The Diversity of Disjunctivism

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During the last ten years or so, there has been a noticeable surge of interest in disjunctivism, accompanied by the emergence of many different promising disjunctivist positions on a large variety of philosophical issues. However, this positive development has yet to lead to a change in the general attitude towards disjunctivism, which is often one of prevailing scepticism or even disregard. It is still not rare to dismiss disjunctivism right from the start as too implausible or abstruse to be considered as a serious alternative to other views. Not surprisingly, disjunctivism has so far failed to gain the level of attention in contemporary philosophical discussions that it deserves, and which many of its rival positions already enjoy.

Part of the reason for this state of the debate is perhaps that proponents and opponents of disjunctivism alike have not always been sufficiently careful in distinguishing the various forms of disjunctivism, nor in determining their precise commitments. This excellent and timely volume—together with the slightly later published collection of classical texts on disjunctivism edited by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (2009)—is bound to remedy this situation and to improve the wider understanding of both the content and the significance of disjunctivist positions. Indeed, the essays concerned show that any serious attempt at accounting for perception, perceptual knowledge, actions or practical reasons has to take the relevant disjunctivist claims and arguments into consideration—notably those discussed in the volume at hand.

The collection brings together seventeen specially written essays on disjunctivism in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and, to a smaller extent, the philosophy of agency and meta-ethics. The standard of the contributions is very high throughout and reflects the quality of the respective discussions in the current literature. As its title already suggests, the book is divided into three parts that are concerned with perception, action, and knowledge, respectively. The relative prominence of disjunctivism in the related areas of philosophy is reflected by the number of papers making up each part: there are eight essays on the nature of perceptual experiences, six on perceptual knowledge or scepticism about it, and only one on the nature of bodily action (with David-Hillel Ruben developing a disjunctive account) and two on reasons for action (with Jennifer Hornsby defending, and Jonathan Dancy attacking, a disjunctive treatment). Thus, all in all, fourteen of the seventeen papers are concerned with issues in the philosophy of perception.

This is very much in line with the origin of disjunctivism in discussions of experience and its role in the acquisition of knowledge, as well as with the continuing focus of the contemporary debates about disjunctivism on perception and perceptual knowledge. Similarly, the essays in this volume reflect the fact that the two philosophers, whose views figure most prominently in the various discussions, are John McDowell and M. G. F. Martin (the latter being the main absentee among the contributors). But, as Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson’s introductory essay makes clear, Paul Snowdon’s work deserves equal appreciation.
In his own contribution, Snowdon identifies J. M. Hinton’s writings (especially his 1973) as being unduly neglected, despite the widespread acknowledgement that Hinton has been elemental in the early formulation and dissemination of disjunctivist ideas. More specifically, Snowdon’s essay tries to get clearer about the precise role of Hinton’s writings in the emergence of disjunctivism (as we now know it) as a philosophical position. During his discussion, Snowdon questions the popular idea that Hinton actually invented disjunctivism about perceptual experiences by pointing to the natural connection between naive realism and disjunctivism (at least within a realist outlook on reality) and to the tradition of naive realism prior to Hinton. Snowdon locates the specific importance of Hinton’s work elsewhere, namely in drawing attention to the largely unsupported status of the widespread (and not always explicit) assumption that perceptions, illusions and hallucinations are of the same fundamental kind of experience; and in providing the first detailed analysis of disjunctive statements (e.g., of the form ‘Macbeth perceives a dagger or is having that illusion’, where ‘illusion’ is meant to include both misperception and hallucination). But, as Snowdon stresses, these disjunctive statements should not be understood as descriptions of how things look to the subject concerned (e.g., as if there is a dagger in front of him), but instead as picking out two exclusive kinds of experience. Another important fact that Snowdon notes is that Hinton did not provide positive arguments for disjunctivism about perceptual experiences, but argued only for the weaker claim that the opposing common kind assumption just mentioned lacks support.

The other essays in the first part of the volume discuss the prospects of disjunctivism about the nature of perceptual experiences. While William Fish and, to some extent, Bill Brewer and Scott Sturgeon provide defences of this view, Byrne and Logue, E. J. Lowe, A. D. Smith, Susanna Siegel and, incidentally, also Dancy in his paper on reasons for action argue against it. Brewer, Sturgeon and Fish are, moreover, concerned with the issue of which version of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is to be preferred. Brewer argues that disjunctivism should treat experiences as instances of objectual awareness, rather than of propositional awareness. Sturgeon and Fish, on the other hand, push more extreme disjunctivist views which are similar in assuming (though for very different reasons) that hallucinations are not mental states with a phenomenal character: although it may introspectively seem to us so, there are no hallucinatory episodes as part of our stream of consciousness. All these contributions are essential and worthwhile reading for philosophers interested in the forms of disjunctivism concerned. But, for reasons of space, I am unable to further discuss them here (apart from the essays by Siegel, Byrne and Logue, and Brewer).

