Spatial articulations of surveillance at the FIFA World Cup 2006™ in Germany

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INTRODUCTION

Between 9 June and 9 July 2006, the FIFA World Cup 2006™ (hereafter World Cup) dramatically changed public life in most German cities. In the media, the temporary reign of football over Germany’s city centres has been most powerfully visualised through spectacular images of tens of thousands of mostly peaceful football fans on so-called ‘public viewing sites’ or ‘fan miles’, which was later named Germany’s Word of the Year 2006.

Despite its concern with the football World Cup, however, this chapter is not about sport. Rather, this study focuses on another spectacular aspect of the World Cup, which can be exemplified by a simple number: 5.3 kilometres. In Berlin alone, fences 5.3 kilometres long and 2.2 metres high were erected, allowing the demarcation of an impressively large ‘fan zone’ in the city centre, reaching from the Brandenburger Tor to the Strasse des 17 Juni. Closely monitored by CCTV cameras, thousands of private security agents and police forces, this pre-defined fan zone – as the territorial framework for the concentration of fans on specific, and clearly separated, parts of the city centre – both materially and symbolically allowed the regulation of social life during the World Cup.

As a symptomatic illustration of the spatially bound logics of security and surveillance strategies, the picture of Berlin’s fan mile also provides a powerful entry point to the main aim of this chapter, which is to examine the territorial articulations of security/surveillance measures for the World Cup 2006. In this, the basic line of my argument is that security politics in general not only tends to relate to specific persons or social groups (Marx 1988; Lyon 2003) but also to select, classify, divide, mark, arrange, in one word, to differentiate specific categories of space. The functions of security and surveillance operations, their scope, impact and the risks they pose cannot be understood without referring to the territories concerned and created by their spatial deployment and performance.

Described as a cross-disciplinary, rapidly developing field of analysis and theory (Lyon 2002: 1), Surveillance Studies have sparked remarkable and
revealing research over the last few years. Focusing on the increased possibilities of knowing, tracking, data-mining and profiling everyday life, one of the innovative powers of Surveillance Studies is to consider surveillance not only in relation to security issues but as a tool of governance in military conflict, health, commerce and entertainment (Haggerty and Ericson 2006). Recent work on surveillance thus provides a solid and fertile ground to examine the social implications of the proliferating range of new aims, agendas, objects, agents, technologies, practices and perceptions of surveillance from a wide range of perspectives.

Despite this increasingly sophisticated body of theoretical and empirical research, however, very few academics have provided critical accounts of the complex ways through which specific models of surveillance are becoming ‘expert exemplars’ for more normalised use. All too frequently, the study of particular surveillance projects is thus separated from the critical investigation of the broader processes, mechanisms and relationships, which lie behind the current proliferation of globally calibrated security procedures, operations and strategies.

It is from such a standpoint that this chapter engages with the spatial articulation of surveillance during the 2006 football World Cup, as a key moment, and as a key location, in the production and circulation of security/surveillance-related practices and expertise on different – local, regional or global – scales. The analysis builds upon the general understanding of the World Cup as both the product and the producer of a broader set of developments in security politics. Based on the study of a series of official documents (from police sources, political authorities and FIFA) and media articles about the World Cup, I shall advance a number of preliminary arguments in connection with four main developments at work within current dynamics and global re-calibrations of surveillance, which together constitute the basic structure of this chapter: the urbanisation, globalisation, technologicalisation and commercialisation of surveillance.

In each part, I shall first discuss how each development explains the relationships between the security/surveillance operations for the World Cup and space. I shall then provide a reading of how these developments are reflected in two specific examples of spatially anchored security measures: public viewing events and security rings around World Cup stadiums. From an analytic standpoint, this approach provides an exploratory framework not only to investigate where, by whom, how and to what purpose security politics imposed its logic on urban space but also to examine the broader processes at work within local, national and international interdependences in the co-production of security politics.
URBANISATION OF SURVEILLANCE

Mega sport events are typically moving from host city to host city (Hiller 2000). Their organisation and securitisation thus mainly constitute urban phenomena, even if their economic and social outputs are often expected to lie on a broader, national or international scale. According to Boyle and Haggerty,

the primary fronts for security programs underwritten by recent developments are increasingly urban-centred. Security concerns are couched within, or coloured by, an urban frame of reference to the point that every security apprehension appears to be somehow urban and every urban issue is infused with security concerns. Mega-events figure prominently in the dynamics of this global re-calibration of security.

