The Hidden Work of Symbolic Resources in Emotions

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Carol Magai and Jeannette Haviland-Jones have written a patient, systematic book about emotions and their role in development throughout the lifespan. Addressing difficult questions—emotions in personality, interaction, thinking and change—they also take the risk of qualitative, person-centred case studies, analysing the life and work of Carl Rogers, Robert Ellis and Fritz Perls. I will first summarize their work and highlight some of their contributions. I will then pick on a few difficulties. This will finally lead me to propose an additional perspective on the data gathered by the authors.

Ideoaffective Systems in the Life-Course

*The Hidden Genius of Emotions* addresses the role of emotions in people’s life and transitions; to do so, it proposes to consider psychological development in the light of a self-organizing systems approach. In that perspective, changes within life-trajectories are possible in far-from-equilibrium situations, which are not the result of stage changes or clear-cut transitions. Drastic changes might be provoked by situations of ruptures in the course of events, but also by very tiny, imperceptible, events; these can slowly contribute to changes while
reinforcing some tendencies, or constitute the ‘ultimate drop’ before a dramatic disequilibrium. As an outcome, the person can change and develop more complex strategies; but she or he can also not move and rigidify existing patterns, or decompose and regress to more simple ways to apprehend events. The outcomes of such moments are not predictable: many possibilities are offered, or closed; a given developmental shift can be reached through different paths, and similar paths can lead to very different results. Within this non-linear view on development, the innovative stance of the authors is to propose that outcomes of changes are facilitated, or constrained, not only by socio-cultural contexts, interpersonal relationships or random events, but also by personal emotional patterns:

Some emotional patterns seem, themselves, to set the boundaries conditions for change, determining whether the self system is more of an open system or a closed system in terms of intersubjectivity. That is, the type(s) of emotion(s) in which an individual’s personality is grounded comprises a set of parameters governing whether the system operates in a feedback or feed-forward fashion. Particular emotions influence boundaries in certain ways. (p. 465)

These emotional patterns are addressed through the notion of ‘idio-affective biases’, which are at the heart of a person’s actions, feelings and thoughts, in personal and interpersonal situations. The notion, inspired by Tomkins’ ‘ideoaffective structures’ (see, e.g., Kosofsky & Franck, 1995), designates

... filters and regulators of information and experience. They predispose individuals to perceive the world in certain emotionally framed ways and to assimilate information to pre-existing affect-laden schemas. They also may prepare a particular course of action. Each person evolves particular patterns of emotional bias in the course of development. (p. 11)

On this basis three theoretical questions are addressed:

How do ideoaffective structures develop in childhood and change across the lifetime? How are ideoaffective structures seen in virtually every movement of the individual—in the face, voice, posture, and bodily attitude? And how do these expressive behaviours influence other people? How are ideoaffective structures integrated into intellectual work to provide focus on certain content areas, to motivate styles of problem solving, or to block discovery in some areas? (p. 19)

Methodologically, the authors work on case life-stories.¹ To answer their three questions, the authors propose first a psychobiography of Rogers, Perls and Ellis—a story of their emotional development, explained through their attachment story² and significant reinforcing or challenging events, creating privileged associations between situational
patterns and emotions, or between emotions. Second, they analyse the writings of these men, and identify different modalities of thought structuring their work across their careers: an absolute logic (linear-causal), a relativistic logic or a patterned thought—a type of thought that emerges beyond relativistic logic, that proposes new arrangements (dialogic thought is one type of patterned thought). In parallel, the emotional vocabulary employed in these texts is analysed. This grounds the exploration of three hypotheses about the links between emotion and intellectual work: first, that ‘blocked or singular emotional investment in certain ideas leads to blocked or singular examinations of those same issues’; second, ‘that the elaboration of certain ideas with a wide variety of emotions leads to commitment to explore those ideas and represents a person’s best intellectual and creative efforts’, with the restriction that these emotions ‘only when differentiated and organized with different themes will lead to complex cognitive development’; and third, that ‘changes in emotional experiences lead or are interrelated with intellectual changes and changes in the issues that require commitment’ (pp. 292–293). These propositions are challenging and interesting, and contribute to a developmental psychology of thinking beyond adolescence.