In the remainder of this review article, I take a closer look at the introductory essay by Haddock and Macpherson and, in particular, at their comments on the variety and unity of disjunctivism. I also present one of Siegel’s challenges against Martin’s and Fish’s disjunctivism about perceptual experiences, as well as some of the debates on perceptual knowledge and the epistemic standing provided by perceptions, which discuss—and sometimes misconstrue—relevant aspects of McDowell’s version of disjunctivism. Two specific issues to be addressed are whether disjunctivists about experience should treat the latter as representational or not, and whether—and if so, how—they might be able to properly accommodate illusions. Both questions concern some of the core commitments of disjunctivism, which have just recently begun to emerge as research topics in their own right (cf. Travis 2004 and Fish 2009).
The introduction by Haddock and Macpherson is unusual in several respects. First, it is very substantial and has the appearance of a full-blown contribution, not only in length and detail, but also in argument. Second, it does not summarize the essays—this task is left to an analytical table of contents containing abstracts of all essays—but instead provides a detailed and systematic overview of the various forms of disjunctivism to be found in the writings of Snowdon, McDowell and Martin, and briefly locates the particular contributions to the volume at hand in the respective traditions. This turns the introduction into a very useful background against which to read the subsequent essays. I positively wish that more collections would follow this model of introducing their contents, even if it meant more work for the editors concerned. Third, and perhaps most noteworthy, the introduction addresses the important issue of whether the various kinds of disjunctivism, put forward with respect to very different phenomena, might have something distinctive in common. In fact, the question of unity arises very naturally from the noticeable diversity of the collected essays that sometimes do not seem to share much more than a very general concern with theories, which assume a difference in nature or rationality where it has been orthodoxy to assume commonality. It is a bit unfortunate that none of the other essays in the volume really takes up this issue—Byrne and Logue perhaps come closest in their joint paper—and it can just be hoped that the question of unity will figure more prominently in the future research on disjunctivist theories.

Haddock and Macpherson’s proposal is that ‘the mark of disjunctivism, in all of its varieties, is a conception of the inner and the outer as suffused’ (p. 22). In the case of metaphysical disjunctivism, what they mean by this is that disjunctivists reject the—often only implicit—assumption of more orthodox views that the inner world and the outer world are constitutively independent of each other. Different forms of metaphysical disjunctivism focus thereby on different aspects of the inner and the outer. Haddock and Macpherson distinguish three such forms. Metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences claims that some of these inner experiences (i.e., perceptions) are constituted by objects in the outer world, while others (i.e., hallucinations) are not.1 Its equivalent concerning external bodily movements assumes that some of them (i.e., expressive actions) are constituted by internal elements (e.g., the underlying intentions or expressed mental states), while others (i.e., mere movements) are not. And the corresponding theory of reasons for which, or because of which, we act—which may reasonably be treated as part of the inner—maintains that some of them are constituted by (known) outer facts, while others consist merely in (false) beliefs.