(Boyle and Haggerty 2005: 4)

For the purpose of this chapter, emphasising the urban-centrism of mega sport events helps to explain both the general conditions and the specific needs as regards spatially anchored security/surveillance operations during the World Cup. In this perspective, however, the World Cup 2006 differs from other mega sport events in at least three important ways. First, in contrast to the concentration of Olympic athletes in specific villages near the host city of the Games, many national teams before and during the World Cup chose to stay in relatively remote villages, which often led to considerable security concerns in traditionally rural areas. In the small village of Achern, for example (in Germany’s southern black forest region), English fans were allowed to camp near their national team’s high-class residence, within a clearly designated area for up to 5000 fans (Dpa/Swr 12.4.2006: online). Rented out by a private provider, the camp was not only monitored by freshly installed CCTV cameras but also by both private and public security agents, aiming to secure the rearranged and demarcated (fenced) ex-parking field (Mühlfeit 20.6.2006: online). As we shall see shortly, these security measures are in many ways similar to security/surveillance operations for public viewing events in the urban environment. Second, the staging of the World Cup games affected not only one particular urban site but a network of 12 German host cities with World Cup stadiums, where most football fans, thousands of World Cup collaborators and hundreds of media representatives were concentrated: Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund, Cologne, Berlin, Munich, Hanover, Hamburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern and Nuremberg. Third, with more than 200 public viewing events in most large cities and many small villages, security issues became part of the agendas of various urbanised municipalities across Germany. Given the fundamentally different character and behaviour of football fans from supporters at Olympic Games, for example, and given the mobility of fans within the
network of German host cities, security issues at the World Cup thus crucially affected large parts of Germany.

From this, however, we must by no means call into question the predominantly urban dimension of the World Cup’s securitisation. On the contrary, considering security operations both in affected rural areas and in host cities as locally anchored key sites of the World Cup helps to identify the relationships between security politics and space more generally. In both cases, spatially anchored security operations were driven by the need to monitor and manage risks in a context of increased diversity and density, which obviously, but not only, applies to the urban environment, as the locus of increased density and diversity par excellence. ‘Urban space gathers crowds, products in the markets, acts and symbols. It concentrates all these, and accumulates them’ (Lefebvre 1991: 101). As I seek to demonstrate in this chapter, the spatial logics of security operations during the World Cup, both in cities and in rural areas, above all dealt with the marking, division, delimitation, i.e. with the differentiation, of relatively distinct and small portions of space, in order to regulate densely packed social activities through spatial operations and actions.

While this claim will be illustrated by the examples of public viewing events and security rings around World Cup stadiums, many other examples (from team hotels to railway stations, etc.) could in principle provide the basis for a more precise, micro-geographical analysis of physical and symbolic markings and arrangements of space by fences, patrolling police agents, access control installations, surveillance devices, etc.

**Public viewing events and security rings around stadiums**

The organisation of public viewing events constitutes a particularly meaningful example for pointing out how security politics, following the need to manage social risks in a context of increased diversity and density, translates into the urban territory. Conceived as central meeting spots for fans without match tickets, public viewing sites allowed supporters to watch football games on massive video screens in the heart of most German city centres. Clearly separated from their surroundings by fences, planned and often architecturally conceived like sport arenas (including different areas such as special children’s sections and sections which were liable to pay costs), public viewing sites were in many ways treated like stadiums. Securing these publicly accessible ‘places at risk’ became one of the main focuses for both German and international police forces and for private security staff, which were hired by the commercial organisers of the events.

From this perspective, public viewing sites can be understood as the privileged spatial points of security politics within the urban environment, harbouring specific norms, values and constraints, including spot-checks of
onlookers and specific legal regulations. According to these regulations, people with stadium bans or with a blood alcohol level of more than 160mL were banned from public viewing sites (Gelsenkirchen 2006). In contrast to real stadiums however, access control to public viewing sites was not based on generalised identity checks.

Generally speaking, public viewing sites predominantly concentrated fans on specific points in the city centre. Thus, they hierarchically invested (selected, classified, separated, symbolically marked, materially arranged and controlled) particular portions of space, whilst other urban areas remained less considered. As we shall see later in this chapter, these differentiations of the city were further strengthened by the uneven deployment of surveillance technologies and by the reinforced presence of police and private security agents.

In addition to public viewing events, the so-called ‘outer security ring’ around World Cup stadiums provides a second, powerful example of how security politics resulted in new differentiations and hierarchisations of the urban environment, expressed as different types of constraints and stipulations. Reaching as far as 1 kilometre from the stadium (depending on the city), the outer security ring constituted the first clearly fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. Restricted to holders of match tickets, accredited staff, members of the press and other authorised persons, the enclosed area was closed to the general public for the duration of the World Cup. The spatial delimitation of the outer security ring around World Cup stadiums, however, differs from public viewing events not only in its further restricted ‘permeability’ but also in its internal organisation. Conceived as the spatial stadium’s extension, security rings were divided into four strictly separated sectors, following the need to avoid encounters between different fan groups. These sectors were accessible only by passing through particular access points, after repeated ticket and luggage checks. Despite these differences, however, public viewing events and security rings around stadiums are comparable in both their spatial logics and functions. Both cases bear material testimony of the production of distinct, spatial ensembles, which are materially and symbolically separated from their adjoining perimeters in order to regulate social activities through the separation and marking of hierarchically invested territories of security.