Third, an analysis of the filmed interactions of the three therapists with the same patient is conducted to illustrate the hypothesis that the idioaffective system is diffracted and actualized in patterns of interactive behaviour, bodily micro-gestures or preferred linguistic terms, and so on. This chapter, which could be read as a comparison between therapeutic approaches, is important for rehabilitating qualitative methodologies that are too rare in present psychology research; it offers pages of precise verbal description of interactions, it highlights how non-verbal attitudes model these, gives us substantial observation tools, and grounds useful insights.

This book confronts the reader with challenging questions about life-trajectories, and questions some theoretical and developmental assumptions. Indeed, the unpredictability of actual periods of change in one’s life, the interaction between emotional profile and professional creation, or the durability of idioaffective patterns are disturbing ideas in developmental research.

**Attachment, Emotion and Cognition**

There are some difficulties inherent in Magai and Haviland-Jones’ courageous inquiry. I will concentrate on two points, on which the authors provide contradictory statements.
First, the attachment model (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) grounds the whole approach, which raises problems—both because of the difficulty of inferring early attachment styles on the basis of external facts, testimonies and later behaviour (e.g. the fact that Rogers’ mother must have given him some attention because of his sicknesses, or the quality of his later marital relationship); and because of the very partial material at hand. Such indices give a very vague idea of the pattern and the quality of the attachment effectively actualized. Magai and Haviland-Jones seem themselves ambivalent, simultaneously using attachment style as a powerful explanatory tool, and insisting on its limits—for example, proposing style variations such as an ‘imperfectly secure attachment’ (p. 67), or, more important, admitting that it can’t account for some observed changes in the attachment patterns and the emotional structure. The question is: if, as the authors propose, it is possible to infer one person’s early attachment style from her or his later discourse or behaviour, it presupposes that attachment style is constant; given that, then, attachment style and emotional profile are closely connected, how can emotional profile develop in time, given a specific, early attachment style? One of the recent extensions of attachment research concerns the link between attachment and symbolization development. Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) show that attachment contributes to the construction of children’s ‘mentalization’ abilities—processes allowing one to catch one’s own mental states—which will be the key for further regulation of affects. Two aspects of a close relationship contribute to it: mirroring activities of care-givers, which acknowledge the child’s feelings and reflect these to her or him; and second-order comments that parents bring to hold in mind such states of mind and feelings. The child progressively internalizes these two movements and might become able to do the same holding and reflecting upon, and mentalization of her or his thoughts and feelings. Some authors call ‘symbolization’ the same mentalization processes when these are supported by a shared, symbolic mean, mediated by a bodily, pictorial, linguistic support or activity (Tisseron, 1999). Thus, affects do not exist as such; to be part of one’s thought, they must be linked to other representational elements through symbols, or semiotic tools (Valsiner, 2001). Such symbolization abilities, constructed within an attachment relationship, are important to discriminate between imagination and real life, one’s own affects and those of others, and connected to various forms of reflection (Fonagy et al., 2002). They are the basis of humans’ uses of signs, theories and other symbolic human constructions (Nelson, 2002). Finally, if symbolization is part of affect
regulation, we might start to see how an attachment pattern might evolve through time.

A second difficulty the authors face is how to give a suitable model for emotions. Magai and Haviland-Jones aim at overcoming the Piagetian division between emotions as the ‘energy force in mental life’ and cognition as providing contents (p. 9), and propose to see them as organizing principles (linking, categorizing) of thought; however, at the end of the day, the authors state that,

. . . considered at least metaphorically as energies, each emotion contains a rate or speed of process as a part of its definition—very fast for surprise, for example. Emotions also contain a direction—approaching and uplifting in the case of happiness. . . . Different emotions are more or less intra- and inter-systematically open. Emotions such as anger, contempt, and disgust are more refractory to change and inimical to creativity, especially, perhaps, contempt and disgust. Others may be more conducive to change, such as surprise. (pp. 465–466)

These concluding pages propose a ‘flow’ model of emotions at the same time, emotions seem disconnected entities that can be classed in typologies of which some are primary (after Tomkins, e.g. 1978/1995); they are finally organized by ideofunctional structures, which are what beds are for rivers—they create attractors and repellors for some types of emotion, but can also be modified by them. When the issues debated are cognition, professional activity and free-will in one’s lifespan, some questions might be of interest: Are these emotions conscious or not? Who labels them, and on what grounds? Do they need to be labelled to be perceived? How embodied are these? What is intentional? Of course, few satisfying theories of affects have been proposed in psychology, and less have connected emotions with thinking (p. 329); still, social psychologists, neuropsychologists, cultural psychologists and psychoanalysts have contributed to the debate.