Furthermore, Haddock and Macpherson distinguish two forms of metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences. Experiential disjunctivism—as developed in Snowdon (1980, 1990)—is the more general form, since it just assumes a difference in intrinsic nature between object-involving and object-less experiences. Phenomenal disjunctivism, by contrast, is more specific about the difference in nature concerned: it is a difference in phenomenal character, that is, in what the experiences are subjectively like. Indeed, it may be argued that the nature of conscious experiences is exhausted by their phenomenal character (or their ‘phenomenal nature’, as Martin (2010) puts it). But it may also be argued that there is more to the nature of experiences than their first-personal character—namely, for instance, their third-personal (e.g., causal, functional or informational) structure. In particular, there is the possibility of endorsing experiential disjunctivism without endorsing phenomenal disjunctivism (but not the other way round). Haddock and Macpherson briefly mention this possibility, but do not further discuss the resulting structural disjunctivism about perceptual experiences.2
It is interesting to note that, although the essays in the collection at hand are by no means untypical of the literature in (more or less) identifying disjunctivism with the claim that perceptions and hallucinations do not share a ‘common element’ (see, for instance, the contributions by Snowdon, Byrne and Logue, Ruben and Dancy), this claim need not be endorsed by metaphysical disjunctivists (or by epistemological disjunctivists, for that matter). For the assumption of a difference in nature between perceptions and hallucinations is perfectly compatible with the idea that there is still some overlap in the essential features of the two types of perceptual experience. This is also in line with McDowell’s denial of an epistemological ‘highest common factor’, given that the latter is just meant to stress that perceptions increase our epistemic standing more than hallucinations and, hence, still leaves room for the possibility of their sameness in nature (see below for more on this issue). What may explain the bias for the more extreme version of metaphysical disjunctivism, according to which the two types of perceptual experience have no essential feature in common, is perhaps that it has been dominating the recent debate (partly because of its endorsement and defence by Martin (2004, 2006)). But it might be worthwhile to consider alternative forms of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences which, for instance, allow for (partial) identity in phenomenal or functional kind (cf. Dorsch 2010, 2011).

What makes metaphysical disjunctivism interesting as a philosophical position is in part what the two call the ‘fundamental disjunctivist commitment’ (p. 18): namely that the constitutive differences in question are not recognizable from the subjective perspective. For instance, disjunctivism about experiences claims that both veridical and hallucinatory experiences can be truly described as cases of its phenomenally looking to the subject concerned as if things are a certain way (e.g., as if there is a red rose); while they none the less differ in nature and, possibly, even in character. So what experiential disjunctivism questions is the justification of the inference from the subjective indistinguishability of two experiences to their sameness in nature. The possibility of a gap arises here because the presence or absence of a contribution of external objects to the constitution of experiences is not noticeable from the inside. Similar considerations are true of other forms of metaphysical disjunctivism, such as those concerning bodily movements or reasons for action.

In contrast to metaphysical disjunctivism which makes a claim about the nature of things, epistemological disjunctivism is concerned with the epistemic standing of the subject. Haddock and Macpherson identify two forms of epistemological disjunctivism. The first focuses again on perceptual experiences and maintains that, while perceptions do have the power to justify beliefs and make knowledge available for us, hallucinations do not (even if they happen to be veridical). The underlying thought is that a two-factor theory of knowledge—which treats justification as defeasible and therefore as independent from whether the experiences in question correspond to the facts—should be rejected in favour of the view that experiential justification has to be indefeasible and therefore involve factive experiences (cf. McDowell 1982). The second form of epistemological disjunctivism is concerned with bodily movements and maintains that only some of them—namely the expressive ones—give us access to the person’s mind. More specifically, seeing expressive behaviour does put us in the position to acquire knowledge about the expressed states of mind, while seeing other bodily movements does not. Again, the underlying idea is that expressive behaviour is an indefeasible indicator of the presence of the expressed state of mind, but non-expressive behaviour is not.
As Haddock and Macpherson note, metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism are logically independent views: someone may endorse one of them, but not the other. They also observe that epistemological disjunctivism has so far played no role in the debate about reasons for action, although the view that only the recognition of reason-constituting facts can ground knowledge of what to do (or believe, for that matter) surely has its attractions. Finally, they suggest that epistemological disjunctivism is of the same type of view as its metaphysical counterpart, since it posits the same suffusion of the inner and the outer. More precisely, Haddock and Macpherson understand epistemological disjunctivism as maintaining that justification rests on a link of indefeasible indication (rather than a relation of constitutive dependence) between aspects of the two realms. Inner perceptions are indicators of the existence of outer objects or facts; and outer expressive behaviour is indicative of inner mental states.

However, this is not enough to unify metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism under the label of ‘suffusion’. What is still missing is an identification of what constitution and indication may have in common. Moreover, the focus on the relation between expressive behaviour and expressed state of mind only distracts from the distinctive feature of all forms of epistemological disjunctivism. For what ultimately matters is that the epistemic standing bestowed by inner experiences is said to be constitutively dependent on outer facts: we are justified in judgmentally assuming the presence of a tree, or the sadness of a person, only if the relevant perceptual experience is a perception and, hence, corresponds to the facts. By contrast, whether the facts at issue are directly perceivable, or instead perceptually knowable merely in virtue of being indicated by perceivable facts, is relevant only for the determination of the scope of the justification provided by the experiences concerned; it does not contribute to the quality of the epistemic standing of the subject.

