host cities (2) of the tournament. This approach also aims to bring to the fore a number of more fundamental insights in contemporary security governance. Two key issues stand out: firstly, the complex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and reconciliation of the core requirements of mobility and surveillance, circulation and enclosure in contemporary security governance; and secondly, the multi-scalar, public-private collaboration and interests associated with this phenomenon.

2.1. Interplays of surveillance, bordering and mobility

The complex interplay of surveillance, bordering and mobility in the post 9/11 context has sparked a revealing literature over the last few years (Albert and Jacobsen 2001; Bigo 2003; Walters 2004; Zureik and Salter 2005; Amoore 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008). One of the key lessons deriving from the literature is that the distinction between inter-state border control and the monitoring of more diffuse access and passage points across the national and urban territory is increasingly blurred from a spatial, functional, technological and organisational viewpoint, and therefore quite relative (Graham 2010).

Recent developments towards so-called “smart” or “biometric” borders, for example, enable much more flexible and mobile forms of policing of trans- and intra-national circulations of people and objects (Amoore 2008). Yet besides their state and policing applications, novel control, filtering and identification techniques are also increasingly used in private places, and for private purposes, from RFID chips in tickets to fingerprint identification and face recognition for access control to buildings and larger spatial enclaves.

In this emerging system of connections and separations, there are yet still myriads of other places and sites, based on more sporadic and permeable access control, separating more or less purified “insides” from more or less dangerous “outsides” (Franzen 2001:207). Examples range from gated communities (Connell 1999) to shopping malls (Benton-Short 2007) and from airports (Adey 2004; Salter 2008) and other highly secured transport hubs to recreational facilities, leisure spaces and bunkerized private homes (Klauser 2010).

In this context of ever more generalised types and logics of access and passage controls, “the contemporary border is constituted as much by data-flows, artificial zones and spaces of enclosure that seep into the city and the neighbourhood, as by older state and geographic boundaries” (Amoore, Marmura and Salter 2008:96). As Graham argues, “borders cease to be geographical lines and filters between states (always an over-simplified idea) and emerge instead as increasingly interoperable assemblages of control technologies strung out across the world’s infrastructures, circulations, cities and bodies” (Graham 2010:132).

In this paper, my aim is to address this problematic through the lens of sport mega-event security. In view of this analysis, two main conceptual tools will first be introduced.
2.2. Discipline and security

My investigation draws heavily upon Michel Foucault’s distinction between (apparatuses of) “discipline” and “security” (Foucault 2009). With the help of these conceptual tools, Foucault distinguishes between two types – or “arts” (Foucault 2009:92) – of governing, i.e. between two “economies of power” (Foucault 2009:11) shaping, and shaped by, different sets of relationships and procedures for organising and regulating the two fundamental objects of government: population and territory. Foucault, in sum, proposes a “history of governmentality” (Foucault 2009:247) concerned with the question of how governing relates to its two main objects and “resources”.

Apparatuses of “discipline” and of “security”, for Foucault, differ in multiple ways and on multiple levels: in terms of their treatment of the uncertain, their relationship to normalisation, their specific procedures and techniques of power and, perhaps most interestingly, their spatial logics and articulations. For Foucault, the purpose of discipline is the “constitution of an empty, closed space within which artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and organized” (Foucault 2009:17). The functioning of discipline thus relies on spatial enclosure, isolation and segmentation in order to impose a predefined model of normativity.

“Discipline, of course, analyzes and breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, movements, actions, and operations. […] Second, discipline classifies the components thus identified according to definite objectives. […] Third, discipline establishes optimal sequences or co-ordinations. […] Fourth, discipline fixes the process of progressive training and permanent control, and finally, on the basis of this, it establishes the division between those considered unsuitable or incapable and the others. […] Disciplinary normalisation consists first of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model (Foucault 2009:56-57).

In contrast, the aim of “security”, for Foucault, is to “let things happen”, whilst also regulating and monitoring them (Foucault 2009:41). The limit of the acceptable is not merely conditioned by a binary opposition between the permitted and the prohibited, but adapted gradually to a given reality, in function of careful calculations and through complex procedures. Here reality is approached from a techno-scientific viewpoint as an ensemble of intelligible and manageable entities and conditions of governing. The question at stake is how to know, to regulate and to act upon this reality within a “multivalent and transformable framework” (Foucault 2009:20). In this view, techniques of information gathering and analysis are, of course, of fundamental importance. “Surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) and databases, for the purposes of calculation, simulation and anticipation, are the very basis and means of Foucauldian “security”.

The spatial logic of “security”, thus, is not one of enclosure, fixity and isolation, but one of circulation. “Spaces of security” respond to the need to regulate, optimise and manage flows.
“The problem is not only that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, shifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out (Foucault 2009:65).