For example, post-Freudian psychoanalysis still works at developing an affect theory. In his current efforts to synthesize progresses in the field, Green (1973/1999, 2000, 2002) sees affects as the dynamic, working aspects of drives. Basically, provoked externally or internally, affects can be seen as grounded in the bodily part of the experience, which is beyond consciousness; then affects tend to diffuse through different layers of the psyche. In the unconscious, they can be connected to representations of things (mnemonic traces), and progressively in representations of words (or symbolic means allowing reflectivity), which can be linked in the consciousness through symbolic forms. Affects can be more dangerous for the production of thought if they subsist without being attached to any representations,
not acknowledged as such—they can become cleaved, like in the case of trauma, which causes a zone of avoidance of thinking, or they can be discharged through acting-out or somatization. Once an affect is linked and dynamizes representation, the affect-and-representation can be repressed or transformed to be consciously tolerable, and this can in turn modify deeper memory. Affects can also have functions of signalization (Green, 2002; Tisseron, 1996) of these various psychic processes.

Such a model also accounts for variations in thinking modes. Thought is possible and creative if a double linkage is made: between embodied affects and representation that might be mentally grasppable; and between representations charged or moved by affects, in the chain of representation that constitutes thought. Weaknesses at these two levels of linkages account for different modalities of talking-and-thinking: language that follows logical rules but whose thoughts have not been loaded by, or whose dynamic is not moved by, affects can seem ‘rational’ but without any representativity toward deeper psychic or bodily reality; thought or language that lets affects emerge unlinked to symbolic representation—diffusing along thought, following free association—can be inconstant, fragmented and explosive. Finally, complex and creative thinking processes, requiring this double link, suppose a harmonization between associations moved by logics of affects and mastered by logical principles; such harmonization is much facilitated by the uses of symbolic tools. Affects are thus not only flows; they can also leave traces in the memory, and link memory to the present. They are not exactly representations either; they have dynamizing and signalling, organizing and linking functions. Affects are more or less conscious, and the less conscious they are, the less controllable and linkable to symbolic means these will be; their power of diffusion upon thought and language, their distorting force in the case of a traumatic event, will be much less apprehensible, but such distortions might be observable through distortions of behaviour, thought and speech (Green, 1992).

At this point, we can reconnect attachment and affect theories through the notion of symbolization, and see them in a developmental perceptive. If attachment can tell us something about how someone is going to think, and if unlinked affects can disturb ways of thinking, it is because attachment is crucial for the elaboration of the symbolic function, and because symbolic thinking processes are at the heart of the regulation, the transformation and the interpretation of affects. It is largely admitted that pure affect, unanalysed, unlinked, is highly disruptive in thought and action (Bion, 1977; Winnicott, 1971/2001).
On the other hand, a theory of symbolization is necessary to explain how affects are linkable, mentally grasping or even consciously known and progressively modified, how they can be integrated in thought and language, shaping behaviour and interpersonal relationships, and, in turn, changing one’s memories and affecting regulation abilities. We can now turn to the question of symbolic mediation of such processes in affective phenomena.

**Uses of Symbolic Resources in Affect Elaboration**

To try to overcome some difficulties met by Magai and Haviland-Jones, I will focus on cultural resources in development, for these can facilitate and orient symbolization processes, that is, they can mediate regulation or elaboration of affects in life-changes.

Focusing on one of Magai and Haviland-Jones’s case studies, I will summarize their analysis of Rogers’ (1972) autobiographical essay, and complete it with my reading of the same text with a focus on cultural elements. Cultural elements are here a shared, visible (audible) ensemble of symbols, encapsulating previous meanings or experiences of persons (experiences of various persons minimally overlap at this symbolic point) (Cole, 1996). I will consider the place of two types of cultural elements in Rogers’ life: closed, materially bounded organized systems of symbols, such as books; and cultural elements belonging to more distributed, socially regulated symbolic systems, such as a religious system. Cultural elements can be said to be ‘used’ when they become symbolic resources—what turns a symbolic element into a resource is both the fact of being used for something, for a given person, intending doing something, at a given personal, socio-historical location, and its extraction out of its context of normal use (a novel is normally read; it can also be used, however, as a model by which to raise children [Zittoun, 2001]). By using symbolic resources, a person can come to materially and mentally grasp and manipulate symbolic forms that offer ways to facilitate symbolization processes. As will become clear in the case of Rogers, uses of symbolic resources can mediate symbolization processes that can enable actions, learning, identity changes, emotional elaboration and constructions of meaning.