This shift of attention back from bodily movements to perceptual experiences makes it possible to provide a general and basic characterization of disjunctivist positions as views that defend a relation of constitutive dependence between some inner and some outer elements. But it also has the consequence that the two forms of epistemological disjunctivism identified by Haddock and Macpherson are, in fact, just one and the same: they both concern the epistemic standing bestowed by perceptual experiences and its dependence on external facts.

Indeed, it may seem reasonable to go one step further and maintain that epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is really nothing more than another form of metaphysical disjunctivism—namely one that is concerned with the power of perceptual experiences to determine the epistemic standing of the subject, and which takes this power to be part of the intrinsic nature of the experiences. According to this view, experiences are factive, or constituted by external elements, in so far as their essential reason-giving power is constitutively dependent on those elements. What renders the resulting metaphysical disjunctivism about the rational role of experiences particularly interesting is that it is compatible with the idea that perceptions and hallucinations still share their phenomenal character and functional role (cf. Dorsch 2010, 2011). Moreover, disjunctivism about reasons for action—or, indeed, good actions—may be integrated in a very similar way: having reason to act—or acting in a good way—is constitutively dependent on external facts. So, perhaps what is really distinctive of disjunctivist positions is that they defend the existence of certain phenomena—whether they are experiences, actions, reasons or something else—the intrinsic nature of which contains both inner and outer elements, that is, mind and world.

In her contribution, Siegel provides several objections against the epistemic conception of hallucinations, which is central to the versions of phenomenal disjunctivism about perceptual experiences defended by Martin and Fish. One of her challenges is to provide
an explanation of the fact that we are in a position to introspectively know of our—perceptual or hallucinatory—experiences of something that they are not perceptions of something else. To take one of Siegel’s examples, it is possible for us to come to know by introspection alone that our perceptual experience of a butterfly is not a perception of a sausage. She argues that proponents of the epistemic conception do not have the resources to account for this fact about what is knowable for us. In particular, this epistemic fact cannot be explained by reference to the introspective indistinguishability of hallucinations from corresponding perceptions. Siegel’s reason for this conclusion is that being unable to introspectively know that our experience is, say, not a perception of a butterfly seems to leave it epistemically open whether it is a perception of a butterfly or a perception of something else (e.g., a sausage).

But this line of reasoning is problematic in two respects. First, it is not sensitive to the fact that proponents of disjunctivism and of the epistemic conception would assume that what is in need of explanation are in fact two distinct types of introspective knowledge, which have different kinds of experience as their object and, hence, different facts as their grounds. And second, both the relationality of perceptions and the introspective indistinguishability of hallucinations—that is, the distinct grounds in the two different cases of perceptual experience—exclude the epistemic possibility of, say, perceiving a sausage when having an experience which is introspectively indistinguishable from a perception of a butterfly.

To be more specific on this last point, we are in a position to introspectively know of our perceptions of a butterfly that they are not perceptions of a sausage precisely because being acquainted with a butterfly (i.e., enjoying genuinely relational awareness of the latter) rules out the epistemic—as well as the metaphysical—possibility of being acquainted with a sausage. We are presented with an existing butterfly located before our eyes; and this relational presentation does not leave it epistemically open that our object of perception may in fact be a sausage. To use Austin’s phrase, it is already ‘settled’ by our experience that the perceived object is a butterfly (cf. Austin 1962: 113).

According to phenomenal disjunctivism, the same considerations cannot apply to the case of hallucinations, given that the latter are not instances of acquaintance. What matters for them is, instead, the fact that they are introspectively indistinguishable for us from the corresponding perceptions. More specifically, the fact that we cannot introspectively know a hallucination of a butterfly to be distinct from a perception of a butterfly entails that we can distinguish the hallucination from a perception of a butterfly. For the reason just mentioned, we can tell apart a perception of a butterfly from a perception of a sausage. Hence, any hallucination, which we cannot distinguish from a perception of a sausage, would turn out to be discriminable from a perception of a butterfly in this respect—namely relative to whether it is distinguishable from a perception of a sausage. For instance, the hallucination would fail to incline (and entitle) us to judge that we are not perceiving a sausage; and we would be able to note this difference between the hallucination and a perception of a butterfly by introspection alone. That the introspectively accessible indistinguishability of a hallucination of a butterfly from a perception of a butterfly entails the introspective knowability of its distinctness from a perception of a sausage suffices to ensure that the knowability is grounded in the indistinguishability.⁶