In this paper, Foucault’s distinction between “discipline” and “security” will be mobilised to interrogate the intertwined spatial and functional logics of access and passage controls at Euro 2008. I will show that logics of “discipline” and of “security” were present in combination at Euro 2008, underpinning and shaping the efforts towards increased flexibility and mobility of the complex border assemblages at the tournament.

3. THE BORDER PROBLEMATIC IN SPORT MEGA-EVENT SECURITY

By way of introduction, four main characteristics of the border problematic associated with sport mega-event security need highlighting. This discussion also underscores the importance and key challenges of border control in the context of sport mega-events both on the inter- and intra-state level.

3.1. Issues of circulation in mega-event security

The expansion of sport mega-events into globalised media spectacles has dramatically increased the economic significance of the tournaments. Yet as the events have expanded, and especially since 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, the increased transnational significance of mega-events has also resulted in dramatically reinforced security efforts (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). Security expenditure for the 2004 Athens Olympics amounted to £0.7 billion, more than double that for the 2000 Sydney games (Samatas 2007), and recent cost estimates for security arrangements at the forthcoming 2012 London Olympics approach £1 billion, a figure which is likely to increase further (Magnay 2010).

At the core of this cost explosion lies a deep concern with the threats posed by terrorism, political violence and hooliganism (Jennings and Lodge 2009). Despite the fundamental differences between these three types of risk, they share some common features, which shape the security efforts surrounding contemporary sport mega-events. Three of these features are particularly important from a border perspective.

- Firstly, terrorism, political violence and hooliganism are, fundamentally, trans-scalar in nature and implication. The risks they pose, their origins, their characteristics and manifestations, as well as their policing, depend on and bring together local, national and transnational components, issues and actors (Bigo 2003).
Secondly, and building upon the first point, terrorism, political violence and hooliganism are all connected in important ways with issues of mobility. Recent terrorist attacks in New York (11 September 2001), Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) focused on, and worked through, inter- and intra-urban mobility systems (trains, buses, aeroplanes). Political violence and hooliganism are linked with mobility, in that (1) mobility systems enable and shape their development and current globalisation; (2) mobility systems are often affected by both kinds of risks; and (3) mobility systems are at the very core of current policing efforts directed at political violence and hooliganism (travel restrictions, filtering of international mobilities, etc.).

Thirdly, monitoring and combating terrorism, hooliganism and political violence at sport mega-events occurs in the same context of increased density, diversity and visibility (media exposure).

Thus all three types of risk raise the same dilemma for mega-event security: how to keep the host nation’s borders open and cities moving whilst also anticipating, monitoring and combating the security threats at the tournament. At the interface of two apparently opposed worlds – the necessary entrance and circulation of visitors, spectators and officials, and the institution of security measures and restrictions – the basic problem is how to manage and secure increased scales and densities of circulation within a context of heightened risks, density, diversity and media exposure. Security issues, in this context, are addressed by a set of practices and techniques whose key challenge is to balance the demands for mobility and enclosure. This challenge – essentially a problem of how to articulate “security” and “discipline” in Foucault’s terms – is of course not exclusive to sport mega-events (Aas 2005; Amoore 2006). However, it is of heightened relevance in this context because of the event’s scale and special characteristics. Relevant questions are:

- How are the core requirements of mobility and security, circulation and surveillance balanced in the context of sport mega-events?
- How do emerging geographies of surveillance and security at sport mega-events work to align different types of circulation with identification, verification and authentication controls?
- How do the practices and techniques of surveillance – as means and tools of mobility governance – engage with the key infrastructural networks that aim to keep people moving through and between cities?

The basic assumption of this paper is that it is precisely to these questions that efforts towards increased border flexibility, variability and mobility aim to respond.

3.2. Multi-scalar (local-national-transnational) security cooperation

Sport mega-events provide not only an exemplary illustration of the intertwined local, national and transnational origins, modalities and implications of risks and security threats, but also of the multi-scalar functioning and logics of security partnerships, information exchange, norms and agreements. A few examples taken from Euro 2008 in Switzerland provide a flavour thereof.
• In 1990, Switzerland ratified the “European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sporting Events” (Council of Europe Convention SR0.415.3), promoting the exchange of information and police cooperation for sport events. For Euro 2008, Switzerland also concluded a range of additional ad hoc agreements with neighbouring, transit and participating countries. Interestingly, several agreements written up for earlier events were used again for Euro 2008 (examples include the international treaty for air defence with France, signed at the occasion of the 2003 G8 summit in Evian near Geneva, and the air defence agreement with Italy, established for the 2004 Turin Winter Olympics). This observation resonates with those literatures that describe sport mega-events as catalysts in setting off longer-lasting international security collaborations (Chan 2002).