As the locus, medium and tool of security politics, and as an immediate, lived and experienced practical reality, both public viewing events and stadium rings can be seen as central points within the urban net- and meshwork of security politics. Serving to ‘define both a scene (where something takes place) and an obscene area to which everything that cannot or may not happen on the scene is relegated’ (Lefebvre 1991: 36), the securitisation of public viewing events and stadium rings above all relied on access control. Aiming to create safe and risk-free places by controlling flows (of people and objects), which are crossing the border line between inside and outside at
particular points in space, access control perfectly illustrates the fundamental spatial logic of security politics, which consists in selecting, classifying, differentiating, arranging and controlling specific portions of space, without according the same type of attention to the whole urban (or national) territory.

Access control thus above all aims to guarantee the well functioning of separated, differentiated and hierarchically organised parts of the urban environment, often carried to the point of complete segregation between indoor (secured) and outdoor (unsecured) space. Legitimised by the rhetoric of security, access control permits particular functions to be assigned to particular places. In other words, the regulation of social and spatial practices in the urban environment, at moments of increased social risks, does need borders and frontiers to control, organise, enlarge, facilitate, but also to supervise, enclose and if necessary repress. ‘The prime function of surveillance in the contemporary era is border control. We do not care who is out there or what they are doing. We want to see only those who are entitled to enter’ (Boyne 2000).

**GLOBALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE**

Surveillance, as the expression of a project, is the product of relationships, which are mediated by specific codes, techniques, intentions, domains of expertise, etc. It is thus of crucial importance to examine the networks of actors involved in the setting up, development and use of spatially anchored security strategies for the World Cup. At this point, however, it would be too tall an order to provide an exhaustive analysis of the whole panoply of actions and actors engaged in the securitisation of the World Cup. Rather, I will put particular emphasis on the proliferating range, scale and importance of multinational security collaborations.

To begin, it is worth providing some general examples of globalised security partnerships for the World Cup before examining the territorial expression of these linkages in relation to public viewing events and security rings around stadiums. Two years before the World Cup, Germany itself – together with Australia, France, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States – took part in the Olympic Security Advisory Group, which provided coordinated security advice to Greece on its security planning (United States Government Accountability Office 2005: 6). During the World Cup, police officers from 13 countries were reported to join the German federal police, to build up the largest joint police operation in European history, as the spokesman for Germany’s interior ministry was repeatedly quoted in the press (for example Associated Press 6.6.2006: online). Teaming up with German officers, international police agents were vested with similar competences as their German counterparts, including the power to arrest and
expel fans of their own nationality. This collaboration was completed by intense exchanges of international hooligan databases, by close communications among secret services from different countries and by the integration of international terrorism experts (Bundesministerium des Innern 2004: 6). As the spokesman for Germany’s interior ministry pointed out in the press, ‘to give up that much sovereignty would have been unthinkable a decade ago’ (Sachs 2006; cited in Associated Press 6.6.2006: online).

Furthermore, in order to control and restrict border crossing of ‘undesirable’ fans, bilateral agreements with all participating countries as well as with several neighbouring and transit states were signed before the World Cup. ‘We want to create a threat filter which is effective beyond our borders: in the participating countries, transit countries and in the countries of our direct neighbours. The bilateral agreements are the basis for travel bans on hooligans and potential criminal offenders. They allow an intensive exchange of information and enable us to deploy security forces of partner states in Germany’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online). Political agreements of such types are symptomatic of at least three broader developments in security politics: first, they again point out the crucial importance of access and border control (and thus of mobility management) for security politics, in addition to the already mentioned range of inner-urban access controls. As I have argued above, border control relates to space in a most significant way, in that it constitutes and reinforces a spatially anchored system of limits, resulting in the arrangement, marking and differentiation of space into hierarchically organised territories of security. Second, Germany’s bilateral agreements with participating and neighbouring countries point towards the high relevance of formalised, transnational alliances within security politics. If we want to uncover the relationships embedded in contemporary developments of security politics, and if we want to assess how security systems are subsequently planned, built up and used, the importance of government alliances on a global scale cannot be underestimated. Security issues at mega sport events are thus often described as a catalyst in setting off much broader and longer-lasting international security collaborations (Chan 2002). Third, the temporary and flexible reintroduction of border controls with Schengen partners strongly underlines the current exemplification processes of security politics. In recent years, this measure has indeed become a common ‘exemplar’ of dealing with security and terror issues at major (sport) events. For example, Portugal re-introduced border checks during the European Football Championships 2004, while Finland did the same during the 2005 World Athletics Championships in Helsinki.