The essays in the last part of the volume are primarily concerned with the significance of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences for two important and closely related epistemological issues: the nature of perceptual justification and knowledge, and the possibility of answering scepticism about our perceptual knowledge of the external world. Alan Millar concentrates on one particular motivation for experiential disjunctivism,
namely that it can well explain our capacity to perceptually pick out objects (and, subsequently, think demonstratively about them) and our capacity to perceptually acquire knowledge about them. His general strategy is to show that experiential disjunctivism is not needed to account for these two aspects of our perceptual contact with external objects. More specifically, while Millar grants that the two capacities can be accounted for only by reference to essentially object-dependent elements, he maintains that taking these elements to be the perceptions themselves is only one way of guaranteeing the needed relationality. The other way, put forward by Millar, is to identify the underlying discriminative and recognitional abilities, the exercise of which becomes manifest in the occurrence of perceptions, as the object-dependent elements. Accordingly, only perceptions—but not hallucinations—involve the employment of those abilities.

This attempt to be disjunctivist about perceptual abilities, rather than perceptual experiences, is certainly subject to the objections raised by proponents of phenomenal disjunctivism against their opponents (cf. Martin 2002, 2004, 2006 and Fish 2009). But there is also a more direct worry about Millar’s specific view of the perceptual abilities at play. He understands them in such a way that the presence of a sufficient number of perfect replicas undermines our possession of those abilities. That is, if we are in an environment with many fake azaleas that are visually indistinguishable from real ones, we loose both the ability to discriminate azaleas from other flowers and the ability to recognize them for what they are, namely azaleas. However, disjunctivists about perceptual experiences are likely to dispute that the issue of whether we enjoy an experience of seeing a particular azalea depends in such a way on what is true of our environment (or, relatedly, in relevant close worlds). After all, the only thing that matters for metaphysical disjunctivists is whether the experience concerned involves a particular azalea as its constituent; while epistemological disjunctivists tend to insist on the indefeasible character of the epistemic justification provided by perceptions in virtue of their relation to the perceived objects. The worry is therefore that Millar’s account does not manage to capture the particularity of perception: the proposed perceptual abilities remain too general in nature.

In their contributions, John McDowell and Crispin Wright continue their past discussions about the relevance of epistemological disjunctivism for scepticism. One of the sceptical thoughts at issue—and, according to McDowell, central to Cartesian scepticism—is that it is impossible to make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to external and experience-independent facts. That is—since what is at issue is the intelligibility of epistemological disjunctivism—it is denied that the epistemic standing bestowed on us by perceptions is any better than the epistemic standing bestowed on us by hallucinations. But if the best epistemic standing available to us is that provided by hallucinations, we cannot rule out standard sceptical scenarios.

Another part of the debate between McDowell and Wright is whether the introduced sceptical thought is indeed central to Cartesian scepticism, and also whether epistemological disjunctivism has any significant bearings on Humean, or Moorean, forms of scepticism. Ram Neta in his contribution sides with McDowell on the latter issue and provides a contextualist defence of McDowell’s approach against Wright’s objections. Duncan Pritchard is more critical about certain elements in McDowell’s reply to scepticism—notably his quietist stance. But he nonetheless defends (if not fully endorses) the general neo-Moorean strategy to be extracted from McDowell’s reply, including the idea of internally accessable reasons that are constituted by external facts.

In what follows, I concentrate on the exchange between McDowell and Wright on the initial sceptical thought, according to which it is impossible to make sense of the idea that perceptions increase our epistemic standing more than hallucinations. McDowell’s
response to this challenge consists basically of two claims. First, he argues that the intelligibility of this idea is already ensured by the intelligibility of the idea that, in perceptual experience, it at least appears to us as if the objective world is a certain way. And second, he maintains that the sceptical position presupposes the intelligibility of understanding experiences as appearances as of an objective world, precisely because its denial of the intelligibility of the idea that such appearances can put us into contact with reality rests on the assumption (of the intelligibility of the idea) that enjoying such appearances is compatible with reality not being as it seems to be.