In the authors’ account, Carl Rogers is described as having been a baby receiving good attention, developing an almost secure attachment, experiencing a first disenchantment at the birth of a sibling, and growing up in a pragmatic family retaining its emotionality. As an obedient child, hiding his anger, he would stay home when required and he developed no friends. A compensation is said to have
been literature; quoting Rogers: ‘I was buried in books—stories of Indian and frontiers [or also] the encyclopaedia or the dictionary’, the Girl of the Limberlost and books about nature (Rogers, 1972, in Magai & Haviland-Jones, p. 69). For the authors, Rogers’ readings substituted for human beings; they where a constant way to escape while in reality his family was moving and he had to change schools. Rogers was also raised in a religious family, whose ‘fundamentalist’ climate, according to the authors, provoked disgust.15 In the authors’ view, these experiences account for Rogers’s underlying revulsion, later noticeable in the way he would reject colleagues not sharing his interests. Also, Rogers used ‘intellectual resources’ (p. 70) to escape his disenchanted situation, finding ways to deal with the contempt developed through religious education and isolation. Finally, his emotional profile is described to be one of ‘interest and joy’, ‘shame and disgust’, and an ‘undeveloped anger’ (pp. 229–230). His ability to be surprised accounts for his later ‘wisdom’ and his ability to move from a quite mechanistic style of thinking to a more dialectical one. The description and interpretation of Magai and Haviland-Jones are patiently constructed and based on concomitant facts. However, to contribute to the idea that an understanding of affect and thinking would gain from considering questions of mediated symbolization, I will explore the question of the uses of symbolic resources in Rogers’ development and affective life.

Looking at Rogers’ life (Rogers, 1972), we can read another developmental story. At an early age he was involved in close learning interactions that were strongly emotionally marked (Tomasello, 1999). For example, he not only learned to read early, but especially read the Bible until he went to school, aged seven. We could imagine that the caring mother of the sickly Rogers spent a lot of time telling or reading him biblical stories; this heavy and austere set of dramatic stories might have been the form through which the tenderness and the preoccupation of the mother were addressed to Rogers. This experience of the importance of a strongly invested, culturally mediated relationship might then have been transposed when entering school; very soon, Rogers states, he fell in love with his young, feminine school teachers; in a schematic way, he could be said to have, at an early stage, internalized a strongly invested triangle—Rogers, a caring woman and a book, sustaining his interest in this third term. The emotional tie might have coloured his relationship to cultural elements, and his later internalization of the role of teachers triggering curiosity. It is also of note that Rogers’ mother used to comment on real events with Bible quotations; she was thus bridging real situations with biblical ones, using the latter to illuminate the former.
Later, though an excellent student, Rogers was absent-minded at school. He seems to have been a child with a deep and rapid intelligence, quick to be bored. His ‘escapes’ into Indian stories and the encyclopaedia might be seen as ways to sustain his curiosity and his thinking abilities and provide them with some material, so as to avoid apathy. We might also imagine that in part, these imaginary experiences offered a space in which emotions and affects could be lived-out when they were not allowed in real, social life (aggressivity, taste for revenge, desire to know). Some authors would see here a cathartic use of the novel; rather, it seems that a non-real space (known as such) is offered in which to live, explore and master real, authentic affects (Freud, 1908/2001b, 1914/2001c; Harris, 2000; Tisseron, 2002; Vygotsky, 1931/1994; Winnicott, 1971/2001).

The fact that Rogers gives a quite detailed list of the most important books read during his formative years also suggests that these might have played a role in his development; although what follows is necessarily speculative, it might be of interest to explore possible relations between the imaginary triggered by these books and Rogers’ real life. For example, after Rogers’ passion for Indian novels, his family moved to a country house, where

... to play in the woods (the ‘forest’ for me) and to learn the birds and animals was bringing my frontier stories to life. Many of the Indians I have crept up on, all unsuspecting, in those wooded glades. What if they were only imaginary? (Rogers 1972, p. 33)

It seems that the novels-mediated imaginary experiences of Rogers allowed him to face not a strange, unknown environment, but rather a place he had (as it were) already explored in imagination; this imaginary life seems to have been superimposed upon the real one, as a way to place transparent guidelines on it; the life there, its laws, its animals and vegetation, were somehow already domesticated. It is as if the novel pre-formed Rogers’ perception, prepared him for some events that might happen, reducing anxieties that a foreign, unpredictable place might cause. It also added to the country house a perfume of magic and adventure: although Rogers’ Indians were imaginary, it allowed him to transform a few banal trees in a deep dream-like field. Rather than words composing a novel having the echoes of their previous social insertions (Bakhtin, 1986), it is as if the real-life components come alive with the echoes of the imaginary.