Fourth, the emphasis on joint international security operations for the World Cup can be highlighted by Germany’s request for the assistance of two Nato Airborne Warning and Control System planes (Awacs), in order to provide airspace surveillance for this ‘Special Major Event’, as the World Cup was called in military jargon (Bittner and Klenk 11.5.2006: 10). This request
not only gives another flavour of the scale and importance of the securitisation of the World Cup on an international scale but also emphasises the broader trend towards the increasing militarisation of public safety, linked to the prevention of crowd violence and terrorist attacks (Warren 2004). There is another point to be made here regarding the aforementioned exemplification of security politics. Since Nato began to give air surveillance support in 2001, as part of the Alliance’s contribution to the defence against global terrorism, Awac planes have flown more than 3000 hours for more than 30 events, including the Summer Olympic Games in Athens 2004, the 2005 Winter Games in Turin and the Pope’s visit to Poland a few days before the World Cup (Nato 6.6.2006: online).

Public viewing events and security rings around stadiums

More particularly, in order to understand the transposition of current globalisation processes of security politics onto the level of urban morphology, it is worth looking back at the examples of public viewing events and security rings around World Cup stadiums. Public viewing sites indeed constitute a powerful example of the increasing globalisation of security politics, i.e. its co-production between numerous public and private, local, national and international parties. While local (commercial) organisers were held responsible for the securitisation of public viewing events in the first place (Polizei Nordrheinwestfahlen 2006: 3), public viewing sites also constituted the privileged territorial framework for the deployment of the above mentioned national and international police forces, as various images on internet weblogs (f.ex. www.flickr.com) of posing fans with English, French or even Angolan police officers suggest. Globalisation processes of surveillance can thus not only be seen in connection with the planning and setting up of security politics ‘behind the scenes’ but also within the urban environment itself.

The same applies to security rings around World Cup stadiums, revealing again to what degree security politics during the World Cup has been co-produced through globalised, public–private security partnerships: adding to the high number of state actors (from police agents to fire brigades and emergency services) more than 15,000 private, nationally and internationally recruited security agents and stewards were employed by FIFA for an estimated €30 million, mainly for security purposes within the outer security rings of the stadiums and for ticket controls (Borchers 17.5.2006: online).

Adding to the erection of fences, as new material and symbolic border lines in the urban environment, the deployment of international security personnel strongly contributed to the demarcation and control of specific spatial ensembles, as the privileged locus, medium and tool of security politics. Both public viewing events and stadium security rings acquired normative value as
an immediate practical reality only through their active surveillance and regulation by globalised and privatised security partnerships and by the wide use of surveillance technologies, as we shall see in the following section. The degree of differentiation which was superimposed upon the urban environment above all followed the mobilisation of myriad different actors, harbouring specific domains of expertise, instruments, etc. Only if we take into account the various needs and intentions of these parties (both behind the scenes and on the spot) can we understand how spatially anchored security measures are helping to impose a certain order on the urban environment.

Both public viewing events and stadium security rings also indicate how the security measures employed and tested during the World Cup can be setting new trends for security politics more generally. In the ‘Host City Charta’ for the organisation of the 2008 European Championship in Austria and Switzerland, a detailed contract between UEFA and the European Championship host cities, the staging of public viewing sites and the demarcation of stadium security rings is indeed prescribed with great care and explicit reference to the FIFA World Cup. Swiss and Austrian police delegates closely followed every step of their German homologues during the World Cup (Blick 26.5.2006: online). Public viewing events and stadium security rings can thus accurately be described as pre-defined security models, which are based on the delimitation, demarcation, material arrangement and symbolical marking of particular portions of space within the urban environment.

TECHNOLOGICALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE

Security issues at mega sport events also involve the increasingly complex assemblages of disconnected, semi-coordinated and heterogeneous forms and functions of surveillance (Ericson and Haggerty 2000). Mega sport events are indeed largely used as test sites of increasingly sophisticated high-tech security, thus strongly pushing forward the use of new, preventive arrangements of control and surveillance, which are disproportionately valuing the surveillance and securitisation of particular ‘places at risk’. This claim is powerfully exemplified by experiences in Athens’ summer Olympics 2004 (Samatas 2006), Turin’s Winter Games 2005 and Germany’s FIFA World Cup 2006. In Athens, the so-called ‘C4I-system’ included thousands of computers, surveillance cameras (partially equipped with automated behaviour-recognition software) and microphones (able to analyse dozens of languages). This unprecedented science fiction security system was modelled on a range of military technologies including underwater sensors, patriot missiles, zeppelins and US battleships. During the World Cup, the ‘nerve centre’ for German-wide security operations was located inside the Interior Ministry in Berlin. Here, 120 security agents, equipped with monitoring screens, dozens of computers and sophisticated communication gear, brought
together satellite views, close-up CCTV images from sport arenas and city centres and reports from police sources, the military and from intelligence services (Nickerson 7.6.2006: online). On-the-spot, specialised police agents employed ‘fast identification’ devices for DNA analyses of suspect individuals (Bild 11.6.2006: online).

Importantly, these examples not only underline the aforementioned globalisation of security and surveillance issues but also point towards the multiplication of private responsibilities in providing technologically-based solutions in matters of public safety and counter terrorism policies. The growth of socio-technical arrangements and operations that are put to work within security politics is also resulting in new interdependences between different parties concerned. Here I have in mind in particular the technical competences required to manage high-tech security systems, which are likely to give certain highly specialised, private parties more weight. The multiplication of the use of socio-technical mediations in the ‘making’ of surveillance is also resulting in new procedures and even leading to new, highly specialised professions, such as ‘surveillance designers’, for example (Ruegg, November and Klauser 2004). Furthermore, it is particularly interesting to note that the use of surveillance technologies is accompanied not only by the creation of an increasing number of private intermediaries but also by the development of a specialised language, the use of which becomes accessible only to specialists. Relationships between the user- and the supply-side of surveillance technologies are thus going far beyond the level of mere business relations in that they are bringing together a wide range of subtle, complex and contingent interests, strategies and reciprocal implications.

**Public viewing events and security rings around stadiums**

The growing use of technologically-based security operations at mega sport events probably finds its clearest expression in the securitisation of the outer security ring around World Cup stadiums. Digital communication technologies in the rebuilt Olympia Stadium in Berlin included nearly 300 kilometres of cabling, converging in the stadium’s Facilities Management Centre as the heart of the security system. Here, private security staff and police agents jointly monitored CCTV images of the stadium, the underground car park and the routes to the boxes. From this central point of the security system, most of the monitored locations in Berlin could also be visualised, as well as transmitted images from mobile surveillance vehicles within the city centre.

Furthermore, a large number of other high-tech security devices were used by security staff, such as robots to check the stadium’s surroundings for bombs before matches and high-resolution cameras with face-recognition software, allowing the recording of biometric facial features of suspected hooligans, which could be checked in real time against photos stored in a
central database (Blau 29.5.2006). Importantly, all 3.5 million match tickets were sold with embedded RFID chips, containing personal information on the ticket holder (name, address, date of birth, nationality and number of ID card or passport), which was electronically checked not less than four times before arrival at the stadium.

Besides these spatially-bound and technically-based access control measures, it is particularly relevant to focus on CCTV, in order to point out the spatial logics of surveillance in general and for the World Cup more particularly. We have already seen that the organisation of the World Cup resulted in the first use of biometric face-recognition cameras in Germany. Consider as well the condition of CCTV monitoring for the staging of official public viewing events in the whole of Germany, leading to the implantation of an important number of additional surveillance cameras in public places in German host cities. In Stuttgart, for example, hundreds of CCTV cameras were installed for the World Cup, provided by the same manufacturer (Indigo-Vision) and with similar technical features, as for the 2006 Olympic Games in Turin and in Athens in 2004. Adding to this, public transport companies in many German cities just before the World Cup invested millions of euros in CCTV technology, such as in Munich, where an additional 542 surveillance cameras were installed two years before the World Cup to monitor metro stations, escalators, etc. (Münchner Verkehrsgesellschaft 4.2.2004: online).

In fact, while much effort has been expended on analysing video surveillance as a tool of social sorting, there is a current lack of research regarding the spatial logics and characteristics of CCTV. Before targeting specific social groups or individuals, the installation points of the cameras, their technical features (zoom, angle of vision, etc.), their direction while unattended and the active manipulations of their position by camera operators are first and foremost related to specific portions of space. Individuals or social groups are monitored once they enter the cameras’ gaze. Social behaviour is of interest only within the cameras’ premises. As a limited window to the city, video surveillance must thus above all be considered as ‘surveillance of space’.