Wright’s criticism of McDowell’s response exploits the fact—acknowledged by the latter—that hallucinations and dream states, which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, are appearances as of an objective world, too, despite not making us directly aware of the latter. Because of this fact, so Wright, understanding experiences as appearances as of reality does not suffice for understanding them as being able to bring us into indefeasible contact with reality. However, Wright seems to miss McDowell’s point here. What Wright’s example shows is that being an appearance as of the objective world does not suffice for making us directly and indefeasibly aware of that world; and that, relatedly, thinking of an experience as purporting to be about reality does not imply thinking of it as an instance of direct awareness of reality. But McDowell can—and probably will—accept both conclusions. What he is instead concerned with is establishing a weaker claim, namely that conceiving of an experience as being an appearance as of the objective world implies being able to conceive of it as an instance of direct awareness.

Perhaps there is an underlying—and implicit—disagreement about what it means for a perceptual experience to be an appearance as of reality. McDowell assumes this to mean that they purport to put us into direct contact to reality—that is, that they purport to improve our epistemic standing with respect to how the objective world is. Spoken more loosely, that hallucinations (as well as perceptions) purport to be of the objective world means that they purport to be perceptions, and not hallucinations—whereby the difference between these two types of perceptual experience is to be understood in epistemic terms. Accordingly, thinking of experiences as appearances as of reality implies thinking of them as purporting to be instances of direct awareness, which again implies being able to conceive of them as such instances. But someone—like Wright—who is less sympathetic to epistemological disjunctivism might perhaps want to deny this priority of perceptions over hallucinations and insist that experiences, which purport to be of objective reality, are neutral on whether they are perceptions (rather than hallucinations).

McDowell’s version of disjunctivism is also the subject of a dispute between Bill Brewer and Sonia Sedivy. Brewer argues that proponents of this form of disjunctivism should understand successful perception as a matter of being relationally aware of an object, rather than as a matter of correctly representing a fact. Part of his reasons for this conclusion is the ubiquity of illusions. For Brewer, it is very plausible to assume that all perceptual experiences are illusory in at least some—possibly rather minor—respect. But this means that a disjunctivist should count illusions among the good cases, that is, cases which involve genuine contact with reality. For, otherwise, he has to accept that there are no good cases of perceptual experience, and that the nature and functional role of the bad cases has to be elucidated in terms of some never achieved ideal of perception. However, as Brewer argues, the disjunctivist can treat illusions as good cases only if he understands them as instances of successful object awareness, rather than as instances of unsuccessful (i.e., false) representational awareness.

Sedivy, by contrast, stresses the importance of object-depending concepts—concepts which may be employed in thought only if their putative referents do exist—in
McDowell’s and Gareth Evans’ writings. Accordingly, treating illusions as conceptual representations is compatible with treating them as successful in their reference to the objective world. That is, a disjunctivist like McDowell may insist that illusions—just like perceptions, but unlike hallucinations—succeed in putting us into contact with external objects, even though they misrepresent how those objects really are. However, as Byrne and Logue note in their essay, this is probably not a route that McDowell would be prepared to take, given that he counts illusions among the bad cases elsewhere (cf. McDowell 1982). Another option for him would be to insist that broadly illusory experiences may still be locally veridical. That is, while it may very well be true that all perceptual experiences misrepresent the world in some respects, this does not prevent them from getting it right in others. This is possible because of the richness of experience: a single perceptual experience may—and usually does—present us with many distinct putative facts. Finally, McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism need not concern itself with the ubiquity or not of illusions. Its primary purpose is to show how perceptual knowledge is possible, and not whether it is actual. Moreover, since it need not be combined with experiential disjunctivism, the issue of spelling out the nature of illusions in terms of perceptions does not necessarily arise.

So, what may partly (though by no means fully) explain the disagreement between Brewer and McDowell is that the former appears to take the latter to be an experiential disjunctivist, and not merely an epistemological one. This metaphysical understanding of McDowell’s view is not uncommon. Byrne and Logue identify a list of philosophers who appear to construe his position in this way (p. 65, n.15); and Sturgeon offers two rival interpretations of McDowell’s writings, both of which seem to treat him as endorsing experiential disjunctivism. In this context, it is very helpful that Byrne and Logue take a close look at the actual textual evidence and come to the conclusion that this widespread metaphysical reading of McDowell’s position is in fact not very well supported by his key writings.