• As was the case during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the Euro 2008 host cities ensured that foreign fan groups were accompanied by police and fan monitors from their own countries. In addition, Switzerland asked France and Germany to supply up to 1,000 police officers (a total of 5,250 working days) to increase its police contingent for Euro 2008 (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a:50).

• Finally, it is important to acknowledge the strong collaboration between public security authorities and Euro 2008 SA, a subsidiary company of UEFA and the official organiser of the event. Indeed, security in stadia and official UEFA fan zones was mandated to Euro 2008 SA, who decided to implement the task by contracting private security companies (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination 2007:47). In studying cross-border cooperation in security governance at sport mega-events, therefore, it is also necessary to consider the important roles played by the event organisers (UEFA, FIFA, IOC, etc.) and private security companies.

The examples cited above provide a good starting point for considering the multiple partnerships and agreements linking together local, national and international security stakeholders at Euro 2008. As privileged loci where transnationally operating security players meet with locally anchored stakeholders, sport mega-events exemplify the cross-scalar interdependences present in contemporary security governance. Thus the border problem at sport mega-events is not only how to filter, monitor and, if necessary, restrict different types of circulations, but also how to set up efficient security governance across different national, regional and local (institutional, legal, political, linguistic, etc.) contexts and separations. The two questions are intrinsically related, since efforts towards the increased flexibility and mobility of border controls at Euro 2008 indeed relied on carefully orchestrated trans-scalar security collaboration and exchange.

### 3.3. Circulating events and best-practices

A third border issue associated with sport mega-event security is related to the events’ own circulation from nation to nation and city to city. This raises an important question with regard to how relevant expertise and best-practice models circulate transnationally across different types of borders (political, socio-cultural, linguistic, etc.).
As I have emphasised elsewhere (Klauser 2011a; 2011b), there are many good reasons for understanding sport mega-events as highly visible and prestigious projects whose securitisation is firmly embedded in more or less coercive transnational circuits of imitation and standardisation. This issue is not at the core of the present paper, but it is nonetheless vital for an understanding of the origins and development of the cross-border collaborations and transnational “mobile border assemblages” underpinning event security.

3.4. Exceptionality of the event

In the context of sport mega-events, some of the most important trans-scalar and mobility-related issues concerning contemporary security become crystallised in a specific set of layered national and urban geographies. The exceptionality of the event increases the weight and perceived importance of particular security projects undertaken for the event, whilst at the same time decreasing the scope for criticism and opposition (Tomlinson 2009). Thus mega-events trigger and facilitate projects and developments which would not otherwise have been possible; Euro 2008 made no exception to this (Klauser 2011c).

Many of the special security preparations, efforts and investments for constructional measures, surveillance technologies, novel legislation and security partnerships for Euro 2008 conveyed an explicit border dimension. This can be seen, for example, in the aforementioned cross-border collaboration agreements with neighbouring countries, in special visa regulations and in novel mobile fingerprint identification devices (these examples are discussed in more detail below). The scale and exceptionality of Euro 2008 thus produced important changes in the ways in which Switzerland and Austria dealt with border-crossing flows and restrictions both during and after the event, on different geographical scales and for different reasons.

4. FLEXIBLE BORDERS AT EURO 2008: THE INTER-STATE LEVEL

The staging of Euro 2008 in an EU member state (Austria) and a non-EU country (Switzerland) raised important questions relating to the inter-state border between the two countries. Issues were further complicated by the fact that prior to Euro 2008, Switzerland had not yet implemented the EU Schengen agreement on European cross-border police cooperation.

The specific border challenges arising from Switzerland’s political individualism were countered by a range of either pre-existing or specifically crafted arrangements with participating, neighbouring or transit countries (Public Authorities Security Sector Coordination UEFA EURO 2008 2007:17). For example, a temporary visa agreement was signed between the Schengen nations and Switzerland: whilst the border between Austria and Switzerland remained a border between an EU member state and a non-EU country (thus with border controls in place), no specific Swiss visa was required for fans from participating Schengen countries. This special arrangement also
included a temporary agreement for border controls to be manned by mixed teams of staff from both countries (Amies 2008; Klauser 2011c).

In order to further investigate the logics and guiding principles of border control at Euro 2008 on the inter-state level, I propose to look in some detail at the following quote, taken from the final report on Euro 2008 in Switzerland (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a). The quote is long and relatively generalist in its tone, but it brings to the fore at least three main ambitions associated with border control at Euro 2008, including differential (1), mobile (2) and diffuse (3) control strategies and measures. Each of these deserves some discussion below.