First, the camera’s position can be quite vertical in order to concentrate on one particular point in space, often corresponding to access gates or entrance doors. Second, the monitoring of certain ‘spatial points’ may be enlarged to ‘spatial lines’. In this case, the cameras’ gaze not only allows coverage of one particular point of interest but the monitoring of whole building walls, platforms in metro stations, etc. Consequently, the camera’s position will be more horizontal, following the need to ‘stretch’ its field of vision. Third, in the case of movable, swivelling and zooming cameras, CCTV might enable the transmission and recording of visual information, relating to larger ‘spatial surfaces’. Once again, however, surveillance operations will be restricted to specific parts of space. Corresponding to different spatial scales of surveillance, all three types of CCTV powerfully illustrate the logics of security politics to select and to disproportionately monitor distinct, hierarchically
organised and relatively small portions of space, with the result of new spatial disparities between more or less monitored areas within city centres.

COMMERCIALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE

A growing body of theoretical and empirical research focuses on the value of mega sport events as ‘entrepreneurialist’ strategies of public policy (Harvey 1989; Hubbard and Hall 1998), entitled to promote cities’ and nations’ tourist image (Hannigan 1998; Fainstein and Judd 1999), to facilitate urban regeneration, to attract financial investments and, consequently, to produce economic development (Euchner 1999; Degen 2004). As we see in official statements from the German government, the same logic also applied to the World Cup, which was presented by the Interior Ministry as a unique opportunity for a ‘business location and image campaign’ to promote Germany as both a ‘ hospitable, cosmopolitan and modern country’ and a ‘strong and innovative place’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online).

Yet this highly revealing literature on mega sport events in terms of city marketing and ‘place selling’ (Philo and Kearns 1993; Horne and Manzenreiter 2006) tends to ignore completely the business-relevant role of security politics. Consider, by way of example, Konrad Freiburg, head of the German police union, who stated that ‘there would be terrible pictures seen all over the world – in which 200 mad neo-Nazis are being protected by a ring of 1000 policemen from a counter-demonstration. This would be shameful. It’s not the image of Germany we want to present’ (Freiburg 2006; cited in Furlong 5.6.2006: online). In this light, threats of terrorism and escalating hooligan or neo-Nazi violence were seen not only to endanger the population but also to threaten the carefully constructed marketing image of an ‘enjoyable, colourful and secure World Cup’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online).

However, the World Cup’s economic appeal cannot be reduced to its importance as a business location and image campaign for Germany and its host cities. On the contrary, the World Cup above all constituted the commercial product of a powerful, profit-oriented global player: the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Even if the World Cup was financially supported by the German government, the ‘ Länder’ and the host cities, and even if the event was hosted by the German Football Association (DFB), it was officially organised by FIFA. ‘This is not Germany’s World Cup, but FIFA’s World Cup’ – FIFA president Joseph Blatter was famously quoted in the press (Hanimann, 16.6.2006: online). This statement is of major importance for the last part of this analysis, as it also raises significant issues regarding the relationships between the tremendous security efforts during the event and FIFA’s business interests in the World Cup, wherein I will concentrate on FIFA’s subtly forwarded attempts to guarantee the exclusive branding of city space by its official sponsors. In this, public viewing
events and stadium security rings provide a particularly meaningful illustration of the complex relationships between security politics, economic policy and private business interests, or – in other words – of the relationships between processes of securitisation and branding of space.

**Public viewing events**

During the World Cup, the spatial delimitation and differentiation of public viewing sites corresponded not only to functional differences and to different security standards but also to different degrees of commercialisation between the inside and the outside. On the one hand, fences around public viewing events separated and marked specific ‘places at risk’, which became the object of increased control, based on security technologies and realised through globalised, public–private security partnerships. On the other hand, the same fences also marked the spatial limits of FIFA’s sphere of influence within the city, given the fact that FIFA fully controlled the organisation and marketing of public viewing events. Indeed, these fan festivals helped to push forward FIFA’s power to produce its own, commercially useful urban environment in at least three ways.

First, public viewing events principally had to be registered and licensed by the Swiss company ‘Infront Sports’, FIFA’s television partner and the holder of all public viewing rights in Germany (Martens et al. 9.3.2006: online). Furthermore, depending on the classifications of the event as commercial or non-commercial, public viewing licences were liable to pay costs. Second, FIFA fully controlled the symbolical marking of fan festivals through the prescription of brands and advertisement boards to be displayed. In this, prominence was given to the logos and products of FIFA sponsors (Wilson 6.6.2006: online). Only in non-host cities were other sponsors admitted, as long as they would not be competitors to official FIFA partners. In this way, FIFA succeeded in creating a ‘clean’, commercially useful environment for its official partners’ products and advertisement banners. Consequently, many of the most prominent urban squares in German city centres were invested by FIFA interests for the duration of the World Cup. The public viewing site in Cologne, for example, on the famous Roncalliplatz, offered splendid views not only on the Cathedral but also on the prominently positioned Hyundai exposition model beside a large screen.