The articulation between imaginary and reality takes other forms. The _Girl of the Limberlost_, a novel by Gene Stratton-Porter, amateur entomologist, created in Rogers ‘a responsive mood’ (Rogers, 1972,
p. 33) that allowed him to see moths in a tree, which he brought home and raised. Under the guidance of this cultural resource, he became a passionate ‘little scientist’, raising caterpillars, and using specialized literature for this. Owing to its semantic content, its structure or its emotional qualities, this cultural element awoke some ‘resonance’ in Rogers; it changed his perception of the real world, and then could be used to acquire knowledge and skills to be applied to reality, where they guided actions. We might also think that, given his family’s agricultural exploitation, Rogers was already acquainted with systematic planning and animal care; his scientific game and education might have been a playful way to reappropriate, to make personally meaningful and interesting, the adults’ farming work (Furth, 1987; Piaget, 1945/1951).

Sent to work manually in a quite remote area during the summer, the adolescent Rogers became a passionate reader of Victor Hugo, Dickens, Emerson, Carlyle, Poe, and so on. Retrospectively, he judged himself as having been living in a world of his own. However, these chosen readings are not the easiest ones: they introduce the reader to the complexity of human life and to the cruelty of fates; they show the best and the darkest of human deeds and thoughts, how much is beyond mastery, and how small events can change a life-course. For these features, we might see in these books some transpositions of the power of Rogers’ childhood biblical narrative into socio-historically and politically located drama. If one takes seriously that imaginary experiences allow ‘real’ emotions to be symbolized, they offer powerful ways to explore possible situations not offered in everyday life and to feel the particular emotional movements and experiment with consequences that they might generate. Furthermore, complex novels can be powerful symbolic resources for the elaboration of affects: they can awaken and animate diffuse feelings, distribute and attach them to different characters, aspects of the landscapes or poetic sentences; once loaded with the reader’s affects, novels can then follow complex narrative paths, operating slow reorganizations of representations, and, in turn, of these affects. We can wonder how much these specific readings increased Rogers’ interest in humankind, its failures and its perfectibility—that is to say, how much they shaped the psychologist to be. If these readings played an important role, such symbolic resources had two types of outcome: the exploration of emotions, and, maybe, the countenance and the transformation of anxieties Rogers might have had as an adolescent; and the facilitation of Rogers’ reflection upon himself and his interests, in the sense of an identity redefinition.
The role of the Bible as a symbolic resource is probably more complex than we have the means to analyse. However, we can recall that after having first thought of starting agricultural studies, Rogers chose a religious career. When he later abandoned this religious project, his link with Christian life was not cut. We can imagine that his religious, emotionally invested background still shaped some actions and thoughts; it might be that the uses of its symbolic resources changed through time. In his youth, it was through his belonging to religious organizations that Rogers developed good social skills. Also, ‘chosen’ at a national level to go to China, Rogers said he developed a sense of exception—which might have had some resonance with earlier readings of lonely heroes or with the trajectory of Christ. Leaving his religious path against some social expectations must have been a hard decision; again symbolic means of this type might have supported him. In effect, as offering forms of semiotic regulations, uses of symbolic resources can support the progressive construction of temporary definitions, ‘quasi-aims’, possible paths to the future (Josephs, 1998), provisory meanings, leading to some actions (Valsiner, 1998) in some blurred or uncertain situations, such as the one caused by doubts about one’s career. Symbolic resources might confer a temporary reassurance and stability to the oscillation between actions and aims, experiences and personal meanings (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003). Finally, beyond Rogers’ interest in human failure and its perfectibility through therapy, his later professional work is shaped by a rigorous sense of ethics: a respect for others’ opinions; a radical refusal of any corruption in academic politics. The use of symbolic resources is subtle—it is as if earlier uses had left traces in Rogers’ more durable values. Hence we might suggest that Rogers’ link to religious cultural elements and his uses of symbolic resources moved through different layers of his life, having different degrees of generality: heavily emotionally loaded, they mediated the mother–child relationship; the Bible offered the first imaginary explorations in childhood; they allowed shared ritualized practices in family and church and their related feelings of communion; they nourished an interest for religion, history, philosophy and knowledge about the ‘meaning of life’; they became a social mediation to join communities of young people in the YMCA and to discover China; and, finally, they grounded an overarching, very general, abstract ethical orientation system.