“The main purpose of the joint activities was to prevent potentially violent fans from entering or leaving the country. Emphasis was placed on the main traffic axes and delegated airports. Furthermore, the GWK [border guard corps] took part in the FRONTEX Joint Operation […] for the fight against illegal immigration at the external EU borders, and were involved in the collection of information through RAILPOL, the network of police forces for European rail. […] Border control authorities and customs – in coordination with the airport operators – offered facilitated arrival and departure conditions to teams, VIPs and officials. Shared standards were guaranteed through process instructions given to the airports, the “team liaison officers” and the “team security liaison officers”. International trains, (scheduled and extra trains) were assessed for specific risks by both the police and the train attendants, as well as by the GWK after crossing the border, and accompanied to their destinations. Between 7 and 29 June, the GWK prevented 149 illegal immigrations and implemented 702 refusals of entry at the border. 110 of these were due to an active travel ban, of which 12 were registered in the HOOGAN databases” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a:43–44, my translation).

4.1. **Differential border control**

The quote portrays border control as an exercise of differentiation and categorisation of transnational flows of people and objects. Echoing Foucault’s understanding of the functioning of “security”, the stated objective of border control is to allow circulations to take place whilst differentiating, monitoring and regulating them. International mobilities are categorised into target groups and risk categories and then treated and monitored accordingly. Whilst “bad” (risky) travellers are singled out and stopped, based on international databases and police/intelligence collaboration, border crossings and circulations of “good” visitors are induced, facilitated and accelerated. The aim is to segregate “legitimate” mobilities, such as peaceful fans and official delegations, from “illegitimate” mobilities, such as hooligans, illegal immigrants and political activists.

Of course, such differential control and treatment of international mobilities is neither new nor exclusive to sport mega-events. A growing body of work has in recent years highlighted the increasingly powerful, technology-based possibilities of tracking and differentiating international flows of people and objects, and the problems associated with these developments (Aas 2005:200;
Amoore 2008; Amoore, Marmura and Slater 2008:98). Thus extensive literatures show that such processes of ordering and (software-) sorting are never neutral. The deployed codes and databases constitute often invisible processes of classification and prioritization, which affect the life-chances of individuals or social groups in ways that are often opaque to the public and that easily evade conventional democratic scrutiny. The case of mega-event security presents at least three special qualities, which are further increasing this problem, in need of some discussion here.

Firstly, it is important to note that to a large extent, the preferential treatment of particular visitor categories had already been requested at the pre-bidding stage by UEFA. As a pre-condition for their bid for Euro 2008, the Austrian and Swiss governments and football associations had to provide a series of guarantees relating to a wide range of issues. These included provision of event security, the protection of UEFA’s commercial rights, granting visas/work permits, and the free importation of goods listed in UEFA’s “Schedule of Conditions” (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008a:100–105). From the very start of the bidding process for Euro 2008, UEFA ensured that official delegations (such as UEFA delegates, delegations of national teams, official UEFA partners, official LOC suppliers and media journalists) were provided with free visas and exempted of taxes linked to their professional activities in Switzerland. Thus, the differential treatment of international mobilities at Euro 2008 not only resulted from risk assessments and security considerations, but also responded to external stipulations, private interests and commercial rationales. In later parts of this paper, further imbrications between security and business interests will be explored, on other geographical scales. Together, these comments reiterate the need to problematise the often unquestioned public-private coalitions of interest and authority underpinning and shaping the differential treatment of social groups and individuals, with a view, most notably, to implied effects in terms of social justice and (positive or negative) social discrimination.

The second special quality to highlight relates to what made differential border control possible in the first place; namely, increased possibilities of knowing, tracking and restricting border-crossing flows of people and objects, grounded in additional policing strategies and special surveillance measures. The temporary reintroduction of border control with neighbouring countries (i.e. with Schengen partners in the case of Europe) is perhaps the most tangible example at hand. Interestingly, this measure has now become a standard security strategy for major sport events: Portugal reintroduced border checks during the European Football Championships 2004, as did Finland during the 2005 World Championships in Athletics held in Helsinki. Yet for Euro 2008, border controls had to be reintroduced only in Austria. In Switzerland, since the EU Schengen agreement had not been implemented before Euro 2008, border controls were still in place and needed only to be increased and adapted to the specific needs and conditions of the event.

Yet efforts towards differentially reinforced border control at Euro 2008 also relied on less tangible special measures, related to novel legislation and increased efforts in gathering, analysing and exchanging data. The above quote hints at the use of the RAILPOL information system and the international HOOGAN database, but many other examples could be provided. In Switzerland, for instance, special anti-hooligan legislation had been introduced before Euro 2008, offering much
increased autonomy to police for arresting and monitoring suspected hooligans. This also brought about novel possibilities for international collaboration and information exchange (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft 2011). These examples reiterate powerfully that to understand the paths, processes and networks of the movements of persons, we also need to examine the paths, processes and networks of the movement of their personal data and information (Zureik and Salter 2005:5; Aas 2005:197). Again, this issue is not exclusive to mega-event security, but the special conditions and measures deployed at mega-events add further importance to it.