Third, FIFA also managed the spatial dimensions of public viewing events, their separation from the surrounding urban environment and their internal subdivisions and arrangements. For instance, although public viewing events strictly concerned public space, FIFA had to give its approval for any extension of the events’ size, to comply, for example, with the wish of many cities after the first round of the World Cup (Stadionwelt and dpa 16.6.2006: online).
Security rings around stadiums

Security rings around stadiums provide a second example to consider the spatial concurrences between security and business interests. Before the World Cup, the whole outer security ring had to be handed over to FIFA as ‘neutralised space’, with all signs of advertising and sponsorship removed. The early, legally binding agreement, determined in point 8.1 of FIFA’s specifications for the organisation of the World Cup in the so-called ‘FIFA Pflichtenheft’, had to be signed by the German government and by each host city before it was even known whether Germany could organise the event (Pfeil 3.11.2005: online). In this agreement we can deduce not only the weight of sponsors’ needs within the organisation of the World Cup but also the deep connection between security issues and appeals of mass marketing. Spaces near the stadiums had to be separated from their surroundings not only to provide risk-free games but also to provide the privileged stage for branding and advertisement strategies and thus to become commercially invested (symbolically marked and materially arranged) by FIFA sponsors.

At this point, the question might arise as to whether there is any way of dating what may be called the origin or driving force behind the spatial concurrence between security and business interests. A definitive answer to this question would obviously require more detailed and comparative empirical investigations into the complex processes, mechanisms and relationships in the setting up and staging of mega sport events. However, if indeed there is a need at all to identify a ‘first step’ and to maintain its distinction from the ‘following steps’, its importance must be quite relative. Related to the Actor Network Theory as developed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon (Latour 1992), there is good reason to assess the ‘making of stadium security rings and public viewing events’ – or the ‘making of Mega Sport Events’ more generally – as the result of complex, subtle and highly interwoven interactions and interdependences of myriad different actors, strategies and interests. Various questions and interests are in play in the set-up of surveillance-based security politics, just as many different aspects help to model the ability of particular measures or constructions to respond to the existing demands.

At this stage, it is of most importance to underline the factual correspondences between different functions of space, which allowed FIFA to impose its own spatial rationality and commercial branding within the re-territorialised stadiums’ surroundings. Both our examples of spatially bound security operations during the World Cup – public viewing events and security rings around stadiums – thus point towards the fact that the partitioning of the urban environment into specific areas of control also stood for specific relationships to the city, mediated through FIFA’s intentions to create a clean environment for its official partners’ merchandise.

Following on from this, it is particularly interesting to note that the negative implications of stadium security rings for concerned residents and local
business companies have been widely annihilated, discursively, by the supposed usefulness of stadium security rings (as their very name suggests) for security purposes, thus fading out potential critiques of FIFA’s economic benefits. For example, in order not to compete with FIFA sponsors’ interests, local car garages had to remove their advertisement marks (because of the exclusivity of Hyundai as official FIFA sponsor) and restaurants had to hide their outside beer signs (advertisement reserved to Budweiser). Furthermore, to guarantee the FIFA sponsors’ exclusivity, 7 of 12 stadiums were renamed ‘FIFA World Cup stadiums’ because their original denomination contained the name of a commercial company. In Munich and Hamburg, the huge sponsors’ names outside the stadiums even had to be removed by a crane (Wilson 6.6.2006: online). FIFA did not only control the materiality of the stadiums’ surroundings and names but also fans within the arenas. Before the game between the Netherlands and Ivory Coast, for example, FIFA collaborators found Dutch fans guilty of ambush marketing because of the logo of a Dutch beer company – which was not one of the official FIFA sponsors – on their orange dungarees. Consequently, hundreds of fans had to take off their trousers before entering the ‘security ring’ around the stadium.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter was driven by two broad objectives. On the one hand, it was concerned to critically examine the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany as both the product and the producer of a general cluster of developments in security politics: the urbanisation, globalisation, technologicalisation and commercialisation of security/surveillance issues. Yet these developments do not enter into antagonism with each other. On the contrary, each development embodies and nourishes the others. For example, the predominantly urban-centred proliferation of high-tech surveillance technologies also highlights current trends in security politics which is becoming increasingly global in scope (addressing globalised social risks and bringing together globalised security partnerships) and commercial in nature.

On the other hand, and through the lens of these four developments, the chapter has analysed the relationships between security politics and space and the production of hierarchically organised ‘territories of security’ within Germany’s city network during the World Cup more particularly. These investigations not only repeatedly underlined the logics of security politics to select and classify specific portions of space, to separate these places from their surroundings and to symbolically mark, materially arrange and control these portions of space, but also highlighted FIFA’s attempts to reconfigure the urban environment into relatively small, disproportionately commercialised spatial entities.