In conclusion, if we want to summarize the link between symbolic resources and affects, we might first see how affects guide one’s choice of privileged resources. Given some sociocultural, historical, practical and economical constraints, Rogers had no choice but to be confronted
with the Bible. He later started to choose his readings, and emotional resonance is one of the grounds upon which we choose a book, together with resonance in contents (thematic, semantic) or structure (Zittoun, 2001). Affects also mediate one’s acquaintance with other persons or social groups that might introduce one to given cultural elements. Second, being complex combinations and assemblages of symbols, symbolic resources have the power to facilitate symbolization, ‘fixing’ affects and unformed memories into shared symbolic forms that are personally loaded. They thus re-present one’s own memories in another form (Valsiner, 2001), or mediate reflectivity, and thus, linking images and affects, can facilitate thinking processes (Fonagy, 2003; Tisseron, 1999). These processes can occur within sentences, stories, pictures or movies, where they are part of wider evolving narrative, are transformed, decomposed and reassembled—and such movements might facilitate one’s internal ‘working through’ of affects. These linkage and elaboration processes of affects allow them to be integrated into symbolized memories, and this integration prevents affects from harming or distorting thought. In that sense, symbolic resources modify one’s modes of thinking. Third, symbolic resources allow explorations of possible worlds, beyond what is given to one’s immediate experience; they facilitate playing with hypothetical futures and changing perspectives upon the past; they can facilitate exploration of the range of affects one has to avoid in real life, and reduce anxieties due to uncertainties. In sum, symbolizing processes, as means to integrate past experiences and affects, and symbolic resources, which allow safe exploration of affects under new patterns of events, can both participate in one’s reshaping and modification of ideoaffective biases, and have consequences in one’s choices, way of thinking and actions. Through Rogers’ life-story, we saw the trajectory of a man who, having been taught early on to link the real and the imaginary through the mediation of symbolic elements, was able to find symbolic resources in cultural elements at his disposal, which he used in different ways—to acquire knowledge, construct meanings, define values, regulate emotion, redefine himself in relationship to others; he became able to acquire deeper understandings and emotional richness after extensive life changes.

The Hidden Genius as a Symbolic Resource

As a complex cultural artefact, The Hidden Genius of Emotions offers the reader a challenging journey through ideoaffective systems in the life of three scholars of the psyche. Hence the resonance this book
awakened in me triggered new questions; used as a symbolic resource, it contributed to the reshaping of my understanding of affects and development; it encouraged me to explore some of the pathways it indicates, and to add a contribution to the important issues raised by Carol Magai and Jeannette Haviland-Jones.

Notes

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1. The choice of the subjects is justified, first, by the fact that the three men seem to come from comparable religiously aware, middle-class families, in the same historical period; all grew up in relatively difficult conditions. Since such ‘sociological’ description cannot account for the differences in the therapeutic models elaborated by them, Magai and Haviland-Jones can follow the exploratory hypothesis that ideoaffective structures explain these differences. Another justification is linked to the availability of documentation about each man—autobiographies, scientific texts and a movie showing interactions of these three men with the same patient, offering material for the analysis.

2. Based on Bowlby and developed by Main, Ainsworth and her collaborators (1978) have observed and described three styles of attachment—secure, ambivalent or avoidant—that are constructed through early interactions between a child and her or his caregiver. Among them, a ‘secure attachment’, based on a certain quality of caregiver–child attunement allowing the child to ‘know’ that the caregiver will be there when needed, is said to provide the better base for ulterior exploration of the world and thus for development.

3. This distinction allows for the gradation of achieved development, for it seems assumed by the authors that the third type of thought is far more complex than the first one.