Thirdly, and in line with Foucault’s understanding of “security”, the example of border control and policing at sport mega-events also exemplifies powerfully the complex analytical framework and detailed calculations mediating the surveillance and filtering strategies focused at international mobilities. Austria’s final report of Euro 2008 provides a flavour thereof:

“Border controls were temporary and only at certain border crossings of international and regional significance to Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary, depending on the countries competing on certain days, and expected supporter travel routes” (Republik Österreich 2008:97).

Rather than a system of permanent and rigid constraints, we find a type of regulation that combines various event-related parameters and rationales, evaluates probabilities and then acts in differential and flexible ways, based on a series of analyses and special arrangements. The organisation and intensity of this differential and flexible type of border control depends on risk assessments at a given time, combined with a number of other relevant (economic and socio-political) parameters whose relationship with the managed context of increased risk, density and visibility is carefully evaluated. A central challenge for future research into the power issues associated with security and border control at sport mega-events will thus be to undertake more detailed and fine-grain empirical investigations into the precise ways in which specific parameters and interests are coming together in this sophisticated “analytics of surveillance and regulation”.

4.2. Mobile border control

The quote taken from the final report on Euro 2008 in Switzerland also shows that by contrast with a mode of border control that focuses exclusively on specific points in space in order to monitor, limit and restrict transnational movements, border control at Euro 2008 was in itself mobile in space, for purposes of increased control and facilitated intervention. For example, trains transporting foreign fans considered “risky” were accompanied by border control guards. In the host cities, fan groups were monitored by police delegations and fan monitors from their own countries, and fan zones and other areas of increased fan concentrations were closely patrolled by local, national and foreign police, fan monitors and private security staff.

Border control at Euro 2008 was thus integrated within a wider security scheme, bringing together a long chain of public and private actors, from border control guards and (foreign) police delegations to fan monitors and private security staff. The carefully coordinated actor network
offered a multi-scalar and – above all – mobile “dispositif” of surveillance (Foucault 2009:11) for accompanying and managing fan flows and activities “on the move”. Adapted to, and positively embracing, the monitored mobilities, this dispositif combined punctual access and passage controls with more linear and planar logics of surveillance and regulation (where linear controls occur along transport routes and planar controls are in fan zones, around stadiums, etc.).

4.3. Diffuse border control

In highlighting the mobility of security and surveillance measures at Euro 2008, the quote also implicitly testifies to a third defining feature of border control at the event: the multiplicity of more or less mobile spatially dispersed control points for the management and filtering of national and international mobilities. Three examples help to further elucidate the spatial diffuseness of border control at Euro 2008.

- For “registered” hooligans, border controls started in their very country of residence, with the imposition of travel restrictions or orders to report to the police before and during the tournament. Interestingly, we here find another policing measure, which has recently become best practice in event security: At the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, for example, more than 3,000 English fans were prevented from leaving the country.

- According to the Final Report Euro 2008 in Austria, “in the course of the ‘Joint Operation EUROCUP 2008’ (JO), the FMI and the European Border Agency FRONTEX carried out a joint so-called HIO (High Impact Operation). While the EURO 2008 lasted, a total of 55 Austrian officers served at the external borders (incl. embassies, airports and land borders, e.g. Poland-Ukraine), and 141 foreign officers served at Austrian land-borders and at international airports in support of the Austrian border control officers” (Republik Österreich 2008:98). Swiss border guards also contributed to the same operation (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand 2008b:55), but no detailed information could be found regarding the number of officers serving at foreign borders.

- The mobile fingerprint identification system, bought by the Swiss police from Motorola for Euro 2008, provides a third example of the efforts towards increasingly diffuse (and mobile) border control1. As stated by Mark Hess, spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Police and quoted on Motorola’s Euro 2008 website, “Mobile AFIS enables us to operate quickly and discreetly in busy and crowded areas. It’s an ideal solution for targeted border control, helping to protect citizens and visitors. An event like EURO 2008, when our borders will be much busier than normal, is a good example of how much flexibility a mobile solution can provide” (Motorola

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1 Stationary biometric fingerprint ID devices have been employed by the Swiss Border Guard for many years. In 2005, for example, 18,000 prints were checked against the national police’s BIS database and over 5000 positive identifications were made (Motorola undated:5). Yet at Euro 2008, these devices were deployed not only at border check points, but also within the event crowds.
The quote bears striking testimony to current technologically mediated developments towards “ubiquitous borders” (Graham 2010; Lyon 2005), thus elucidating how novel technologies disrupt and delocalise territorial boundaries (Aas 2005:207).