In order to assess the issues that are linked with this enquiry, we have to
remember how deeply space is related with society. On the one hand, space is produced by society and its inherent relationships of power. In this regard, the last part of the chapter pointed towards FIFA’s power to ‘hegemonically’ produce its own, commercially useful urban environment during the World Cup. On the other hand, space produces society. According to Lefebvre, a decisive part is played by space in the continuous reproduction of society. ‘Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind; this is its raison d’être [. . .] Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order – and hence also a certain disorder (just as what may be seen defines what is obscene)’ (Lefebvre 1991: 143). We must, in this light, understand the final aim of the interwoven processes of selection, classification, separation, symbolical marking, material arrangement and control of spatial entities as the regulation and control of social activities. Pointing towards the spatial logics of security politics thus also highlights the linkages between security politics, space and social relationships of power more generally.

Exemplifications of security politics

The emerging picture of this twofold analysis suggests a series of further investigations into the roles and wider social implications of mega sport events as an important research programme within the interdisciplinary field of Surveillance Studies (Lyon 2007).

First, there is a crucial need to further investigate the increasing importance of private actors and commercial goals within current developments of security-driven, spatial reorganisations of the urban environment. While the linkages between the increasing commercialisation of urban space and the proliferation of spatially anchored security measures such as CCTV, for example, have been subjected to repeated analytical scrutiny (Reeve 1998; Coleman and Sim, 2000; Töpfer, Hempel and Cameron 2003), very few academics have provided critical accounts of how these developments are pushed forward by globally operating business companies (the FIFA and its official World Cup sponsors, for example). In this, it seems particularly worthwhile to further investigate the pressures to differentiate city space into clearly demarcated ‘territories of security and commerce’, arising from sponsors’ interests, private insurance companies, but also from locally anchored shops, hotels, etc. Or, to put it as a question: what type of commercially motivated interests, practices and relationships lies behind the security operations and strategies which assume to protect the population from dangers?

Second, my study of the securitisation of the World Cup points towards a series of important ‘issues of scale’, which might guide future empirical investigations of the interactions and interdependences between global, regional and local security partnerships. What can mega events tell us about the interactions between security issues on different – local, regional and
global – scales? How do global security partnerships relate to and intervene in particular local circumstances?

Third, there is a strong and pressing need for further empirical investigations into the contribution of mega sport events – as test sites for the use of complex high-tech surveillance systems – for the development of increasingly standardised ways of dealing with security issues more generally. In both scholarly research and public debate about current developments in security politics, there is in fact almost a complete silence on the question of how specific security measures are becoming expert ‘exemplars’ for more normalised use not only in similar circumstances (‘horizontal exemplification’) but also in other, more trivial moments, situations and places of everyday social life (‘vertical exemplification’). In the first case, mega sport events must be further exploited in their importance as a privileged locus, where globally operating standard actors – moving from country to country, from city to city and from event to event – are implanting increasingly standardised security solutions to create standardised territories of security. The underlying assumption could be that the potential applications of these standard security solutions are not defined in relation to any locally anchored social, cultural or legal specificities but by the predefined equation: specific type of event = specific range of possible applications of security models. In this regard, critical attention must above all be paid to the increasingly important part which is played by private security companies, ‘wandering the planet in search of consultancy fees and places to save, “parachuting in” to localities with plans and designs and then moving on to the next place – almost as if they float free without any connection to any kind of territory’ (Holden and Iveson 2003: 66).

In the second case, referring to the ‘vertical exemplification of security politics’, this standardisation process does not only apply to structurally similar places, moments and events. Rather, previously tested security solutions (such as RFID chips or biometric face-recognition software for access control to sport stadiums, for example) also tend to be generalised in more ordinary places, situations and moments of everyday life (such as in supermarkets, etc.). From this perspective, it will be of major importance to further evaluate the new international pressures arising from internationally pre-established security models, which are increasingly influencing local decisions. What does this development – which could also be described as an increasing ‘normalisation of the exceptional’ (Agamben 2005; Flyghed 2002) – mean in terms of the scope for critical democratic debate about the appropriateness and proportionality of specific surveillance measures?

Regarding the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany more particularly, a major issue will be whether the temporarily engaged security measures will continue to impose themselves within the urban environment. What future will be reserved for those fences, checkpoints and technological infrastructures whose installation was legitimised by the exceptional circumstances of the World Cup? On a political level, and after the emotions evoked
by the event itself, these questions should be resolved calmly, by considering again the wide range of social costs and benefits related to the above shown trends in security politics.

References