4. There are other problems. Some are due to the fact the authors’ project brought them beyond expectations—which is rather laudable—causing some notional imprecision. Others are more problematic: one is that the authors use assertions taken from Tomkins’ work to justify interpretations, often lacking grounding (e.g. the explanatory power of the notion of ‘disenchantment’, which might have caused the ‘disgust’ characterizing Roger’s emotional profile—given that ‘disgust is a reaction generated when “something that was once good turns bad” ’ (p. 66: Carl Rogers, as a sick child deserving the attention of his mother, lost it at the birth of a younger sibling). This uncritical use of quotation might be connected to a hidden agenda of the book, which is to account for Tomkins’ intuitive emotional understanding, for which the authors have a huge admiration (pp. 3, 434).

5. Moreover, it seems that the studies assessing adult attachment styles use a quite precise procedure (AAI), which can, for example, predict the
maternal behaviour of a pregnant mother (e.g. Ammaniti, Candelori, Pola, & Tambelli, 1999), but usually with the awareness that the memories actualized during such an interview might reflect the present attachment model, not the previous, child’s one. The authors ignore these problems, which is regrettable, given the importance of attachment in the authors’ interpretations of the three psychologists’ lives.

6. From here on, I will prefer the term ‘affects’ to ‘emotion’, the former being more generic, including feelings, passions, and does not need to be recognized and labelled as such by a speaker (Green, 1973/1999; Valsiner, 2001).

7. Actually, Piaget (1945/1951) also mentions ‘affective schemes’.

8. It is very difficult to depart from a ‘hydraulic model’ of emotions, which has also been used by Freud and Piaget; as others have shown, it seems to be inherent in the embodiment of our language (Lakoff, 1987). However, if we accept that emotions flow along certain patterns, so shall we consider thoughts.

9. For a discussion of the link between developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, cultural psychology and recent neuroscientific research, see, respectively, Fonagy et al. (2002), Green (2002) and Benson (2001).

10. Freud, who did not reduce affects to drives (p. 8, after Tomkins), has left a confusing heritage about affects—considering them at times as one part of the dynamic Id, strongly connected to the soma, and at times more as signals (see Rapaport, 1953/1967, or Fonagy et al., 2002, and Green, 2002, for recent discussions).

11. These linking activities might be, ontogenetically, close to the mentalizing abilities mentioned above (Fonagy, 2003).

12. Green proposed to see in such a harmonization ‘tertiary’ processes: it links primary processes (logic of thought association following free, affect-laden association, condensation and displacement) and secondary processes (thought organized after logico-discursive laws), following Freud’s propositions (1900/2001a).

13. It is thus rather to deplore that the authors seem to fear the notion of symbolization, as if having necessarily a bias for rationalization.

14. The metaphorical notion of ‘use’ in a psychological sense has a double root, in Vygotsky’s and Winnicott’s approaches. The ‘use’ of symbolic elements draws on Vygotsky’s idea of ‘using’ symbolic realities—language—as tools to form and channel thoughts (with a reciprocal co-dependency between language and thought—one always escaping the other) (Vygotsky, 1962). Another root of the notion of use is to be found in Winnicott’s work: an object that can be used is an object given by the environment, the reality-status of which does not need to be clarified, but which allows things to be done, which are mainly related to ‘emotional’ and identity development. One can ‘use’ an object, the image of someone, a sentence, a frame, a cultural thing, and so on, to be certain of existence, to find a sense of unity and continuity through time, to rearrange one’s own understanding about something, to symbolize one’s feelings, to extend ones human experiences, notably through ‘experiences by proxy’, and so on (Winnicott, 1968/1989, 1971/2001).
15. This is supported by the example of biblical quotes Rogers mentions when explaining how his mother mentioned a lot of these: ‘Come out from among them and be ye separate’ and ‘all our righteousness is a filthy rags in thy sight, oh Lord’ (Rogers, 1972, in Magai and Haviland-Jones, p. 69).

16. An entomologist, as Piaget did (Barrelet & Perret-Clermont, 1996)—but in a less systematic way, probably owing to a lack of proper social support.

17. This is possible under some conditions—one of these is related to the too strong presence of unlinked affects or limited symbolization abilities (Fonagy, 2003; Tisseron, 1999). This can lead some people to have difficulty connecting imaginary experiences and real ones—what is lived in the ‘imaginary’ stays there, either because it is preferable to the real, or because it allows one to get rid of unpleasant memories or emotions (Zittoun, 2001, 2002)—which doesn’t seem to be the case for Rogers, who underlines the connections between the two spaces.

18. He changed his mind after a trip to China organized by Christian organizations, where he met other significant adults, on the ground that questions that interested him—such as what human life was about—should not be answered by a unique, closed set of beliefs.

References


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**Biography**

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