Together, the three examples cited above draw a clear picture of the “debordering process” at Euro 2008. They imply an increased dissociation of border functions from the territorial frontiers (Albert and Brock 1996:62) and of the multi-scalar system of threat filters situated both outside (in the first and second examples) and within (in the case of mobile biometric fingerprint identification) the Swiss and Austrian national territories. Foreign fans, considered as risks, encountered the transnational border either in their private home (by being denied tickets or requested to report regularly to the police), on entry to the host countries, or in fan zones in the host cities (through police spot checks and biometric identification). This brings us to the internal spatial restructuring of the host cities of Euro 2008.

5. MOBILE BORDERS AT EURO 2008: THE URBAN LEVEL

Sport mega-events move from host city to host city (Hiller 2000). Their organisation and securitisation thus constitute primarily urban phenomena, even if their economic and social outputs are often expected to lie on a broader national or international scale (Klauser 2008). Unlike other mega-events such as the Olympics or G8 summits, Euro 2008 affected not only one urban site, but a network of eight host cities in two countries: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland; Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria. Using Euro 2008 as a case study thus offers ideal conditions for investigating how inter- and intra-urban spectator flows were channelled, secured and managed within the Swiss and Austrian city-network. This analysis will be structured below into three main parts, corresponding to three different functionalities of intra-urban access and passage controls: enclosing, channelling and following.

5.1. Enclosing

With the staging of sport mega-events, entire city centres are temporarily reconfigured as security landscapes. Euro 2008 made no exception to this: RentES, a company specialising in renting out fences for large-scale events, installed more than 30 kilometres of fences across six of the eight host cities of Euro 2008, demarcating a multitude of access-controlled spatial entities, from the stadiums to the referee headquarters and from team hotels to fan zones (RentES 2008:online).

Border and access control, therefore, not only played a role on a national scale, but also occurred on an intra-city level. As shown elsewhere in more detail (Klauser 2008; 2010), the host cities of sport mega-events exemplify the splintering of the contemporary urban environment into a wide range of more or less hermetically enclosed and tightly controlled enclaves that are supported by advanced surveillance technologies and increased numbers of security personnel.
Perhaps the most obvious example at hand relates to the organisation of so-called “public viewing events”, i.e. specifically designed and enclosed “fan zones” where supporters of various nations could drink and party whilst watching the matches on giant television screens. Closely monitored by CCTV cameras, private security agents and police forces, these pre-defined perimeters for the concentration of fans also allowed the regulation of social life during the tournament. Access to fan zones was subject to sporadic spot checks and ID controls of suspect individuals.

Easing the strain on the security forces in and around the stadia, fan zones during Euro 2008 allowed the concentration, monitoring and regulation of fans within specifically designed, enclosed and secured perimeters across the host cities. Harbouring special norms and constraints, monitored by temporarily installed CCTV cameras and patrolled by public and private security agents, they enabled the policing of particular portions of space, whilst other urban areas remained less considered. Thus fan zones not only bear striking testimony to the event-related “festivalisation” of urban public space (Häussermann and Siebel 1993), but also provide an illuminating example of the separation, fencing and surveillance of extended parts of the host cities. During Euro 2008 the UEFA fan zone in Vienna, for example, covered more than 100,000m² of the city centre and was surrounded by more than 4 kilometres of fencing (Vienna Organizing Committee EURO 2008 2008). Other host cities erected fencing around fan zones of similar proportions. Interestingly, the size and spatial disposition of fan zones were modified repeatedly to accommodate increasing numbers of fans, most notably in Berne, Switzerland (N24.de 2008).
A similar interpretation can be made of stadium security rings, as a second example of the translation of event security onto the level of urban territory in a context of increased density and risk. During Euro 2008, stadium security rings were placed up to several hundred metres from the stadium in each host city, forming the first fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. Restricted to holders of match tickets (requiring ID-registration and thus allowing systematic identity controls), accredited staff, members of the press and other authorised persons, the compound area was closed to the general public for the duration of the tournament. Both fan zones and stadium security rings can be understood as security elements for crowd monitoring and management (Klauser 2011b). They both bear material testimony to the internal fragmentation of the host cities into a patchwork of access-controlled and monitored spatial
entities. In both examples, access control aimed to guarantee the efficient functioning of separated, hierarchically organised parts of the urban environment through the control of the flows of people and objects crossing the line between the inside and the outside at particular points in space. In Foucault’s terms, access control here stands for a disciplinary logic of spatial intervention, which consists in selecting, classifying, subdividing, differentiating, arranging and controlling specific portions of space, without according the same type of attention to the whole urban territory.