Byrne and Logue also use the example of illusions to argue against experiential—including phenomenal—disjunctivism. What they do is present some sort of dilemma. Its first horn is that, if a disjunctivist counts illusions among the bad cases, he is forced to deny that they share a common element with perceptions. But, as Byrne and Logue point out, there is such a shared element between comparable perceptions and illusions, namely that, in both, some particular object looks to be a certain way. Their crucial assumption is that there is no reason to doubt that our ordinary statements about ‘how things look’—possibly in contrast with more technical statements about ‘visual experiences’—pick out mental states. However, as they concede, this assumption depends partly on success in rebutting the disjunctivist’s arguments in favour of his position. Besides, there is also the problem with the ubiquity of illusions (see above). And Byrne and Logue’s line of reasoning does not seem to have a bearing on forms of metaphysical disjunctivism that allow for some overlap in the natures of perceptions and illusions—for instance, a shared content which is described by look statements of the kind mentioned.
The second horn of the dilemma for the experiential disjunctivist is to treat illusions as good cases, which share some essential element with perceptions. Byrne and Logue identify representational content as the best candidate for that element. Their idea is that illusions differ from perceptions just in the correctness of how they present a given object as being; and that this idea of a difference in correctness makes sense only in the context of an assumed representationality. Now, their argument continues that at least part of the shared content should be understood in general terms (i.e., as having a logical form involving existential quantification, rather than singular terms). And, given that there

not seem to be any good reason to deny hallucinations the same general content, once it is accepted for perceptions and hallucinations, there is a common element among all types of perceptual experience. However, the experiential disjunctivist has, again, several replies available to him. Following Brewer, he may insist that the difference between veridical and illusory good cases is best captured in terms of objectual awareness. Then, he can reject the claim that perceptions involve any general content—either by arguing that they do not involve any content at all, or by pointing out that perceptual content (in contrast to the content of illusions) is through and through object-dependent and, hence, particular. A variant of both replies would be to insist that what constitutes perceptions—or, alternatively, the object-dependent elements involved in perceptual content—are not mere objects, but property instances. Finally, Byrne and Logue’s consideration again do not concern forms of metaphysical disjunctivism that posit only a partial difference in essence between perceptions and hallucinations.

What the essays in this collection reveal is that disjunctivist views come in a large variety, are highly relevant for a wide range of philosophical issues and may both enrich and clarify the respective debates. They also illustrate that disjunctivism is a difficult and challenging view, perhaps more so than many of its rivals. But this should be no excuse for philosophers working on one of the topics covered by the essays in this volume to disregard the respective disjunctivist proposals. Engagement with Haddock and Macpherson’s collection is indeed an ideal way of getting acquainted with the contemporary state of the discussion of disjunctivism and its application to various problems in theoretical and practical philosophy.

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Metaphysical disjunctivism about bodily movements stands out because it is the only form of disjunctivism mentioned which takes the outer to be constituted by the inner, rather than vice versa. For instance, if good and bad actions are taken to differ in whether they are constitutively dependent on the presence of reasons for action.

It is interesting to note that Siegel, too, argues that proponents of the epistemic conception should endorse this entailment (pp. 218ff.), but does not take this to be sufficient for grounding the availability of the introspective knowledge under consideration (pp. 219ff.).

1 The issue where to locate illusions is to be discussed further below. In the terminology which I use here, the class of ‘perceptual experiences’ is made up by three distinct types of experience: ‘perceptions’ (i.e., the clearly good cases), ‘illusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ (i.e., the clearly bad cases). Besides, illusions and hallucinations are generally assumed to be ‘perfect’, or perception-like, in the sense that they are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions.

2 See Dorsch (2010, 2011) for a defence of such a view. There, I also spell out why I prefer to use the label ‘experiential disjunctivism’ to denote metaphysical disjunctivism about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences (what Haddock and Macpherson call ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’), rather than metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences more generally (what they call ‘experiential disjunctivism’). In this review of their collection, I stick to Haddock’s and Macpherson’s terminology.

3 While the terminology of ‘indication’ is entirely mine, it is meant to capture what Haddock and Macpherson (following McDowell) have in mind: something indicates something else just in case it provides us with indefeasible evidence for the latter.

4 Metaphysical disjunctivism about bodily movements stands out because it is the only form of disjunctivism mentioned which takes the outer to be constituted by the inner, rather than vice versa.

5 For instance, if good and bad actions are taken to differ in whether they are constitutively dependent on the presence of reasons for action.

6 It is interesting to note that Siegel, too, argues that proponents of the epistemic conception should endorse this entailment (pp. 218ff.), but does not take this to be sufficient for grounding the availability of the introspective knowledge under consideration (pp. 219ff.).
REFERENCES