In addition to the securitisation of specific parts of the event cities, however, the structuring of space through fan zones and stadium security rings also served to temporarily re-territorialise particularly attractive parts of the Euro 2008 host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for UEFA and its commercial partners. As agreed in the Host City Charter, a legally binding agreement between the host cities and UEFA, the official event sponsors enjoyed exclusive branding rights in both UEFA fan zones and stadium security rings (as well as in other so-called “clean sites”) (UEFA undated:44). Each site had to be made available to UEFA free of any contractual obligations (such as leases, utilization agreements, supplier agreements, food, beverage agreements, and so forth) and pre-contracted advertising, in order to allow the site’s branding and commercial re-territorialisation. The zones thus provide another powerful example for the intrinsic combination of security and business rationales associated with access and border control at Euro 2008. It is regrettable that the negotiations leading to the Host City Charter were agreed to remain secret and hence a priori excluded from public scrutiny (Regierungsrat Basel-Stadt 2007:50).

5.2. **Channelling**

Besides the official UEFA fan zones, each Euro 2008 host city also had a “fan mile” of two to four kilometres in length across the city centre. Closed to vehicle traffic during the tournament, yet not as hermetically fenced as the aforementioned “public viewing sites” in order to allow better access to local shops and restaurants, fan miles connected different fan sites, fan attractions, sponsors’ installations, etc. across each host city. As with the aforementioned public viewing sites, fan miles were highly monitored by private security staff and by national and international police forces. On those days where games were held in a particular host city, fan miles were yet further enlarged by a traffic-free, closely monitored and secured corridor, the “fan walk”, linking the city’s railway station to the relevant Euro 2008 stadium. Before and after games, flexible road barriers and check points for possible spectator controls were erected along these corridors (see pictures).
Thus the aim of access and passage controls at Euro 2008 was not only to secure specifically arranged and hierarchically organised parts of the urban environment, but also to channel fan flows
throughout the host cities. Small and larger portions of space were cut off and networked with the rest of the cities through a multitude of access or passage points, some controlled more tightly than others. The event city must be understood as an ensemble of filters and interlinked patterns of more or less detached and purified “insides” (Franzen 2001:207) and more or less controlled routes between these. What is emerging is a temporally limited, security-related form of “passage-point urbanism” (Graham 2010).

With a view to the mobile border issues explored in this paper, the emerging picture raises at least three main points to highlight. Firstly, the spatial and temporal flexibility and adaptability of the event-related system of access and passage points needs emphasising. Various components of the system (e.g. fan zone fences and police check points along fan miles) were constantly rearticulated and modified during the tournament; echoing the marketing slogan of RentES, “logistics just in time” (RentES undated:online), the regulatory control of the territory was adapted constantly to the changing characteristics of the event crowd.

Secondly, the complex interplay of security agents, surveillance technologies and material objects is worth noting. Efforts towards mobile borders rely on a complex and dynamic assemblage of people, technologies and objects, such as fences, police cars used as road blocks, CCTV cameras, etc., which is constantly renegotiated and adapted to specific needs and conditions.

Thirdly, the examples quoted in this paper also demonstrate that the relationship between the spatialities of “discipline” and “security”, in Foucault’s terminology, is not one of opposition; rather, the two are closely interlinked, complementing and supporting each other. The study of Euro 2008 exemplifies the intertwined logics of fixing, enclosing and delimiting space on the one hand, and of regulating and managing circulations on the other.

5.3. Following

Despite the flexibility and mobility of the measures described so far, fences cannot be repositioned and extended infinitely and police road blocks only make sense in certain conditions and on certain routes. In order to follow moving fans more freely throughout the Euro 2008 host cities, other technology-based solutions came into play.

As noted previously, mobile fingerprint identification devices enabled mobile border control throughout the urban environment. Yet they did not allow the monitoring of large fan groups. For this purpose, the police used mobile CCTV cameras - tellingly named “taktisches Fernsehen” (Stadionwelt and dpa 2006:online) - as well as spotters and plainclothes officers alongside and within the moving fan groups, and helicopters and drones above the event cities (Stadtpolizei Zürich 2007).

Since 2005, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used in Switzerland for monitoring traffic, natural disasters and national borders. Yet the policing of Euro 2008 marked the first urban-centred UAV application in the country, thus also providing indirect evidence of the limits of surveillance.
dispositifs anchored on the ground, and reiterating the need for unhindered, mobile and flexible monitoring techniques for crowd control.

6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, border control at Euro 2008 has been portrayed as part of a much wider security scheme, building up a complex assemblage of more or less mobile, diffuse and adaptable control points and techniques. These techniques are based on many different measures, from travel bans to security rings around stadia and other fenced zones, from mobile fingerprint identification devices to renegotiated visa agreements and extended international police collaboration, from the surveillance of fan groups on trains to the deployment of drones above the host cities. Following the need to monitor, filter and, if necessary, restrict and confine international, intra-national and intra-urban flows of people and objects, these techniques also work on many different international, national and local scales.

Following Foucault’s distinction between apparatuses of “security” and “discipline”, the paper has argued that at their very core, these security efforts combine two spatial and functional logics. On the one hand, there is the need to enclose and to “discipline” particular portions of the event territory (stadium security rings, fan zones, buildings). In this disciplinary form of spatial intervention, the urban environment is fragmented into a number of hierarchically organised enclosures, which are subjected to rigid stipulations and intense control. Within these fixed, separated and isolated enclaves, surveillance and normalisation follow a planar spatial logic, aiming at the complete control and “disciplining” of the whole enclosed compound, following a binary opposition between the allowed and the forbidden.

On the other hand, there is the fundamental need to keep the host nations and the event cities open, resulting in a range of efforts and techniques aiming at differentiating and managing different types of circulations. Regulation and surveillance in this second “economy of power” are not based on enclosure and fixity for the majority of the travellers and visitors, but on a range of techniques aimed at “organizing circulation, eliminating its “unwanted elements”, making a division between “good” and “bad” circulation, and maximizing the “good” circulation by diminishing the “bad” (Foucault 2009:18).

What emerges hence is a “programme of government of movement” (Côté-Boucher 2008), aiming to establish and monitor routes and passage points for channelling, tracking, monitoring, facilitating and accelerating different lines and types of circulation, from point to point, from zone to zone. Yet, as argued, such processes of ordering circulations (through privileging and restricting) are neither neutral nor unproblematic. Rather, they raise a series of critical power issues that are often opaque to the public and that easily evade conventional democratic scrutiny. This problematic is of particular importance if, as I have shown through multiple examples, the differential treatments of international mobilities not only result from risk assessments and security considerations, but also respond to external stipulations, private interests and commercial rationales.
6.1. **Intertwined linkages of “discipline” and “security”**

Whilst “discipline” and “security”, in Foucault’s terminology, offer a worthwhile analytical lens to emphasise different spatially articulated functions of security governance, it would be wrong to understand their logics and “economies of power” as strictly opposed. Rather, they must be understood as fundamentally intertwined and mutually supportive. There are at least two main reasons for this, which are both valid in general, but even more so in the context of the increased density, diversity and visibility of sport mega-events.

First, the intrinsic combination of “discipline” and “security” is simply a result of scale. Discipline typically focuses on very specific zones and clearly circumscribed “insides”, in which its mechanisms of power aim to function fully and without limit (Foucault 2009:45). The increased density and diversity at sport mega-events, located within a transnational space of circulation, cannot be managed merely through a series of specifically arranged spatial enclosures, but requires a spatial logic of control for the monitoring and regulation of more extensive scales and densities of circulation across the host nations and cities.

Second, the intertwined combination of “discipline” and “security” is also related to the functionalities and inherent objectives of sport mega-events. Aimed at attracting the attention of visitors, athletes, tourists, etc. – and thus often legitimised politically in terms of “urban entrepreneurialism” and “place selling” (Hall and Hubbard 1998; Kearns and Philo 1993) – sport mega-events, to a certain extent at least, imply values such as openness and joyfulness. Thus policing and control at sport mega-events cannot be based exclusively on a strict logic of enclosure and “discipline”. The fact that UEFA produced more than 15 kilometres of tarpaulin to camouflage the most prominently positioned fences across the eight host cities of the event provides symptomatic expression thereof (UEFA 2008): Whilst fences were in reality omnipresent, pictures of fortified city squares had to be avoided.

Whilst security governance at sport mega-events is shaped by the intertwined (spatial and functional) logics of “discipline” and “security”, a very similar problem can of course also be seen in current processes of globalisation more generally. For contemporary governments, the core requirements of freely circulating people and objects for sustaining the liberalist economic system mix uncomfortably with reflexes towards reinforced enclosures, border controls and access restrictions. By pointing at the interface and actual combination of the two apparently opposed ambitions, and by highlighting the problems associated with the resulting efforts towards increased social sorting and differentiation of apparently “good” and “bad” circulations, the present analysis is

2 This is perhaps the most important difference for security governance between sport mega-events and political summits such as G8 meeting or economic forums. However, as Samatas argues with a view to the 2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Samatas 2011), there can also be important differences between sport events staged in different national contexts.
at its most generalist value. In this focus, the paper powerfully exemplifies the critical, yet often problematic combination of enclosure and mobility, “security” and “discipline”, which is shaping our contemporary world.

7. REFERENCES


